Why the Pit is a Bull: the threat of Tigrean nationalism

By Kallacha Dubbi *

August 19, 2007 — In my previous writing entitled ¡§TPLF and Tigrean Identity Politics¡¨ dated
May 25, 2007, I expressed a view that Tigrean nationalism is overtly
discriminatory, and it is therefore distinguished by negative manifestations
of the Ethiopian integrative power. Instead of uniting multi-ethnic
Ethiopia, the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) leadership has
antagonized them, and as such, it has excluded even Tigreans from mainstream
Ethiopian political discourse. In this follow up, necessitated by email
feedbacks I received, I intend to provide some evidence without encumbering
the reader with too much detail that such data would otherwise require.

My previous argument leads to a conclusion that the negative identity
formation in which a group (TPLF) defines itself and also others in terms of
what it is not, according to a famous sociologist, tends to lead into a
“pathological situation of internal violence.” This has occurred on a large
scale in the Balkans, Sri Lanka, or the Middle East. The situation in
Ethiopia is an even more fitting example with acutely rising consequences.
Tigrean discrimination ignores individual merits based on the victim¡¦s
ethnic background, and this serves as a stifling factor for development,
killing ideas in a poor country that requires mobilizing all its brain
capacities to get rid of the ravaging poverty.

My previous view also suggests that Tigrean discrimination has paradoxically
played a very important role of coalescing the discriminated people, pulling
together victims who share the same abuse to a united powerhouse capable of
undermining or perhaps even toppling the discriminator. Oromos, Somalis,
Sidamas, and Amharas, etc. are united in wanting to dethrone the TPLF. In
other words, even a negative integration, integration that is achieved for a
reason of shared abuse – threats, hatred, tortures, arrests, and killings is
integration of some sort. This natural coalition of the oppressed is as
strong as it can effectively resist political opportunism as well as TPLF¡¦s
corruptive infiltration. There is tangible evidence, that creation of a
country-wide united national opposition front to this Tigrean domination is
targeted by infiltrators from the TPLF dominated regime. But the creation
of a broad-based unity has its own weak points that expose it to such
manipulations.

The weakest link

The Ethiopian political intolerance, exceptionally violent and intense in
its makeup, is nourished by delusional tradition that borders with
compulsive disorder. By and large, it assumes that every human being with
opposing opinion, every political group with a dissenting view, is an enemy.
This intolerance characterizes the individual activist¡¦s manner so
profoundly, that one can observe its manifestations in coffee bar debates,
at community gatherings, and even at scholarly meetings. This is in major
part the legacy of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the
weakest link in the creation of a broad-based opposition against Tigrean
domination, i.e., a hazard for political progress in the country.

In a familiarly condescending tone whose authorship must have a thing or two
to do with EPRP mentality, one wrote, ¡§The theory of the nation which
decomposes Ethiopia by weaving the myths (emphasis mine) of Tigreanism,
Eritreanism, Oromoism and so on goes counter to the core experience of the
people, ¡K¡¨ After reclaiming Eritrea, an independent country and replacing
the well established Ethiopian myth with his own, the author attempts to
guard the mythical ¡§framework¡¨ by delivering another punch to its
contents: ¡§There can be no compromise on the Ethiopian and African
framework for citizen expression and engagement.¡¨ The author forces all
the Ethiopian cultural and ethnic diversities to either become Ethiopians or
Africans of his personal definition of certainly chauvinistic preeminence,
or face a wrath of his verdict and imagination ¡V no compromise, we are told
in no uncertain terms.

So, vaguely articulated malice of EPRP¡¦s ideology still permeates through
the deeds and words of the now senior or middle-aged activists who commenced
politics in the 70s as infantile children. Their politics never stopped
growing, but it grew crook! In the 70s, in a bizarre combination of feudal
tradition with Marxism, the EPRP offered nothing else to the Ethiopian
political roundtable other than winning by killing or dying, even when in
its opposition stood a well-armed national army pronouncing its sure demise.
There was no compromise then as now. Blinded by emotional ambition,
traits of which are still glaring among its rank and file, the children were
too young to fathom the essence of a military balance and too confused to
comprehend the impact of a generation¡¦s death. The military junta was
driven insane by their obnoxious and unflinching ambition, and as a result,
the junta passed a collective death verdict on the generation. This in part
allowed the military to keep political power for one more decade, leaving
behind a scar of historical magnitude. In this sense, the EPRP and the TPLF
have little to distinguish them from Khmer Rouge, except that the TPLF, also
a teen army that grew to power without growing to the society, is now
terrorizing Ethiopia whereas the EPRP resides in old Diaspora minds as a
political paranoia. They do share concealed hate and love for each other;
they can¡¦t go against each other, that can¡¦t go for each other either. It
is sad to see that neither the politics nor the social evolution of the last
thirty years offered any cure to the survivors of the lost generation of
Ethiopia that continue diffusing discord throughout all the political
establishments of the region. There is little doubt that most of the
destructive vectors and inward fighters in all political fronts and
organizations can be traced to this futile ideology in a resistive or
adaptive form. Their relentless propaganda for the unity of Ethiopia on one
hand, and equally relentless objection to the unity of Oromos, Amharas,
Somalis etc. when not on their own sadistic terms on the other, their
objection to the very idea of the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD),
is a synopsis of their fixation on winning, with extremely poor judgment of
their capacity that would enable them to win. By betraying its own mission
and stated goals, the EPRP is acclaimed to be the weakest link of the
Ethiopian political opposition against Tigrean domination, and therefore the
creation of a better tomorrow for the region.

TPLF¡¦s Strength

Facing a disgruntled Ethiopian opposition forces is the TPLF, an
organization that has an exceptional talent in further disgruntling
opposition forces. The TPLF has two strong virtues that link it to the
Ethiopian political power and shape its capacity to destabilize the
opposition. They are its a) military, and b) economy.

a) The military: Strictly speaking, the Ethiopia armed forces are Tigrean no
less than the TPLF is Tigrean. The following list makes this argument
abundantly clear.

Ministry of Defense

– Commander of Ethiopian armed forces – Melles Zenawi (Tigrean)
– Defense Minister is a non-Tigrean, but this position is
constitutionally manned by a civilian, not a military person
– Chief of Staff – Samora (Mohamed) Yunis (Tigrean)
– Department of Training – Major General Taddese Wored- (Tigrean)
– Department of Logistics and Administration – Major General Gezahi
Abera – (Tigrean)
– Department of Operations – Brigadier General Gebrzgiabher Mebrhatu
(Tigrean)
– Department of Military Intelligence- Brigadier General Yohannes
(John) Gebre Meskel – (Tigrean) ¡K. Recently appointed as Deputy Commander
of Central Command. This Department will also be commanded by head of
operations Brigadier General Gebrezgiabher Mebrhatu (Tigrean).
– Commander of the Air Force – Brigadier Molla H. Mariam (Tigirean)

Under the Ministry of Defense there are 5 Ethiopian Army Commanders.
– Northern Command (HQ Mekele) – Major General Seare Mekonnen
(Tigrean)
– North Western Command (HQ Baher Dar) – Brigadier General Abraham
Gebre Mariam (Tigrean)
– Special Army Command (HQ Dessie-Bure Front) – Birgadier General
Teklai Ashebir (Tigrean)
– South Eastern Army Command (HQ Harar) – Brigadier General Seyum
Hagos (Tigrean)
Ć Central Army Command (HQ Shire Indasilassie) РMajor General Taddese
Wored (Tigirean – Agaw). Recently, Brigadier General Yohannes G. Meskel also
Tigrean.

The Ministry of Defense has 28 Division Commanders.

– All but one are Tigreans

Division Commands have 106 Regiments.
– 98% of the Regiment Commanders are Tigireans

It can be safely argued therefore, that there is no Ethiopian national army
but Tigrean.

b) The economy: The Ethiopian economy is controlled by two large
conglomerates:

– The Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT)
– The Ethio-Saudi AI-Amudi-family – Midroc Ethiopia
Of interest to my ongoing argument is EFFORT. We will return to Midroc at
another opportune time.

In 1978, the TPLF created the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), a financial
umbrella organization of the TPLF which acted as an NGO despite headed by a
TPLF Central Committee member. It collected donations from the
international community and channeled it to the TPLF, playing a key role in
the survival and ultimate victory of TPLF over the Derg.

After the rise of the TPLF to power in 1991, REST was formally registered
with the governmental Relief & Rehabilitation Commission in Ethiopia as an
NGO. As the TPLF¡¦s financial backbone, it continued enjoying the state
protection, and the restructured organization emerged as the richest ¡§NGO¡¨
in the continent. In the summer of 1995, about four years after it took
control of central power in Ethiopia, the TPLF established a stronger peer
for REST – the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT).
Sources suggest that EFFORT started its business venture with a lofty
investment volume of about 2.7 billion birr, – then just under US $1 billion
(currently $1 US is about 9 birr).

Through EFFORT, the TPLF has considerably diversified its economic
activities and expanded its outreach even to foreign countries. The
European financial maneuver of the TPLF is based in UK where family members
are trained and placed in key areas of Ethiopia¡¦s financial institutions.
In some cases, they are assigned to a now growing number of
internationalized affiliates co-owned or owned by EFFORT, such as the Tower
Trading Company (TTC) ¡V a London-based TPLF owned company mandated with
money laundering.

New companies continue to emerge, fully or partly owned by EFFORT through an
intricate system of shares and investments. By controlling key growth
areas, EFFORT has become the soul of the country’s economy: agriculture
(Hiwot Mechanized Agriculture), industry (Almeda Textiles Manufacturing Sc.,
Mesfin Industrial Engineering SC.), import-export (Guna Trading House),
transport (Trans-Ethiopia SC.), insurance (Africa Insurance SC.), mining
(Meskerem Investment SC.), communications (Mega-Net Corporation), banking
(Wegagen Bank), just to mention some. Clearly, TPLF¡¦s business enterprises
cover numerous activities including textile, chemicals, pharmaceutical, and
food industries. They also cover major service industries such as banking,
insurance, transportation, printing, advertising, land developing,
import/export, construction, mining, leather products, and farming.

EFFORT is divided into several sectors directed by members of the TPLF
Central Committee, like Abadi Zemo for industrial activities, Arkebe Oqubay
Mitiku for construction and transportation, and Tewodros Hagos for mining.
The individuals may be moved around, but no non-Tigrean is appointed to
EFFORT. In fact, no non-TPLF Tigrean is appointed to the ranks of EFFORT.
Strategic positions of the Federal government that generate large amounts of
cash are also led by Tigreans of EFFORT who hold multiple offices. For
example, Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin is chairman of Ethiopian Air Lines,
chairman of the Mugher Cement Factory, chairman of the Ambo Water Factory,
chairman of EFFORT, and deputy-chairman of the TPLF at the same time. The
more trusted individuals are usually offered the more strategic positions.

Although EFFORT is strictly controlled by the TPLF, it is not the only
entity owned or controlled by high-ranking TPLF officials or favored Tigrean
citizens. For example, although EFFORT controls WEGAGEN Bank, the TPLF
encouraged the creation of DEDEBIT Credit and Savings Institution,
headquartered in Meqele and administered by the local government of Tigray.
The bank has numerous financial links with other TPLF controlled businesses
of the country. DEDEBIT, as an extension of Rural Credit Program, acquired
a near total monopoly over credit to rural areas, mostly farmers. The
financial monopoly over rural Ethiopia has serious political ramifications.
In the early 2000s, the main source of the bank was interest from
fertilizer. Farmers were identified, registered, and forced to make a down
payment of 25% on the price for the amount of fertilizer. The Bank
estimated the amount of fertilizer the farmer supposedly needed. A credit
agreement was written with each farmer, and after six months, the bank
collected the debt from the farmers with 15% interest.

Business in Tigray is completely closed to non-Tigreans, and all walks of
Tigrean businesses are exclusively owned by EFFORT or the local Tigrean
government. For example, the trading company GUNA has a near monopoly in
sesame and incense wholesale in Tigray whereas TRANS Ethiopia carries all
goods designated as relief.

The TPLF also benefits EFFORT by ordering free transfer of funds from
government accounts, often under a bogus claim of services that TPLF
institutions offered to the public. It allows free flow of goods in the
name of EFFORT, without customs and taxes, but EFFORT is allowed to compete
with for-profit businesses of the country through its tentacle bureaus.
Thus, Moseb Cement factory was built with public expenditure at a cost of
1.5 billion birr, and a Textile factory in Adwa at 1.2 billion. However,
the incomes from these public investments are fully controlled by the TPLF
through EFFORT.

EFFORT also makes extensive use of the credit opportunities offered by the
state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE) and other financial
institutions controlled by the government. The generous provision of
credits by CBE to EFFORT is clearly politically influenced and based upon
directives issued by the TPLF controlled government of Ethiopia. When
EFFORT defaults in the payment of loans CBE provides relieving credit,
obviously upon directives from the Ethiopian government. In some cases,
millions of birr loans obtained by EFFORT are unlawfully delayed or even
cancelled. In a widely publicized case a few years ago, the Vice-Governor
of CBE overruled an earlier decision by the credit department of CBE not to
grant 40 million birr credit to SUR Construction, a subsidiary of EFFORT.
There is no way escaping the conclusion that the loan was made possible by
political intervention from the TPLF regime.

As an almost sole beneficiary of state contracts, EFFORT¡¦s income continues
to grow exponentially. For example, during the Ethio-Eritrean war, EFFORT
became the financial wing of the war. MESFIN Engineering supplied water,
fuel, and vehicles. TRANS-Ethiopia supplied trucks, and SELAM Bus was in
charge of transporting militia. The income from the war propelled these
companies to powerful monopolies of the country in their respective business
domains.

EFFORT has now become a self-contained economic state operating on the call
of the official government, formally serving the personal appetite of state
officials, a phenomena witnessed nowhere in the world. Its assets are
protected federally, and its under-the-table contracts are enforced by
TPLF¡¦s iron fisted militias. It has a favored access to government as well
as to foreign aid contracts with profitable niches, dominating joint
ventures with domestic and foreign investors. One of the strategic
alliances is with Amoudi¡¦s Midroc which supplies the TPLF with billions of
birr through investments. Midroc buys natural resources of the South
including gold and other precious stones from the TPLF with cash, and
service contracts at these sites go back to EFFORT.

At a policy level, the Financial Sector Steering Committee (FSSC) serves as
an umbrella institute for justification of fund transfers, creating the
legal framework for supporting even poorly performing EFFORT auxiliaries, or
channeling funds to the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
(EPRDF) cash institutes. EPRDF is a bogus amalgam of Fronts populated with
non-Tigrean renegades, created and dominated by the TPLF. FSSC defines
policies and strategies for banks, appoints board of directors and
executives for the banks, and routinely monitors their operations. Thus,
the FSSC oversees all government banks, and has full power over their
activities. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi chairs this committee. It is a
public knowledge that he personally mandated EPRDF companies: Guna,
Ambassael, Dinsho, and Wando to take over the sugar company when the plant
was privatized. Interestingly Ato Sebhat who owns Guna, Ato Bereket who
owns Ambassel, Ato Girma who owns Dinsho, and Ato Kassu who owns Wando are
members of FSSC, and some of these same individuals seat on the Board of CBE
that financed these companies. As a result, all privately owned enterprises
competing for the privatization of the plant, Star, Abeba co. etc. were shut
out of the competition.

The EFFORT companies are reported to owe billions of birr to Ethiopian
banks. In fact, most of the EFFORT companies would not survive without
government protection. In one case, CBE, the Construction and Business
Bank, and the Ethiopian Development Bank collectively loaned 1.7 billion
birr to EFFORT. According to insiders, the loan has not been paid to date.
The 1.7 billion birr was distributed to Adigrat Pharmaceutical Factory, Adwa
Textile Factory, Dashen Brewery, and Mesebo Cement Factory. These and other
EFFORT or EPRDF affiliates including TESCO, Tikure Abay, Dansho Transport
are constantly in deep financial crisis.

Although the main focus of this paper is private business ventures of the
TPLF, it must be noted that Tigray, the TPLF¡¦s home region has inequitably
benefited from federal funds. For example, a recently published paper
presents comparative welfare analysis of four Ethiopian regions: Oromia,
Amhara, Southern States, and Tigray. A 2001/2002 data of these regions
shows that 42% of children in Tigray are fully vaccinated, where as the
percentage is – 10% for Oromia, 15% for Amhara, and 11% for Southern States.
Population to physician ratio is 28,600 for Tigray. This jumps to 60,800
for Oromia,, 60,700 for Amhara, and 44,000 for Southern States. Secondary education enrollment for Tigray is about 25% (a six-fold increase in just a decade), but Oromia has 11.6%, Amhara 9%, and Southern States 11%. According to World Bank report ¡§Ethiopia Public Expenditure review¡¨ the Federal government never transferred more than 6% of the country¡¦s cash revenue to the states, which leaves more than 94% of the federal budget at the discretion of the TPLF, appropriation of which is apparent from the above numbers.

In conclusion, the TPLF has clearly violated international business rules
and practices, and as a ruling political party, it not only owns large
amounts of properties and engages in commercial and trading activities
whereby it places competing private sectors in a hopeless situation, but it also uses this economic dominance to incarcerate, harass, dominate, and control political opposition forces to stay in power. This injustice
justifies continued armed struggle of the people against the TPLF
domination, and rejection of foreign expeditions to exploit natural
resources of the country on behalf of the TPLF.

* The author is currently based in Londo. He can be reached at
[email protected]