Why national dialogue is the best strategic option for fixing Sudan’s dilemma
by: Trayo A. Ali
To talk about a “national dialogue” in Sudan’s political discussions, especially to do so in a positive tone, is often risky and fraught with emotional responses or suspicions. Such talk raises eyebrows and even creates opportunities for opponents to easily paint the proponents of dialogue as traitors or conspirators. All these negative connotations arise from the bad reputation of dialogue caused by the abuse and the misuse of the term in Sudan’s political history, the pervasive mistrust among the Sudanese political actors arising from consistent betrayals, and because of the culture of political irrationality in Sudan’s political thinking, which belittles the value of dialogue.
As the saying goes, “a cat bitten once by a snake dreads even rope,” and while dialogue is the most realistic, effective, risk-free, transparent, consensual, comprehensive, and advanced form of peaceful political discourse in managing conflict or effecting political change, the concept of dialogue remains more politically contentious—but also necessary–than any time before in addressing Sudan’s political dilemma.
Despite its reputation, the necessity of dialogue in Sudan is unavoidable under the prevailing circumstances and hard facts on the ground. There is an urgent need to have the widest possible base of the Sudanese public collectively translate into reality the hopes enshrined in the slogan of “Freedom, Peace and Justice” as enshrined in the 2018 December Revolution 2018, as well as the need to minimize the ever-mounting dangers threatening the unity of the country itself.
The above reasons for urgency build upon other propelling factors, including civilian and military-political forces’ failure to achieve stability since the independence in 1956, as well as their inability to establish a stable governance system, achieve peace and social security, achieve development, or their failure to transform the popular revolutionary events (October 1964 or April 1985) into an opportunity.
Therefore, it will be a fatal mistake to overlook, ignore, or avoid the initiative on national dialogue as proposed by the international community’s trilateral mechanism of UNITAMS, the African Union (AU), and IGAD. This initiative can be transformed into a powerful platform whereby Sudan’s mosaic political forces, including the energetic youth–both those who have sustained these long and brave protests and those who have endured years of resistance against genocide–can be assembled to resolve the fundamental question of “how Sudan should be governed” alongside the principles of “freedom, peace and justice” to break country’s current dilemma of political deadlock.
Thus, irrespective of any apprehensive perceptions, divergent views, or phobic feelings about dialogue, it is my considered view that Sudanese elites and politicians are obliged to face the moment of truth, engage in public education, and explain, articulate, and popularize the wisdom behind national dialogue as the best strategic option.
The Sudanese public should have space to make choices and decide on Sudan’s future, not by way of intimidation but by way of consciousness. Only an informed public can make rational decisions.
It is an uphill task to eliminate the perpetual nightmare caused by the devilish cycle of military coups, genocidal wars, killing, poverty, and the splitting of the country. This is a political mission that requires a bigger and wider popular front based on collective agreement. Public engagement is especially important given the reality that political forces’ opinions on the initiative are divided and polarized. Some see it as an opportunity tantamount to a “divine intervention” and/or a last-minute lifeboat, while others view dialogue with scepticism, reservations, indifferences, passivity, ambivalence, lukewarm attitudes, or even outright opposition. Some see it as a deceptive trick employed by the powers of the day to “rebottle the old wine in a new bottle”—i.e., to maintain the status quo.
To get the ball rolling on dialogue, it is imperative to start by noting some important remarks that help capture the political scene before raising some pertinent questions and offering some suggestions that might help stimulate public interests, alert political forces to appreciate the necessity for dialogue, and assist the interlocking mediators in their efforts to structure the best viable road map for dialogue.
Observations
First observation: amoebic mutilation of the political forces, divergent views, and sharp polarization.
The most worrisome of the realities in Sudan is the level of divisions within the political landscape. The case is one of “all-against-all.” The army against the civilian politicians, the civil society groups against the political parties, the peace camp against the warmongers, young generations against the older generations, the old establishment against the newly emerging actors, pro-partnership elements against exclusionists, the centre against the periphery, regions against regions, ethnic groups against each other, radicals against the moderates, Islamists against the seculars, left-wing against the right-wing, “Arab nationalists” against “Pan-Africanists”, “anti-imperialist” forces against the “pro World Bank and the IMF economic programs” Even pro normalization with Israel against anti-normalization.
Second observation: trading accusations and patterns of naming and shaming.
The pattern of trading accusations, apportioning blames, repulsive reactions, destructive criticisms, naming and shaming, incriminating and demonizing, and character assassinations are all part of the political discourse. Party statements, activists’ interventions, opinion articles, and political interviews all do prove the above rhetoric. This “disagree to agree” attitude approach led the parties to be contentious over everything, including the interpretation of the revolution’s fundamental slogan of “freedom, peace and justice”.
Third observation: Sudan’s transition is all an interregnum period.
Sudan has, since independence, been in a torturous interregnum period. For over seven decades, nothing has been fixed or settled. No permanent constitution, permanent peace, nor national vision on any fundamental issue. Thus, it will be a mistake to perceive the current turmoiled transitions as an “isolated phase” by itself. It is a continuation and an integral part of a longer “interregnum” period characterized by cyclic phases of totalitarian military dictatorship, human rights violations, and violence against civilians
The December 2018 upheaval has only opened the proverbial can of worms wider, turned things “inside-out”, and squarely brought the fundamental issues to the surface. This situation has placed the future of the country in a more precarious political balance than ever.
As the “traditional political forces” continue denying and undermining the mounting public awareness, the structural changes in the socio-demographic composition (especially in the urban areas), the emergence of the new political actors and the demands they advocate, then the more the accumulates and the wider the window for disintegration becomes.
To the negligence of the political forces, the circumstances surrounding the December revolution of 2018 are qualitatively different than in October 1964 and/or May 1985. The differences include the level of participation of the marginalized political forces in political developments (or their military presence on the ground), or the differences in the composition of the national army itself (whether in terms of their ideological orientation or partisan loyalty, as well as in the dual nature of their command, as the result of the presence of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Further differences are also in the ever-evolving cosmopolitan and demographic composition (especially in the national capital Khartoum as the result of the dense presence of populations from marginalized areas). Another difference is in the degree of divisions and divergence in positions existing among the protesting mass.
All these difficult realities constitute real challenges that go beyond the capacity of any individual political force.
Besides all the above realities, there is also the level of resistance posed by the counter-revolutionary forces of the Islamist defunct deep state. These challenges need a more collective and cohesive vision and approach to resolve them. Only national dialogue can help harness such common positions and shape the required common vision.
Fourth observation: Old ostracized mentality in denying reality.
Of course, it is hard (if not impossible!) to “de-characterize” the character. But Sudanese politicians are badly ingrained into bad habits to change. They are imprisoned, captivated, and victimized by the old mentality. They failed to adapt to the changing world. They have completely submitted to and surrendered to the extreme or become fossilized. They lost any ability to think creatively. Even a snake changes its skin in order to survive.
Fifth observation: the syndrome of “Mistrust” and its deadly effects on Sudan’s body-politics.
One major phenomenon that explains this “all-against-all” dilemma is the syndrome of “mistrust” impacting the cohesiveness of Sudan’s body politics. The mistrust has become a major obstructive factor preventing political forces from any meaningful interaction as has played a major role in the division and fragmentation of the rain-bow political umbrella, Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC).
The ever souring relations between the advocators of the “Three No’s” ( the Resistance Committees (RCs) and the political forces is clear testimony, whereas the RCs categorized the forces as reactionary “soft landers”, “compromisers”, “betrayers” and revolutionary “puritarians. This attitude is severely narrowing and shrinking the cohesiveness of revolution’s support base, undermining common approach to revolution’s fundamentals (the slogan “freedom, peace, justice”).
This is where the dialogue becomes “necessary evil”.
Sixth observation: conflict of generation. The unspoken phenomenon.
These sharp differences also reflect the gap created by the unspoken phenomena of “generation conflict”. This dichotomy between the “Centenarian” political forces and the new generation. It is this widening rift that kept preventing any meaningful interaction with the “resistance committees” (mostly led by young people) and between the political parties. Of course, there is no way to narrow this gap except through dialogue.
Seventh observation: the conceptual defect in the order of the transitional period and in placing the Cart before the horse.
Today no Sudanese can deny the fact that none of the pertinent issues enjoys a common national vision. Whether the strategic ones (such as identity, a system of governance, power-sharing, wealth distribution…etc) or the auxiliary issues of ad hoc nature (such as justice, security arrangements, national census, elections, international role, inclusivity of transitional administration..etc.), are all waiting to be thoroughly examined by all the forces in collective terms. That takes dialogue.
Furthermore, the parties also failed to choreograph a well-structured roadmap for the transitional process (including sequencing and synchronizing issues). Parties failed to put the horse before Cart by undermining the formation of transitional parliament (the all-important stepping stone). They even have different opinions on the vital issue of peace (on how to achieve, how to build, or how to sustain).
Eighth observation: lack of a national vision in redefining core issues.
The failure is not only in sequencing the transitional roadmap but also in redefining fundamental issues or a common strategy for resolution. The controversy over every issue including:
identity: The centrepiece issue of identity remained subject for debate and obstructive factor. Opinions are even divided within the front (FFC) itself.
– System of governance: The disagreement is also on the system of governance. Whether Sudanese needs decentralized federalism or autonomism or confederation remained unresolved. Or the ideal is a presidential or parliamentary system are all are remained pending. How can the agreement be reached over these multiple issues without sober dialogue.?
– Security arrangements: Approaches to the sensitive issue of security arrangements also lack a common vision or understanding. Perspectives held by the political forces are dramatically different. The civilians (being political parties or civil society groups) have neither interest nor shown any concern. The views held by the “armed actors” (the army and the movements) too remained contradictory. For the armed movements, the issue of forces integration is an “existential” matter inseparably linked to the “prevention of genocide” while for the “army” the issue is a simple “absorption” of movements’ individual combatants into their ranks.
– Justice: The indifference also surrounds the central issue of justice (whether on the crimes against humanity or on transitional justice). No coherent national approach or program are designed to address the issue as of yet.
– Elections: As a cornerstone for a genuine transformation, there is only a loose and/or even reckless talk about this delicate issue. The issue is frequently mentioned without linking to its essential requirements (such as stability, security, national census, return of refugees and the IDPs, renewal of voter registration, constituency demarcation, elections law, credible observers…etc). All of these need both thorough technical work and agreement. Talking about it under the present circumstance is both premature and a case of “putting the cart before the horse”.
– Foreign policy: The dilemma is also on how to craft an effective foreign policy to deal with the international community (soliciting its support or responding to its challenges to international peace and security). As the international community is not a “community of charities,” one needs a reliable and trustworthy partner capable of reciprocating interests. No party is considering these dimensions on strategic terms.
The ninth observation: The “evils” of partnership versus extremism of the “three no’s”.
The real challenge facing the political forces is how to reconcile divergent and/or opposing views and positions, especially between those of the “Three No’s” (no negotiations, no partnership and no legitimization of the status quo) and those held by the pro-partnership with the military component.
This level of the distance is manifested in the perception held and the interpretation given by an activist when he wrote:
“What a damn settlement are they talking about. The World want to impose on Sudan settlement. The forces of “soft landing” want a settlement. The settlement means retaining the deep state and keeping the military to continue controlling the country’s economy. The settlement means keeping Darfur and other conflict areas in a state of conflagration, settlement means the establishment of foreign military bases in Sudan. The settlement means God forgive all crimes and atrocities committed. Settlement simply means conspiring to liquidate the resistance committees, means retaining partnership with the military. It simply means to say goodbye to the revolution.”
Of course, if this kind of interpretation is allowed to dominate public perception and understanding, it will irreparably damage the whole idea of the dialogue. This is why public education becomes an indispensable duty for the political forces to argue in more practical terms and help the revolutionary youth to come closer to the terms of reality and their energetic move be turned into one powerful dialogue.
What Sudanese need to appreciate is that transitional arrangement by nature and by definition is a case of “partnership”. This is especially so under the circumstances whereby a Sudan is coming out of both the ruins of wars and that of dictatorship. Politics is an art of possible and the conventional wisdom is that ( “necessity knows no prohibitions”). To explain that needs a robust and transparent dialogue, and that is the challenge facing the political forces.
The tenth observation: defining “Civil/military relation” (CMR) as a political missing link.
The problematic issue of military coups (or military intervention in politics) and the means and ways to prevent has always been a political issue before it is a military problem. This is why politicians and political institutions all over the world have invented what is termed “military/civil relations” (MCR) to deliberate in order to reach sustainable preventive means and ways. This is the missing link in Sudan’s political discourse. It is a conducive platform such as national dialogue that can discuss the root causes of this dilemma. Parties need to reflect and examine why the UMA party-backed 1958 military coup, the communist party supported the 1969 coup or the Islamist National Islamic Front- NIF (turned National Congress Party- NCP) engineered the 1989 military coup.
Eleventh observation: Technocrats or men and women of competence and integrity ?.
Another palaver that needs to be demystified is this confusing term coded “technocrat”. Obviously, politicians invented this dubious tact to hide their parochial intentions. Sudan’s reality has always shown that political forces tend to sneak into power under the disguise of “technocratism”. This deceptive “trick” is not only adding more confusion to the public understanding but also shows the level of political insincerity and keeps fueling more “mistrust” among the political forces. Sudan’s experience knows no “apolitical technocrat”. Even Dr Hamdok himself is not a “technocrat” in the strictest sense. Sudanese need to call a “spade a spade”. Power is an exercise of politics and therefore it is the affair of politicians. What is needed is men and women of competence and integrity and not “technocrats”
Twelfth observation: escalation of “hate speech” of a racist tone.
There is an unprecedented rise in hate speech, most of which is tainted by racist tones. What is worrying is the fact that the trend is not only confined to the activists’ jargons but also is being uttered by senior responsible people. The very recent unpardonable racist offensive remarks directed against Sudan’s former TV director Mr Loguman Ahmed was a horrifying testimony. What is worrying is also that such political clowning goes without any criticism or warning by the political elites or government officials. This trend also shows how the parties are far apart.
Thirteenth observation: The multiplicity of mediators/facilitators. A healthy phenomenon reflects the degree of international concern.
One observation of positive note Sudanese should hail is the composition of the mediation. This international “troika” of the UNTIAMS, AU and IGAD should be seen as a positive combination that could reinforce the capability, public confidence, and the leverage of the mediation mechanism and international help.
Fourteenth observation: resignation of Dr Hamdok. An irrecoverable mistake committed by all parties.
Of course, capturing the general view of the pathetic situation will not be completed without referring to the political climate under which the Prime Minister Dr Hamdouk was working and the pressure mounted upon him by all the political forces, primarily the so-called political “incubator” the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the restrictions denying him the liberty to work freely in formulating his policies.
The truth is that all the political forces have miscalculated in their losing Dr Hamdok. Especially political parties failed to give him the necessary support, a fact that became a major propeller for his resignation.
Parties failed to rally around him, cooperate with him and failed to defend him.
Not only that, but in contrast to anybody’s imagination or expectations, the forces of the “Three Nos” were found joining the campaign staged by the deep state’s counter-revolutionary forces against Hamdok’s government. It was a “wind-fall-gain” for counter-revolutionary forces.
Again, the prime minister was in differences with the FFC from the onset on two fundamental issues: radicalism versus gradualism over the issue of “partnership” with the military component and on his economic policies (in particular on the IMF prescriptions).
Though a number of inexperienced mediocre people sneaked and climbed their way up into the joints of Hamdok’s administration and distorted the show, Dr Hamdok remained a value in himself ((or by himself)) as a symbol of a transitional administration. He had patience, technocratic experiences, respect for the value of democracy, a comprehensive understanding of Sudan’s socio-political reality, and knows the importance of “dialogue”.
Was he allowed to remain, the two most intriguing political problems facing Sudan could have been resolved: Wavering of the foreign debts, removing Sudan from the list of terrorism and repositioning Sudan to the fold of the international community system. That was due to the political forces’ irrationality. They share the mistake of losing him. None of them dares to throw a stone at the “sinner”.
Sudanese can reach nowhere unless they overcome this deaf-blind style of communication. They should think outside of the box. Mature dialogue can help shape common understanding, common vision, common strategy, and common approach.
That is why “national dialogue” became the “necessary evil”. But that takes political rationalism to stomach it (or digest it).
🛑 Questions
- From the above observations emerge a host of self-propelled fundamental questions. On the top is this mother of all questions which faces the political forces (especially the traditional parties). The question is: Whether Sudan’s post-December 2018 political transition is a case of transiting from a state of “dictatorship to democracy”, or it is a case of transiting from “war to peace”, or a combined case of transiting from both “dictatorship and war” to a “democracy and peace” alike?
Of course, this question is also applied to October 1964 and April 1985 revolutions.
Unfortunately, it is most likely the political forces have intentionally avoided raising this fundamental question (in the manner it should be). The reason is that they feared political repercussions and implications of answers could emanate from this question.
Obviously, the answer is a case of transiting from both “dictatorship and wars” to both “democracy and peace” alike.
The political forces have avoided this hard answer because it implies commitments toward peace (including the difficulty of attaining, building, and preserving) and sustaining it with democracy in an appropriate combination.
As experience shows, Sudanese political forces always prefer easy-going options. They always kept silent over the issue of peace (as post-October 1964 or April 2085) have shown and are being repeated now.
It’s this attitude of avoiding commitments for peace that caused the failure of the October 1964 revolution as well as April 1985.
Evading this question is what perpetuates this conflict.
Thus, if Sudanese want to attain any successful democratic change, they are compelled to bear the brunt of answering this question and work hard to configure and weave together appropriate formulas capable of combining building peace and sustaining democracy simultaneously.
Another pivotal issue that lies at the heart of Sudan’s political crisis, should not be left at the level of observation (as we did with other issues) but needs an explanation as it has kept escaping the attention of the political forces (the civilians) is the issue of security arrangements.
The question is: Why are the civilian forces not interested in the issue of “restructuring security sector institutions”? Is it because these forces lack the ability to competently address the issues or because they lack the desire and interest?
This question is relevant because the matter of security arrangements is a public issue of a political nature especially, as it is connected to violence against the civilians in the first place and to the entire stability of the country as well.
It is my considered view that the questions raised above have the capacity to dictate why Sudanese should appreciate and embrace the idea of national dialogue.
🛑 Suggestions
If the dialogue is to be an attractive process and to be turned into a successful story, the facilitators should take into consideration a number of issues. The fundamental requirement for its commencement is the creation of a conducive environment (toped by immediate and unconditional cessation of killings).
For the process to be attractive it must be inclusive (in terms of participation) and comprehensive (in terms of issues).
However, in choreographing a meaningful process the mediation should take into consideration addressing the fundamental issue of “mistrust” both among the Sudanese parties and the parties and mediation. This obstructive menace should be mitigated by offering strong “doses” of confidence-building measures (CBMs) at all levels of the process, from procedural, to substantive and to implementation.
Hostilities should be prevented, tension should be averted, and transparency should be the benchmark. There should be constant outreach and regular consultations.
Parties should cooperate for nationwide education, and popularization exercises should be conducted to explain the rationale and relevancy of choosing dialogue as the most effective and “risk-free” political venture.
Quick-fix approaches do not work in Sudan’s political context. It should not be the approach. As one expert observed to transform Sudan is like “turning into an aircraft carrier”. Therefore, the process should be a patient “bottom-up” process and not a “top-down” one. It should start from the level of states (or regions) up to the national level.
Both Sudanese political forces and the mediator(s) need a new strategy of thinking outside of the box.
🛑 Conclusion
To sum up, we opined that in the view of Sudan’s dilemmatic deadlock and irrespective of the fact that the idea of national dialogue has been tainted with a bad reputation (as the result of abuse and misuse the term has suffered), it remains the most viable, risk-free and advanced political option in harnessing national vision and national consensus on strategic issues. It, therefore, needs to be articulated and popularized to rally public support around it.
Thus, for the purposes of stimulating public interest, alerting political forces, and aiding the mediation, we described the political scene by noting some key observations, posed some pertinent questions and offered some relevant suggestions.
We stated that the current state of tumultuous transition is not an isolated phenomenon but it is a continuation of Sudan’s post-independence chronic syndrome of failure and instability.
We have observed that as the result of the impact of the pervasive syndrome of “mistrust”, Sudan’s political forces are fatally divided to the point they failed to maintain the “ideal prime minister of the revolution” (who resigned primarily due to the lack of agreement within his political incubator). The division cannot be repaired except by a “Third Party” moderator(s).
We also noted that the December revolution has turned Sudan’s political reality “inside-out” and brought all the elements of the situation to the surface, and that added more challenges.
We noted that political forces have failed to raise the vital question regarding the nature of the transition: Whether it’s from dictatorship to democracy or from war to peace or it’s from both cases, dictatorship and war to peace and democracy.
We further noted that political forces (civilian or military) are undermining these qualitatively new realities (especially dimensions brought by the emerging marginalized forces and the gap caused by the “generation conflict”
We opined that no matter how it has been opposed, the nature of the transitional process is by definition a case of “partnership” amongst different forces (especially where war and peace are factored). It is a necessary evil and Sudanese need to deal with it by way of thinking outside the traditional box.
Most importantly, we also have observed that there is a need for the political forces to build a broad-based consensus and national vision around fundamental issues such as the question of identity, system of governance, security arrangements, justice, elections, foreign policy, partnership versus “Three no’s”, civil-military relations, the myth of “technocrat”, rising hate speech, multiplicity of mediation and on and so forth.
Finally, we suggested that the best way to confront these multiple challenges is through collective efforts which take to reckon with the necessity of comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue.
Thus, while Sudanese actors are free to choose whatever choice they make, it is important for them to remember the statement made by the late Dr John Garang when he said (upon signing the 2005 peace agreement) that “Sudan will never be the same again”. Sudanese can choose any model be it that of Tunisian model or Libyan fashion. But it is considered advised to go the South African way. Mr Nelson Mandella was not weak when he chose the path of dialogue. Neither was Mr De Klerk an angel when he accepted dialogue. Mandella (after more than a hundred years of South African struggle) chose dialogue to minimize any extra costs and Mr De Klerk reasoned to preserve the future of his “white folks”. They all turned out to be far-sighted leaders.
If mediated through a strong “Third Party”, national dialogue can be the most appropriate, surest, and effective way to silence the guns, stop the bloodshed, minimize the cost, guarantee comprehensive participation, restore peace, generate national consensus, crystalize a common vision, mitigate the mistrust, build confidence, guarantee international assistances, assure implementation of the outcomes in a manner serves all the parties and preserves the unity of the country and sustained democracy and freedoms.
By: Trayo A. Ali