A rebuttal to Mr. Bona Malual

Why the SPLM’s Forceful Stance was Overdue

By Parek Maduot

December 13, 2007 — It is instructive that the latest broadside leveled against the SPLM by our veteran politician and elder Bona Malual coincides with the partial resolution of the impasse between the SPLM and the National Congress Party. It is illustrative of the paradox between the historic postures that Southerners have taken in confronting the hegemony and political muscle flexing of the successive Northern regimes. Generally, the Northern governments have dictated the terms of any resolution of any complaints raised by aggrieved Southerners and other marginalized peoples because they have always been conceded the right of ruling and determining the course for the rest of the country. The historic decision of the SPLM to bring the issues of the implementation of the CPA to light forcefully and unequivocally turned this trend on its head, and provided the NCP with the first politically coherent and principled counterweight from what it assumed would be another docile partner. Of course, the fact that the NCP and many other forces and personalities in Sudan were shocked by the SPLM’s stance provided proof of how deep seated the twin senses of Northern entitlement and lingering Southern acquiescence are.

There are many rebuttals that can be marshaled against the charges directed at the SPLM and its leadership with regards to the singular issue of suspending participation in the Government of National Unity, but I want to stress a fundamental thread that runs through Mr. Bona Malual’s long address. Implicit in Mr. Malual’s critique of the SPLM is a deep apprehension and dismay with the audacity of the Movement’s demands. That same apprehension lies behind his well documented skepticism and hostility to the concept of New Sudan, as articulated by the SPLM over the last two decades and a half of struggle against the regimes in Khartoum. Equally implicit is a veiled criticism of the leadership for allowing the Movement’s stances and positions to be influenced by the small minded sentiments of the people. That is very clear in the very second paragraph of the address, when he concedes that what he is about to utter will be met with disappointment by fellow Southerners. It is clear that the fact that the Movement’s position is overwhelmingly popular among Southerners and others is not lost on Mr. Bona Malual.

These two currents drive the rest of the address, and should be closely examined. The audacity charge is something all members of the SPLM and the wider community of Sudanese have been hoping for since the beginning of this partnership with the NCP, and it is something to be proud of. The very foundation of the Movement is built upon the audacious expansion of it objectives to address the Southern suffering in the hands of the successive Northern regimes by framing it as a symptom of a fundamentally regressive and cliquish ruling apparatus intent on marginalizing everyone else. So it was the hope of all likeminded Sudanese that the SPLM would not rest on its laurels once it got to share in the partnership, but that it would extend that audacity of vision into every cranny and nook of the institutions it joined. After the Movement joined the Government, the traditional course of appeasing and disregarding the intransigence of the NCP was given as much time as it could ever deserve to bear fruit. The experience with the Ministry of Energy and Mining was the first volley in the war of attrition against the CPA by the NCP, and despite initial skepticism, the leadership conceded the point in the spirit of letting the process start. Needless to say, the worst fears of the pessimists were confirmed and it only got worse after that. It is therefore incredible that Mr. Malual thinks that a more fundamental challenge to the NCP’s feet dragging on the CPA was not warranted, even after more than two years since the commencement of the implementation phase. It is moreover clear that Mr. Malual believes that the SPLM has essentially brought woe to the South by instigating a feared bully like the NCP. Here is an interesting quote:

Even now, the situation in South Sudan remains so fragile and the NCP still has the means and the potential of rocking the boat in the South, if it comes to the conclusion, that under the leadership of the SPLM, South Sudan is nothing but a trouble for them. For the people of South Sudan, the question in the mind of many of them these days, must be where the SPLM is leading them to, under the CPA.

Now, this in itself provides proof of the very grievances that the SPLM argued needed to be resolved comprehensively before the partnership can resume. It is an outright concession from Mr. Malual that the NCP is so devious and so ill-intentioned against the South that it could rock the boat in the South because of the SPLM’s actions. Of course, this is not news to any Sudanese of age, but what is incredible is that the SPLM would be criticized for forcefully protesting against such tactics and actions from such a political party. At any rate, we all know that the potential destabilization of the South by the NCP has been tried and will continue to be tried, regardless of what the SPLM does in the corridors of power in Khartoum. The only way such schemes could be precluded is for the SPLM to become an active stooge of the NCP in destroying the South. Thankfully, that prospect is unlikely as long as the leaders of the SPLM place the fate and sentiments of their constituencies at the top of their agendas.

This is a good segue to the issue of blindly acceding to the sentiments of the people as to what represents a nationalist stance by a Southern leader. All over the world, Politicians lead because of the mandate from the people, and not because of their innate ability to single-handedly foresee the right course. While everyone is entitled to their opinion, his address is full of positions that are anathema to the bulk of Southern Sudanese. In the issue of Abyei, he says that it alone should not return people to war. By implication, I would say that he equally believes that the border issue, the redeployment of forces, the oil proceeds, the other two transitional ares, and other clauses in the agreement should not cause a return to war if they are violated or completely frozen. The idea underpinning this position is that any forceful haggling over the details and protocols above will endanger the singular objective of reaching the self-determination date and voting then. This is rather curious, because how can you ensure that a party that violates critical components of an accord would ultimately stand to the side and allow you to exercise the historic right to self determination. If we all agree that the crux of the Abyei issue is the oil flowing there, why would the NCP stubbornly refuse to resolve it because of the fear of losing revenue now, while at the same time allow the South to aimlessly stumble its way to a vote in 2011 that potentially deprives it of the so called 50% of the oil its is receiving now. Mr. Malual has appropriately counseled discussion as a way to resolve the issue, and that is what the SPLM has always committed itself to even after the freezing of participation in the government. However, discussion does not mean a blank concession to the NCP’s rejection of what it committed itself to in Naivasha, and certainly does not mean accepting elaborate schemes to curve out areas to please the NCP and its allies. Moreover, the charge of war drumming is one that is thrown around, but there isn’t any documented instance of the SPLM calling for a return to war because of Abyei or any other instance. In fact, the consistent pleas of the SPLM were always directed at urging the other partner to implement the agreement, only to be met by calls to mobilize Mujahideen and press propaganda about fictitious SPLA troops invading from the South.

The experience of the Movement in the Government of National Unity provides further proof of a truism that applies to all political movements, including the NCP. The NCP has the same appetite and propensity to push to dominate as much of the field as the other players are willing to concede. Anchored by its principles and stated objectives, the SPLM and others should push back as hard within the parameters of the political arena that is ushered in by the CPA. The just and correct equilibrium position would then be reached by both parties that, at a minimum, binds them to their commitments in the Peace agreement. The Movement did all the people of Sudan proud by pushing back against the tide of the NCP, and that has borne fruit in the form of a renewed agreement from the NCP to get back to implementing its part of the agreement. That remains an agreement, like the broader CPA, that the NCP has be held accountable to with the same resoluteness exhibited by the SPLM recently.

The author residing in the US. He can be reached at [email protected]