Genocide’s Victory
By Eric Reeves, The Boston Globe
December 8, 2007 — The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated
genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now
poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region’s African
populations.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1769, adopted in July,
authorized a force of 26,000 troops and civilian police to protect
Darfur’s civilians and the humanitarian groups serving some 4.2 million
desperate people. Without protection, these groups will be forced to
withdraw. But Khartoum has obstructed the force authorized by the UN,
and final success in these efforts seems within grasp. On Nov. 26,
Jean-Marie Guéhenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping, raised the
prospect that the UN-authorized force for Darfur may have to be aborted
because of Khartoum’s actions.
Guéhenno asked a question that answered itself: “Do we move ahead with
the deployment of a force that will not make a difference, that will not
have the capability to defend itself and that carries the risk of
humiliation of the Security Council and the United Nations and tragic
failure for the people of Darfur?”
The unprecedented UN/African Union “hybrid” mission for Darfur (UNAMID)
has been badly hurt by the refusal of militarily capable nations to
provide the two dozen helicopters required, at the least, for operations
in Darfur. No NATO country has offered even one helicopter – a sign
that, despite fulsome rhetoric, these nations’ real concern for Darfur
is minimal. But it is Khartoum’s brazen obduracy that threatens to leave
the people of Darfur without protection.
Months after Resolution 1769 authorized the present peace support
operation to Darfur, and more than a year after a previous council
resolution authorized a similar operation, Khartoum is still objecting
to the roster of countries that are to provide troops, police, and
specialists. Khartoum refuses to grant landing rights to heavy transport
aircraft or allow night flights (critical for both civilian protection
and medevac needs); refuses to grant adequate access to Port Sudan; and
refuses to grant adequate land or water rights in arid Darfur. Khartoum
also demands the right to shut down UNAMID communications during its own
military operations – an unacceptable condition.
What will happen if the UN gives up on UNAMID? Utter catastrophe. A
weak, undermanned African Union mission currently serves as the only
protection in Darfur. This demoralized force is barely functioning,
simply trying to hold on until Dec. 31, when its mission is supposed to
fold into UNAMID. But given Khartoum’s obstructionism, this transfer
will be at best symbolic: There may be UN sponsorship, but no meaningful
deployment of UN troops or resources. Once it is clear that a meaningful
UNAMID is not deploying, African nations will quickly withdraw their
overmatched troops, which have already endured an unconscionable number
of casualties.
With no international presence – by the UN, the AU, or aid organizations
– nothing will constrain Khartoum, or the rebels, or various armed
elements and bandits. Confrontations between Khartoum’s forces,
including its Janjaweed militia allies, and increasingly militarized
camps for displaced persons will escalate quickly. Khartoum is likely to
use its bombers and helicopter gunships in such battles, ensuring
massively disproportionate civilian casualties.
UNAMID was badly conceived. Its command-and-control structure is
ambiguous. It relies too much on African nations that cannot provide
enough fully-equipped, self-sufficient troops and civilian police. The
“hybrid” nature of the mission was itself a poorly calculated concession
to Khartoum. But this mission is now the only arrow in the quiver: There
is no other force on the horizon, no other means for protecting
civilians and humanitarians. If NATO nation24 helicopters, they are hardly likely to participate in any
non-consensual deployment of force to Darfur.
UNAMID must succeed. If it does not, how long it will be before Darfur
slides into cataclysmic destruction, with no means of halting that
slide? This is the stark choice before the international community: Is
it prepared to see the mission fail? Or will it rally the resources and
exert the pressure on Khartoum, both of which are critical to the
mission’s success?
Eric Reeves is a professor at Smith College and author of “A Long Day’s
Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide”