Darfur Betrayed Again: The “Hybrid” Force Steadily Weakens
Darfur Betrayed Again: The UN/AU “Hybrid” Force Steadily Weakens
Less than a month after passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1769,
the force authorized is devolving into the “African Union-Plus” of a
year ago
By Eric Reeves
August 24, 2007 — Bending to the will of Khartoum’s brutal National Islamic Front
(National Congress Party) regime, African Union leaders are engaged in a
process of eviscerating whatever potential may have existed for the
force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (July 31, 2007).
As it did in defying UN Security Council Resolution 1706 (August 31,
2006), Khartoum has apparently ensured that any force deploying to
Darfur will be little more than an enlarged version of the present
African Union mission in Darfur, known as AMIS (African Union Mission in
Sudan). We are seeing, in short, an updated version of the “African
Union-Plus,” first proposed following the rapid collapse of
international support for Resolution 1706. Leading the way in
abandoning any commitment to the UN resolution was Jan Pronk,
then-Secretary General Kofi Annan’s incompetent special representative
for Sudan. Out of Pronk’s insistence that the only option was
augmenting the AU, the notion of an “African Union-Plus” was born,
leading by a tortuous diplomatic path to the misconceived and ominously
unprecedented AU/UN “hybrid” force, first promulgated at a “High
Level Consultation on the Situation in Darfur” (Addis Ababa, November
2006).
This AU/UN “hybrid” force will inherit nearly all the weaknesses of
AMIS and relatively few of the strengths that might have come from a
true UN operation. Key command-and-control issues have yet to be
resolved and are already creating embarrassing problems around the
appointment of the deputy commander for this unprecedented combined
force. Troubling issues regarding training, equipment,
inter-operability (the cohesion of units from different countries and
military traditions), critical skills sets, and the overall
qualifications of potential troops and civilian police have been
highlighted by a number of informed commentators.
The crisis of military capability emerged fully in a politically
expedient announcement by African Union Commissioner Alpha Oumar Konaré:
“I can confirm today that we have received sufficient commitments from
African countries that we will not have to resort to non-African
forces” (Associated Press [dateline: Khartoum], August 12, 2007).
This announcement came in the immediate wake of a meeting between Konaré
and National Islamic Front (National Congress Party) President Omar
al-Bashir, and no doubt was tailored to please al-Bashir and his brutal
security cabal. But by excluding non-African forces from the mission,
Konaré has effectively denied this embryonic force the personnel whose
skills are critical to any truly successful effort to protect civilians
and humanitarians. In light of this statement, it becomes much more
unlikely that non-African countries will volunteer their personnel—and
much more likely that any such offers will be rejected by Khartoum on
the basis of Konaré’s preemptive announcement.
This is the price Konaré and others in the African Union are willing to
pay to avoid a confrontation with Khartoum and the risk of creating
within the AU a split among Saharan and sub-Saharan African countries.
In short, with visions of personal grandeur attendant, Konaré has
decided that the political preservation of the AU, as he sees it, is
more important than providing adequate protection to the people of
Darfur. Despite the conspicuous inability of the AU to provide remotely
adequate force levels for its current mission in Somalia, or even to
reach previously authorized force levels for the current Darfur mission,
Konaré has declared that for the massive “hybrid” mission in Darfur
(26,000 troops and civilian police, as well as a substantial civilian
component), the AU “will not have to resort to non-African forces.”
This has been greeted with universal skepticism by military experts, as
well as policy and human rights groups. Even African nations are
publicly demurring. Darfuris in particular, both within the rebel
movements and among the civilian populations in camps for Internally
Displaced Persons and refugees, are adamant about the need for Western
forces; their disillusionment with the African Union can hardly be
overstated, even as their voices and demands are so rarely considered.
In an effort to blunt the categorical nature of Konaré’s untenable
claim, “hybrid” mission head Rodolphe Adada recently asserted:
“‘Many African countries are ready to contribute troops and the
pledges are very high, but they have to meet the standards of the United
Nations,’ Adada told reporters in el-Fasher, capital of North Darfur
state late on Wednesday [August 15, 2007].” (Reuters [dateline:
el-Fasher], August 16, 2007)
The Reuters dispatch went on to note that:
“UN officials have said some African units may not have adequate
equipment, especially armoured vehicles, to be part of the joint
mission. Peacekeepers are generally expected to bring their own weapons
and equipment.”
Further limitations to AU deployment, and the quality of current AU
contributions to the mission in Darfur, have been widely discussed.
See, for example, the testimony of Mark Malan of Refugees International
before the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, August 1, 2007 at
http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2007/MalanTestimony070801.pdf:
“It is not simply troop numbers that are lacking: the AU mission in
Darfur has revealed that the AU suffers from a lack of strategic
management capacity; has no effective mechanisms for operational level
mission management; has insufficient logistic support and ability to
manage logistics; lacks capacity in communication and information
systems; and is totally dependent on external partners for technical
advice and support.”
What is tragically clear is that the world community has already waited
far too long in responding to Darfur’s unsurpassably urgent security
crisis, and that even an expeditious deployment of a truly international
force would take months. But relying exclusively on the African Union
extends this unconscionably dilatory time-frame by many more months,
even as the needs are critical right now. A full year after the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 1706—authorizing “rapid”
deployment of 22,500 civilian police and troops under Chapter 7 of the
UN Charter—fewer than 200 UN technical personnel have actually
deployed as part of the so-called “light support package” that is to
provide minimal preparation for the anticipated “hybrid” force.
There is no appreciable deployment of the “heavy support package,”
which has been designed to enable a large follow-on force as well as
modestly augment the abilities of a crumbling AU force. The
international community has squandered twelve months, during which time
human suffering and destruction have proceeded apace within Darfur’s
conflict-affected population of some 4.2 million civilians (with another
population of 700,000 affected civilians in Eastern Chad, according to
the latest figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs).
KHARTOUM: UNTROUBLED, UNCOOPERATIVE, UNCONSTRAINED
Even so, there is no evidence that Khartoum will now allow for
expedited deployment of desperately needed security forces with passage
of Resolution 1769—also under Chapter 7 authority, though with a
mandate significantly weaker and less ambitious than that of Resolution
1706. Indeed, Khartoum shows no signs of responding to international
consensus about Darfur.
Here it is also revealing that the regime continues to defy the
International Criminal Court, indeed has appointed a now-indicted
orchestrator of numerous massacres in West Darfur, Ahmed Haroun, as
“minister of state for humanitarian affairs” (see excellent
dispatch by Maggie Farley of the Los Angeles Times [dateline: el-Fasher;
August 5, 2007], “Darfur war crimes suspect has free rein,” at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-harun5aug05,0,7234603.story?coll=la-home-center).
Khartoum has also—in a gesture of menacing warning—summarily
expelled two senior Western diplomats (from Canada and the European
Commission), giving clear indication that it will tolerate no criticism
from foreign countries represented in Sudan (Associated Press [dateline:
Khartoum], August 23, 2007). The US mission in Sudan was recently
informed by Khartoum’s Foreign Ministry that the regime had decided to
impose highly constraining measures for “all high ranking visits.”
The regime also brazenly dismisses all human rights reporting from
abroad. Of the recent and authoritatively documented report from the
Geneva-based UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the terrible
sexual violence in the Deribat region of Jebel Marra (December 2006),
involving Khartoum’s regular military forces, Khartoum’s Justice
Minister Mohamed Ali al-Mardi declared (August 23, 2007):
“‘This is a false report and it is clear to us that the [UN] human
rights commissioner [Louise Arbour] does not care about her
credibility,’ Sudanese Justice Minister Mohamed Ali al-Mardi told The
Associated Press on Thursday [August 23, 2007]. Al-Mardi criticized the
UN for impugning his country’s reputation, saying ‘we no longer care
for such reports that target Sudan and that lack credibility and
responsibility.’” (Associated Press [dateline: Khartoum], August
23, 2007)
The August 20, 2007 report from the UN High Commission for Human Rights
(“Women abducted, raped, and kept as sex slaves following the December
2006 attacks on Deribat,” at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-76AHFN?OpenDocument)
found—on the basis of a very substantial investigation and a
“significant number of interviews,” “conducted
independently,” with “individual testimony by each witness [ ]
systematically corroborated” by UN human rights officers—that:
“The attacks on Deribat and eight other villages in East Jebel Marra,
South Darfur [occurred] in late December 2006. The villages were
attacked by Government [of Sudan] and allied militias on land and by
air. Local sources reported 36 civilian deaths.”
“Witnesses estimated their [the attackers’] number at several
hundred,” and that “approximately 50 women and many children were
forcibly taken to the wadi (stream) [between Kutur and Deribat].”
“The abducted women were systematically raped.”
“Some women were beaten by their abductors and they were exposed to
the traumatic scenes of rape. ‘They often watched what happened to
their mothers,’ according to one witness.”
“This pattern of mass abduction which reportedly started at the
beginning of the conflict in 2003/2004 still seems to be occurring. The
African Union has no presence in Jebel Marra.”
In response, Peter Takirambudde, Africa Director of Human Rights Watch,
has declared that,
“‘Civilians under attack today can’t wait for the hybrid
force,’ said Takirambudde. ‘Better patrols to protect women and
more human rights monitors are needed now.’” (Human Rights Watch
press release [New York], August 22, 2007)
But Takirambudde says nothing about how to provide “better patrols”
now, or how to convince Khartoum to accept more human rights monitors
“now.” Truly urgent pressure for deployment of adequate
protection and monitoring forces in Darfur has been much too long in
coming from too many advocacy quarters, and this has contributed to a
grim status quo, one that the increasingly notional “hybrid” UN/AU
force gives no sign of changing for many months, and perhaps never.
Khartoum has continued to assert its claims of “national
sovereignty” in ways that may make a successful deployment
impossible, or simply too easy to paralyze. Land acquisition, water and
fuel supplies, air routes, and a host of other logistical and material
problems present themselves in ways that Khartoum is confident it can
control, no matter what the consequences for Darfuri civilians.
In another sign of contempt for the international community, Khartoum
continues—despite the presence of the AU, and despite explicit
prohibitions in previous UN Security Council Resolutions—to introduce
significant new quantities of weapons into Darfur. Amnesty
International reports:
“Amnesty International today [August 23, 2007] released new
photographs showing that the Sudanese government is continuing to deploy
offensive military equipment in Darfur despite the UN arms embargo and
peace agreements.”
“‘The Sudanese government is still deploying weapons into Darfur in
breathtaking defiance of the UN arms embargo and Darfur peace
agreements. Once again Amnesty International calls on the UN Security
Council to act decisively to ensure the embargo is effectively enforced,
including by the placement of UN observers at all ports of entry in
Sudan and Darfur,’ said Brian Wood, Amnesty International’s Arms
Control Research Manager.”
“The photographs, sent to Amnesty International and the International
Peace Information Service in Antwerp by eyewitnesses in Darfur,
reinforce evidence provided in Amnesty International’s May 2007 report
‘Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human rights violations in
Darfur.’ Taken in July at El Geneina airport in Darfur, the new
photographs show:
“Containers being offloaded by Sudanese army soldiers from an Antonov
aircraft onto military trucks at the military apron of El Geneina
airport. The Russian-supplied Antonov 12 freighter aircraft with
registration number ST-ASA is listed as operated by Azza Transport,
itself under investigation by the UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan arms
embargo for arms transfers into Darfur (photograph 1). A
Russian-supplied Mi-17 military helicopter (registration number 534)
belonging to the Sudanese Air Force at El Geneina (photograph 2). Russia
signed a deal to supply at least 15 such helicopters for delivery in
2005 and 2006. A Russian-supplied Mi-24 attack helicopter with
registration number 928 redeployed to El Geneina airport from Nyala,
Darfur (photograph 3). Russia supplied 12 such attack helicopters to
Sudan in 2005.”
“Aerial attacks by the Government of Sudan on civilians in Darfur
continue, with the UN reporting air attacks in North Darfur at the end
of June [2007]. Thousands of displaced villagers have fled the Jebel
Moon/Sirba area in West Darfur after renewed attacks on areas under
control of armed opposition groups by government of Sudan forces
supported by Janjawid. Local people said that helicopters brought in
arms to the government and Janjawid forces.”
“In South Darfur a Sudanese government Antonov aircraft carried out
bombing raids following a 2 August [2007] attack by the opposition
Justice and Equality Movement on the town of Adila, targeting villages
and water points. Since then there have been a number of Sudanese
government Antonov bombing raids on Ta’alba, near the town of Adila,
and on 13 August [2007] the villages of Habib Suleiman and Fataha were
bombed. An Antonov capable of such raids was reportedly transferred from
Russia to Sudan in September 2006.”
(Amnesty International, “Sudan: New photographs show further breach
of UN arms embargo on Darfur,” AI Index: AFR 54/045/2007 (Public)
News Service No: 161, at
http://news.amnesty.org.au/comments/new_photographs_show_further_breach_of_un_arms_embargo_on_darfur/).
Khartoum has not abandoned its genocidal military ambitions, as these
authoritatively detailed incidents clearly reveal. Notably, both Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, key human rights organizations
that have been slow to push with sufficient vigor for urgent deployment
of the requisite protection forces to Darfur, are now finding their
voices:
[Amnesty International, August 1, 2007, New York]:
“Amnesty International today welcomed the unanimous UN Security
Council vote to send a strengthened African Union-United Nations
peacekeeping force to Darfur but called for urgent deployment, effective
resources to support the deployment and the full support of the Sudanese
government. [ ] ‘While we welcome the passage of Resolution 1769, the
truth is that Darfur can wait no longer for help. The region desperately
needs a protective force now to prevent more killings.’”
“‘World leaders must guard against efforts by Sudan to obstruct the
peacekeeping force from taking effect,’ [Amnesty International/USA
President Larry] Cox said. ‘And they must give us assurances that the
force will be established and on the ground as swiftly as possible. To
do otherwise, will only sentence many more Darfuris to the horrors we
have witnessed for four years now. ’”
“As swiftly as possible” in the context of exclusively AU personnel
seems an entirely inappropriate phrase. And that Khartoum will
“obstruct the peacekeeping force” we must take as a given: the
question is what effective methods of “guarding against” such
predictable behavior Amnesty has in mind. To date the organization has
been conspicuously silent.
“While passage of the resolution gives some long-awaited hope to
millions of Darfuris, it is now essential that UN member states provide
the resources necessary to swiftly deploy an effective force with a
strong human rights component, Amnesty International said. This must
include the capacity and authority to monitor and investigate human
rights violations, including all cases of rape and other forms of sexual
violence, and to report publicly on all human rights abuses.”
“Deployed in a region awash with arms, the United Nations must also
ensure the forces can oversee the disarmament and demobilization of
government-supported Janjawid militia. The new resolution only allows
the force to monitor ‘whether any arms or related material are present
in Darfur’ and urgently needs to be strengthened.”
Of course there has been no strengthening of the mandate for the
“hybrid” force; on the contrary, all too predictably Khartoum has
begun to send signals that it will work hard to restrict the mandate of
the force as much as possible. This is the significance of recent
comments by General Majzoub Rahama:
“General Majzoub Rahamah, the officer in charge of international
relations at the defense ministry, said that the military personnel in
the [UN/AU] hybrid operation do not have the right to protect civilians.
He further said that this force has the right to act under chapter 7
only in the case of self-defense.” (Sudan Tribune, August 19, 2007)
And yet of course protecting civilians, and the humanitarian operations
upon which some 4.2 million conflict-affected human beings now depend,
is the essential task of the “hybrid” mission. An assertion that
the Chapter 7 mandate of Resolution 1769 extends only to self-defense
makes a ghastly mockery of the entire UN effort. Moreover, without
significantly increased security, humanitarian organizations remain
poised to withdraw or evacuate their personnel. Since the signing of
the ill-conceived Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, Nigeria; May 5, 2006),
insecurity has very significantly increased, with the effect that areas
inaccessible or with only very limited humanitarian access have
quadrupled in size. The number of people beyond reach of humanitarian
assistance has varied from 500,000 to 1 million during this period.
Were the weakened populations of Darfur to lose all access to
humanitarian aid, if several large-scale security incidents occurred
involving expatriate workers and compelled evacuations, hundreds of
thousands would die.
Human Rights Watch, also belated in finding a suitably urgent and
forceful voice in calling for civilian protection, declares tactfully in
a letter to Konaré and Jean-Marie Guehenno, head of UN peacekeeping
operations (August 16, 2007):
“Human Rights Watch welcomes the news that African governments have
responded so rapidly to the call for troops for the hybrid force.
However, the statement that these pledges mean the operation ‘would
not need to resort to non-African troops’ raises a number of
substantial concerns. In our view, fielding the most capable force in
the shortest time possible must be your overriding objective.” [ ]
In order for the UN/AU “hybrid” force…
…to deliver on its promise—and its mandate—to protect civilians
in Darfur, it will need experienced commanders, qualified engineers, and
technical specialists, as well as massive logistical support. The hybrid
operation must also have rapid response capabilities in each sector to
protect civilians in imminent danger. The force will also require a
civilian contingent, including police, who are experienced in dealing
with human rights, sexual violence, and the rule of law.”
But such “rapid response capabilities” are woefully insufficient
within the AU, as are trained civilian police, which Human Rights Watch
rightly notes is an essential element of the deployment, though one that
has received little discussion recently. As this writer has argued in
some detail, expedited deployment of civilian police to the most
insecure camp areas, with adequate military protection, should be the
highest priority for the “hybrid” force (see
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article176.html). There is no evidence
that this is being contemplated or that the current upsurge in violent
attacks on the camps (see below) can be controlled by any contemplated
deployment of force in the near- to mid-term. Indeed, while the African
Union is weak in many key areas, the lack of trained civilian police
stands out as one of the very most consequential.
The absence of a civilian police presence in nearly all camps,
including the largest, has generated a violent and volatile atmosphere.
The camps are awash with weapons, and there is a growing rebel presence,
both for recruitment and as an escape from the battlefield. To gain a
sense of what the newest “battle front” in Khartoum’s genocidal
counter-insurgency war may be like, we should look at the very recent
the assault on the massive Kalma camp for some 90,000 displaced persons,
outside Nyala (South Darfur). Early reports are incomplete but ominous,
and deeply threatening of any possible peace process:
“A leading Darfur rebel faction said Wednesday [August 22, 2007] it
was ‘reassessing’ its commitment to an internationally-sponsored
peace initiative in the light of recent raids by Sudanese government
forces. On Monday [August 21, 2007] night, government of Sudan forces
attacked Kalma camp (in South Darfur) with some 35 Land Cruisers and
1,500 troops, said Nouri Abdalla, a spokesman for the Sudan Liberation
Movement faction of Ahmed Abdel Shafi. ‘Five people were killed in the
raid, two of them were children and around 40 rebels were arrested,’
he told AFP by phone from Kampala. The casualties could not immediately
be independently verified.” (Agence France-Presse [dateline: Nairobi],
August 22, 2007)
The UN Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) reports from
Khartoum (August 22, 2007):
“[Kalma camp IDP spokesman] Abu Sharad told IRIN from Kalma camp in
South Darfur [ ] said 2,800 police, army and border intelligence
officers surrounded the camp, which hosts an estimated 90,000 people.
‘They arrested 30 IDPs, burnt down 12 shelters and looted 175
others,’ he added.”
Here we should recall another attack on a camp for displaced persons in
the Jebel Moon area of West Darfur. The UN High Commission for Human
Rights reported on November 3, 2006 (“Attack on Villages around the
Jebel Moon Area”) that,
“In the morning of 29 October 2006, hundreds of armed men in green
camouflage uniforms, described by the local people as ‘janjaweed,’
launched a brutal attack against several villages and one IDP camp south
and west of Jebel Moon area in West Darfur. The attack resulted in
approximately 50 civilian deaths. A the very least, the attacks
demonstrated the [Government of] Sudan’s continue failure to disarm
militia in Darfur, and at worst its use of militia forces that target
civilians.”
“Eyewitness testimony and list provide by the communities indicate
that the majority killed were young male children and elderly men.
According to information gathered, 26 children were killed; of those 21
were under the age of ten.”
Not only did a nearby Khartoum army base not respond, the UN report
found “troubling indications that Sudanese military personnel may have
participated in the attacks, based on descriptions of some of the
attackers.” Further, there are strong indications that the targeting
of males was genocidal in nature. The UN reports that the population of
the attacked villages “is mainly of African origin.” One chilling
narrative recorded makes clear the motive of the killings was to prevent
African male children from becoming adults:
“Four children escaped in a group and ran under a tree for
protection. An attacker came and shot at them, killing one of the
children. Another group of three children (5, 7, and 9 years old) were
running in a line. The five-year-old fell down and was shot dead.
Another one of the boys stopped and told the attacker, ‘you killed
this child, please let me go.’ The attackers said, ‘If we let you
go you will grow up. I will not let you go.’ Then the attackers shot
the boy. A woman had a four-year-old baby and it was pulled from her
and shot dead in front of her.”
A LONG HISTORY OF BAD FAITH
The most basic error in confronting Khartoum, and the fundamental
reason that genocide continues in Darfur, is international failure or
refusal to understand perceptions from the perspective of a regime that
is in full-on survivalist mode. These canny, ruthless
survivalists—all of whom fully understand that they would face
multiple life sentences if ever brought to justice in The Hague—simply
will not yield to any but the most concerted, robust international
pressure, both economic and diplomatic. It has no intention of allowing
a truly consensual environment for deployment of any version of the
“hybrid” force. Its first effort has been to ensure that there
will be no adequate complement of skilled international troops to make
up for the inevitable shortfalls in African troops and civilian police;
the second effort will be to obstruct, harass, and gratuitously burden
those African forces that do deploy. This has in fact been the history
of AMIS since it first deployed to Darfur in a cease-fire monitoring
role more than three years ago.
The lack of international pressure, particularly from China, convinces
Khartoum that the price to pay for sustaining a grim genocide by
attrition in Darfur and eastern Chad is simply not great enough. There
is no credible threat of UN sanctions because of China’s opposition,
nor is there any way to bring pressure to bear on the oil sector that
China dominates and which has become the economic life-line of the
regime. China also refuses to offer honest assessments of the Darfur
crisis in its official pronouncements, and takes no cognizance of the
extensive human rights reporting to date. But even the European Union
has failed to find the political will to impose sanctions on the
Khartoum-dominate economy. For their part, the Arab League as well as
the countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference provide
unqualified economic and diplomatic support to Khartoum.
To gain a sense of how canny and brazen Khartoum can be in its
obstructionist ways, it will be useful to review briefly how much
reneging and bad faith has come in the wake of the regime’s signing of
the north/south Comprehensive Peace Agreement (January 9, 2005). A
series of increasingly dire and all too authoritative warnings have been
issued recently about the fate of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA), and how dangerously likely a renewed north/south war has become.
My own travels in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains in January 2003,
including innumerable conversations with civil society leaders as well
as commanders and senior officials in the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army/Movement, left me with one overwhelming conclusion: if war does
resume in Southern Sudan, it will be the most destructive phase of a
civil war that first began in 1955, the year before Sudanese
independence. Well over 3 million people have died of war-related
causes over the past half century.
THREATS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA)
Khartoum’s bad faith in adhering to the terms and protocols of the
CPA has long been in evidence (see my extended analysis of September 24,
2005, “The Slow Collapse of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for
South Sudan,” at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article70.html). But a
recent report from the International Crisis Group provides a useful
overview of current issues, many of which have festered for over two
years.
The ICG report (“A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan,” July
26, 2007, Brussels/Nairobi, at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4961&l=1) argues,
optimistically, that:
“[The CPA] contains the detailed provisions and schedule for
governmental reforms and a democratisation process leading to national
elections in 2009 which can be the building blocks for peacemaking in
Darfur and elsewhere.”
But there is a more telling and pessimistic follow-up to this account
of what the CPA offers:
“[The CPA] is in danger of collapse due to government [of Sudan]
sabotage and international neglect, the latter a cruel irony in that
preoccupation to conclude the CPA negotiations led to initial reluctance
to address the developing Darfur crisis in 2003-2004.”
“[International] cooperation needs to be expanded to prioritise core
elements of the CPA, but growing problems with that agreement are
receiving little attention, even though peace in Darfur and elsewhere
can only be build on its foundation. The first major implementation
deadline—withdrawal of [Khartoum’s] Sudan armed Forces (SAF) from
the South by July 9 [2007]—was missed without an international
response.”
This highly consequential failure to meet the deadline for withdrawal
was also noted by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in his most recent
report on the CPA, but his response has been mere exhortation. While
Ban indicates that “at least 3,600 troops remain, mostly in Upper Nile
state,” highly reliable sources report that the number is much
larger—particularly if we consider the paramilitary forces that make
up the category of “other armed groups” noted explicitly in the
security protocol of the CPA. These Khartoum-allied militia forces are
often simply extensions of the regime’s regular military forces, and
are paid and supplied by Khartoum (these “other armed groups” were
long ago to have been absorbed into either the SAF or southern Sudan
People’s Liberation Army).
The ICG report notes that while both the SPLA and SAF missed the July
9, 2007 deadline, the deeply consequential violation is that of
Khartoum:
“Only 66.5 per cent [of Sudan Armed Forces] redeployed on time,
according to the UN Mission in Sudan. The SAF and SPLA recommitted to
the withdrawal at a recent Joint Defense Board meeting, but the SAF is
keeping large forces in the areas of Bentiu, Faloj, and Heglig, which
may lead to insecurity there.”
Nor is it happenstance that Khartoum’s heavy concentration of
military forces violating the terms of the CPA is in Upper Nile
Province: this is the oil-rich part of Sudan, and its seizure would be
the primary strategic goal in any resumed war. Both Western and Eastern
Upper Nile, the areas of operation for the production and development
consortia dominated by the Chinese, are among the most likely flash
points for renewed conflict. As if to underscore this danger, heavy
fighting in the Central Upper Nile town of Malakal (November 2006) could
easily have escalated rapidly without restraint shown by the SPLA.
Another extremely dangerous flash point is the Abyei region of northern
Bahr el-Ghazal Province, whose border proved the most troublesome of the
final issues negotiated in the CPA. The issue was ultimately referred
to a distinguished international panel for arbitration, and the “final
and binding” arbitration report was submitted to Khartoum by the Abyei
Boundary Commission in July 2005–over two years ago. And yet it has
been peremptorily rejected by President al-Bashir, and Abyei continues
to operate without civil administration, without recognized borders, and
with no adequate interlocutors for humanitarian organizations operating
in the region (which again is within one of the rich oil concession
blocks).
At the same time, Khartoum refuses to establish a functioning and
adequately funded north/south boundary commission, one that will
demarcate the oil regions and thus determine the oil revenues that are
due to the floundering and radically under-funded Government of South
Sudan. Hundreds of millions of dollars for critically needed
development and government operating expenses have been denied the
south, as the Khartoum-controlled Finance Ministry and the Ministry of
Mining and Energy refuse to open the books on oil revenues or provide
any of the accounting transparency necessary for confidence-building.
Despite the rapidly approaching elections of 2009, Khartoum also
refuses to fund the census that is critical for the integrity of these
elections. Ultimately, Khartoum is bent on forestalling the scheduled
self-determination referendum for the people of the south, scheduled for
2011—a referendum that will have as one of its options secession by
the south.
As the ICG report accurately notes of the machinations already in
evidence (and not simply in southern Sudan):
“While free and fair elections may worry the National Congress Party
[National Islamic Front], it would welcome quick and dirty ones with a
pre-arranged outcome. The [NCP] controls the financial resources and
state machinery necessary to manipulate electoral outcomes.
Khartoum’s constant backtracking and foot-dragging on the Darfur
process seem designed to perpetuate the region’s instability and so
preclude its genuine participation in the 2009 elections.”
There has been no meaningful power-sharing per the terms and spirit of
the CPA, and many southerners are abandoning any effort to participate
in national governance in Khartoum, finding themselves constantly
marginalized and undercut by a well-entrenched civil administration and
regime-controlled bureaucracy, and a threatening security service that
is totally controlled by the National Islamic Front. Moreover, taking
the Foreign Ministry was a deeply misguided decision by the SPLM, and
the choice of Lam Akol as Foreign Minister an unmitigated disaster. Lam
has done nothing but ingratiate himself to Khartoum’s génocidaires,
simply parroting the party line—on Darfur and all other issues where
the SPLM might have had a voice of restraint.
Importantly, the ICG report (which declares that “a subsequent Crisis
Group report will assess CPA implementation in greater depth”) also
highlights potential points of conflict in northern Sudan, both in
Kordofan and in the far north, where environmentally and economically
irresponsible dam projects on the Nile have brought Nubian and other
affected populations to the brink of armed response to the violence and
injustice they have experienced. Eastern Sudan also remains a terribly
poor and marginalized region of Sudan, and the weak peace agreement
between Khartoum and the so-called Eastern Front (the Beja Congress and
the Rashaida Free Lions) could easily fall apart, depending on the
actions of bordering Eritrea.
The dispiriting but all too accurate conclusion of the ICG report
focuses on the ease with which Khartoum has been able to undermine or
ignore the CPA, and to continue its ruthless arrogation of national
wealth and power, with few or no consequences imposed by the
international community:
“Peace in Sudan is being frustrated on all fronts by the NCP
[National Islamic Front] regime, which views the transformation of the
country as a threat to its survival. Obstacles to CPA implementation
continue to grow, and a collapse of the agreement is a real possibility.
[International attention has been so focused on Darfur] that CPA
implementation—the bedrock for peaceful transformation in the
country—is being ignored.”
“The CPA’s collapse would mean return to large-scale war in much of
Sudan. Since the Khartoum-SPLA war ended in 2005, both sides have been
rearming and preparing for resumption of hostilities.”
All evidence suggests that this re-armament is severely asymmetrical,
with Khartoum able to use vast oil revenues for large acquisitions of
advanced weapons.
The larger threat is of a much more chaotic and inclusive civil war in
Sudan, with catastrophic consequences for the country itself and the
region (including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda):
“Unlike the last war, this one would probably not be limited to the
South, Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and Southern Blue Nile. It could
easily connect with the conflict in Darfur and spread to other
disaffected areas of the North, leading to Sudan’s first truly
national civil war. The impact on at least all nine neighboring
countries would be devastating. The threat is very real and requires an
urgent international response.”
DARFUR IN EXTREMIS
Even following the persuasive logic of the ICG report in arguing for
re-invigorated international commitment to the CPA and its full
implementation, the situation in Darfur is so critical, so fraught with
danger, that a response cannot be held hostage—either to CPA
implementation or to a new ad hoc “Darfur Peace Agreement.”
Indeed, a new “Darfur Peace Agreement” is precisely what Khartoum
will not agree to negotiate. Lost amidst the welter of diplomatic
gatherings in Paris and Tripoli and Addis Ababa, and the exceedingly
modest success of the rebel conference in Arusha (Tanzania) in early
August, is Khartoum’s continuing insistence that it will not
re-negotiate the terms of the disastrous Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
negotiated last year in Abuja, Nigeria (May 5, 2006). As Gerard Prunier
has pointedly observed:
“The Sudanese government, meanwhile, stated categorically that the
whole point of the meeting [in Arusha] was simply to get the
non-signatories [rebels not signing the DPA] to adhere to the agreement
and that the agreement would, under no circumstances, be renegotiated.
Since the [rebel] participants all agreed that the [DPA] was a dead
proposition, this was not an auspicious beginning.” (“Buying time in
Darfur,” Mail and Guardian [South Africa], August 22, 2007)
Prunier’s view is supported by the assessment of the UN diplomat in
charge of the Darfur file, Jan Eliasson: “Eliasson said the government
[of Sudan] has made it clear that it would not allow ‘a renegotiation
of the Darfur Peace Agreement’” (Associated Press [dateline:
Khartoum], August 7, 2007).
In short, there is presently a vast chasm between the negotiating
starting points of the rebel groups and Khartoum, one that will not be
bridged—if at all—without months of effective diplomacy. The rebels
may or may not achieve a sufficiently united front to present an
effective negotiating team. But rebel unity will hardly compel Khartoum
to surrender what it rightly believes is the enormous success of the
DPA, particularly the agreement’s failure to specify any meaningful
guarantors for regional security arrangements. Moreover, matters as
critical as the disarmament of the Janjaweed are essentially left to
Khartoum by the DPA. Since the regime has flouted every demand and
reneged on every promise concerning the Janjaweed for over three years,
this glaring lacuna in the security arrangements implies an absurd
optimism.
Time is not on the side of Darfur, and there are many signs that
large-scale conflict could resume, either in the camps or on the sites
of land that is being claimed by Arab groups from Niger and Chad. The
Independent (UK) reported on July 14, 2007:
“Arabs from Chad and Niger are crossing into Darfur in
‘unprecedented’ numbers, prompting claims that the Sudanese
government is trying systematically to repopulate the war- ravaged
region. An internal UN report, obtained by The Independent, shows that
up to 30,000 Arabs have crossed the border in the past two months. Most
arrived with all their belongings and large flocks. They were greeted by
Sudanese Arabs who took them to empty villages cleared by government and
janjaweed forces.”
“One UN official said the process ‘appeared to have been well
planned.’ The official continued: ‘This movement is very large. We
have not seen such numbers come into west Darfur before.’” [ ]
“‘Most have been relocated by Sudanese Arabs to former villages of
IDPs (internally displaced people) and more or less invited to stay
there,’ said the UN official [from the UN High Commission for
Refugees]. The arrivals have been issued with official Sudanese identity
cards and awarded citizenship, and analysts say that by encouraging
Arabs from Chad, Niger and other parts of Sudan to move to Darfur the
Sudanese government is making it ‘virtually impossible’ for
displaced people to return home.”
The Independent also notes that these demographic ambitions could spark
extremely dangerous new violence:
“If Khartoum is moving Arabs from abroad to replace them, diplomats
fear that Darfur rebels may try to remove them forcibly. ‘It could be
quite explosive,’ said one western diplomat. ‘It is a very serious
situation.’”
More recently, a dispatch from Tulus (West Darfur) by Edmund Sanders of
the Los Angeles Times (August 12, 2007) reports in a similar vein:
“Over the last six months, nearly 30,000 Chadian Arabs have crossed
into Sudan, many of them settling on land owned by Darfur’s pastoral
tribes that have been driven into displacement camps, aid groups say.
This migration has quickly become the latest obstacle to peace in
western Sudan, drawing the attention of international observers and
protests from those displaced from Darfur, who accuse the Sudanese
government of orchestrating an ‘Arabization’ scheme by repopulating
their burned-out villages with foreigners.”
The “Arabization” of Darfur is a means of consolidating previous
genocidal destruction, but cannot be separated from the savage electoral
politics of the National Islamic Front regime.
“‘This is a government plot to give our land to Chadian Arabs,’
said Mohammed Abakar Mohammed Adam, 27, a farmer from the village of
Bechabecha, which he said was abandoned after armed nomadic tribes known
as janjaweed, widely believed to be backed by the government, attacked
in 2003. But in recent months, Chadian newcomers have begun building
homes atop the remains.” [ ]
“International humanitarian groups worry that disputes over the land
might re-ignite violence in western Darfur and lead to further delays in
resolving the region’s massive displacement crisis, with more than 2
million people driven from their homes. ‘The mere presence of people
on this land will make it more difficult for [displaced persons] to
return home,’ said Ita Schuette, head of the Habillah branch of the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the world
body’s refugee agency, which has been monitoring the influx.”
“Tensions have been heightened by rumors that some Chadians have been
offered Sudanese identification cards or papers to help them establish
citizenship. One Darfur hospital was reportedly asked to forge 100 birth
certificates, according to a UN official. In another reported case,
Chadians were allegedly photographed for ID cards in the city of Foro
Burunga [very near the Chad/Darfur border].” (Los Angeles Times
[dateline: Tulus, West Darfur], August 12, 2007)
[A forthcoming analysis will analyze in detail the proposed EU
deployment of military forces to Eastern Chad—its potential, its
risks, and its implications for humanitarian aid on both sides of the
Chad/Darfur border.]
Humanitarian indicators are also showing worrying trends, especially in
the area of malnutrition. For example, the most recent “Darfur
Nutrition Update,” Issue 9 (DNU-9) from UNICEF (covering the period
May-June 2007) contains a number of ominous findings from the six sites
surveyed (the report is available at http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SJHG-75NA95?OpenDocument). Perhaps most significantly, DNU-9 finds that “Global Acute
Malnutrition (GAM) rates exceeded the emergency threshold of 15 percent(ranging from 17.2 to 30.4 percent) in all six [sites surveyed].”
“Mortality rates in two surveys (Otash Camp and Kass in South Darfur)
were above alert levels for both under-5 [year-olds] and crude mortality
[for the entire population]. The primary identified cause of death were
reported as diarrhoea (watery and bloody) and Acute Respiratory
Infection.”
“Admissions into Therapeutic Feeding Centres across Great Darfur
continue to increase, almost doubling compared to the last two months
and higher than those reported during the same period in 2006.”
Despite this increase in admission to therapeutic feeding centers,
Khartoum, with obscene cruelty, blocked delivery of therapeutic milk,
directly contributing to morbidity and mortality in children. DNU-9
notes:
“The Federal Ministry of Health’s global ban on the use of F100 and
F75 therapeutic milk, following concerns about the quality of stocks in
Khartoum, must also be noted. The ban was not systematically applied but
reports were received of increased diarrhoeal disease where therapeutic
milks were not being used, as this required the use of alternatives that
increased exposure to water-borne diseases.”
This deliberate and groundless obstruction of therapeutic milk
continues a long pattern on Khartoum’s part of blocking both food and
medical supplies from timely delivery.
Some of the specific site data from the DNU-9 survey are highly
alarming:
Kebkabiya in North Darfur registered a Global Acute Malnutrition Rate
(GAM) of 27 percent of the population (Kebkabiya has registered a
straight-line increase in GAM over the past two years). In Abu Shouk
and Al Salaam camps the rate was 30.4 percent of the total population.
In Kass town, the morality rate for children under five was reported as
4.42/10,000/day. In the course of a month, for an under-five population
of 10,000, this represents approximately 120 excess deaths. 10,000 may
well represent the under-five population of the Kass area (whose overall
population now includes both IDPs and residents). 120 very young
children dying needlessly every month, in one location in South Darfur.
While global mortality rates are impossible to establish in the absence
of more comprehensive data, such UNICEF findings should give sharp pause
to those content with a total monthly excess mortality, for all ages and
all regions in Darfur, of 200—the figure offered by Time Magazine
Africa correspondent Sam Dealey in a New York Times opinion piece
(August 12, 2007).
WHAT WILL BE THE FUTURE OF THESE CHILDREN?
What will happen to the children of Kass, and to the many hundreds of
thousands of other children in the many scores of camps and towns under
relentlessly violent siege? What will their lives look like in the
absence of any rebuilding of their families’ agricultural lives and
livelihoods? What are the chances that these children will be educated?
have access to primary medical care? escape the warehousing
environments of the camps in which they languish, still subject to
hunger, violence, and disease? By virtue of its acquiescing in the
formation of an increasingly AU-defined “hybrid” mission, the
international community has left answers to these questions to the likes
of Alpha Oumar Konaré and Omar al-Bashir and Nafi Ali Nafi, the
especially vicious National Islamic Front thug now controlling the
Darfur file.
The stakes could not be higher. For as great a failure as the AU force
has been to date—and despite the fact that many of its soldiers have
served with courage and distinction, if hopelessly under-manned and
under-equipped—this failure will pale next to that of the looming
operation whose only clear connection to the UN will be funding by the
international organization. But at $2 billion per year, such an
operation is consuming an enormous amount of the resources available for
peacekeeping throughout Africa and the rest of the world. Will the AU
make effective use of this funding? The history of AMIS is the opposite
of encouraging, and yet pridefulness on the part of some African leaders
and political expediency in confronting the Khartoum regime seem an
irresistible mix.
Of course many in Africa are well aware of the perils of failure in
Darfur—both for Darfuris and for the African Union of the future. We
are exactly a year beyond UN Security Council passage of Resolution
1706, which in the face of rejection by Khartoum has been completely
inconsequential in providing security for Darfuri civilians and
humanitarian workers. Given Khartoum’s grudging and prevaricating
“acceptance” of Resolution 1769, and a continuing unwillingness
by the international community to compel real acceptance, the new
African Union mission in Darfur may well be a failure of historic
proportions.
* Eric Reeves is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide. He can be reached at [email protected]. www.sudanreeves.org