Sudan Democratic Transition: The Path Forward
By Sudan Democratic Transition Working Group[*]
In December 2018, widespread protests against corruption, unemployment and poverty erupted in Sudan, including in the capital Khartoum, and dozens of innocent protesters were killed by the Sudanese security forces in their violent crackdown of the protests. On 11 April 2019, as a result of the continued protests, the Sudanese military removed former Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, from power, suspended the country’s constitution and imposed a three-month state of emergency.
On 3 June 2019, during Sudan’s military rule, security forces attacked a protest outside the military headquarters in Khartoum (where Sudanese were organizing a sit-in), killing at least 127 people. Security forces, which included the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, tried to conceal their violations by dumping dead bodies weighted with bricks in the River Nile, of which around 40 floated back to the surface according to the Sudanese doctors’ Committee; and hundreds of people had been arrested and detained. This is in addition to rape and torture crimes that affected hundreds of Sudanese males and females in and around the sit-in area.
On 04 August 2019, after the African Union intervention, the Sudanese civilian and military factions agreed to share power in a three-year transition period, with elections scheduled for 2023 after the end of the transitional period.
On 3 October 2020, the government signed the Juba Peace Agreement with the coalition of four main armed movements in the Darfur region. The agreement gained political momentum and was followed by a campaign to sell the agreement as a comprehensive settlement and a final solution to the problems of war in Darfur, Blue Nile and Eastern Sudan. It is no secret to anyone that the negotiation process was marred by a lack of transparency and flaws, the most important of which was that the military component in the Sovereignty Council had confiscated the powers of the Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok as stipulated in the constitutional charter to spearhead the peace talks.
Many voices criticized the agreement in its final form, as it failed to address the root causes of the issues that led to the outbreak of war in Darfur and the Blue Nile and the tension in the East. Rather, the agreement later inflamed the situation in Eastern Sudan as a result of the so-called paths that dealt with the Sudanese problem from a regional and geographically perspective and neglected the nature of the state that creating the reality of unbalanced development. This is in addition to the fact that the agreement was reduced to the usual formula of the previous Sudanese peace agreements, which does not exceed the sharing of positions of power amongst the leaders of the armed movements, rather than an agreement with a popular cover to address the urgent issues of the displaced and refugees, the issue of justice and the stolen lands.
Undoubtedly, the nature of the authority that was formed after the entry of the coalition of armed movements and representatives of the coalition of Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) into the second transitional government was fueled by political competition at the expense of the democratic transition process launched by the December revolution. It was evident that this scene had been manufactured and engineered by Al-Bashir’s security committee, which was the de facto ruler of the country through the façade of the civilian government in order to create the conditions for the seizure of power.
On 25 October 2021, the Sudanese military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, took control of the government in a coup; and several top government officials, including civilian Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, were initially detained for his refusal to declare support for the coup. After the coup, Sudanese civilians initiated a campaign of civil resistance against the military regime and called for the reinstatement of the dissolved government. In November 2021, military leaders and Abdalla Hamdok announced a deal that included his reinstatement as Prime Minister and in January 2022, PM Hamdok announced his resignation after failing to name a government amid continued anti-military protests in the country, which are still continuing.
Currently, the military coup front consisting of the Sudanese military, the RSF, and armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement (along with the Islamists/National Congress Party (Bashir’s party)) are in full control of Sudan in a severe blow to Sudan’s envisioned transition to democratic rule. The Sudanese State at this juncture is completely hijacked and held hostage by paramilitary establishments that use the state’s institutions as a façade to legitimize their existence and activities. The Defense Industrial Systems and other security-owned enterprises, both run by close circles of the military elite and their civilian allies, represent one of the direct military interventions in the civilian economy which dominate vital economic sectors through engaging in activities that are beyond the control of the state. The deep involvement of the RSF in illicit gold mining, trade and various business dealings is yet another encroachment on civilian economic enterprises. Conservative estimates indicate that between the military and RSF investment there are over 10 billion dollars of economic activities controlled by a small group of people who are not accountable to any governmental entity.
For decades, economic enterprises owned by security forces escaped civilian oversight over their finances and assets by capitalizing on their political influence and the domination of the public sphere. These enterprises are not accountable to the Ministry of Finance or the state’s general accounts and auditing bodies. These various military and paramilitary economic conglomerates function in parallel to the state while using the state to gain social and political legitimacy. It must be made crystal clear: dealing with such a structural conundrum requires a multi-level strategy to save the country from descending into complete chaos as a result of the erosion of social order and the disappearance of what is left of the state as a legal or political entity.
Against this backdrop, the way events unfolded in Sudan created a challenging path for a smooth democratic transition. Until very recently, a number of actors have hoped that the outcome of the various mediation efforts could allow Sudan to return to the pre-October 25 constitutional arrangements. Many supporting this approach contend that Sudanese first need to return to where things were and then start a genuine and credible dialogue about how to move the country forward. However, this assessment appears to be logically flawed as it evades certain realities on the ground.
The Status Quo
First, there isn’t a unified centre of leadership for this coup despite the appearance of General Al Burhan as the default leader. In reality, this coup is a reflection of a balance of weaknesses within the coup’s fragile coalition which includes the Sudanese Armed Forces, RSF, the Islamists/National Congress Party (Bashir’s party) and four of the signatories of the Juba Peace Accord (SPLM, JEM & two factions of SLM). While the majority of the international community is still unclear about how to reverse the coup and return to the status quo before the October 25, the most organized political group within the coup, the Islamists, are working constantly not only to undo all the reforms introduced in the past two years so as to regain full control of the state’s bureaucratic machinery, but also to impose conditions that would make it impossible to reverse course without violence. The Islamists are likely to use the threat of resorting to violence as a bargain to maintain the status quo (i.e., the post-coup new order).
Second, what happened was not a military takeover or a temporary suspension of the Constitutional Document of 2019. What really occurred was, and still is, a military coup. Different players may choose to call it otherwise because they don’t want to jeopardize their diplomatic efforts or lose the ability to be a vital player while, perhaps, using other non-diplomatic means to mount pressure on the military leaders. Failure to treat the situation as a coup undercuts other countries’ abilities to be vital players.
Third, an overwhelming majority of Sudanese were sceptical of the constitutional arrangements put in place as a result of the power-sharing agreement on 17 July 2019 between the FFC and the Transitional Military Council (TMC), which in reality was the most powerful military men remaining from Bashir’s regime. People were reluctant to back them, partially because of the long history of the military institution’s failure to deal with the issue of governance in Sudan, in addition to the legalized corruption, recurring civil wars, the inherent collapse of the economy and services, and the historical isolation that Sudan has suffered from during decades of military rule in cooperation with Islamist organizations. This is besides the TMC’s clear approach to working against the requirements of a meaningful civil democratic transition. How the negotiations were conducted to reach the power-sharing agreement with the TMC had cast a shadow of doubt over the future of this military-civilian partnership.
Sudanese want a full-fledged Democratic Civilian Rule
Sudanese people demand a political system with constitutional arrangements that would bring about true justice, protect and maintain their hard-earned freedoms and build lasting peace and stability, and pave the way for full-fledged democratic governance and civilian rule. There is no doubt that the sacrifices paid for bringing about this system since the coup are huge. Over 100 people have been killed in the protests, thousands injured (including those who have lost parts of their bodies and became disabled), hundreds have been arrested as a result of malicious reports and some were victims of enforced disappearance. In addition to killing, the authorities have been systematically using torture and rape (for both sexes) as a weapon to break the resistance, which is documented by human rights groups.
This is in addition to the escalation of organized violence and the killing of civilians in various regions of Sudan, specifically in Darfur, where West Darfur continues to witness patterns of violations and violence around the clock. The assassinations of civilians in the recent Kreinik locality events, West Darfur amounted to 201 citizens, including children, women and large numbers of elderly people and school teachers, in less than three days, in addition to the systematic destruction of infrastructure.
The demands of the Sudanese people in various parts of Sudan and their insistence on making all these huge sacrifices in order to reach a democratic regime that leads to the stability of the country; are not absurd or unrealistic demands. Rather, they are sincere aspirations and legitimate demands resulting from long experiences and deep knowledge of the limitations and problems of the military institution and the coup front, which seeks to plunge the country into collapse and fragmentation. On this basis, it is possible to read the current situation and conclude that what is required is to develop and build a negotiation mechanism that responds as much as possible and according to the conditions of reality to the legitimate demands of the people and works to remove the ruling class represented by the army and their allies from the political scene at the lowest possible cost.
Three-phase Strategy to reach a Political Settlement in Sudan
In designing that mechanism, we envision a three-phase strategy with three paths of facilitation, dialogue and negotiation that should culminate in producing a historic political settlement that can produce incentives for the military and pave the road for drafting the permanent constitution and put the country on a path for reconciliation and aspirations for democratic governance. As such, we must be very clear from the outset that we have an unaverred conviction that the pro-democracy groups are the backbone of this process and while this proposal calls for engaging the majority of political (with the exception of the NCP) actors such as the signatures of Juba Peace Accord and other political groups, we don’t perceive these groups as equal when it comes to believing in democracy and pushing its agenda forward. Despite their apparent differences, the pro-democracy forces have proved time after time that they have genuine aspirations to transform this country fundamentally, ending the relationship with the accumulated legacy of failure and paving the way for building a second Sudanese republic. In addition, the forces supporting democracy have the legitimacy to represent the aspirations and dreams of the vast majority of the Sudanese people. The Sudanese men and women have proven this repeatedly to the military establishment and its allies during the events of the December revolution and the subsequent attempts to abort the revolution in the form of organized violence represented in the massacre of the sit-in and the unparalleled valour that followed, to say the least.
Given the changing nature of emerging political forces on the ground and the level of mistrust between almost all political players, we believe that a high-profile entity with regional representation can lead the efforts in consultation with Sudanese to facilitate the dialogue and negotiation among Sudanese political actors and stakeholders (those involved in all social groups, including trade unions, labour unions, and professional associations). We propose that the Troika-like mediators with regional representation from Arab countries, AU, IGAD and UNITMAS team in Sudan be formed to lead this effort and work in close coordination with Sudanese stakeholders. It goes without saying that reaching political stability in Sudan will require patience and orderly negotiation, as it is not possible to reach sustainable solutions through an urgent formula in light of the complexities in the current Sudanese situation.
Phase One (being the Central Phase)
The first phase of the strategy is to unify Sudanese political actors around a pro-democracy vision for the country’s future path. Failing to have a government in any shape or form shall not delay this phase. This phase requires Sudanese to undergo three main steps
(1) – First Step: The first step requires engaging in unifying the political actors around an agenda and vision (and not necessarily creating a unified body), with a view to facilitating an agreement among the revolutionary political forces (political parties, professional associations and resistance committees and the armed groups who did not sign Juba Peace Accord, namely SPLM led by Abdelaziz Adam Al-Hilu and SLM let by Abdelwahid Nour). The modality can be through developing several mechanisms for resolving contentious issues and organizing a series of meetings with these groups separately and then asking them to formulate a position on how they envision working with other allies to accomplish their goals. This effort should culminate with establishing a consensus-building platform where a final agreed-upon position will be announced and signed as the formal position representing the pro-democracy revolutionary forces regarding their views about the democratic transformation and the means for achieving their objectives. This potion should contain four main areas: 1) the role of the military in the envisioned Sudanese democratic state, 2) a broad vision of constitution building, including agreed-upon principles and mechanisms, and 3) the structure of the transitional government and its most immediate mandates 4) a comprehensive vision to address transitional justice and how to achieve it, both socially and institutionally.
The forces supporting the democratic transition in Sudan bear the responsibility of being present in the dialogue platforms with the Peace and Juba groups and other groups that may not be present in the platforms in the first step.
(2) – Second Step: The second step is to facilitate meetings with political groups that signed the Juba Peace Accord and ask them to develop their vision of the democratic transition beyond the slogans, which are nothing but a campaign for the political status quo which is unsustainable. The goal of this mediation and facilitation is to provide a reasonable and practicable approach to maintaining the Juba Peace Accord while creating a practical path to a democratic transition, even if that requires amending the peace agreement or transferring some of the pending issues to be handled by the mechanism for drafting the permanent constitution.
(3) – Third Step: The third step requires trust-building among Sudanese before allowing any of the groups engaged in the unification process as part of steps one and two to facilitate and mediate a dialogue with the groups that are currently trying to play an active role. The efforts of this group failed to bear fruit to be part of the transition in Sudan and they were merely a reaction to political exclusion and a sense of isolation. This camp comprises different groups of the (non-NCP) Islamists and small political parties and actors who, in the past, continued to throw Bashir’s regime a political lifeline on so many occasions, the last of which was the so-called national dialogue, which was a desperate attempt to prolong Bashir’s regime. The outcome of this facilitation should culminate in an agreed-upon vision for the country’s democratic path forward.
Phase Two
The second phase of the strategy is to bring together the processes resulting from the three different paths in a meeting or a conference to create a coordinating mechanism representing the three camps. Each camp should be asked to provide their visions for military and security reform and a mechanism for constitutional drafting. A body out of this coordinating mechanism must be formed and can be called the National Mechanism for Consensus and State Building (“NMCSB”). The integrated vision that emerges from these groups should be supported by regional and international actors and the military leaders must be pressured to accept the outcome as an ultimatum with clear consequences if they attempt to play any games. The outcome of this step should culminate in forming a transitional government keeping in mind the political weight of the pro-democracy revolutionary forces while making sure that Juba Peace Agreement is preserved and observed to the extent possible. This stage may require developing a new constitutional charter and a very narrow mandate for the transitional government. As such we propose that the duration of the transitional period should not exceed three years and the priorities of the Transitional Government should be (1) managing the national economy; (2) reforming the legal system as well as the civil service; and (3) conducting the census, 4) preparing the country for the general election by ensuring constitution ratification and a fair election law that reflects the revolutionary spirit of Sudanese people.
Note: It must be made very clear that this proposed NMCSB body is not to compete with or substitute the Legislative Council that will be formed as part of the transitional government. On the contrary, the role of this body will remain solely and purely technical and for coordinating purposes, it should work closely with the Legislative Council in areas pertaining to facilitating societal dialogue about the permanent constitution, including the mechanism for its drafting and ratification.
Phase Three
The third phase should support NMCSB through the Legislative Council throughout the transitional period and help mobilise local, regional and international resources to aid it in achieving its political mandated tasks. These tasks are: (1) formulating a national vision for security and military reform, including the integration of the armies according to a new doctrine and the exit of military and security institutions from economic activities; and (2) mechanisms for constitutional drafting and ratification
The NMCSB should continue to engage all political actors in broad and inclusive societal dialogue, mediation and consultation. It should first complete the military and security reform which should define the military’s role in the desired Sudanese state and incorporate peace agreements and the role of the Armed Forces in the permanent constitution in a political environment that offers political and social stability.
With the oversight of the Legislative Council, the NMCSB should then finalize drafting and overseeing the ratification and by the end of the transitional period, Sudan must have reformed its military and security sector, conducted a census, ratified a permanent constitution and was ready to hold its first general election.
Final Remarks
If we hope not to be back to a position of a military coup or a complete state of chaos in a year or so, the dominance of the military establishments of Sudanese politics and economy, the priority should be given to a political process that produces a roadmap for constitution building so as to address the role of the military in the future of the Sudan through a process that can build trust and unify Sudanese political actors around a democratic national vision. Sudanese political actors do not trust each other to work together at this point in time. To avoid the current threats, it is inevitable to engage in a genuine political arrangement to articulate dialogue mechanisms that can help establish, at a minimum, a basis for trust. If successful, the outcome of this process also happens to meet the legitimate demands of the Sudanese people in the streets and their vibrant revolutionary actors and put the country on a path to healing and reconciliation.
[*] This proposal is an outcome of continuous work for six months, and it is a living document that is subject to updates from time to time by the Sudan Democratic Transition Working Group. Future amendments will be necessary to introduce more clarifications and updates and to take into account any necessary recommendations that are required for this proposal to keep pace with the fast-changing political landscape in Sudan and to align it with any subsequent developments relating to the entire political process in Sudan. The group members are Bakry Eljack Elmedni, Guma Kunda Komey, Abdelkhalig Shaib, Hala Al-Karib, Munzoul Assal, Nada Fadul and Hadia HasabAllah.