What Alternative to UNAMID Will Provide Security for Darfur? (1)
If the Khartoum regime successfully resists the force authorized by
Security Council Resolution 1769, will there be any security for Darfur
in three months? Six months? (Part 1 of 2)
By Eric Reeves
December 22, 2007 — There can be little doubt that the peace support operation authorized
in July 2007 by UN Security Council Resolution 1769 is inadequate for
the immensely challenging tasks of civilian and humanitarian protection
in Darfur. The force is not what it should be, either in mandate or
resources, in its confusingly “hybrid” nature and command structure,
or in its terribly belated creation. The security environment in Darfur
has deteriorated dramatically since passage of a stillborn predecessor,
the robust force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1706
(August 2006). International failure to push for deployment of this
earlier and much more timely force set a grim precedent: never before
had an authorized UN peacekeeping force failed to deploy.
But a similar fate may very well befall the current UN-authorized force
(UNAMID). Deployment has been virtually paralyzed by the Khartoum
regime’s calculated obstructionism and by the refusal of militarily
capable nations to provide critically needed tactical and transport
helicopters, as well as ground transport capacity. The likelihood of
successful deployment has diminished by the day since passage of
Resolution 1769 almost five months ago. And the longer Khartoum delays
meaningful deployment, the greater the chances for outright failure of
the mission or, just as likely, a decision by the UN to abort the
mission entirely rather than risk such failure. The UN’s head of
peacekeeping operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, posed on November 26, 2007
a question that answered itself:
“Do we move ahead with the deployment of a force that will not make a
difference, that will not have the capability to defend itself and that
carries the risk of humiliation of the Security Council and the United
Nations and tragic failure for the people of Darfur?”
But this question forces another: is there an alternative to UNAMID if
we are serious about protecting civilian lives in Darfur? Is there
another way for the international community to provide security for the
humanitarian organizations that are on the verge of withdrawing from
Darfur in the absence of a force capable of protecting their personnel
and operations from relentlessly increasing violence? Of course there
is not, a fact unacknowledged by those who regard the UN-authorized
force as already a “failure” or, in the words of Ban Ki-moon’s key
advisor Jeffery Sachs, a “waste of money.” Nor is there any chance
that a peace settlement will be reached in time to make the challenges
to the “hybrid” UN/African Union force less strenuous. Laurie
Nathan, an advisor to the African Union during the ill-fated Abuja peace
talks, with their culmination in the disastrous Darfur Peace Agreement,
has put the matter with appropriate force and insight, indeed offers an
indispensable moment of clarity:
“The UN and the AU insist there is no military solution to the Darfur
crisis. They contend that any solution has to be political, in the form
of a negotiated settlement. At the very least, the long anticipated
deployment of a peacekeeping force requires a ceasefire agreement so
that there is a peace to be kept.”
“While this argument might be correct in principle, it is tragically
wrong in practice. A negotiated settlement for Darfur is out of reach.
In the absence of clear political agreement, there are only two
strategies that hold any prospect of providing relief to the people of
Darfur: a robust peace operation that vigorously provides protection to
civilians, and concrete pressure on Khartoum to abstain from
violence.”
“This was obvious in 2006, it remains obvious today and it will be no
less obvious in 2008. The question that matters most now is whether the
UN and the AU have the stomach to pursue these strategies.”
(Globe and Mail [Canada], November 16, 2007; co-authored by Robert
Muggah, research director of the Small Arms Survey)
What should be continually borne in mind in discussing the need for
civilian security in Darfur is the desperate plight of humanitarian
organizations, which have begun to draw down their key expatriate staff
in significant numbers. More than 4.2 million people in Darfur are
defined by the UN as “conflict-affected” and in need of humanitarian
assistance; many are completely dependent upon aid organizations for
food, clean water, shelter, and primary medical care. Particularly in
South Darfur and West Darfur, the already terrifying security situation
continues to move inexorably toward a total meltdown. Oxfam
International, one of the largest and most important of the
nongovernmental humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur, is close
to withdrawing. Oxfam spokesman Alun MacDonald recently put the matter
bluntly:
“‘Our staff are being targeted on a daily basis. They are being
shot, robbed, beaten and abducted,’ MacDonald says. ‘We can’t use
the roads, we have to fly to the majority of our programme locations. In
terms of actual violence against aid workers, seven were killed in
October.’ The security situation, he insisted ‘is the worse since
the entire conflict began by a considerable way.’”
“Oxfam, like other aid organisations, has no plans to pull out but Mr
MacDonald believes this may soon change. ‘We can get staff to Darfur
then they can’t move, they can’t get to the villages and the camps.
These aren’t conditions we can keep working in,’ he says. If aid
organisations like Oxfam were forced to pull out of Darfur, the
consequences for the four million people who rely on such agencies to
survive would be unthinkable. Yet with 75% of the region’s roads now too
dangerous for them to use, that possibility grows by the day.” (BBC
[dateline: el-Fasher, North Darfur], December 3, 2007)
Seven humanitarian workers killed in Darfur in October alone….
In West Darfur, a leading nongovernmental humanitarian organization has
ended all travel for its workers through at least the New Year, as
carjacking reaches unprecedented levels, and is marked by growing
violence and sophistication. This is the culmination of a contraction
in humanitarian reach that has been accelerating for well over a year,
and yet the security crisis continues to deepen. The threat (December
20, 2007) by the forces of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) to
seize el-Geneina, capital of West Darfur, though implausible, would be
disastrous if realized. Absent an international force to deter such an
ill-advised military action, hundreds of thousands of Internally
Displaced Persons and host or resident families would be dispersed by
JEM’s fighting its way into el-Geneina. Khartoum would shut down all
transport into the region, and a large-scale humanitarian exodus would
begin immediately. Human destruction would be massive. However
unlikely a JEM assault on el-Geneina may be at present, Darfur is
lurching toward more such large-scale, indeed catastrophic threats.
Morale among humanitarians in South Darfur—which has half Darfur’s
population, and half its Internally Displaced Persons—has plummeted
according to recent assessments. This is partly because of an acute
reduction in humanitarian access and a sharp increase in violence
against humanitarians. During his recent trip to Darfur, UN
undersecretary for humanitarian affairs John Holmes saw “a UN map
show[ing] about half of South Darfur had limited access for aid and
large swathes were completely no-go” (Reuters [dateline: Nyala, South
Darfur], December 1, 2007). Hundreds of thousands of vulnerable human
beings simply can’t be reached. South Darfur, the Nyala area in
particular, is the focus of Khartoum’s efforts to forcibly expel
displaced populations from the many camps that serve as tenuous sources
of humanitarian assistance and protection from Janjaweed militias. The
lead UN humanitarian in South Darfur, Wael al-Haj-Ibrahim, was expelled
from his position by Khartoum on November 7, 2007 for opposing these
forced expulsions of completely vulnerable civilians.
VIOLENCE DIRECTED AGAINST CIVILIANS
Violence directed against civilians also continues, if not at the same
levels that marked the height of genocidal destruction from late 2002
through early 2005. Ethnically-targeted killing continues, as in the
attacks on the towns of Muhajiriya (South Darfur) and Haskanita (North
Darfur) earlier in the fall. The New York Times, on the basis of highly
informed sources on the ground, reported on October 17, 2007 the
aftermath of an attack on Muhajiriya, east of Nyala (“In Darfur, Signs
of Another Massacre”):
“[W]itnesses said Sudanese government troops and their allied
militias had killed more than 30 civilians, slitting the throats of
several men praying at a mosque and shooting a 5-year-old boy in the
back as he tried to run away. According to several residents of
Muhagiriya, a small town in southern Darfur, two columns of uniformed
government troops, along with dozens of militiamen not in uniform,
surrounded the town around noon on October 8, [2007] and stormed the
market.”
“Muhagiriya was a stronghold of one of Darfur’s many rebel
factions, but witnesses said that there were few rebels there at the
time and that government forces turned their guns—and knives—on
civilians. Ayoub Jalal, a mechanic, said his father was praying at a
mosque when soldiers burst in. ‘They dragged my father and the others
out of the mosque and slashed their throats,’ said Mr. Jalal, who was
interviewed by telephone.”
“Both the United Nations and the African Union said that dozens of
civilians had been killed and that witnesses had consistently identified
the attackers as government soldiers and allied gunmen. However, neither
entity said it could independently verify who was responsible. The
Sudanese government denied any involvement, but witnesses said uniformed
troops methodically mowed down anyone who tried to escape, including a
group of fleeing children.”
“‘The youngest child, a 5-year-old boy, I knew well,’ said Sultan
Marko Niaw, a tribal elder, who also spoke by phone. He said the boy’s
name was Guran Avium, adding, ‘A soldier had shot him in the
back.’”
“The viciousness of the attack, as described by the witnesses and
corroborated by aid organizations working in the area, seemed
reminiscent of the early days of the conflict in Darfur, when government
troops and allied militias slaughtered thousands of civilians, according
to human rights groups.” [ ]
In short, this was an attack on an African civilian population by
Khartoum’s regular and Janjaweed militia forces, entirely in character
with attacks earlier in the genocide:
“James Smith, chief executive of the Aegis Trust, a British
anti-genocide group working in the region, said villagers in Muhagiriya
‘confirmed to us that government and janjaweed forces deliberately
attacked unarmed civilians,’ referring to the Arab militias that are
aligned with the government. Solidarités, a French aid organization that
distributes food in the area, said three Sudanese aid workers were
killed in the attack. In a report, it also said that ‘many people are
wounded and need medical assistance.’ ‘Many houses and shops have
been looted,’ it said. ‘Many families lost everything.’ In
separate interviews, several residents said they watched soldiers cart
away their property in government trucks. [ ] ‘All the IDP’s,’
internally displaced persons, ‘believe it was a joint
government-militia operation,’ said Radhia Achouri, a United Nations
spokeswoman.”
There are some who, invoking a perversely attenuated version of the
1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, argue that genocide is not longer occurring in Darfur. But it
is not only attacks such as that on Muhajiriya that undermine such
claims. The Genocide Convention stipulates as genocidal those acts
“deliberately inflicting on [national, ethnical, racial or
religious groups] conditions of life calculated to bring about [their]
physical destruction in whole or in part.” Earlier violence in
Darfur, orchestrated by the Khartoum regime, destroyed the livelihoods
of millions from the non-Arab or African tribal populations, and such
violence continues, if on a lesser scale because of the
comprehensiveness of former destruction.
In this context, then, Khartoum’s deliberate compromising of
humanitarian aid—amply and continuously documented by human rights
groups and UN officials—is a highly consequential extension of
previous violent efforts that have “deliberately inflicted conditions
of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction” of African
tribal populations. Khartoum’s efforts to impede and delay
humanitarian assistance have been sustained, systematic, and sanctioned
by the upper reaches of the National Islamic Front hierarchy. So too
are efforts by the Khartoum regime to compel the return of displaced
persons without security or the wherewithal to sustain agricultural
life; this represents a further extension of genocidal violence, and one
that appears to be accelerating dramatically.
Genocide is not simply equivalent to violent mass ethnic slaughter, and
the refusal to see the ongoing relevance of the various terms of the
Genocide Convention in Darfur has become a form of apology for
Khartoum’s génocidaires.
THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE AGAINST UNAMID
A fuller account of mounting threats to civilians and humanitarians in
Darfur, as well as troubling humanitarian indicators, appears in Part 2
of this analysis. But given the skepticism about whether there is any
point to deploying UNAMID, despite Khartoum’s clearly prevailing
genocidal ambitions, it is important to see precisely what is entailed
in arguments against the very idea of trying to secure full and
unimpeded access to Darfur for a UN-authorized protection force. To be
sure, the success of such a force is increasingly unlikely, in part
because of callous skepticism that looks increasingly like
self-fulfilling prophecy. But the alternative to UNAMID is
acquiescence, with quite literally millions of civilian lives at stake.
Some of the arguments against deployment of the UNAMID force are simply
an outrageous and unconsidered flippancy, with no demonstrated
comprehension of Khartoum’s role in generating the complex violence in
Darfur or the current levels of insecurity confronted by humanitarians
and civilians. Jeffrey Sachs, a key advisor to Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon, and the primary proponent of global warming as explanation for
the Darfur conflict, recently declared:
“the focus on peacekeepers was misplaced because the crisis was
fundamentally a development problem, not a political one. He said the
crisis stemmed from the desperation of poor people in a huge, arid,
underdeveloped region. ‘You could put the peacekeepers in there, they
won’t change one iota on the ground in terms of the grim realities of
the harshness of life in Darfur,’ Sachs said, pointing to the need for
clinics, schools, electricity and water holes. ‘I’m not against the
peacekeepers, I just find them a waste of money,’ he said. ‘Unless
the rich world is going to promise $2.6 billion for the peacekeepers
each year, plus $2.6 billion for development, I’d say keep your
peacekeepers.’” (Reuters [dateline: New York], December 3, 2007)
The idea that UN-authorized peace support personnel with a mandate to
protect civilians and humanitarians “won’t change one iota on the
ground in terms of the grim realities of the harshness of life in
Darfur” is a perverse combination of ignorance and callousness. It is
easy for Sachs, living his well-heeled life at Columbia University and
the upper reaches of the UN Secretariat, to say, “don’t bother with
peacekeepers—the problem is one of development.” Leaving aside the
impossibility of development proceeding amidst Darfur’s chaotic
violence, Sachs chooses to ignore the most fundamental political and
historical dimensions of the current crisis. Darfuris certainly have a
radically different perspective, including some of the most
distinguished champions from this tortured region, two of whom recently
received prominent human rights awards.
Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Abdalla, on receiving the Robert F. Kennedy Human
Rights Award for his work with victims of rape and torture on the ground
in Darfur over the past four years, spoke forcefully about a peace
support operation in Darfur and the conditions requiring urgent
deployment of the UN/African Union force. He also spoke of “the final
phase of the Sudanese government’s plan to exterminate the African
tribes of Darfur.” His impassioned words have been echoed in one form
or another in every conversation this writer has recently had with
Darfuris, with human rights workers, and with the personnel of
humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur.
Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Abdalla (November 16, 2007):
“I would like to speak to you about the situation on the ground in
Darfur, to tell you about my work with survivors of torture, and,
finally, about the Darfurian peoples’ hopes for peace.”
“During the past few months, there has been an absolute deterioration
in the conditions in the Internally Displaced Persons [IDP] camps. There
are many people who are now out of reach of humanitarian aid. In the
hospital, we are seeing more cases of malnutrition and infectious
diseases we have not seen in a long time, such as polio, measles and
tuberculosis.”
“In July [2007] the United Nations passed a resolution to send an
international peacekeeping force to Darfur with a strong mandate to
protect the people who continue to be attacked by government forces and
local militias. Soon after that, the government of Sudan announced to
local media that by the time the peacekeeping forces arrive, no IDPs
will be left for them to protect. For the past several months since the
UN resolution, the Sudanese government has begun to carry out a campaign
to forcibly empty the IDP camps. It is testing the international
community, and intends to embarrass it once again.”
“The government has used a two-part strategy to liquidate the IDP
camps. First, it has targeted humanitarian organizations so that they
will leave. These groups have been subjected to assaults and looting.
Just in the town of Nyala, the capital of South Darfur where I work, 4
to 5 aid vehicles might be stolen in a single day. These groups cannot
tolerate the deteriorating security conditions, and many have been
forced to leave or halt their activities. Their withdrawal creates a
disastrous situation, because the civilians depend almost completely on
aid from these groups for survival.”
“The second part of the government’s strategy is to attack the
people in the IDP camps. Within the past few weeks, government forces
have killed people in several different camps. They kill people to
intimidate the rest of the survivors in the camps, and also to test
whether the international community will respond. In addition to
killing, they are using violence or the threat of violence to force
others to leave the camps. In the last two weeks, at a camp near Nyala
[South Darfur], soldiers and police carrying sticks and rubber hoses
threatened IDPs, while tents were destroyed and property was carried
away in trucks.”
“Approximately 1,000 IDPs were forced onto trucks at gunpoint and
were dumped in the outskirts of the city. Some people have been removed
to locations that the African Union forces are prohibited from visiting,
so we cannot know their fate. Just two days ago, while I was here, the
Kalma camp was surrounded by government forces. We do not know the fate
of these people because all lines of communication have been cut. The
head of the United Nations’ humanitarian operations in Nyala was
expelled from Sudan for publicly objecting to these forced
relocations.”
“This is a moment of great possibility and hope. The hybrid
UN-African Union forces that are due to be deployed early next year are
authorized with a strong mandate to protect civilians. But if the
international community does nothing to provide the equipment they need
to do their jobs, the result will be absolute disaster—we will have
another Rwanda.”
(http://www.rfkmemorial.org/legacyinaction/2007_Ahmed)
To all of which Jeffrey Sachs of Columbia University, special advisor
to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, says simply that security efforts
for Darfur are “too expensive and a waste money.”
Salih Mahmoud Osman, Sudanese human rights lawyer and recent winner of
the European Union’s Andrei Sakharov Award for human rights advocacy,
was as outspoken as Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Abdalla:
“Mr. Osman criticised European governments for not exercising their
full diplomatic potential towards Sudan’s government and cited as an
example the fact that the Darfur issue was not specifically discussed at
the EU-Africa summit last weekend (8-9 December [2007]). ‘We are
disappointed,’ he said, adding that Europe fears that the
[north/south] Comprehensive Peace Agreement might be jeopardized if more
pressure is put on Sudan. ‘But it is at the expense of the lives of
people of Darfur,’ Mr. Osman concluded.”
“The Sakharov Prize winner also spoke about a 26,000-strong
peacekeeping mission, made up of UN and African Union forces, which is
to replace the 7,000 African Union operation this month. ‘You tell us
you are busy in Afghanistan, but without an international component
there will never be effective protection of the people in the region,’
he said.” (EU Observer [dateline: Strasbourg], December 11, 2007)
Salih Mahmoud Osman (December 11, 2007 interview):
“I am really glad about this recognition of the work of us human
rights defenders in Sudan, and Darfur in particular. We are working in a
hostile environment, under perpetual danger of being intimidated,
arrested, detained and tortured. Still I think there is always an
ethical and moral responsibility to stand with the people.”
“There is a real human suffering in Darfur. For me as a lawyer it is
genocide. More than 400,000 people have died and more than 2000 villages
have been erased. Rape is used as a weapon of war; young girls, as young
as 8, are being assaulted. Many rapes take place in front of the
victims’ male relatives to humiliate them.”
“Despite serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law, there is no justice. There is an atmosphere of total
impunity; all the perpetrators are still beyond the reach of justice. We
talk about impunity because our judicial system is incompetent and
unwilling to provide justice.” [ ]
“There will never be peace in Darfur and Sudan without justice. There
is no peace without justice. Justice is a very important and basic
element of peace, and cannot be compromised for any political reasons.
In the south of Sudan more than 2 million people were killed and about 4
million have been displaced. Justice is not for the purposes of revenge;
it is for a lasting peace and a possible reconciliation. The nature of
the atrocities will never allow the victims and survivors to forget
about their suffering. This is why justice is important.”
[concerning Europe and Darfur]
“For many victims and survivors steps by the international community
were too slow. Many UN Security Council resolutions have never been
(effectively) implemented. Nevertheless, it is the international
community—Europe, America, Canada—that made it possible for more
than 5 million people to be alive today through humanitarian
assistance.”
“People of Europe brought to victims things to keep them alive, but
it is not enough. We want them to think about protecting the lives
perishing daily, and help the innocent to go back to their homes with
safety and dignity. It is not acceptable to leave people in the camps
for more than four years now. We want to see more concern from Europe,
rallies for solidarity with the people of Darfur, like in the US.”
“We want Europe to put pressure on the government of Sudan to allow
deployment of hybrid forces. Europe has responsibility to send troops to
Darfur. I will be calling on the leaders of Europe to think about their
moral, ethical and legal responsibility to protect the lives of people
and to prevent the government from destroying our communities.”
(European Parliament website, December 11, 2007 at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/015-14630-345-12-50-902-20071210STO14629-2007-11-12-2007/default_en.htm)
OTHER VOICES ARGUING AGAINST UNAMID
But it is not just Jeffrey Sachs who speaks so callously of the
protection force that Mohamed Ahmed Abdalla and Salih Mahmoud Osman
plead for with such anguish and deep experience of Darfur’s suffering.
There is a growing chorus of voices dismissing the notion that Darfur
continues to be the site of genocide, dismissing the idea that UNAMID
can address any elements of the security crisis facing civilians and
humanitarians in Darfur, and sniffing contemptuously at the very
advocacy efforts celebrated by both Mohammed Ahmed Abdalla and Salih
Mahmoud Osman. The loudest of these voices belongs to Julie Flint, who
has published a series of articles in recent months that strenuously
make the case against all that Mohammed Ahmed Abdalla, Salih Mahmoud
Osman, and so many other Darfuris plead for with such painful urgency,
indeed desperation. Three articles are of particular note:
“Darfur, Saving Itself,” The Washington Post, June 3, 2007, at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/01/AR2007060101850.html
“Faint hearts can’t lift darkness in Darfur,” The Irish
Independent, December 12, 2007, at
http://www.independent.ie/opinion/analysis/faint-hearts-cant-lift–darkness-in-darfur-1244606.html
“A bad idea is about to deploy in Darfur,” Daily Star (Lebanon),
December 14, 2007, at
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=87464
Several of Flint’s statements in these pieces are unsupportable
claims, many others are little more than elegantly turned sneers that
elide key issues, and there is a recklessly tendentious attitude in too
many of her assertions. But there is no voice that represents more
fully than hers the attitude of an unnamed official who, Flint reports,
peremptorily declared following a “brainstorming session in
Khartoum,” that “no one thinks UNAMID is a good idea.” Another
source, not named or characterized by Flint, declares, “They
[uncharacterized] are all going into it knowing it is going to be a
nightmare. They [uncharacterized] are playing up to public opinion. It
is absolutely disgraceful.”
Flint makes it clear that she agrees. But what does such cynical
skepticism imply? Again and again we must ask: Is there an alternative
to UNAMID that does not take the form of acquiesce before the continuing
destruction of the people of Darfur?
The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations was charged in July 2006,
by then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, to design the best possible
peace support operation for Darfur. It was this operation, robustly
mandated and resourced, that was authorized by UN Security Council
Resolution 1706 (August 31, 2006). But Flint was among those who
supported Annan’s special representative for Sudan, Jan Pronk, in
capitulating almost immediately before Khartoum’s refusal to accept
deployment of the authorized force. In the wake of such capitulation,
and as a consequence of the international community’s failure to
confront Khartoum forcefully—threatening real consequences for
non-compliance with Resolution 1706—talk turned to a nebulous
“African Union-Plus” force as a substitute for the UN operation.
This was indeed a truly “disgraceful” option and led directly to
yearlong, obscenely deferential discussions with Khartoum about a
“hybrid” African Union/UN force—the origins of the presently
authorized force that Flint finds such a bad, indeed “disgraceful”
idea.
There is dishonesty in Flint’s not acknowledging her refusal to
support the UN operation authorized by 1706 at a time when violence was
much less chaotic and challenging for a deploying force. She further
declares that a peace support operation “would have made more sense in
2003-2004, at the height of the conflict.” This writer concurs,
indeed argued in the Washington Post on February 25, 2004—almost four
years ago:
“Khartoum has so far refused to rein in its Arab militias; has
refused to enter into meaningful peace talks with the insurgency groups;
and most disturbingly, refuses to grant unfettered humanitarian access.
The international community has been slow to react to Darfur’s
catastrophe and has yet to move with sufficient urgency and commitment.
A credible peace forum must rapidly be created. Immediate plans for
humanitarian intervention should begin. The alternative is to allow
tens of thousands of civilians to die in the weeks and months ahead in
what will be continuing genocidal destruction.”
Every word remains as true today as then. But Flint’s voice was
nowhere to be heard when this proposal made “more sense.” She is
either writing self-exculpatory history with her present declaration
about the appropriateness of a force for Darfur in 2003-2004—or simply
doesn’t mean what she says. It is impossible to say. Certainly in
writing self-exculpatory history she would have a great deal of
company.
Flint also viciously excoriates the advocacy community that has for the
most part consistently pushed for an international protection force in
Darfur: this highly diverse groups of advocates, including distinguished
human rights organizations, is accused of “creating mass hysteria
which limited the ability of decision-makers to pursue legitimate policy
options,” of “perceiving the war as a simple morality tale,” and
of “expecting that UNAMID will secure every displaced camp, end
criminality and disarm militias.” UNAMID, Flint claims, “was pushed
by an international lobby that is crying ‘genocide’ almost three
years after large-scale hostilities ended.”
This is a preposterous and dishonest homogenization of Darfur advocacy
on several counts. Certainly there are varying levels of understanding
within Darfur advocacy groups, within human rights organizations, and on
the part of a range of individuals working in various ways on issues
pertaining to Darfur, southern Sudan, and the ongoing tyranny of the
Khartoum regime. But wildly unreasonable expectations of UNAMID and
“hysterical” narrations of a “morality tale” do not define
the vast majority of Darfur advocacy efforts. And Flint’s suggestion
that genocide is over simply because “large-scale hostilities ended”
almost three years ago betrays precisely what is discussed above as an
attenuated, and seriously misleading, rendering of the definition of
genocide within the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. In accusing Darfur advocacy of ignorance,
Flint ends up betraying her own—or, again, her disingenuousness.
Moreover, nowhere does Flint acknowledge what Salih Mahmoud Osman
declares on the occasion of winning the European Union’s Sakharov
Prize for Human Rights:
“Many UN Security Council resolutions have never been (effectively)
implemented. Nevertheless, it is the international community—Europe,
America, Canada—that made it possible for more than 5 million people
to be alive today through humanitarian assistance.”
The world’s largest (if most endangered) humanitarian operation
deployed on a vast scale, and with a sense of urgency, that derived in
critical ways from Darfur advocacy, including the all too accurate
assertion that massive ethnically-targeted violence, and its terrible
aftermath, constituted genocide. Not to acknowledge this, or the
consistent importance attached to a credible peace forum by Darfur
advocacy at all levels, is to mischaracterize the efforts of hundreds of
thousands of individuals, as well as a great many organizations,
including the world’s most distinguished human rights organizations.
Again, some are inevitably less informed than others; but the majority
are still animated by a compassion nowhere rendered in Flint’s account
and certainly not in her characterization of advocacy efforts as
“hysteria”:
“For them [Darfur advocates], Darfur is not a place with a complex
history; it’s a moral high ground. Darfurians are no longer real
human beings who laugh and love and care for children; they are
on-dimensional images of suffering.”
The animus in Flint’s characterization is not easily comprehended;
her inaccurate caricature is easily recognized as contemptible slander.
Half a year ago, in her Washington Post op/ed, Flint concluded by
declaring, “The people who will ‘save’ Darfur are the
Darfurians.” This was on the basis of a March 2007 sojourn in a
relatively small portion of rebel-controlled North Darfur, where she
found that “life is returning to normal” (though North Darfur has
been relentlessly bombed by Khartoum’s Antonovs precisely because of
rebel control). But Flint’s observation that life for Kaltouma Musa
and her baby, and for villages in the Ain Siro mountains of North Darfur
(northwest of Kutum), had regained some of what they had lost can hardly
be the basis for concluding that “Darfurians will save themselves.”
Indeed, such a suggestion, even for most of North Darfur, is highly
misleading. El-Fasher and its surrounding camps for displaced persons,
the deeply threatened areas around Tawilla and eastern Jebel Marra, the
town of Haskanita in eastern North Darfur (which was completely
destroyed by Khartoum’s forces in early October 2007)—in short,
areas with the majority of the population in North Darfur—all remain
thoroughly dangerous for civilians, and life is anything but
“normal.”
In speaking about the capabilities of UNAMID, Flint declares:
“The only task that is still achievable is securing the perimeters of
displaced camps. Security for the displaced needs a civilian police
force inside the camps, which are armed and increasingly lawless.”
But UNAMID is in fact scheduled to deploy over 6,000 civilian police
(some in Formed Police Units). Policing the camps is certainly now a
much more dangerous task than when Resolution 1706 authorized some 4,000
civilian police almost a year and a half ago. But it is not impossible,
even if success will be far from complete. Negotiations with the
various armed elements in the camps, especially those allied with
particular rebel groups, will be difficult. But there is no inherent
reason that progress cannot be made in policing some of the camps,
thereby contributing in significant ways to halting Khartoum’s
campaign to dismantle the camps and forcibly relocate civilians without
regard for their security or well-being. These police will need
military protection, and their liaison efforts with traditional leaders
within the camps will be critical. But this task only becomes more
difficult with delay, as authority increasingly passes from the sheiks
and omdas to young men with guns. Some camps, such as Kalma near Nyala,
are poised to explode in violence. Flint is advising that the
international community confess helplessness, and that we simply watch
as humanitarian organizations serially withdraw as insecurity becomes
intolerable.
WHAT COULD UNAMID DO, IF EXPEDITIOUSLY DEPLOYED WITH APPROPRIATE
PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES?
Beyond the camps UNAMID could also provide security for the convoys,
particularly those of the UN’s World Food Program, that are now
subject to constant attack. It will soon become impossible to find
Sudanese drivers (virtually all the drivers are Sudanese nationals)
willing to run the gauntlet of bandits, undisciplined rebels, Janjaweed,
and other arms elements. To be sure, some humanitarians will cleave to
a neutrality that will not permit them to accept escort missions by
UNAMID; but some are desperate for such escort protection. And those
with the riskiest jobs, the convoy drivers, are most desperate for
protection. Key transport corridors could be cleared of criminal
checkpoints and many of the threats that currently plague operations.
Communication with combatants will be essential—both rebel and
militia forces, as well as Khartoum’s regular military. Indeed,
communication with Arab groups will be essential if UNAMID is to achieve
significant success in stabilizing a highly volatile security
environment. A recent report by the International Crisis Group
(“Darfur’s New Security Reality,” November 26, 2007,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5180) offers an
especially timely and important assessment of the changing roles of Arab
tribal groups in the Darfur conflict:
“Inter-Arab dissension has added new volatility to the situation on
the ground. Some tribes are trying to solidify land claims before the
UN/AU hybrid peacekeeping operation in Darfur (UNAMID) arrives. This
has led to fighting with other Arab tribes, which have realized that the
National Congress Party [National Islamic Front] is not a reliable
guarantor of their long-term interests and have started to take
protection into their own hands. There is now a high risk of an Arab
insurgency, as well as potential alliances with the predominantly
non-Arab rebel groups. A spillover of the conflict in Kordofan
[Province to the east] has also started.”
[Detailed analyses of particular elements of the “Rise in Arab-Arab
Conflict” are a key part of the ICG report, pages 2-6.]
What if UNAMID had been deployed expeditiously? What other tasks might
it have been able to undertake? What tasks can still be achieved? An
answer requires first a rehearsal of the time-frame for past actions and
failures.
It is now a year and a half since Kofi Annan charged the UN Department
of Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO) to plan an effective peace support
operation for Darfur (July 2006). It is well over a year since Security
Council Resolution 1706 (August 31, 2006) authorized the mission
carefully outlined by UN DPKO. It is over a year since the
international community sought to pick up the pieces after capitulating
before Khartoum’s unprecedented blocking of a UN peacekeeping force.
This took the form of talks beginning in November 2006 (Addis Ababa)
that vaguely sketched out a “hybrid” force of UN and AU forces for
Darfur. Specifics of the force would require eight long months of
negotiations with Khartoum before passage of Resolution 1769 (July 31,
2007).
It is now five months since passage of Resolution 1769, and over a year
since it became clear that a force approximating to UNAMID was in the
works—time in which militarily capable nations should have been
preparing for requests they knew would come from UN DPKO. The form of
these requests was readily discernible, particularly in light of radical
deficiencies in the current African Union mission in Darfur. Instead,
both UN DPKO and key governments simply waited for the belated passage
of Resolution 1769.
Khartoum for its part, seeing that its obstructionist tactics have
worked superbly well and that there is little willingness on the part of
militarily capable nations to contribute key resources to UNAMID, has
only become more defiant and recalcitrant, and will continue to do so
without much greater pressure from the international community and China
in particular (see my recent analysis of China’s enabling role in the
Darfur genocide, The New Republic, December 19, 2007 at
http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=1f4269dd-9d4f-4911-891f-57ae85d66b70).
It is in the context of this shamefully dilatory, fitful, and too often
half-hearted effort to provide a robust international protection force
for Darfur that we are obliged to assess the prospects for UNAMID. As
head of UN DPKO Guéhenno has clearly suggested, the mission may never
deploy in meaningful fashion. A range of recent news reports indicate
that there will be fewer than 9,000 personnel of the 26,000 authorized
at the time of official handover from the UN Mission to the UN/African
Union “hybrid” mission (December 31, 2007). Key enabling units of
the force have not been deployed because of Khartoum’s refusal to
accept the proposed list of troop- and personnel-contributing countries.
A slow, prolonged deployment may endanger the mission and risk early,
perhaps fatal humiliation. The AU troops that will make up the
overwhelming bulk of the “re-hatted” force in place on the first of
the year are demoralized, under-equipped, and rightly feel betrayed by
the international community. There is little reason to expect any
change in the security crisis on the ground with such meager
augmentation of the current AU mission.
But were the UNAMID force to deploy with real urgency, were the
required helicopter assets to be provided, as well as ground transport
resources, were 6,000 well-trained civilian police to deploy along with
the full complement of well-equipped troops, the possibilities for
protection are many. UNAMID could and should:
[1] Prevent, by virtue of its presence and its willingness to act
vigorously, Khartoum from continuing its long-planned campaign to empty
the camps, as urged by Dr. Mohammed Ahmed Abdalla:
“I urge the United States and the international community to
understand these camp liquidations for what they are: the final phase of
the Sudanese government’s plan to exterminate the African tribes of
Darfur. The fate of the people expelled from the camps is clear: they
are left vulnerable to attacks by militias and left without access to
the humanitarian aid they rely upon. Because of this situation, they
will soon die of preventable disease, malnutrition, starvation or
violence—unless they are protected!”
[2] Protect the camps for displaced persons from external assault by
the Janjaweed and Khartoum’s regular military forces. The threat of
direct armed assaults on the camps has grown steadily as the camps have
become more politicized, more militant, and more awash in weapons.
[3] Provide a growing police presence within the camps, and restore
authority to traditional tribal leaders. This will be a slow and
difficult process, requiring both sustained communication and a clear
willingness to protect leaders who are threatened by men with guns in
the camps.
[4] Protect convoys, especially those of the UN World Food Program.
Clear key road arteries of bandits and checkpoints controlled by
renegade rebel elements. Again, communication with rebel groups, Arab
groups, and Khartoum itself must be patient, but forceful.
[5] Provide security for returning displaced persons. As some of the
camp populations contemplate voluntary returns to their villages and
lands, they will require an extraordinary initial level of
security—particularly if their lands have been seized by Arab raiders
or opportunists. UNAMID must provide, in order to build confidence, a
constant armed presence for the first groups venturing into land
controlled by the Janjaweed, most of whom have now been recycled by
Khartoum into other paramilitary guises.
[6] Participate directly and vigorously in a renewed cease-fire
commission in the event that a cease-fire is negotiated between Khartoum
and rebel groups. The current unworkable commission structure reflects
yet again the failure of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), negotiated in
Abuja, Nigeria (May 2006). It is critical that any new cease-fire
commission include all parties in a single framework and be able to
report in timely and unfettered fashion the results of any and all
investigations of cease-fire violations. This will require robust
self-assertion by UNAMID.
These are the key tasks. All are daunting, and will require at least
the full and robust deployment of UNAMID, with all necessary helicopter
and ground transport, and the tactical helicopters critical for
reconnaissance, civilian protection, and self-defense. Presently,
Khartoum refuses to accept the UN/African Union-proposed roster of
countries that are to provide troops, civilian police, and specialized
units. Khartoum refuses to grant adequate land and water rights to
UNAMID, or to grant required night flying rights. The Khartoum regime
has at various points in tortured negotiations with the UN and AU
insisted that it be able to shut down UNAMID communications during
military operations, and that UNAMID notify Khartoum in advance of all
its military movements. Khartoum has refused to grant landing rights at
Nyala and el-Fasher for heavy transport aircraft; has refused to
expedite off-loading of critical equipment in Port Sudan; has seized
communications equipment destined for UNAMID use in Darfur; and has
objected to UNAMID forces wearing the UN blue berets and helmets.
Recently, Khartoum delayed for three hours the emergency medical
evacuation of an African Union soldier who had been shot in the back and
very seriously wounded.
UNAMID: GOING FORWARD OR GOING BACKWARD?
This obstructionism is the best measure of the obstacles that UNAMID
will face going forward. If there is no international will to confront
Khartoum vigorously—and to demand truly unimpeded access for UNAMID,
its designated personnel, and its required resources—then the mission
will indeed fail. But it will not be a failure deriving from a lack of
practicable tasks. It will not be a failure reflecting an impossible
deployment. It will be a failure marking international capitulation
before the obstructionist efforts of a genocidal regime that has for 18
years ruthlessly arrogated to itself Sudanese national wealth and power,
and presumed to speak of Sudanese “national sovereignty” despite
overwhelmingly unpopular national policies—in the south, in Darfur,
and in other regions of the north. It will be a failure stretching back
at least to summer 2006, and arguably late 2003, when the genocidal
nature of the violence became fully clear (see my statement of December
30, 2003 at http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article301-p1.html).
This failure will also have to be seen in the context of all that is
now clearly impending in Darfur, in particular the steady deterioration
of humanitarian indicators and overall humanitarian security. Global
Acute Malnutrition (GAM) is rising ominously. Water shortages are
growing as overused camp boreholes go dry, aquifers are depleted at
unknown but threatening rates, traditional water storage systems degrade
for lack of maintenance, and a general deterioration in sanitation is
increasingly in evidence (see an especially important report on the
water crisis around el-Fasher and Darfur generally, UN Integrated
Regional Information Networks, December 10, 2007 at
http://allafrica.com/stories/200712100881.html). In the extremely
hot and arid region of Darfur, water is as precious as life. Management
of water supplies for millions of human beings is a critical
humanitarian task.
Here it must be acknowledged that UNAMID will have a large and
consequential footprint in Darfur, and be in particular
water-consumptive. But to make this an argument against deployment, as
Flint does, is simply perverse: the only reason clean water and sanitary
facilities are available to some 2.5 million displaced persons, in
addition to large numbers of other conflict-affected persons, is because
of the presence of humanitarian water and sanitation operations. If
UNAMID does not deploy successfully, and as a consequence insecurity
forces humanitarian personnel to withdraw—a development daily more
likely—there will be no one to control the purification or
distribution of water, no organized maintenance of sanitary facilities,
and no primary medical response to the inevitable outbreak of diseases
such as cholera and dysentery. Displaced and conflict-affected Darfuris
are not in a position to “save themselves,” and are well aware of
the fact.
Humanitarian operations also continued to be threatened by Khartoum’s
vicious bureaucratic machinations. A critically important Moratorium on
Restrictions governing the visas, travel papers, and movement of all
workers for nongovernmental humanitarian organizations has yet to be
renewed by the regime, even as it is of surpassing urgency in
humanitarian planning. As Refugees International notes in a recent
overview (“Humanitarian Action Still Under Fire in Darfur,” December
13, 2007):
“In 2007, the Government of Sudan extended the Moratorium for one
year until January 31, 2008. Unless the Moratorium is now renewed for at
least another year, all visas and permits for international NGO staff
working in Darfur will expire at the end of January, and the
humanitarian operation in Darfur will grind to a halt.”
Nongovernmental organizations are typically the enabling agencies for
UN organizations such as the World Food Program. This is all the more
so as humanitarian need continues to grow. Some 280,000 Darfuris have
been newly displaced this year alone, the fifth year of genocidal
destruction and displacement. The most recent UN Darfur Humanitarian
Profile (No. 29, representing conditions as of October 1, 2007)
estimates that the conflict-affected population in Darfur now exceeds
4.2 million. Many, a great many, are poised to die.
Retrospective human mortality remains a controversial issue. This
writer has argued that approximately 500,000 civilians have died in
Darfur and Eastern Chad from all causes—violence, disease, and
malnutrition—since the outbreak of major hostilities in February 2003
(see http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article102.html). But other estimates
are lower, even if less inclusive of the extant data. Though Flint now
declares that Darfur advocacy is engaged in the “inflation of death
tolls,” her words were previously of a different tenor, as when she
described this writer’s efforts as “a serious analysis of
mortality” in Darfur (“A Year Gone By in Darfur, and the Despair
Has Deepened,” The Daily Star [Beirut], December 30, 2004). My
estimate of total mortality at the time of Flint’s appraisal was
370,000 dead (see
http://www.sudanreeves.org/Sections-article256-p1.html). The grim
truth is that few any longer dispute that hundreds of thousands of
Darfuris have perished because of Khartoum’s relentless orchestration
of violence and deprivation. Nor can there be much doubt about the
cataclysm of human destruction that will ensue in the event of
humanitarian withdrawal.
THE SYLLOGISM OF HUMAN DESTRUCTION IN DARFUR
A grim syllogism of human destruction in Darfur remains fully in force:
if UNAMID does not deploy effectively, or if it is aborted, then the
African Union nations participating in the present mission in Darfur
(AMIS) will withdraw. Currently hunkered down, badly demoralized,
conducting almost no patrols or missions, and unable to protect
themselves, let alone civilians and humanitarians, AMIS is a portrait of
impotence. But withdrawal by AMIS would convince humanitarian
organizations that security had entered free fall, and they would refuse
any longer to accept what are already intolerable attacks, risks, as
well as threats from Khartoum.
An alternative to UNAMID? Would that there were one, but there is not.
The choice before the international community is stark: Is it prepared
to see the mission fail? Or will it rally the resources and exert the
pressure on Khartoum, both of which are critical to the mission’s
success?
There are few hopeful signs, and the voices denying that there is any
real purpose to UNAMID make it daily less likely that the mission will
deploy at all.
* Eric Reeves is author of A Long Day’s Dying: Critical Moments in the Darfur Genocide. He can be reached at [email protected]. www.sudanreeves.org
Part 2 will address humanitarian conditions more particularly, as well
as survey the ongoing catastrophe in Eastern Chad and the prospects for deployment of a European Union force to the border region with Darfur.