Burhan’s Speech: significance of its timing, its intended audience and what to do next
Yasir Arman*
Without dwelling on the content of General Burhan’s speech last night, I will try to address some of the important questions raised by it.
• What did the speech omit to say?
Significantly, the speech omits deliberately the expression ‘excluding the National Congress Party’, which suggests to some of the forces of the revolution and the street that, when it mentions the civilian forces, it is referring to the forces of the revolution and the protestors on the street. This intentional ambiguity has caused some confusion.
The speech does not contain any mention of the Juba Peace Agreement signatories. It also omits any clear reference among the tasks of the proposed Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to the most important national issue which is building a single professional national army that reflects Sudan’s diversity and does not engage in internal wars. This is the most important issue of concern to both the military and civilians and on which the future of democracy and Sudan depends.
• The significance of the timing of the speech
The speech is consistent with a confidential memorandum which the military component sent to the Tripartite Mechanism and members of the international community a few days ago.
It clearly contains the tasks of the Supreme Military Council of the Armed Forces, foremost of which is the exercise of sovereign functions in relation to the conduct of foreign policy, the Central Bank of Sudan, and other issues.
The speech also attempts to obscure the magnificent scenes we witnessed recently of the huge mass eruption and the renewed momentum of the December revolution in a new beginning toward regaining its public glory with the aim of defeating the coup.
This momentum spans all parts of Sudan, both rural and urban, which gives it a national character and banishes the intimations of ethnic and geographical divisions or accusations of elitism and gives it a comprehensive national character.
The speech is also a new, desperate attempt to confuse the revolutionary camp, sow confusion and discord and tamper with the contents of the revolution, its unity and its gains.
• Forces targeted by the speech
First: This speech targets the mass of ordinary Sudanese who are striving to make a living, who are toiling daily to secure food, drink and basic services, and who are facing the difficulties of day-to-day life as their living conditions become more difficult. So, the speaker gives his usual promises.
This speech comes on the eve of Al-Burhan’s travel to the IGAD Summit, despite the African Union’s freezing of Sudan’s membership. Indeed, Sudan issued the invitations for this Summit.
Second: The civilian forces that the speech refers to are not exclusively the civilian revolutionary forces, but they include the civilian forces supporting the coup (the forces of the Salam Rotana Hotel).
Third: The speech purports to be responding to one of the main demands of the revolution, namely the return of the military to their barracks, in order to try to influence and isolate sections of the revolutionary forces who support this demand.
Fourth: This speech mainly targets the regional and international community, some of whose members are looking for quick solutions, while others are prioritising stability over democracy, given concerns about internal and regional fragility. The speech seeks to launder a deal through the Tripartite Mechanism that legitimizes the coup by getting civilians who support the coup to choose a Prime Minister who would receive his orders from the General Command, something that was rejected by Salvador Allende in Chile and who paid for it.
Their intention is to choose a prime minister who is a wolf in sheep’s clothing and takes his orders from the military council. Thus, the military assume control of both sovereign and executive powers in the name of a political solution.
The speech also seeks to define the crisis as a schism between the civilians themselves, which has nothing to do with the October 25 coup.
Rather, the speech claims that this coup is a result of the crisis among civilians and the ‘hijacking’ of the revolution by some of them, and that, the crisis will end if the civilians can reach a consensus. This narrative has been put forward in the name of (national consensus) over the past months, and what is meant here by civilians is a diverse group, the majority of whom are supporters of the coup; while the supporters of the revolution and the protestors who made sacrifices and lost martyrs would be in a minority. So, the pro-revolution forces would be like orphans at the banquet tables in the Rotana hotel, whilst most pro-coup supporters would choose the wolfish prime minister disguised in the civilian clothes of the revolution.
There will then be demands for everyone’s blessing and for the international community to lift its restrictions and normalise and legitimise the coup in its new form, and the wolf-like prime minister will be installed, regardless.
Therefore, the speech is a continuation of the steps taken on October 25, paving the way for sham elections, which will lead to totalitarianism’s return in the guise of democracy and the preservation of the former regime.
• What to do?
We should support the escalation of the tide of mass protest and the expansion of sit-ins in all cities and villages re-enacting the great Ramadan Iftars, and we should encourage graduated steps towards civil disobedience and a political lockdown, and support the attempts of professionals associations, resistance committees, political forces, and civil society to build coordination centres between the revolutionary forces and to establish a unified centre for all who seeks to defeat the coup and establish democratic civil authority.
This should be accompanied by relentless efforts to win the support of the regional and international communities to the side of the revolutionary forces who are striving for democracy and peace.
Those who specifically want peace need to realize before it is too late that there will be no peace without democracy and a civilian government.
*The author is the deputy head of the SPLM-N Agar and a leading member of the FFC