Sudan, will the military quit power?

by Osman Mirghani*

Confusing and distracting the opponent or enemy is a well-known tactic in military plans. A careful reading of the speech of Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, last Monday, and the reactions to it, suggest that this is exactly what happened. The speech, which was surprising to many, sparked widespread controversy and raised questions about whether the military component would actually withdraw from the political scene and hand over power to civilians.

The short answer is no, and the explanation is in the speech itself. In addition, the main missing thing in the current scene is trust, as it is completely non-existent between the forces of the revolution and the military component, and even between parties in the civilian component crowded with players from all shades, including the pillars of the former regime, Islamists and others.

The speech mainly revolves around three points. The first is the withdrawal of the military component from the dialogue facilitated by the Trilateral Mechanism (the United Nations, the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development known as IGAD). The second is to throw the ball into the civilians’ court to conduct a dialogue between their various components and agree on the formation of a transitional government. The third, and most importantly, the formation of a higher council of the Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces to take over the high command of the regular forces and be responsible for security and defence, in addition to other unspecified responsibilities.

The first and second points are clearly linked. They are aimed at confusing the scene, blaming civilians and betting on their differences, especially after mobilizing pro-military forces and supporters of the October 25 coup. The occurrence of differences in such a situation is certain and will lead to the failure of the dialogue. Hence, this will serve the scheme to portray the deep crisis the country is going through as a crisis between civilians and had nothing to do with the military component, which is the same justification that was used to justify the October 25 coup.

This brings us to the third most important point in al-Burhan’s speech, which is the formation of a higher military council from the Sudan Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces, after the formation of the transitional civilian government – if it is formed. This body will assume the “supreme” command of the regular forces, meaning that it will serve as the supreme commander, this authority normally granted to the head of state. The Council will be responsible for security and defence tasks and “related responsibilities”, a loose sentence that grants broad powers, and was used in previous periods to justify repression, state of emergency imposition and justification of coups d’état.

The speech did not stop there but rather indicated that the Council would “complete its functions in agreement with the would-be-formed government “, which means that it has other tasks that are not explained, or will not be disclosed now.

There are reports that the military component wants a role in sovereign functions, foreign policy, judicial appointments, and possibly even extending powers to the central bank. The military component has already prepared to announce that the current Sovereignty Council will be dissolved, allowing the planned Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to be the alternative, not by name but by powers.

The military component took another step that makes the proposed Supreme Military Council a reality from now on, following the decision to relieve civilian members of the current Sovereign Council of their positions and to keep only military members and leaders of armed movements. The status of leaders of armed movements was left unclear in al-Burhan’s speech, an issue that will emerge later and will be among the issues and problems that the civilians have to negotiate. How can we talk about a government of independent technocrats, while the leaders of the armed movements say that they will not give up their positions in it? Rather, how does the proposed government include figures who supported and instigated the coup, some of whom took positions against the revolution?

Many saw in al-Burhan’s speech as a tactical retreat rather than a step out of the political scene and handing over power to civilians. In fact, if the military component was serious about handing over power, it would have done so a long time ago, instead of the manoeuvres that sought to obstruct Hamdok’s government, and then overthrew it in an outright coup, whose authors are the ones who want to continue the scene, whether through the current Sovereignty Council or through the proposed “Supreme Council of the Armed Forces”.

One of the envisaged scenarios is that when the dialogue between civilians fails, as it is expected, the military component can use this failure to justify a call for early elections, with the hope of reproducing the former regime with new military and civilian faces.

To hold free and transparent elections there is a need to create the right atmosphere, a condition that is completely missing at the moment. The elections are not held for the sake of a sham process of filling the boxes, but rather as a mechanism to achieve the democratic civilian rule for which people overthrew the Bashir regime and the Islamists, and they have been engaged in a revolution that has been going on for more than three years.

Elections are a requirement but can only be held if they have the appropriate atmosphere, and prerequisites such as the political parties act on which the elections will be held, the process of party registration, the distribution of electoral districts, the voter register, and how the youth of the revolution will be represented.

In addition, there is a haziness about who will participate in the elections, as al-Burhan and his deputy Hemetti continue to say that no one should be excluded.

With this complex picture, what can the civil, political and revolutionary forces do after most of them rejected the al-Burhan speech of July 4?

There are only two options: either to continue the protests and escalation despite the hardships, high cost of lives and threats facing the country in terms of the terrible economic and security deterioration or to regain the political lead alongside the street movement.

It goes without saying that the forces of the revolution suffer from their differences and fragmentation. This undoubtedly contributed to complicating the scene during the transitional period, weakening the Hamdok government and opening the way for those who wanted to obstruct the December revolution.

The ball is now in the court of these forces. Simply rejecting al-Burhan speech will be a continuation of the reactive approach that has enabled the military component to always be one step ahead of the civilian forces. If these forces overcome their differences and set a clear charter, they could turn the tables by agreeing on a civilian government that would close the way for any other attempts to obstruct the transitional period and be the starting point for full civil rule after the failure of partnership formula.

* The opinion article was published in the Arabic edition of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper on July 7, 2022