Unresolved: China’s feigned support for Darfur

By Eric Reeves, The New Republic on-line

August 2, 2007 — News reports have been busy celebrating Monday’s passage of U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1769, authorizing the deployment of a
“hybrid” U.N./African Union force to the Darfur region of western Sudan.
Particular note has been made of the Chapter 7 mandate for parts of the
mission, an essential provision that gives this hybrid force the
authority to intervene militarily, rather than just sit back and
observe. On these points, the resolution appears to echo Resolution
1706, which the Security Council passed last August. That resolution
similarly authorized a large and robust–if “unhybridized”–U.N.
peacekeeping operation for Darfur under Chapter 7 authority.

So what has changed? Last year, China abstained from voting on the
resolution, signaling to the Islamist regime in Khartoum that it could
resist its implementation without fear of isolation. As a result, within
weeks of the resolution’s passage, the U.N. Secretariat and its special
representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, capitulated, arguing instead for
more assistance to the hopelessly inadequate African Union force. This
year, by contrast, the vote for Resolution 1769 was unanimous. In the
end, even China came on board.

But this should not be counted as a decisive or unqualified victory for
Darfur advocates. Winning China’s support came at a significant price.
Khartoum’s staunchest ally voted for the resolution only after it had
helped to secure the elimination of key provisions.

First, the hybrid force will have no authority to seize weapons from
belligerents. This will make it impossible to control the brutal
Janjaweed militia or other armed elements. Second, the resolution does
not condemn Khartoum for its well-documented obstruction, harassment,
and abuse of humanitarian workers and operations over the past four
years. And third, there is no provision for sanctioning the Khartoum
regime in the highly likely event of non-compliance, making the entire
document something of an empty threat.

But China isn’t the only one to blame for the watered-down resolution.
Last month, the African Union demanded changes in the terms of reference
for the hybrid force. And since the AU will be critical in securing the
manpower for the mission–which Khartoum still insists must be
essentially African in character–the U.N. chose to accept the changes,
including ambiguous language for command-and-control. As a result there
will constantly be the potential for tension between the African
commander on ground and the “control structures” of the U.N. Department
of Peacekeeping Operations in New York.

And then, some weaknesses in the current resolution are simply
inexplicable. No mention is made, for example, of the destabilizing
ethnic violence that has spread from Darfur into eastern Chad and
northeastern Central African Republic. Resolution 1706 specified an
active monitoring of Darfur’s borders with these two poor and weak
countries; 1769 merely exhorts the governments of Chad and Sudan to
abide by an absurd agreement cobbled together in Tripoli in early 2006
that merely urges respect for an unmonitored “cease-fire.” But this is
short-sighted in the extreme. Perhaps a mooted EU force will indeed be
mustered for eastern Chad, but both sides of this volatile border need
effective monitoring.

Resolution 1769 also contains no provisions for halting aerial assaults
by Khartoum’s helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers. While an
Iraq-style “no fly zone” is certainly militarily impracticable, a force
on the ground should have the authority to disable those aircraft
implicated in attacks on civilians or found to be in violation of any
cease-fire agreement. Monitoring and enforcing a ban on offensive
military flights from the ground in Darfur would be militarily
straightforward and would not risk instigating reprisals by Khartoum, as
an aMost frustrating, however, is the fact that what little good may result
from Resolution 1769 won’t come quickly. The resolution’s time frame
speaks of an “initial operational capability for the headquarters” by
October 2007. But this will do nothing to protect people. The resolution
then sets a December 31, 2007 deadline for the transfer of authority
from the African Union to the AU/UN hybrid. But such transfer of
authority will likely be merely symbolic, with little significant new
deployment of security personnel.

Of even greater concern is the inability of the African Union to solicit
enough trained troops and civilian police for the hybrid force, or the
technical personnel for the antecedent stage of deployment known as “the
heavy support package.”

This package is supposed to include the critical contingent of
logisticians, communications and engineering personnel, and other
technical experts required to make possible deployment of the large
follow-on hybrid force. Given the heavy footprint of such a large force
in an extremely arid land, without infrastructure, and far from any
navigable body of water, this preparation is essential. But it hasn’t
deployed. Indeed it hasn’t been fully assembled or committed to. And if
Khartoum cleaves to its insistence that both the heavy support package
and the hybrid force be “predominantly African in character,” progress
toward meaningful deployment will be even slower, stretching well into
2008.

Given the urgency of the security crisis on the ground, the UN should
reconsider its timetable and deployment strategy, and move as rapidly as
possible to send additional civilian police–with all necessary military
protection–to the most insecure areas of Darfur: the vast camp at
Gereida in South Darfur, where 130,000 people are presently served only
by the International Committee of the Red Cross because of insecurity;
the highly endangered camps near Tawilla and Kutum in North Darfur; the
most unstable of the vast camps around the three Darfur state capitals.
Of course trained civilian police are in short supply within the AU,
which augurs poorly for a “predominantly African character” to the 3,772
civilian police authorized by Resolution 1769–as well as the 19 “formed
police units” (another 2,800 personnel). Non-African civilian police
must be sought on an urgent basis, and African candidates trained on an
emergency basis.

Protection for Darfuris simply can’t wait for the dilatory time-frame of
Resolution 1769. If those who voted for this resolution are serious,
Khartoum should be tested early and often on its willingness to accept
authorized personnel. This will entail continual pressure on China,
which surely hopes that it won’t be required to do more that might
offend Khartoum’s génocidaires or risk its immense stake in Sudan’s
large petroleum sector. But unless advocacy pressure remains high, and
international actors of consequence stay resolutely engaged with
Beijing, we may be sure that Khartoum will construe the current U.N.
resolution as no more than yet another small hurdle to the success of a
grim genocide by attrition. It is not enough for China’s strongmen to
have voted for this resolution out of political expediency: They must be
held responsible for its urgent implementation. The people of Darfur
can’t afford more delays.

* Eric Reeves is a professor of English Language and Literature at Smith
College and has written extensively on Sudan.