INTERVIEW: Sudan opposition leader says ruling party under pressure
By Wasil Ali
December 9, 2007 (KHARTOUM) — A Sudanese opposition recently released after four months of detention, said that the government is under intense pressure domestically and internationally.
Mubarak al-Fadil, leader of the Umma Reform and Renewal told Sudan Tribune that Sudanese authorities knew that there was no evidence against him but wanted to extend his detention time for political reasons.
The former presidential assistant was arrested along with a number of retired army generals, including retired general Mohamed Ali Hamid, who worked as deputy director of security in the late eighties, as well as former minister of tourism, Abdel-Jalil al-Basha.
A total of 28 people were arrested in the alleged coup attempt but Al-Fadil was released abruptly last week hours before his trial.
Al-Fadil said that the decision to release him was not made by Sudan’s justice minister but by other senior officials. He also disclosed that the Egyptian and Libyan leaders intervened personally to secure his release.
The opposition leader said that the crisis in Sudan are stemming from the unwillingness of the National Congress Party (NCP) of honoring the agreements they sign. He further said that the crisis between the NCP and SPLM is a result of this strategy.
Al-Fadil said that the deadlock between the SPLM and NCP is primarily over the control over oil fields in the Abyei region. He said that the NCP is not willing to give up control over the region as it would weaken them financially and politically.
He called on the deployment of international peacekeepers into Darfur and disarming both sides of the conflict before any peace talks can commence. He said that the notorious Jinjaweed militias are now rebelling against the government in Darfur.
The following is the text of the interview
NO EVIDENCE AGAINST ME SINCE DAY 1
– Can you tell us about the treatment you received while in detention?
Al-Fadil: Sudan National Security and Intelligence Service have their own section in Kober prison where I was held. Every two prison cells in that section have their own yard and restroom. The purpose of this division is to prepare the detainees for solitary confinement. The practice of Sudan security has always been to jail detainees separately. This section is highly controlled and even the Kober prison guards have no access to it. I was allowed to leave my prison cell to use the bathroom or perform my prayers only; otherwise I was always locked up and did not meet with other prisoners.
Of course some of the other people who were detained as part of the alleged coup attempt had their hands and legs cuffed and they were also blindfolded sitting under the tree. They detailed that in their personal accounts that they have written.
Personally I was subject to the verbal abuse by security officials. They threatened me with torture but they did not go that far. They told me that if I didn’t cooperate “we will deal with you”. Basically they were trying to extract a confession out of me.
– What evidence did they confront you with during the investigation?
Al-Fadil: The first day they came up with false documents talking about a coup attempt planned for the Thursday following my arrest. They read me a document, outlining the formation of the new government following the success of the coup in which I was supposed to be the president. In reality they had nothing against me.
Then they showed me a statement purportedly written by me that was to be read following the success of the coup. I told them this is a fabricated one since it makes no mention of the Darfur crisis, democratic transformation or the Comprehensive Peace agreement (CPA) or the economy.
However the next day they withdrew this piece of evidence and told me that I collaborated with retired General Mohamed Ali Hamid in planning the coup attempt.
I told them that I knew Hamid in the last months of the democratically elected government in 1989 when he was deputy security director. I had no personal relationship with him nor did I see him for over 18 years. Hamid requested a meeting with me a year and a half ago and appealed for financial support to a new party he was planning to create. However I politely declined his request and that was the end of it.
The rest of the investigation afterwards was just focused on the conversation we had during that meeting. They took the statements from General Mohamed Ali Hamid and Abdel-Jalil Al-Basha on the meeting that matched what I told them. After that they raided my office to take pictures of the “meeting place”. I was present during the raid along with Hamid and Al-Basha.
At that point they knew that they could not come up with any incriminating evidence. I even made a joke to them saying that our situation is similar to the story of a famous Egyptian movie that talks about two ordinary citizens who got into a simple fight and ended up getting accused of trying to overthrow the government.
One of the investigators then approached me saying “Shall I tell you a secret? We are done with your investigation”. That was a month after my arrest. Sudan security officers questioned me for over two weeks, on and off. However during the second day of interrogations, the security officers tried to resolve my issue politically but their leadership declined. They knew they had no case against me and so they tried to find a way out of it.
– Who specifically rejected a political settlement to your case?
Al-Fadil: I believe it was Salah Gosh, the head of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service. The chairman of the investigation committee came up and told me that we want to resolve the matter politically. I suggested to him that if they insist that Al-Basha is involved in this plot, then they should let me talk to him and find out what the real story is in order to prevent any possible bloodshed. In return for that, Al-Basha was to be set free. I told him that our party’s principles have always been against sabotage plots. He was pleased with what I said but he never got back with me on this proposal. Apparently the response from his leadership came back negative.
On July 25, which was the last time I met the security officers, they called me up and told me that they will submit a report saying that my case is a political one and should be resolved politically. They even told me that I can be a useful political force in the future.
However there was insistence from their leadership on pressing the case against me.
– Despite the lack of evidence against you why did they insist on keeping you in jail?
Al-Fadil: All this time the authorities were trying to find a reason to keep me in jail for the longest time possible. This had nothing to do with the plot. However I do believe they had a worst scenario for me in the works, since they started talking about assassination attempts and blowing up strategic locations in Khartoum as part of the alleged plot.
– But why did they target you in particular?
Al-Fadil: I think that the whole thing was to distract people from the fact that they accepted the Darfur peacekeeping force after their fierce rejection. Second they wanted to stop the reunification of the Umma party which was alarming them. Moreover they think that my party is very active politically and given their bad political situation they wanted to get rid of us at least until the 2009 elections or even forever.
The other thing they had in the back of their minds was that I have contacts with international powers and that I advise them of the political situation inside Sudan.
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ALLEGED COUP PLOT
– The Sudanese government said that you sought Libyan support for the coup attempt. Have you had any contacts with the Libyans before your arrest?
Al-Fadil: That is all baseless. In the beginning they accused the Libyans of direct involvement then they changed this version of the story. Mohamed Atta, deputy chief of Sudan’s Security and Intelligence Bureau, initially told reporters that Libya was involved in the plot. Even during their investigations with me they accused Libya of aiding me and that I was marketing the coup to them. The truth of the matter that there was no coup attempt and therefore no such thing as Libyan involvement.
– So the Libyans did not notify the Sudanese government of the alleged coup attempt?
Al-Fadil: I highly doubt it. One of the security officers told me that the Libyans inquired from them, not told them, of whether there was anything unusual going on as far as military movements.
– Did this contact between Libyans and Sudanese take place before or after your arrest?
Al-Fadil: I am not sure when this contact took place, but this is what they told me during the investigations. However I am very skeptical of this story. I think these were all attempts to show that they have some sort of proof.
I think it all comes down to those retired military officers who were around 89,000 and growing into a very politically active group. They were holding meetings and forums which was worrying the government. I believe that the arrest of the alleged coup plotters which included some of those retired military officers was intended to scare them from being politically active. Those retirees do not have any forces or weapons to carry out a coup. The government’s idea was that those people agreed with the Hawazma tribe to launch a military offensive to take over the capital. Since Al-Basha is from Hawazma they arrested him. This is a very naive and unbelievable story.
– What made the government make the surprise decision to release you?
Al-Fadil: The Sudanese justice minister Mohamed Ali al-Mardi disregarded his duty and started working on orders from Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service. It has always been the case that once you question Al-Mardi’s professionalism and impartiality, he starts getting aggressive and very vocal. Throughout my case he was very aggressive; refusing all legal petitions for my release despite the clear lack of evidence.
– So you are saying that all this time he was acting on orders from Sudan security?
Al-Fadil: Exactly, and like I mentioned before their sole purpose was to keep me in jail for the longest amount of time possible. Al-Mardi kept us in detention for 18 days without being charged. When we appealed the unlawful extension of detention, he inserted a charge in the log book of the case. This of course, is legal. We as prisoners have no access to the log book. Moreover the charges should be made in our presence and we are entitled to an appeal within seven days in accordance with the law. But he ignored the law because the security services and their agents in the judiciary.
When the orders from higher came up to release me Al-Mardi was in Cairo en-route to Tehran. His deputy called him up and notified him of the decision. But Al-Mardi told his deputy not to sign the release decision until he returns. However they told him that if they were to hold the decision until he comes back then it had to be by tomorrow. As a result Al-Mardi cancelled his visit to Tehran in order sign the decision to release me. He simply wanted to get the credit for releasing me even though he was very staunch about keeping me in jail. The committee he formed in my case was supposed to evaluate the evidence and decide who to charge. In the write up of his release decision, Al-Mardi said that there was “absolutely no evidence” against me despite his earlier statements of charges being brought. He was simply contradicting himself every step of the way.
– Did you have personal relationship with Al-Mardi when was a member of the Umma party back in the days?
Al-Fadil: Not at all. Even when he was in the Umma party I had no special relations with him. I used to think of him as an “opportunistic” person.
– Were there any international efforts to release you?
Al-Fadil: The Egyptians told me that president Hosni Mubarak spoke directly to the Sudanese president on my case twice already. The first visit made by my family was upon intervention of Mubarak. Even the Libyans told us that Muammar Gadhafi mentioned it to Al-Bashir during his last visit to Sirte. Al-Bashir promised both Mubarak and Gadhafi that he would release me.
The delegation of the elders formed by Nelson Mandela that included, South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and U.N. veteran former envoy Lakhdar Brahimi were also active on my case. I have a personal relationship with all three of them and particularly Brahimi. The latter told Al-Bashir that there is no legal basis for accusations against me and that one of my lawyers happen to me his legal adviser in Iraq.
POLITICAL CRISIS BETWEEN SPLM AND NCP
– During the time you were in detention the disagreement between the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP) developed into a full blown political crisis. What is your opinion on that?
Al-Fadil: I think this whole thing is complicated with the attitude of the NCP. We have been through this with the NCP and we tried to prepare the SPLM for that. The NCP will sign an agreement with you but at the same time they “want to have the cake and eat it all”. So the NCP are acting as if they are the only members of the government. At the same time the NCP’s decision making process is limited to very few figures and outside the NCP instiution.
– Who are those “few figures”?
Al-Fadil: I think this includes 2nd vice president Ali Osman Taha, Presidential adviser Nafi Ali Nafi, Energy minister Awad al-Jaz and of course the head of Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service Salah Gosh who is the prime executor of the government’s decisions. This may also include people such as the undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mutrif Siddig.
– What about Sudanese president Omar Hassan Al-Bashir?
Al-Fadil: Al-Bashir gives those people the power but does not necessarily take part in these decisions. He willingly delegates his power to them.
– What is the way out from this deadlock between SPLM and NCP?
Al-Fadil: The issues in question are very big ones. The most crucial one is the control over the oil fields. The party that can take over the oil fields “can call the shot” and will be China’s future trading partner. The Sudanese army units and the special oil field protection forces created by the energy minister Al-Jaz withdrew from these areas. The Joint forces are now the ones patrolling the region and of course the SPLA has a strong presence there. At any point the SPLM may decide to close down the oilfields and establish their own pipeline. The control over the oilfields is the most important issue because it is the only lifeline for the NCP since their spending has expanded dramatically.
Secondly there is the issue of Abyei which is not simply a matter of Messiriyah and Dinka. This is largely a dispute over oil. The oilfields in Abyei such as Heglig and Dafra are the largest of its kind in the country. They produce $600 million worth of oil a year which means that the SPLM will get 42 of it and the natives another 8%. This all adds up to $300 million that the NCP will lose in annual revenue.
Third there is issue of the Messiriyah tribe who want access to the cattle grazing pastures which are deep south of Abyei and they are not necessarily concerned with the dispute over the oil rich area.
So at the end of the day it all comes down to oil. What has been pumped in oil from the Abyei region so far is over $2 billion. Therefore if the Abyei protocol was to be implemented retroactively then the NCP will have to pay the SPLM $1 billion upfront. This will make the NCP very vulnerable financially since they are totally reliant on oil and their spending has grown astronomically specially on security. In the last budget the SPLM objected to the fact that most of the money is allocated to security and defense. The Abyei dispute involves $1 billion in arrears as well as $300 million going forward.
Finally is the issue of political transformation which means the NCP has to dismantle the one party state and relinquish its control over the state bodies.
For these issues to be resolved, the NCP has to be serious about making concessions.
SECURITY REQUIRED FIRST FOR DARFUR CRISIS RESOLUTION
– How do you see the Darfur crisis today?
Al-Fadil: The Darfur crisis has been handled incorrectly by the international community. The Sudanese government wants a clandestine agreement that would offer the rebel figures ministerial posts while maintaining the status quo.
The rebel groups are in themselves are what I call “protesting movements” meaning they have no deeply benched organizational structure which is why they split so easily.
I think that Abdel-Wahid Nur’s [head of Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)] position, despite being extreme one, is the most realistic one. The most important thing in Darfur is to bring security and disarm both sides of the conflict. You also have to build governing local bodies and begin a reconciliation initiative as well as development projects, else no solution will work. Only after you do all that can you move to a political settlement. All Darfur groups have to be present for any peace to work since the rebel groups are not representatives of all Darfuris.
I think the peacekeeping force is needed to neutralize combatants and assist refugees in returning to their homelands.
– So you support the deployment of peacekeeping force in Darfur?
Al-Fadil: Definitely. There is no way to keep the peace and stop the bloodshed without a robust force.
– There has been talk about an attempt by Sudan to encourage resettlement of Arab tribes in Darfur. What information do you have on that?
Al-Fadil: Generally there has been a huge influx of migrants from West Africa into Sudan given the size of its economy and the fact that borders are open. The Sudanese government has been very lax on the issue of immigration and border control so the presence of Africans has grown in Sudan.
In Darfur there are Arab tribes from other countries and the government has armed them as part of Jinjaweed militia. It is the custom for these to conduct raids and drive people from their lands.
– So this is a natural movement of tribes?
Al-Fadil: This is not natural. This has been complicated by the fact that the governments funded and armed them. The new development is that the Jinjaweed militia which was integrated in the border patrol forces is rebelling against the government.
In South Kordofan a Jinjaweed group led by Mohamed Ali Hamiditi defected from the government along with his 20,000 heavily armed supporters. Last week the government bombarded him using the air force.
Hamiditi felt that the government abandoned him after they accepted the peacekeeping force as well as the fact that they are not paying them as they are used to so they rebelled in Zalingi region. They blocked the road between Nyala and Zalingi.
There are reports that Hamiditi’s group are currently coordinating with Khalil Ibrahim from Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Abdel-Wahid Nur from Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM).
There is also another Jinjaweed group that defected from the notorious tribal leader Musa Hilal and ambushed government troops killing large numbers of them and fled to the mountains close to Kabkabiya region.
So now the crisis is complicated by the fact that Arab tribes are revolting against the government.
– What is your party’s position on the International Criminal Court (ICC) work in Darfur?
Al-Fadil: We support the court and what is doing. Justice has to be done. Back in 2005 when the issue of Darfur war crimes came into surface a group of prominent Sudanese lawyers told the government to establish special tribunals headed by retired judges. They also recommended that the Sudanese law be modified to incorporate punishment on crimes against humanity and genocide. The trials as they suggested was to be monitored by the international community. But the government ignored the call and so the ICC has to step in
– You were once a member of the government and an assistant to the president. Do you regret this role?
Al-Fadil: We evaluated our participation in the government and we think it had its pros and cons. One of the advantages is that it gave us an opportunity to take part in the peace talks leading to the CPA and involving in dialogue with international players. Another advantage is that we realized that there is no such thing as NCP. The base of decision making in the NCP is very narrow and limited to few powerful figures. We also managed to help ordinary citizens since the NCP only care about power and not the welfare of their people.
REUNIFICATION OF UMMA PARTY FACTIONS IS CLOSE
– Are you getting close to uniting with the Umma party led by former Sudanese Prime Minister and leader of the opposition Umma party Sadiq al-Mahdi?
Al-Fadil: There was a committee working on the issue of reunification of the Umma party for over three years now. Al-Sadiq said that we should the throw the past behind us and proposed to proceed with either reunification or alliance at the minimum. He also proposed a workshop to create the reunification mechanism and I agreed to that. When the members of the workshop met, the chairwoman Balqees Badri said that this will take a long time and this unacceptable given the current situation of the party and the country. She proposed that the reunification should take place immediately and that workshop should convene at a later date. They told me their new proposal 2 days before I was arrested so the process was interrupted. The committee visited me in jail on how the reunification process can go forward. I suggested that both sides should meet in the general assembly scheduled for January.
I proposed two things; First the committee preparing for the general assembly should contain representatives from our party and that it should be headed by a figure agreeable to both sides. Secondly there is a tradition in the Umma party that the membership of executive bodies is not subject to reelection by the popular base. I wanted the same rule to apply to our party leaders which is around 300 people and that they should be part of the general assembly. After that our own popular base will join the party.
Also the Umma party has a legality issue since they never registered under the new party law in Sudan. They objected to that saying that they will have to register as a new party or else they can’t run for elections. We already did that in 2002 under the exception granted by Al-Bashir who allowed all parties to operate if they had representation in the last elected parliament as long as they deposit their paperwork with the authorities. We registered under the Umma party as a continuation of the original party founded in 1954. We told them that we will pass the title on to you [Al-Sadiq faction] and put that in an agreement. In the interim we will create a committee and call the political crisis committee headed by Al-Sadiq with me as his deputy and members from their leaders and ours. We work together in the framework of national politics. This is to bring us together and provide for a smooth transition before the general assembly.
The committee said that my proposals are acceptable but they had a problem with the fact that I will Al-Sadiq will sign an agreement as my counterpart. I told them that I have no problems with the way the agreement will come out as long as it contains the beforementioned items.
To be frank with you there has been overwhelming demand from people from the Umma party and others for unification of the two factions. It almost became an obsession in a manner that I have never seen before so I feel that this is a responsibility.
(ST)