Sudan’s CPA needs implementation no renegotiations
Sudan’s CPA needs no re-negotiations but political will for its full implementations.
By Paul Bor Gatwech*
December 12, 2007 — Following recent move by the SPLM to freeze its participation in the Government of National Unity as step to pressure notorious NCP to implement outstanding clauses in CPA, NCP cliques have been allegedly accusing SPLM of fearing to negotiate disputed issues in the CPA. They (NCP) adamantly alleged that SPLM is lacking skills in negotiations in the process of implementing the CPA and now resort to “unfounded measures” such as the recent withdrawal from participation in the Government of National Unity (GONU). This move was again exacerbated by unexpected and unnecessary suggestions by US Secretary of State Condi Rice to SPLM Chairman comrade Salva Kiir to bring in the US, China and Saudi Arabia to open-up another Naivasha for re-negotiations of the remaining unimplemented 10 percent of the CPA as a gesture to ease the standoff between the two parties to the CPA.
Moreover, Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, former foreign Minster of the GOS, was asked after the signing of the CPA wether NCP will accept the outcome of the referendum if southerners decides to break from the north. His answer strange enough was that “they will ask their brothers from the south to go back to the negotiating table”.
In reality, the current peace agreement that has succinctly transformed the political climate of the Sudan took a decade to be positively concluded. It was started with Abuja’s I and II peace talks in early 90s which subsequently broke down but resurrected after the United States Congress passed the Sudan Peace Act in 2001 after intense pressure on American government by Afro-American and Christian groups in the United States. It has consumed a formidable time, resources and human talents to become a just peace that addresses core issues that attempts to tear down this nation.
The comprehensive Peace Agreement is an agreement that explicitly stands out simply because it was negotiated through external pressures and has addressed the central problem of the Sudan. Many agreements were negotiated and signed but were dishonoured just because the guarantors were Khartoum regimes. However, during the last round of north-south Sudan conflict, both SPLM and NCP believe that the solution to Sudan problem would be solved ONLY when one defeat the other in the battle field. But the truth of the matter is that the nature and cause of the conflict in the Sudan is so complicated that no one from the two parties could defeat the other and unite the Sudan unilaterally: it is about race, God and oil.
Succinctly, the Sudan problem is not about politics but survival- who is in control, which makes it profoundly hard at the moment for either the south or the north to submit and be ruled for fear of ones security and interest- making united Sudan impossible.
Nevertheless, the country Sudan is blessed to arrive at this stage through the provisions given by the CPA in which I can argue that this document gives life to Sudan and follows the Bible and Quran in the context of peace, unity and prosperity of the nation. It was a comprehensively and rigorously negotiated document that has explicitly addressed most of the century long Sudan’s socio-political externalities.
Both SPLM and NCP, in additions to most Sudanese people, agree that CPA is relevant and remains the only cure to stagnated and polarised political situation of the country and should be implemented fully.
But the question is why NCP tend to drag its feet or selectively implement this popular agreement? Does CPA happen to be a threat to NCP as ruling party at some points? And why did it allow those clauses that threatened its existences and influence in the first place to be included in CPA? Or is it logical to sign the agreement before its negotiated fully? Or are there some agreements which are complicated to extend that people need to sign them while some of the clauses are being implemented through continuous negotiations. And finally is CPA an incomplete agreement that need to be continuously negotiated even if already signed?
There are several points I want to explore or highlight to briefly answer the above questions.
Firstly, even though NCP and SPLM own the CPA, they realistically know that it was just forced on them by the external factors. The issue of September 11 and the unprecedented long suffering of the ordinary people of south, Nuba Mountains and the eastern Sudan forced the international community to increase pressure on two parties to end the war: the stance of the US was either the two parties agree to make peace or shall work to end their existence in Sudan.
Secondly, NCP believes that they still have possibilities to find their own ways in controlling the affairs of the Sudan and due to the staunch pressure from the north on concessions made in CPA; they tend to be selective in implementing the agreement.
In reality, CPA remains a threat to old ways Sudan used to be governed. It is therefore a threat to NCP ideology, policies and principles to some extend in which it some times prefers to abrogate it.
However, as said by late comrade Garang, the costs of implementing CPA are much easier and cheaper than abrogating it to both parties. Also, it is not wise to open-up CPA for negotiation again. This initiative can bring total collapse of the agreement due to the fact that NCP is determined to by-path some contentious clauses stipulated in the agreement, the remaining 10 percent. They agreed to sign those clauses in the first place due to the internal and external pressures they faced during the negotiations in which they are now vigorously looking for windows to scape from such.
On the other hand, southern Sudanese felt that most of their aspirations are addressed in the CPA and are determined to work towards full implementation or back to war. There is no room for any new negotiation. Either CPA has to be fully implemented in spirit and letter or else it is not impossible for the south to unilaterally implement the remaining 10 percent. The south cannot afford to open-up another negotiation table where the implemented 90 per cent will be distorted with the remaining 10 per cent making peace unachievable dream in the Sudan.
* The author is a Sudanese living in Australia and can be reached through [email protected]