Ban Ki-moon in Sudan: Vacuous Diplomacy and Specious Declarations
No progress is registered with the Khartoum regime, even as Darfur’s
humanitarian indicators decline sharply, violence increases, and the
time-frame for deployment of the UN/African Union “hybrid” force
steadily expands
By Eric Reeves
September 6, 2007 — Although still notionally “in progress,” UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon’s mission to Sudan on behalf of Darfur has clearly failed to
register significant political progress on any front. And insofar as
this mission marks a culmination of UN and international efforts—in
Ban’s words, represents an “attempt to lock in progress” on
Darfur—the failure is all the greater. Certainly if this visit marks
the limit of pressure on Khartoum to abide by its many
commitments—made or “demanded” over more than four years—the
regime’s génocidaires must be a good deal more confident. They will
certainly know that the large civilian police and military force
authorized by Security Council Resolution 1769 is little threat to the
status quo, indeed seems to fall daily further behind schedule, even as
it lacks the commitment of critical human and material resources. As a
consequence, Khartoum understands full well that for the foreseeable
future it can control deployment of this force, as well as manipulate
security conditions in Darfur and eastern Chad, and threaten
humanitarian operations throughout the region at will.
Ban declared in Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan:
“‘For too long the international community has stood by, as seemingly
helpless witnesses. That is now changing.’” (Agence France-Presse
[dateline: el-Fasher, North Darfur], September 5, 2007)
Perhaps Ban offers here a fair assessment of his predecessor, Kofi
Annan; but Ban himself is very far from demonstrating that we are seeing
any “change” from “helpless witnessing.” The notable exception
is the continuing efforts and courageous commitments of humanitarian
workers and organizations—even as humanitarians are themselves among
those most vulnerable to the violent insecurity that has emerged in
Darfur following more than four years of international acquiescence.
Ban disingenuously presents himself as having…
“a three-part strategy to deal with the Darfur crisis by ensuring
that peacekeepers are deployed quickly and effectively, humanitarian aid
and development is more easily available and the peace process pushes
forward.” (UN News Service [New York], August 28, 2007)
But all the Secretary-General has done here is enumerate, in the
broadest of terms, the conspicuous challenges in Darfur—he hasn’t
articulated a “strategy” for dealing with them. Indeed, the threats
to adequate humanitarian aid seem only to grow, as does the security
crisis confronting aid organizations (see overview of recent
developments in the humanitarian crisis below). Civilians in the camps
confront growing violence, with little hope for the start of either a
credible cease-fire or meaningful peace talks.
Certainly the challenges to deployment of the force specified in UN
Security Council Resolution 1769, and authorized under Chapter 7 of the
UN Charter, only grow (see my recent analysis of these challenges at
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article182.html). The August 31, 2007
deadline for commitments to this force has come and gone, and there
remains an acute shortage of well-trained civilian police, deficits in
skilled personnel for a range of essential tasks in the mission, and
vast shortcomings in essential equipment, especially aircraft. No
significant commitment of intelligence-gathering resources—crucial in
a region as large as Darfur—has been announced.
Mark Kroeker, outgoing UN head of police operations, put a key matter
bluntly:
“The number of officers from major developed nations was dwindling
and countries such as Britain, the United States, Canada, Italy and
France needed to offer more. ‘The countries that have been talking
about Darfur need to now do something about Darfur with their deployment
of police in probably the most desperate place in the world,’ Kroeker
[said].” (Reuters [dateline: Canberra, Australia], August 30, 2007)
The same could be said of these countries when it comes to aerial and
satellite reconnaissance capabilities.
For its part, Khartoum seems only to be warming up in its efforts to
diminish the effectiveness of the force; but the Sudan Tribune (August
19, 2007) reports a telling comment from General Majzoub Rahamah, the
officer in charge of international relations at the defense ministry:
“[General Rahamah] said that the military personnel in the [UN/AU]
hybrid operation do not have the right to protect civilians. He further
said that this force has the right to act under chapter 7 only in the
case of self-defense.”
Khartoum is far from finished in curtailing the mandate of the
“hybrid” force or devising means for compromising its ability to
address insecurity.
PROSPECTS FOR A “DARFUR PEACE PROCESS”
And what of the “peace process” that Ban invokes? Does it exist?
What of real significance emerged from the Arusha (Tanzania) meeting of
some rebel leaders in early August? And what of the skills and
commitment of the Secretary-General’s special envoy for Darfur, Jan
Eliasson, the AU envoy Salim Ahmed Salim, and AU Commissioner Alpha
Oumar Konaré? What evidence do they provide for Ban’s declaration of
two months ago that there has been “credible and considerable
progress” in halting Darfur’s massive human suffering and
destruction? What can this fatuous statement possibly mean in the
context of accelerating violence, deteriorating humanitarian indicators
(particularly nutrition), and a rapidly growing number of Internally
Displaced Persons? And what of Eastern Chad, where an immense crisis
grows deeper and more threatening by the day? What “progress” can
Ban point to?
Arusha yielded nothing of consequence and the actual participants
included few with military strength on the ground. Almost nothing was
done to overcome divisions among personalities, political views, and
ethnicities. The popular Fur leader and founder of the SLA Abdel Wahid
el-Nur was not present—a huge obstacle to success, even as he too has
little military strength on the ground. (El-Nur desperately needs to
devise a workable strategy for accelerating efforts to provide human
security in Darfur while at the same time engaging in negotiations for a
cease-fire, and ultimately peace in the region.) Key SLA commanders
Suliman Marjan and Jar el-Naby where present in Arusha, but refused to
participate until former SLA humanitarian coordinator Suleiman Jamous
had been freed. Prior to Arusha Khartoum had promised it would do as
much on the occasion of a rebel summit, but characteristically reneged.
Jamous is only now being released, and it’s clear this “humanitarian
gesture” was deliberately delayed until the UN Secretary-General met
with National Islamic Front President Omar al-Bashir in Khartoum.
Eliasson has consistently seemed out of his depth in serving as a UN
peace envoy in these difficult circumstances. His refusal to work
full-time or to commit to living in Sudan is reflected in an excessively
limited understanding of the particulars of the crisis and the
challenges in confronting, rather than accommodating, Khartoum. For
their part, Salim and Konaré have essentially capitulated to Khartoum,
and with political and personal motives that don’t bear close
scrutiny. Both have proved remarkably short-sighted in their efforts,
and far too willing to accommodate Khartoum in an expedient effort to
prevent a split within the African Union between Saharan and sub-Saharan
African nations. And if there is understandable frustration with the
unwillingness of the rebel factions to unite, these men should remember
that the fracturing of the rebel movement was dramatically accelerated
by the ill-conceived and disastrously concluded Darfur Peace Agreement
in which they played such large roles.
Moreover, it is the shortsightedness of Salim and Konaré, and their
willingness to accommodate Khartoum on so many issues, that has in the
eyes of Darfuris destroyed the ability of the AU to serve as a credible
intermediary. This in turn augurs poorly for the reception of the
“hybrid” force deploying to Darfur, particularly with Konaré’s
recent declaration that enough contributions had been received from
African nations that no non-Africans need apply (Associated Press
[dateline: Khartoum], August 12, 2007). This comment was quickly
qualified by “hybrid” mission head Rodolphe Adada, who insisted that
UN peacekeeping standards must be met, and that troops must be able to
provide their own weapons and equipment (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum],
August 16, 2007). But the damage was done, and Khartoum will, as
necessary, cleave relentlessly to Konare’s ill-considered and
misleading statement in excluding non-African personnel, even technical
personnel, as a means of weakening the deploying force.
And if the rebels were to unite, what are the prospects for meaningful
negotiations with Khartoum? What is the likelihood that the woefully
inadequate Darfur Peace Agreement will be significantly renegotiated,
particularly the key issues of security (and security guarantors),
compensation, and regional governance? At least the UN’s Eliasson has
the honesty to declare that, “the government [of Sudan] has made it
clear that it would not allow ‘a renegotiation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement’” (Associated Press [dateline: Khartoum], August 7, 2007).
But the rebels have made clear that the DPA is a dead letter, not least
because Khartoum made no real efforts to implement it.
What can break such a diplomatic stalemate? And in the absence of
concerted international pressure, economic and diplomatic, what can
change Khartoum’s calculation that it need only sit at the table with
rebels (if they were to forge a united negotiating front), waiting for
splits to emerge, bribing all who can be bribed—and all the time
insisting that the DPA can be changed only with the addition of very
modest annexes?
Ironically, perhaps the most acute recent assessment of Khartoum’s
outlook and motives—and those of other regional leaders—is offered
by Alex de Waal, advisor to the AU at the Abuja talks that produced the
DPA, and who has over the past year seem locked into the fantasy that
somehow the DPA was almost a success story, thwarted only by inexcusable
impatience on the part of US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick
and his imposition of an arbitrarily hasty deadline. But of course the
DPA left security essentially in the hands of Khartoum, including
disarming the Janjaweed, something Khartoum had many times promised.
Indeed, the UN ineffectually “demanded” that the regime disarm the
Janjaweed with passage of Security Council Resolution 1556 (July 30,
2004). There was simply no reason to believe that without guarantors
much more robust than the AU mission in Darfur, which was even then
crumbling, any of the security arrangements in the DPA would have been
meaningfully implemented (and of course none were). De Waal has
consistently failed to acknowledge this fatal flaw.
But de Waal’s recent comments, perhaps given the fullness of DPA
failure, suggest a more realistic assessment of Khartoum and the
prospects for peace:
“To some extent [ ] there is common interest among [regimes in]
Khartoum, Asmara [Eritrea] and Tripoli [Libya] in sustaining the Darfur
conflict until such time as the United States and the United Nations
lose interest. To that end, Sudanese security is paradoxically
supporting Eritrean initiatives to unify Darfur’s armed movements,
even if that entails prolonging the war, because it could also delay the
international peace process, perhaps indefinitely, and make UN troops
ineffective. These governments are quite prepared to sabotage the peace
process at any moment if they see it to be in their interests. The
United Nations and African Union do not possess the necessary leverage
to ensure that they deliver.”
[It is notable, given de Waal’s assessment here of the Libyan regime
of Muamar Gadaffi, that Associated Press (dateline: Khartoum) reports
today, “UN chief Ban Ki-moon and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir
announced Thursday [September 6, 2007] that new peace talks to end the
four-year conflict in Darfur will start October 27, 2007 in Libya.”
— – ER]
“The greatest challenge is to provide reasons for the Sudan
government to negotiate in good faith, and at present, Khartoum has
little reason to take the peace process seriously. Most of those
represented in Arusha have little armed presence in the field. Some
do—but the government may be able to cut bilateral deals with them.”
(Alex de Waal, “Peace in Darfur: Next Steps after Arusha,” CSIS
Africa Policy Forum, August 21, 2007)
Ban Ki-moon does nothing to address the challenge of giving “Khartoum
reason to take the peace process seriously.” Nor have Eliasson,
Salim, or Konaré addressed this challenge. Moreover, insofar as
sanctions against the Khartoum-dominated economy must be part of any
successful pressure on the regime to engage in good-faith peace talks,
the role of China becomes even more important. Yet China has recently
reiterated its adamant opposition to any sanctions measures, thereby
reassuring Khartoum that it needn’t take the peace process
seriously—and that there will be no consequences for obstructing,
delaying, or harassing the deploying “hybrid” UN/AU force:
“On Friday [August 31, 2007] British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and
French President Nicolas Sarkozy revived the threat of sanctions, but
China’s ambassador [to Khartoum] on Sunday [September 2, 2007] said
dialogue, not threats of sanctions, will help create peace and
stability. ‘Sanctions cannot help to solve the problem,’
[Ambassador] Li Chengwen said in a rare interview.” (Reuters
[dateline: Khartoum], September 2, 2007)
China counts on its vote in favor of Security Council Resolution 1769
to disarm all criticism of its role in sustaining the Darfur genocide,
and that “business as usual” can continue with Khartoum. Thus
sanctions for Khartoum’s inevitable non-compliance with the terms of
reference in Resolution 1769 are a dead issue. Ambassador Li’s
“dialogue” will be mainly about rapidly growing two-way trade and
China’s huge commercial and capital investments in Sudan, particularly
in the petroleum sector. There certainly will be no honest
acknowledgement of Darfur’s deepening crisis, or more than perfunctory
comments on the ghastly realities that continue to define the lives of
millions of human beings. Lucrative arms shipments continue unabated
(see Amnesty International report, “Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel
serious human rights violations in Darfur,” May 8, 2007 [AFR
54/019/2007] at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr540192007).
And Khartoum all too predictably acts with impunity because of such
multi-faceted Chinese support.
WHAT BAN KI-MOON DID NOT TALK ABOUT WHILE IN KHARTOUM
We may be sure that certain issues were not broached during Ban
Ki-moon’s meeting with chief génocidaire al-Bashir. Indeed, the
implications of any such meeting were well captured by Warren Hoge of
the New York Times ([dateline: Khartoum], September 3, 2007):
“Mr. Ban also hinted that he would show more understanding toward
[Sudan’s] much-criticized leadership. ‘I have never put much stock
in grand rhetoric, dreams of the future, “visions” that promise more
than can be delivered,’ he said, addressing an invited gathering at
Khartoum’s palatial Friendship Hall. ‘I am a realist, a man of
action,’ he said. ‘I believe in results.’”
“Following his speech, he held a private meeting with Sudan’s
president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir. Mr. Bashir has been shunned by many
national leaders for his repeated denials of human rights abuses under
his government.”
What is included in and what is excluded from Ban’s “realism”?
Evidently the International Criminal Court (ICC) is too “visionary”
a notion, for despite pleas from ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
directly to the Secretary-General, there has been no word or suggestion
that the ICC emerged as a serious topic in Ban and al-Bashir’s
tête-à-tête:
“The UN secretary-general should press Sudan to arrest two
suspects—including a government minister—suspected of atrocities in
Darfur and hand them to the International Criminal Court, the
tribunal’s prosecutor has urged. Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo
brought up the arrest warrants when he met with Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon in New York Wednesday [August 29, 2007], just days before Ban
sets off on his first trip to Sudan since assuming leadership of the
world body, a court official said Thursday.”
“Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir needs to be told ‘there are two
arrest warrants of the ICC outstanding, including one against a
minister, that Sudan is a member of the United Nations and has the
obligation to enforce these arrest warrants,’ said Beatrice Le Fraper
Du Hellen, who deals with the court’s relations with other
countries.” [ ]
But of course al-Bashir well knows that a Janjaweed leader and his
minister for humanitarian affairs have arrest warrants outstanding—and
Ban Ki-moon is well aware of al-Bashir’s response to these warrants:
“In May [2007], the Hague-based court issued arrest warrants for
Sudan’s humanitarian affairs minister, Ahmed Muhammed Harun, and Ali
Kushayb, a janjaweed leader. The two men are suspected of involvement in
the murder, rape, torture and persecution of civilians in Darfur. It
was the UN Security Council that asked Moreno-Ocampo to investigate
atrocities in Darfur, and officials at the court want the world body to
ensure the suspects are brought to justice.”
“Sudan hasn’t ratified the treaty that created the court and
government officials have vowed not to hand over the men. ‘Our
position is very, very clear—the ICC cannot assume any jurisdiction to
judge any Sudanese outside the country,’ Justice Minister Mohamed Ali
al-Mardi said in May [2007] after the arrest warrants were publicized.
‘Whatever the ICC does, is totally unrealistic, illegal, and
repugnant to any form of international law.’” (Associated Press
[dateline: The Hague], August 30, 2007)
Earlier in August, powerful Interior Minister Zubeir Bashir Taha
weighed in as well (Taha is one of 17 individuals named for gross
violations of human rights in a leaked Confidential Annex to the
“Final Report” of the UN Panel of Experts on Darfur, January
2006):
“[Ahmed] Harun has been interrogated about the allegations, and there
is no case,’ said Interior Minister Zubeir Bashir Taha, a senior
Cabinet minister who also oversees Darfur. ‘The evidence does not
stand scrutiny, and whether it does or not, it is a matter for Sudan to
decide and act upon. The [ICC] prosecutor has no jurisdiction here. He
is an intruder.”
Such outrageous defiance of international justice is nothing new for
Khartoum, but certainly gives us a much better sense of what the new UN
Secretary-General is prepared to ignore in the name of “realism,”
and just what, as a “man of action,” he is and is not prepared to
do. As the Associated Press dispatch also appropriately notes:
“While court officials steer clear of telling the UN how to push
Sudan into cooperating with the court, the Security Council could impose
sanctions on Khartoum for not arresting the suspects. In his meeting
with Ban, ‘Moreno-Ocampo very strongly emphasized that the UN has a
responsibility legally and also morally to make the fight against
impunity more than a concept. To make it a reality by helping to enforce
the court’s decisions,’ Le Fraper said.” [ ]
“This issue is particularly important, ‘because at [an upcoming]
conference they want to address humanitarian issues and one of the
indictees [Ahmed Harun] is (Sudan’s) humanitarian affairs minister,’
said Le Fraper.”
As it has for the past four and a half years, expediency rules the day
within the UN Secretariat, at least in confronting Khartoum’s brutal
security cabal. Ban has clearly calculated that there is no chance for
a sanctions resolution in the Security Council because of Chinese
opposition—despite the enormity of the atrocity crimes committed by
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Haroun and the Janjaweed leader Ali
Kushayb. And he realizes the subject is extraordinarily sensitive for
Khartoum (Ahmed could easily implicate much more senior members of the
National Islamic Front regime in genocidal acts if he found himself in
The Hague). The predictable result is silence, which in turn encourages
Khartoum to defy the ICC even more brazenly. This is prosecutor
Ocampo’s point:
“Countries that are members of the ICC must also do more on the
issue, [Ocampo] said. ‘This is the law…. The state parties have to
assume their responsibilities,’ he said. ‘In four years, the court
has become operational, more mature. We want to go farther, we have to
get more support. We need consistency.’”
“‘[Current Minister of Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed] Haroun displaced
these people [primarily Fur people of West Darfur], and now he controls
them,’ said Moreno-Ocampo, adding that ‘concentration camps’ have
resulted. ‘It was not a tsunami’ but people who have caused the
humanitarian crisis in the region, he said. ‘Executing the law will
help to solve the situation,’ he said. ‘If not, we’re encouraging
the hardliners.’” (Agence France-Presse [dateline: The Hague],
September 3, 2007)
What Ocampo fails to understand is that the regime is made up entirely
of “hardliners.” The calculus of survival is different for
different members of the regime—but there are no “moderate
voices,” none motivated by anything but a desire to perpetuate the
NIF’s ruthless arrogation of national wealth and power. Different
strategies and tactics do not make for “moderation,” and all within
the regime realize that they must “hang together or hang
separately.”
To be sure, the most egregious hypocrisy is that of the Security
Council, which in March 2005 referred the investigation of atrocity
crimes in Darfur to the ICC and yet is now unwilling to see the results
of the ICC investigation supported. But this only gives us a clearer
view of Ban’s deference to the threat of a Security Council veto by
China (likely accompanied by Russia), and the hopeless paralysis of the
Security Council on Sudan overall.
“I am a realist, a man of action,” Ban Ki-moon says. “I believe
in results.” “Realism,” “action,” “results”—the fine
language of pragmatism, put in the disgraceful service of
disingenuousness and expediency.
ACCELERATING VIOLENCE IN DARFUR: CONSEQUENCES FOR CIVILIANS AND
HUMANITARIANS
The newest “Darfur Humanitarian Profile” (Number 28) from the UN
Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] has now appeared
(http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/LSGZ-76RGXG?OpenDocument),
representing conditions as of July 1, 2007 (and thus inevitably failing
to capture a number of disturbing developments of the past two months).
The lead paragraph on the section given over to “Protection” begins:
“The Government of Sudan military attacks with support from their
[Arab militia] proxies against non-signatories of the Darfur Peace
Agreement have continued. Of particular concern were the reports of
renewed air attacks on villages in the Dar Zaghawa area, North Darfur.
The latest bombings have left civilians in the region highly
traumatized. Many told the UN that ‘the biggest threat [to their
lives and livelihoods] now comes from the air.’ Families have fled
their homes and are living in the surrounding hills and wadis, without
adequate shelter and water supplies. The risk of air attacks has also
caused the closure of health posts and schools. Women collect water
only at night, fearing targeted day-time aerial raids on water
points.”
For those who doubt that genocide still continues in Darfur, it might
be useful to reflect on the fact that women—ethnically non-Arab or
African women—are reduced to collecting water only at night because of
the deliberate bombing of water points during daylight. There is no
commodity more precious in Darfur, and Khartoum is deliberately
targeting, on an ethnic basis, vital sources of water with its aerial
military assets.
In a subsequent section on Child Protection, Darfur Humanitarian
Profile No. 28 (hereafter DHP 28) reports on the fate of many newly
displaced persons. UN OCHA now estimates that “since the beginning of
2007, 248,414 persons have been newly displaced or re-displaced in
Darfur,” overwhelmingly because of violence (UN OCHA fact sheet,
August 28, 2007). This figure, especially given it precision, reflects
a census method that undoubtedly misses many of the displaced. But DHP
28 notes of the especially violent regions of South Darfur:
“UNICEF has responded immediately to provide emergency support to the
newly displaced people in South Darfur, mostly women and children,
following a wave of violence that has involved grave child and human
rights violations. UNICEF and [nongovernmental humanitarian
organization] partners have focused on assessing the situation of
families, especially the families recently arrived in al Salam IDP camp.
Over 90% of these families were headed by women. Children have been
exposed to many grave violations, including killing and injury. Many
children have arrived unaccompanied, girls have been raped, often
repeatedly, and other children are missing. In addition, the families
have reported dead and missing fathers.”
This description ominously echoes the reports from the most violent
phase of the Darfur genocide, February 2003 through early 2005. And
though violence now is more chaotic—increasingly involving internecine
rebel fighting, fighting among Arab groups, and a general increase in
banditry and warlordism—Khartoum’s response remains savagely
indiscriminate:
“Heavy fighting in southern Darfur has killed scores of rebels and
government forces over the past week, and the Sudanese air force has
bombed several villages, rebels and international observers in Darfur
reported Thursday [August 9, 2007].” (Associated Press [dateline:
Khartoum], August 9, 2007)
In greater detail, Amnesty International reported recently:
“Aerial attacks by the Government of Sudan on civilians in Darfur
continue, with the UN reporting air attacks in North Darfur at the end
of June [2007]. Thousands of displaced villagers have fled the Jebel
Moon/Sirba area in West Darfur after renewed attacks on areas under
control of armed opposition groups by government of Sudan forces
supported by Janjawid. Local people said that helicopters brought in
arms to the government and Janjawid forces. In South Darfur a Sudanese
government Antonov aircraft carried out bombing raids following a 2
August [2007] attack by the opposition Justice and Equality Movement on
the town of Adila, targeting villages and water points. Since then there
have been a number of Sudanese government Antonov bombing raids on
Ta’alba, near the town of Adila, and on 13 August [2007] the
villages of Habib Suleiman and Fataha were bombed.” (Amnesty
International, August 24, 2007, News Service No. 161)
Such reports have continued steadily throughout August. Here it is
important to understand that whether or not rebel fighters are actually
present in the villages attacked, Khartoum’s aerial bombing attacks
are inevitably indiscriminate, i.e. by virtue of technical and targeting
limitations, these attacks simply cannot discriminate between combatants
and civilians. All such attacks, then, are ipso facto serious
violations of international law, and may well constitute crimes against
humanity.
Despite such indisputable realities, China, Russia, and other countries
continue to ship weapons to Khartoum, knowing that the regime will use
these weapons in Darfur despite a UN arms embargo. The same Amnesty
International report notes:
“The Sudanese government is continuing to deploy offensive military
equipment in Darfur despite the UN arms embargo and peace agreements.
‘The Sudanese government is still deploying weapons into Darfur in
breathtaking defiance of the UN arms embargo and Darfur peace
agreements. Once again Amnesty International calls on the UN Security
Council to act decisively to ensure the embargo is effectively enforced,
including by the placement of UN observers at all ports of entry in
Sudan and Darfur,’ said Brian Wood, Amnesty International’s Arms
Control Research Manager.”
“The [new] photographs, sent to Amnesty International and the
International Peace Information Service in Antwerp by eyewitnesses in
Darfur, reinforce evidence provided in Amnesty International’s May 2007
report ‘Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human rights violations
in Darfur.’”
Amnesty pointedly notes one of the key shortcomings in the mandate of
the “hybrid” UN/AU force, a shortcoming that China did much to
ensure:
“On 31 July 2007, the UN Security Council agreed through resolution
1769 to send a newly strengthened African Union-United Nations hybrid
force to Darfur, but the resolution fails to provide peacekeepers with
the mandate to disarm or demobilize government-backed Janjawid militia
and the Darfur armed opposition groups. ‘If weapons continue to flow
into Darfur and peacekeepers are not given the power to disarm and
demobilize all armed opposition groups and Janjawid militia, the ability
of the new peacekeeping force to protect civilians will be severely
impeded,’ said Erwin van der Borght, Director of Amnesty
International’s Africa Program. ‘For a peacekeeping operation in
Darfur to have any chance of success, the UN Security Council must
ensure that the arms embargo on Darfur is fully and effectively enforced
and that peacekeepers are mandated to disarm or demobilize
government-backed Janjawid militia and Darfuri armed opposition
groups,’ said van der Borght.”
Disgracefully, in the face of this detailed chronicle of violence in
Darfur, Ban nonetheless declared while in el-Fasher that “security [in
Darfur] was improving” (Associated Press [dateline: el-Fasher, North
Darfur], September 5, 2007)—a generalization that simply cannot be
made to comport with the facts at hand, but which will play exceedingly
well in Khartoum.
All too predictably, Ban Ki-moon’s trip to Sudan did not address the
key issues for the deploying “hybrid” force raised by Amnesty
International. The Secretary-General was content with the vaguest of
exhortations and promises concerning deployment. But whenever
consequential numbers of forces deploy to Darfur—perhaps sometime in
2008—they will soon discover the price of a Secretary-General who is
content to declare as a “plan” his vague hope that “peacekeepers
[be] deployed quickly and effectively.” This is, of course, a
critical goal; but it is not a plan or a strategy. Ban’s fatuous
celebration of al-Bashir’s promise to him—“‘[al-Bashir] told me
he will do everything to help the mission logistically’”—is simply
extraordinary, given Khartoum’s relentless obstruction of the African
Union force to date, and the regime’s equally relentless harassment
and impeding of humanitarian efforts in Darfur.
We must hope at least that Ban is more capable of comprehending
Darfur’s vast humanitarian crisis than he is at discerning
Khartoum’s contemptuous mendacity.
DARFUR HUMANITARIAN OVERVIEW, HIGHLIGHTS
In a telling overview of the Darfur crisis, UN Assistant Secretary
General for Humanitarian Affairs Margareta Wahlstrom recently pointed to
an unprecedented decline in the humanitarian situation:
“[Wahlstrom] says the humanitarian situation in Sudan’s western
Darfur region is worsening,” and that “the problems have grown even
more critical in the past few months.”
“Wahlstrom says aid workers are concerned that malnutrition is on the
rise in Darfur. She says several surveys indicate that, in certain
areas, about one-in-five people (17 percent) are malnourished. Wahlstrom
says there is a lean season every year in Darfur, but she says aid
workers have never seen this pattern of decline. ‘With a huge effort
of the international and humanitarian community, from 2004 the situation
stabilized from a health and nutritional perspective,’ she said.
‘So this is the first time we see the potential of a deterioration
for which we are very worried, and we put this in the context of the
very unstable situation.’” (Voice of America [dateline: New York],
August 31, 2007)
The need for all humanitarian resources to be deployed to maximum
efficiency could not be clearer. And yet, in an especially revealing
moment during his time in Sudan, Ban Ki-moon revealed that “he had
unsuccessfully raised the issue of the government’s expulsion last
week of Paul Barker, the director in Sudan of the international aid
agency CARE” (New York Times [dateline: Juba, South Sudan], September
5, 2007). Ban was forced to declare that al-Bashir had simply
“reiterated the position of the Sudanese government,” viz. that
the country director for a distinguished humanitarian organization that
had operated in Sudan for more than 25 years was being expelled for
“espionage.” In fact, a range of sources make clear that Barker
was guilty only of assessing security threats to CARE’s humanitarian
workers in the field—a grim but critically necessary task in light of
ongoing insecurity that has claimed the lives of more than a dozen
humanitarian workers over the past year (four between April and June of
this year). Khartoum’s expulsion of Barker was a clear and deliberate
threat to humanitarian organizations: “you too will face expulsions,
harassment, or curtailment of your life-saving activities if you speak
too honestly about the security crisis in Darfur.”
But only the courageous, indeed heroic actions of organizations such as
CARE sustain the lives of millions of Darfuris now acutely at risk. The
figure for conflict-affected persons in Darfur—those in need of
humanitarian assistance—has hovered between 4.1 and 4.2 million in the
Darfur Humanitarian Profiles for this year. This very likely
understates the number (particularly among nomadic Arab groups) and
excludes the figure of 700,000 that OCHA uses for the conflict-affected
population of Eastern Chad. Approximately 2.5 million have been
uprooted from their homes—more (and perhaps many more) than 2.2
million as Internally Displaced Persons, another 250,000 as refugees in
Chad.
Ominously, the number of humanitarian workers in Darfur continues to
decline, even as human needs are greater than ever. There are 2,630
fewer aid workers in Darfur now compared with April 2006—a decline in
staff of 18%. At the same time, access continues to be severely
curtailed and the quality of humanitarian interventions has
deteriorated. DHP 28 notes that,
“The combination of armed clashes and attacks on humanitarians has
had a devastating effect on humanitarian access and the quality of
humanitarian interventions. Overland humanitarian field visits have
been reduced as a result of many hijackings and road ambushes and have
frequently been replaced by quick in-and-out air missions.”
At the same time, many of those who are conflict-affected have no
resources. The UN’s Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)
reports on an increasingly common phenomenon, as continuing displacement
overwhelms camp capacity, and Khartoum blocks the building of new
camps:
“Displaced people living in squalid shelters on the fringes of an
official displacement camp in Sudan’s North Darfur region lack relief
services as the official camp is full. Efforts by a visiting British
official this week to persuade local authorities to open a new site to
accommodate the overflow of Al Salaam camp near El Fasher, capital of
North Darfur state, failed.”
“Dozens of displaced families said they came here about 14 months ago
from villages in North Darfur, fleeing renewed fighting in the region,
but were not allowed to settle in the Al Salam camp proper, which
already hosts 50,000 IDPs.” (IRIN [dateline: el-Fasher], July 20,
2007)
But greatest concern is now focusing on violence in and around the
camps for Internally Displaced Persons, cauldrons of rage and despair
that are increasingly awash in weapons. The threat of explosive
violence draws ever nearer as these camps loom as the next “front
line” in Khartoum’s genocidal counter-insurgency war:
“Camps teeming with frustrated refugees in Sudan’s Darfur region have
become militarised and present a danger that cannot be ignored, a UN
official was quoted as saying on Thursday [August 30, 2007]. The UN’s
emergency relief coordinator, John Holmes, told the BBC the presence of
weapons in the camps and the proximity of the Sudanese military outside
refugee centres made for a potentially explosive situation.” (Reuters
[dateline: London], August 30, 2007)
Indeed, there have been a number of violent attacks on displaced
persons camps over the past two years (the terrible Janjaweed attack on
Aro Sharow displaced persons camp in West Darfur occurred in September
2005). Most recently and dangerously, the giant Kalma camp outside
Nyala (South Darfur) was the scene of a potentially deadly
confrontation, with significant consequences for the peace process:
“A government raid on Darfur’s volatile Kalma camp raised tensions in
Sudan’s remote west ahead of peace talks, as insurgents accused Khartoum
of trying to force people to leave the camps housing some 2 million
people. [ ] Rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) official Ahmed Abdel
Shafie said the attack on Kalma camp was a ‘clear indication’
Khartoum was not serious about talks and was pursuing a military
solution to the conflict.”
“A spokesman for Kalma camp, Abu Sharrad, denied any of those
arrested were involved in the attacks on police. Sharrad said camp
residents would demonstrate every day until those arrested were released
under UN auspices. Sharrad told Reuters on Wednesday [August 22, 2007]
six people were injured during the police operations and 30 were
arrested. ‘They destroyed six tents and arrested 30 people and looted
175 houses,’ he said. ‘The forces were from the police, army and
border intelligence.’”
“He criticised African Union forces, which have 7,000 troops and
police monitoring a shaky Darfur ceasefire. ‘We told both the United
Nations and the African Union what was happening yesterday and they did
not come for seven hours after the event,’ he said, adding the AU only
stayed a short while because the camp was still full of tear gas.”
(Reuters [dateline: Khartoum] August 22, 2007)
The trigger for outright conflict and pitched battles—between
Khartoum’s regular military, as well as paramilitary forces, and those
with weapons in the camps—is likely to be the regime’s effort to
compel displaced persons to return to their villages without adequate
security:
“Reports from Darfur suggest that the Sudanese government wants those
who fled violence to return to their villages. But many people in the
camps fear they will be attacked if they try to go back, and say they
will instead seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Aid workers have
been pressurised to help in sending villagers home, but UN officials
maintain that many areas are not safe to return to.” (The Telegraph
(UK) [dateline: Darfur], September 2, 2007)
Even so, Khartoum is making clear preparations for forced returns of
displaced persons, a longstanding ambition. Reuters reports ([dateline:
Khartoum], July 31, 2007) that “almost daily, state-owned media are
reporting that 30 or even 40 percent of Darfuris in camps are going back
home.” More recently Reuters reports that the percentage of returnees
claimed by Khartoum has gone up: “The government has declared Darfur
safe for people to return home and has said some 45 percent of those in
camps have gone back” (Reuters [dateline: Otash camp, South Darfur],
August 18, 2007). This deliberate misrepresentation prepares the way
for drastically reduced camp populations, no matter how violent the
means of reduction. The motive is clear to rebel leader Ahmed Abdel
Shafie: “Khartoum [is] trying to empty the camps to lessen
international attention on the conflict” (Reuters [dateline:
Khartoum], August 22, 2007).
Compounding this already highly dangerous situation is the steady
seizure of non-Arab or African farms and land by Arab groups from Chad,
Niger, and elsewhere in Sudan:
“The United Nations’ special envoy to Sudan’s embattled Darfur region
said in Khartoum that land-grabbing has created a ‘a ticking bomb.’
Envoy Jan Eliasson told Voice of America frustration, tension and anger
were mounting in refugee camps. [ ] ‘Also due to the fact that many of
the villages are being reoccupied by people who do not own that land …
this is like a ticking bomb,’ Eliasson said. ‘We need to stop that
process and instead move to the political talks, which in turn would
mean the beginning of normalization of the situation on the
ground.’” (United Press International [dateline: Khartoum],
September 4, 2007)
But there is no evidence of restraint on the part of either Khartoum or
those Arab groups orchestrating the seizure of African tribal lands and
villages. The Independent (UK) reported on July 14, 2007:
“Arabs from Chad and Niger are crossing into Darfur in
‘unprecedented’ numbers, prompting claims that the Sudanese
government is trying systematically to repopulate the war- ravaged
region. An internal UN report, obtained by The Independent, shows that
up to 30,000 Arabs have crossed the border in the past two months. Most
arrived with all their belongings and large flocks. They were greeted by
Sudanese Arabs who took them to empty villages cleared by government and
janjaweed forces.”
“One UN official said the process ‘appeared to have been well
planned.’ The official continued: ‘This movement is very large. We
have not seen such numbers come into west Darfur before.’” [ ]
“‘Most have been relocated by Sudanese Arabs to former villages of
IDPs (internally displaced people) and more or less invited to stay
there,’ said the UN official [from the UN High Commission for
Refugees]. The arrivals have been issued with official Sudanese identity
cards and awarded citizenship, and analysts say that by encouraging
Arabs from Chad, Niger and other parts of Sudan to move to Darfur the
Sudanese government is making it ‘virtually impossible’ for
displaced people to return home.”
The Independent also notes that these demographic ambitions could spark
extremely dangerous new violence:
“If Khartoum is moving Arabs from abroad to replace them, diplomats
fear that Darfur rebels may try to remove them forcibly. ‘It could be
quite explosive,’ said one western diplomat. ‘It is a very serious
situation.’”
As noted above, all this comes at a time when UN Assistant Secretary
General for Humanitarian Affairs Margareta Wahlstrom has pointed to an
unprecedented decline in the humanitarian situation:
“‘[Wahlstrom] says the humanitarian situation in Sudan’s western
Darfur region is worsening,’ [and that] ‘the problems have grown
even more critical in the past few months.’”
“Wahlstrom says aid workers are concerned that malnutrition is on the
rise in Darfur. She says several surveys indicate that, in certain
areas, about one-in-five people (17 percent) are malnourished. Wahlstrom
says there is a lean season every year in Darfur, but she says aid
workers have never seen this pattern of decline.”
Associated Press ([dateline: New York], August 31, 2007) also reports
on Wahlstrom’s concerns, particularly malnutrition:
“[Wahlstrom] said 18 spot surveys by UN agencies and nongovernmental
organizations in the three Darfur provinces all found that for the first
time in three years the number of malnutrition cases has increased
beyond the emergency threshold of 15 percent to ‘well over 17 percent
being detected in some areas.’ [ ] ‘This is the first time we see
the potential for a deterioration which we are very worried’ about,
she said.”
These conclusions should be seen in the context of even more troubling
data from UNICEF. The most recent “Darfur Nutrition Update,” Issue
9 (DNU-9) from UNICEF (covering the period May-June 2007), contains a
number of ominous findings from the six sites surveyed (the report is
available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/SJHG-75NA95?OpenDocument).
Perhaps most significantly, DNU-9 finds that “Global Acute
Malnutrition (GAM) rates exceeded the emergency threshold of 15 percent
(ranging from 17.2 to 30.4 percent) in all six [sites surveyed].”
“Mortality rates in two surveys (Otash Camp and Kass in South Darfur)
were above alert levels for both under-5 [year-olds] and crude mortality
[for the entire population]. The primary identified cause of death were
reported as diarrhoea (watery and bloody) and Acute Respiratory
Infection.”
“Admissions into Therapeutic Feeding Centres across Great Darfur
continue to increase, almost doubling compared to the last two months
and higher than those reported during the same period in 2006.”
Mortality implications are equally grim. In Kass town, the morality
rate for children under five was reported by UNICEF as 4.42/10,000/day.
In April 2006 UN OCHA estimated the conflict-affected population in the
Kass area to be almost 200,000. Assuming that the under-five population
in the region is approximately 10 percent of total population, and thus
approximately 20,000, this represents well over 200 excess deaths per
month. More than 200 children dying every month, in one location, from
conflict-generated causes. Kass may be worse than many other locations,
but it is not likely to be so for long. Darfur Humanitarian Profile No.
28 concludes on a note that finds no echo in the absurdly contrived
optimism of Ban Ki-moon:
“The humanitarian situation in Darfur has never looked as bleak as
now. The numbers of Internally Displaced Persons are at the highest
level ever, whilst there are good reasons to assume that these will
continue to rise over the next few months, given the continuous new
displacements triggered by wide-spread violence and insecurity. The
camps are packed, the rainy season is adding to the misery of the
internally displaced people, and some people who have fled their
villages are arriving in appalling conditions after weeks in the bush.
At the same time, the four years of conflict have seriously drained the
coping mechanisms of the non-displaced, resulting in ever-increasing
number of people in need of external aid.”
“For the first time since late 2004, malnutrition in many camps is
above the emergency threshold. The humanitarian community, itself
victim of continuous targeted attacks, is struggling to cope.”
Not included in this extraordinarily bleak conclusion is the terrible
fate of the people of Eastern Chad, both Darfuri refugees as well as
Chadian internally displaced persons and host communities, who suffer
from ever greater deprivation and violence. This past June Doctors
Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres sounded a clear and urgent
warning:
“In [Eastern] Chad 150,000 IDPs are caught up in a growing
humanitarian crisis. Although an MSF survey has confirmed the emergency
situation, assistance is still largely insufficient and MSF is coming up
against numerous obstacles to increasing its activities. In eastern
Chad, repeated deadly attacks on villages over the past 18 months have
forced tens of thousands of people to flee their homes. Grouped together
in camps where security is not always guaranteed, they live in basic
huts and lack food, water and access to medical care.”
“Epicentre, MSF’s research and epidemiological survey centre,
carried out a survey at the end of May in the camps around Goz Beida.
This survey revealed that one child in five was suffering from acute
malnutrition and that the mortality rates from March 30 to May 20, 2007,
were catastrophic.” (“While attention is focused on Darfur, an
emergency situation is unfolding in eastern Chad,” June 8, 2007)
The “realism” that Ban Ki-moon celebrates in himself must include
an ability to absorb and respond meaningfully to such realities. On his
present mission to Sudan, Ban gives little indication that he is the man
he claims to be.
* Eric Reeves is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide. He can be reached at [email protected]., website : www.sudanreeves.org