Is an all-inclusive conference a panacea for Ethiopia?
By Dada Talibe
January 31, 2008 — The Ethiopian political landscape is heavily crowded with a myriad of
conflicting interests. The visions espoused as well as the means chosen to
pursue them are also divergent. While those operating in the political
process hope against hope that their deliverance will come from the ballot
box, those from outside look towards popular insurrection and armed
resistance as a way out. Interestingly enough neither the former nor the
latter is unequivocally and fully committed to its chosen mode of struggle.
The “legal” opposition is unconvinced that EPRDF would relinquish power
through the ballot box. The sobering experience of the May 2005 election can
only bolster this conviction. Their choice of this means of struggle is
also not based on a principled belief that the “legal” route is inherently
superior to the armed in defeating tyranny. It is partly predicated on the
belief that the EPRDF is more vulnerable politically than militarily.
At times the opposition blames the resistance for providing the EPRDF with a
pretext to justify its draconian measures under the guise of maintaining not
only peace and security but also national unity. The threat of insurgency,
however ineffective, enables EPRDF to equate all dissent with subversion.
At the same time, they welcome and look to the pressure exerted on EPRDF by
the resistance to create more openings, breathing space, in the political
process. The opposition is therefore ambivalent: while publicly shunning
the resistance, it secretly wishes its success. This is one of the sources
of its internal discord.
The resistance groups on the other hand took up arms as an option of last
resort. Their constituents are also conflicted. While being frustrated at
the sacrifices and modest progress achieved by this mode thus far, they are
also not convinced that the ballot box offers any better prospect of
success. As a result armed struggle is waged haphazardly and grudgingly,
which may, at least partially, account for its ineptness. The resistance
also looks down on the “legal” struggle and sees the whole process as a
sham. This does not however preclude their openly wishing its triumph.
However, the fact that EPRDF could not even tolerate weak opposition groups,
let alone those with huge popular following, entrenches them in armed
struggle, to which they were allured into by their bitter experience during
the early 1990s when they were part of the political process. They had seen
first hand and up close how EPRDF treats its opponents, especially those
with a sizeable base. They have little reason to believe that EPRDF has
changed since.
The resistance also at times faults the “legal” opposition for providing
EPRDF with a semblance of external legitimacy. By choosing to play by its
rules when they know full well that they are stacked against them, the
opposition serves as a smokescreen for EPRDF’s claim of a fledgling
democracy. At the same time the resistance credits the opposition for
exposing EPRDF’s undemocratic nature. The squeezing and chocking of the
opposition deflects domestic and international pressure on the resistance to
be part of the same flawed political process. The resistance, like its
civilian counterparts, is also ambivalent, which has also been a lingering
source of internal friction and dissension.
During the May 2005 elections it looked as if the ballot box was about to
bear fruit. A few in the resistance began to doubt the wisdom of staying
out of the political process. The dissonance however quickly died down as
soon as the crackdown against the CUD intensified. The continuing
popularity of the OLF as well as the ability of ONLF in 2006 to bring about
international limelight on the deteriorating situation in the restive Ogaden
region and the country at large highlighted the promise of armed resistance.
Today it is obvious that EPRDF is in a weak position both politically and
militarily. Although neither electoral nor military victory is imminent at
this juncture, the fact that EPRDF is politically so bankrupt gives credence
to the notion that anything could happen any time.
If there is any one common agenda that is shared by all proponents of change
it is the call for an all-inclusive conference. The call has been
repeatedly made since the early 1990s, most consistently by OLF. It gained
currency in 2006 upon the launching of AFD, which made the call for an
all-inclusive dialogue the cornerstone of its policy. Like all past calls
this one too was frustrated not only by lack of a positive response from
EPRDF but also by the inability of the proponents of change to properly
appraise the prevailing asymmetry of power and come up with robust
strategies tailor made to bridge the gap.
An all-inclusive conference is a uniquely African invention. It was used
principally and particularly in Francophone Africa during the 1990s to
fulfill two goals: address the demands for liberalization through an
inclusive process and achieve a managed transition to democracy. A national
conference is a public forum, held over an extended period, at which
representatives from key stakeholders discuss, develop an agreed upon “rules
of the game” and jointly chart a country’s political future. Where it has
worked, it has been a valuable tool to forge internal consensus on
democratization and transition. However, its record in achieving
democratization and smooth transition is mixed at best.
The main determinant of the success of a national conference is the balance
of power between the incumbent regime and the forces of democracy and
change. Unless it is on the verge of collapse the participation of the
incumbent in a national conference is necessary. The incumbent is usually
reluctant to assent to holding a national conference, unless forced, because
of one obvious fact: national conferences usually lead to the possible
disempowerment of the regime on power by making a level playing field for
all.
The factors that contribute to the success of a national conference include:
the goodwill and readiness of the ruling regime to share power, the
neutrality of the army, the pressure and sponsorship of the international
community, the potency of domestic popular pressure, and the threat of
economic or general societal collapse.
After 16 long years experience of failed expectations it is vain to continue
to believe that the TPLF/EPRDF will ever share power. It is ideologically
and practically committed to maintaining its perpetual dominance. It
believes that its very existence is dependent on its absolute domination of
the political, social and economic life of the country.
In today’s Ethiopia the neutrality of the army is not to be hoped. It is an
ethnic army for all intents and purposes. The officer corps is predominantly
Tigrean. The regime has been successful in instilling a siege mentality
among Tigrean elites in general and Tigrean officers in particular so much
so that they liken their privileged life to the survival of the regime. The
opposition as well as the resistance has not been effective in dispelling
this misconception. It is true that the Tigrean element is not that
prevalent in the rank and file. However, while disdainful of Tigrean
domination, the fighting force is fractured along ethnic lines. The rank
and file is confronted by a bleak choice between being reluctantly loyal to
a despised regime and being literally thrown on the streets, facing abject
poverty. Although high profile defections have seriously put into question
the loyalty of the army to the regime, the fact that the bulk of the army is
deployed on the northern borders insulates it from popular discontent
simmering elsewhere.
We have seen from experience that the rhetoric of the international
community on democracy and human rights, particularly when it comes to
Africa, rings hallow. Their overriding policy objective is evidently the
maintenance of short-term stability. Human rights and democracy can be
sacrificed at the altar of stability. If a strategic resource or interest
is not at stake silencing political dissent is condoned so long as a facade
of law and order can be maintained. Little thought is given to the long-term
implications. Meles could always play the “Islamic-Terrorism” card to win
Western backing. The rest of Africa is oblivious to what is happening at
home, let alone far off Ethiopia. Asian states seem unmindful to human
rights and democracy. Their superseding objective is to gain access to
cheap natural resources and meet their burgeoning economy’s insatiable
appetite for more energy. In short in today’s Africa, freedom fighters and
democrats have very few international friends and allies. No country is
willing to pressure Meles to heed the call for an all-inclusive conference.
None is ready to sponsor such an endeavor.
Because of the divergence in vision and contradicting interests represented,
the potential threat of popular protest alone could not force the regime to
the negotiating table. The trigger-happy nature of the regime dissuades
many to commit to this course. Unless carried out under an all-encompassing
common political agenda, incidents of civil disobedience would remain
isolated, limiting their potency. When the Oromo region is engulfed by
popular protests in 2005 the rest of Ethiopia was silent. When Addis
erupted into riots in the aftermath of the botched elections of May 2005 the
remainder of the country was asleep. The fact that the CUD is dominated by
Amharic-speakers allegedly intent on dismantling the current federal
structure and ending self-rule, however symbolic it is currently, is said to
have discouraged the Oromo and other oppressed peoples from joining the
protests in Addis. The misgivings and misrepresentation of OLF’s ultimate
objective and its stand on secession by some quarters makes others
unenthusiastic about joining the protests in Oromia. This enabled EPRDF to
play one established interest against the other, thereby preventing the
emergence of a broad-based popular resistance.
The crushing defeat of the EPRDF during the May 2005 elections has forced it
to seek legitimacy outside of the political arena. Instead talk of rapid
economic development is presented as an alternative source of political
legitimacy. As a result, the EPRDF is on a hurried and massive spending
binge with a preponderance of propaganda work to match. This has undeniably
created an artificial and an untenable bubble that has in turn opened the
floodgates to rising inflationary pressures. The economy is also vulnerable
to shocks arising from the volatility of the global market, draught, famine,
political unrest, war and other man-made disasters. However, it is
difficult to envisage the EPRDF coming to the negotiation table out of
worries about a possible economic meltdown.
The sudden plunge of Kenya, one of the most established African democracies,
into chaos should be a clear warning for us all. If this is happening in
once stable Kenya, no one can be sure that a similar development is
impossible or unlikely to transpire in fragile Ethiopia where domination has
long been a deeply resented phenomenon. The hegemonic status of the minority
elite in the political, social and economic sphere is unmistakable. All of
the many ethnic groups have experienced humiliation in the hands of the
regime during the last 16 years. This is on top of an already established
bitter history of domination, marginalization, exploitation and subjugation
witnessed in the agonizing process of birth of Menelik’s Ethiopia and ever
since, whose memory is still fresh.
Siye Abreh’s courageous testimony that the prisons in Ethiopia speak Oromo
is a stern warning. It is indicative of the depth of grievance in the
country’s most populous region and perhaps the most vital constituency to
determine Ethiopia’s future course. This is not an idle comment coming from
one of the architects of the Tigrean military machine. Brutal crackdown in
Ogaden has displaced thousands. The level of bitterness there can be easily
guessed. Although manifestly CUD is systematically broken up, the grievance
in the urban areas and the Amhara region, where it had the most support, is
palpable. However, it is impossible to envisage the EPRDF heeding the call
for an inclusive conference out of fear of the risk of a social chaos in
Ethiopia. This requires foresight and a sense of responsibility and
accountability, which are in short supply within the EPRDF.
From its nature EPRDF oscillates between arrogance and panic. When it is in
a panic mode, it accepts anything— at least in principle, only to reverse
itself later. Once it is in its over-confidence mode, it rejects off-hand
any proposal with even the remotest chance of diluting its undue dominance.
Currently EPRDF is projecting a false over-confidence.
Although the dire conditions warrant the holding of an all-inclusive
conference to resolve the impasse in Ethiopia, EPRDF is unlikely to budge
unless compelled. The first priority is to take care of the vision thing—
the synchronization of long-term goals, which takes a lot of political will
and courage. Next comes the application of targeted pressure to shatter the
fictitious invincibility of the EPRDF. Absent a harmonization of
objectives, cooperation can only be tactical, which in turn cannot overcome
the mistrust and animosity between different vested interests so as to allow
the emergence of a broad-based and effective popular movement. Even if the
EPRDF accepts the call for the conference at this point, it can easily
manipulate the process and render it fruitless or renege on whatever
promises it might make as it often does. Short of a shift in the balance of
power, EPRDF won’t heed the call for an all-inclusive conference. Unfazed
by the troubles within the CUD, AFD should therefore continue to consolidate
by further synchronizing the goals of its diverse family and building
collective muscle and teeth. Should it heed these advises, it won’t be long
before EPRDF swings to its panic mode.
The author is based in the USA. He can be reached by [email protected].