The 3rd Anniversary of Sudan’s CPA

By Maker Costa

January 10, 2008 — As Sudanese or the marginalized Sudanese should I say, celebrate the 3rd anniversary of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which was signed on January 9, 2005, and given the fact that many Sudanese (myself included) consider January 9th rather than January 1st as the real Independence Day, it is worthwhile that we pause for a few minutes to remind ourselves of things we have achieved as a people, things we failed to accomplish, threats, disappointed hopes of the marginalized, proposals and so on. As such, the article will cover many issues which are not necessarily related in nature, but are in a way central to the welfare of the marginalized Sudanese in general and to the people of southern Sudan in particular.

The CPA is a monumental landmark; an agreement that embodies and manifests the hard-won rights, freedom, and justice; an agreement that came as a result of brave men and women paying their precious lives as a price, in wars that have spanned the entire last century. The names of those brave men and women who paid their ultimate sacrifices may never be precisely known but one thing will always stand out: it is because of their selfless sacrifices, sacrifices of the wounded veteran, and the sacrifices of those who made into peace but also have given up their personal dreams, that we are now about to have a place that we will, proudly, call home.

In addition, the CPA is the most articulate, most inclusive, and most detailed accord ever signed in the African continent. It presents workable solutions to most of Sudan’s chronic problems, and has indeed brought the longest civil war in Africa to an end. This tells of the thoughtfulness, ingenuity, and determination of those who negotiated the deal on our behalf; they have represented our cause in an unmatched accuracy.

But as beautiful as the CPA is, it is wise to remind ourselves that the CPA came into being as a result of the National Islamic Front (NIF) now turned National Congress Party (NCP), acceptance, rather reluctantly, to share power and wealth with the SPLM/A and others. This should always keep us alert and vigilant that the NCP/NIF will never fully implement the CPA, and that the NCP/NIF will always device gimmick ruses aimed at watering down the CPA.

Therefore, the SPLM/A and its allies have to always keep their guns cocked and ready to fight should the NCP/NIF decides to do away with the CPA.

Now, doing away with the CPA may not come at once, but could come incrementally. Let’s list few areas where the NCP/NIF has been sluggish in terms of implementation:

The NCP/NIF refusal to accept the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) verdict is a serious material breach of the CPA, but it looks like the NCP is getting away with it
The south-north border is nowhere near being demarcated which should have been concluded now
The NCP/NIF still has a monopoly on the national government; in fact, Bashir and his fanatics still run the state as they did before the CPA
The NCP/NIF still fuel tribal conflicts in the south by arming tribal militias in the south
The NCP/NIF-funded northern militias of Al-Miseriya tribe and others still terrify the civil population (southerners) along the south-north border reminding southerners of the notorious and rapacious Muraheels militias
The NCP/NIF still keeps more than its agreed share in oil revenues
The present national media could hardly be differentiated from the war-propaganda machine that characterized the national media before the CPA
The census is nowhere near being carried out; hence, could hinder the general elections that is projected to take place next year (2009)
Above all, Al-Bashir, blatantly violated the CPA in vivid terms when he declared a general mobilization of his Jihadists (Difa’a Al-Shabi) in Medeni in 1/1/2007

The NCP/NIF is opportunistic in nature and looks for loopholes in their main rival/partner in order to strike. In other words, the NCP/NIF will never attempt to fight the SPLM/A if they know that the SPLM/A is stronger than they are and would crash them. Hence, the SPLM/A has to plan accordingly, i.e., modernize and equip the SPLA to the strongest extent possible. This is exactly what our late hero Dr. John Garang intended to do, he said and I paraphrased:

We will make the price of not implementing the CPA very high and costly that implementation of the CPA will be preferable to all…

Now, we all know that Bashir’s military parade in Khartoum in 01/01/2008 was an act of desperation when he showed what he named ‘Sudanese made war machines’. After all, Bashir had always have these war machines before the CPA but failed to flush out the SPLA in the south and other areas of the Sudan, not only that but his praised war machines failed and are still failing to defeat the rather fragmented Darfur movements. Thus, his misplaced intent was, obviously, to deter the SPLM/A and other rival forces, and send them a clear message that they won’t succeed if they opt for a military confrontation with NCP/NIF. Absolutely, Bashir’s missile veered off target regarding that military parade; nobody was deterred.

Having said that, it shouldn’t be an excuse for SPLM/A leaders to indulge in the notion of the NCP/NIF being desperate and weak; instead, the SPLM/A should not look relaxed, complacent, and unconcerned since that will be enough incentive for the NCP/NIF to get on the offensive. So, the only way you can make sure the NCP/NIF doesn’t go on the offensive is to strengthen and modernize the SPLA. Honestly, President Kiir has been taking firm positions on many issues lately; for instance, his decision to withdraw his ministers from GoNU was decisive, his dismissal of indiscipline officials like Telar, Aleu, and Lam was crucial to the progress that has been made. Mr. President deserves our applauses!

The SPLA

As the Guarantor of the CPA, the SPLA comes atop of all things that should be given more attention. In this regard, a question always poses itself: how prepared is our army, the SPLA? To be honest, I do not know. But, there are things that indicate the strength of an army which are normally observable to the public. For instance, the American Army is known to be strong because you see around the Apaches, B2’s, Raptors, Abrams, not only that, but you also see the Pentagon recruiting the best scientists, engineers, medic’s, and researchers. These are the things that Guarantee for the US army the superiority in battle; not anything else.

In our case, and since we are far from resembling the US Army, we have things that can indicate our local military superiority/inferiority. Our army is definitely superior on the ground because we have brave soldiers who are always ready to fight even if armed with sticks and spears; however, this should not be a trump card for our leaders to always march them into battles bare-chested. Our leaders should accept the fact that sheer number of soldiers can not win a mechanized and high-tech war that lies ahead no matter how brave the soldiers may be. But, since our government has what it takes to buy choppers, carriers, or even bombers for our military, one sees little reason the SPLA still doesn’t have them. Don’t tell me we have our fleet in Ethiopia, Uganda, or whatever country, that argument simply doesn’t make sense. We do not have to lie to ourselves wishfully that we have these things; we need to have them, period. With the chopper price ranging from $4million to $10millions and a decent fighter ranging from $20million to $38million, and given the fact that the SPLA takes %40 of our budget ($500million), the cost of having these machines would reasonably be on budget.

Development

A lot has been about out tottering development in the south, but one thing keeps repeating: vital ministries keep under-spending their allocated resources. One such ministry is the Ministry of Education which spends only half of its budget; it is just ridiculous in the light of the facts on the ground across south Sudan where most teachers do not receives their meager salaries, that is if there are enough schools in the first place. On the hand, ministries like the Ministry of Presidential Affairs do over-spend their budget. Something is really wrong with our system in Juba; simply, development will not progress without mending the system by bringing in professional rather than opportunists who are now in charge of most vital developmental department in Juba, and who have no clue whatsoever as to what their department are suppose to do.

Nevertheless, we have come a long way and that is itself an achievement. If we hold on, it is just a small distance and everything will be alright even though Abyei issue will be some sort of a vena-contracta. There is a say that goes: no matter how long the night may seem, the day is sure to come.

Surely, January 9, 2005 marks a defining moment in our history.

Maker Costa is a Sudanese residing in New York; you can reach him at [email protected]