Potential impacts of the framework agreement on Sudan’s revolutionary movement

by Bakry Eljack Elmedni

A river might change course with topographical and geological transformations, but it does not change the direction in which it flows. Nature offers human beings these observations so we might draw insights and lessons. In politics, however, matters are in constant transformation, even the direction of the river’s flow. We need only revisit what has been written on any event or political process in our history, recent or distant, to recall that a shift in attitudes is not an insult or a weakness if it is built on sound assessments and logical approaches to the present and the future. In this short article, I will discuss three aspects related to the ongoing political process and the Framework Agreement it has produced:

1)  Some assumptions on which the deal was constructed that are at times promoted to legitimise the political process as the only viable option;

2)  The methodology that has been and is being adopted in managing the political process; and

3)  The results that might flow from this agreement and its effects on the revolutionary forces.

For the record, I am not here to attack or reject the agreement, as it is still under deliberation and negotiation. Rather, I will analyse and explore some potential outcomes of the revolutionary movements and opportunities for the political transition.

The assumptions on which the agreement is based are as follows.

First: the depiction of the political reality as if it were a zero-sum game, where there are only two possible options: either a political process, which means a negotiation reflecting the balance of the negotiating parties’ weaknesses and capabilities, or a radical stance for change, no matter how vague, that expects everything to happen in a singular, forthcoming coup de grace that no one knows how, from where, or by what means will take place. Any progress toward one of the options will necessarily come at the expense of the other. Apart from being logically unsound, in that it depicts an evolving reality as if it were static, this assumption also feeds off of itself in a case of circular logic and a logical fallacy of the highest order: if A is bad, then B is implicitly good, and vice versa. When defenders of this assumption write about any political compromise on the premise that this is the best we can get, they imply an internal logic that refutes the arguments of the radical position, garbing themselves in political realism by saying “this is the best that could happen”. The same may be said of activists for radicalism, solely concerned with the arguments of a moral discourse based on political correctness whose ambitions and objectives no proponents of change may disagree with.

Second: that the reason for the failure of the first transition experience was spoilers, or saboteurs, as is the preference of those who speak incessantly of conflict resolution theories—especially those who love to intersperse their Arabic sentences with English buzzwords; and that expanding the base of participation by absorbing political forces who have not recently been known as believers in the democratisation process will contribute to reducing the chances that they are politically exploited by the real spoilers (i.e., alliances of capital and authority within the security and military establishments, and their civilian extensions) to sabotage the democratic transition process.

Although it is based on revolutionaries’ demands for the expansion of the base of participation, this assumption is actually an error in itself. The success of the transition is dependent on expanding the base of democratic forces that have material interests in the establishment and sustainability of democracy, not of political rubbish and uneducated opportunists.

Third: strengthening the proposed constitutional document via a set of constitutional law experts is the primary guarantor of a smooth democratic transition. Yet the (ongoing) debate about the proposed constitutional draft, as some experts have also written, is essentially defined by controversy over the constitution and constitutionalism. Apart from being the greatest and highest law of the land, the constitution is also involved in limiting the authority of the state. Conceptually, constitutionalism is concerned with reducing the chances of state tyranny and defining its authority through a system of governance based on the rule of law that the constitution must guarantee. If this draft is adopted and gains constitutional authority, it will be the 59th document if we count the People’s Authority Charter and the Framework Agreement, starting with the 1947 Juba Conference. If we overlook the Sudanese political experience that in essence pays no attention to documents and charters, could any rational person believe that protecting the transition involves constitutional texts? Even if there were sufficient political will this time, this state does not have the capacity and competence within its mechanisms to carry out most of what will be agreed upon; anyone who believes otherwise ought to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of this apparatus to grasp the scope of its conceptual distress, technical, ideological, and moral poverty, and the corruption that has become the basis of everything in it.

Fourth: the economic and political situation is more dangerous than ever, and we must do something to address it, up to and including civil war.

(1) No rational person in this country could be mistaken about the gravity of the situation and its deterioration, including the dissipation of the state and the continuation of ethnic and tribal tensions that never stopped to begin with. Yet this critical turning point in the country is still unfolding, and in truth we do not know how long it will be before it ends. We were born in it, have lived in it, and might die in it. The point is that the danger and complexity of the situation are not an objective justification for carelessness, but the opposite: the launch of a blind political process that does not comprehend this intricacy and meet the conditions of responding objectively to its components cannot be fruitful even under the perpetual slogan of “let’s remedy the deterioration and get out of the dangerous turning point”. The evidence is that we have done so continuously throughout our history, and here we are in the depths of this dangerous turn.

(2) Put simply, there is a systemic flaw in the way in which this process has been and continues to be conducted, from start to finish. A priori, there is not a rational political actor that can be opposed to negotiation on principle. Strikes, like processions, are a form of negotiation, and even the slogan “no negotiation” is a negotiating position in itself. Yet the question is: negotiation on what? Moreover, there is a problem of involvement and consultation in the whole process. It is not an issue of formal transparency in data gathering with the sole objective of refuting accusations of non-transparency, as an alternative to a real process seeking to determine the country’s fate by first constructing a national revolutionary front that unites pro-democracy forces around a vision for transition, then exchanging ideas as to the means and mechanisms of achieving that vision.

Against this backdrop, broad sectors, even of the parties of negotiating forces, remained excluded and absent from this process. As for attempts to communicate with resistance committees and unions via numerous frustrating and confusing initiatives, they have not been based on a free space to exchange ideas but on commands, instruction, reprimand, and all parties claiming to possess truth and wisdom—each putting forth arguments that the optimal route is such and such.

Further, I am convinced that it was and is still possible to hold a serious dialogue between pro-democracy civilian revolutionary forces to agree on a vision that provides sufficient legitimacy to launch a political process guiding the transition and addressing the question of legitimacy, which will accompany any political actor in this country for decades to come.

(3) The results that have begun to follow from the way in which the political process has been conducted and the framework agreement it has produced, in essence, will lead indirectly to the elimination of pockets of pro-democracy political resistance. The failure in addressing the question of legitimacy, along the lines of “who represents whom?”, has pushed most actors into a race to the bottom. Instead of searching for a means to a broad consensus on answering the legitimacy question—in the absence of an opportunity to hold elections that are representative of the revolutionary camp in favour of democratic transition—that could grant the political process a degree of acceptability, most actors have engaged in a battle over asserting representation of the true revolution and claiming moral superiority and political correctness. One camp claims wisdom and political realism, while another claims revolutionary purity, moral clarity, and the right to defend the blood of martyrs—as if the blood of martyrs is exclusive to anyone in particular.

This reality was already present in this complication, and the launch of a political process served only to bring these senseless disputes into the open. Rather than relying on a strong, organised street as the most important factor for the revolutionary forces—bearing in mind that the foreign factor is beset with significant complications, even if some actors are supportive of democratic transition—negotiators considered it an annoyance and a potential cause of their inability to negotiate and complete the political process.

Indirectly, the process of eliminating and fragmenting the forces organising the movements (from all sides) came under way according to zero-sum perceptions, and the security and intelligence services carried out the remainder of the task.

Those who say that the political process can proceed to fail, because the streets will be there if it fails, perhaps do not know much about the psychology of the masses. People do not mobilise according to this chaotic simplification, and the defeat of the social imaginary of opportunities for revolutionary change will have its consequences: the emigration of the middle class and youth, the aversion and despair of some, the suicide and radicalisation of others—all of this in a reality witnessing the tribalisation of politics and the politicisation of tribalism in a systematic, almost daily manner.

In brief, it is most likely that things will end with the signing of a framework agreement, giving a new flavour to the Christmas celebrations of Volker Perthes and his trio and a small victory to the quartet ambassadors: something to include in the diplomatic cables. It would give the Alliance for Freedom and Change several weeks of false hope that the agreement is the beginning of the end of the uprising. This victory could come true if the text of the agreement is translated into lived reality through the exit of the military establishment from political and economic life and its subjugation to a civilian head of state and prime minister; the disassembly of the structure of the old regime and reform of the justice system; the rebuilding of the security apparatus according to a new doctrine; and the end of the case of multiple armies. If a clear accomplishment on the matter of transitional justice is added to these developments, it would be “too good to be true”, as the expression goes.

This is despite that the agreement did not speak much about how to address institutional corruption, which has struck all pillars of the state. Further, the agreement gives al-Burhan credibility in front of the international community and a chance to catch his breath and organise his ranks. Because al-Burhan and his remaining Islamist allies in internal and external security institutions, as well as his primary competitor, the Rapid Support Forces (i.e., the Dagalo brothers), have multiple options at their disposal and room to manoeuvre, it is most likely that he will stall for time on the pretext that significant civilian forces (e.g., the alliance of the Unionist Party, some signatories of the Juba Agreement, and community leaders) refused to sign the political announcement, and that the consensus of all civilian stakeholders—the stipulation for the nominal departure of the military establishment from political life—has not been achieved, as he continues to claim. This takes into consideration the established fact that there are many centres of power among the revolutionaries, and that it is difficult to be certain that there is someone in full control. In any case, if General al-Burhan is compelled to sign a final agreement, he can delay and specify how he would like a given article to be implemented or return to the original scenario: pushing the country toward early elections based on formal arrangements that do not address the fundamental issues and produce a political regime operated by remote control.

These have been the choices before al-Burhan, his allies, and his military intelligence for a long time. For the Freedom and Change alliance, even this scenario is undoubtedly a political and diplomatic victory if they force al-Burhan’s hand, although it might come at a high cost. To offset this burden, in the language of the street and the processions, let us treat this agreement as if it were a gain on the ground and shield ourselves from here to protect what has been accomplished, or as if it were an armoured vehicle that we have reclaimed and raised a flag over. The more important challenge is: what are we, the civilian and revolutionary forces, to do if things do not lead to more than the framework agreement? What are we doing in the face of the political consequences that will afflict the revolutionary forces due to the faulty method of the political process and the likely failure to achieve swift victories if a final agreement is reached? Any popular support for this agreement will depend on the chances for an improvement in living conditions, work opportunities for the youth, establishment of security, and an end to the ethnic and tribal violence in a short period of time. What are we doing in the wake of the signing of the framework agreement to enable the opportunities of these good proposals to transform into a final agreement that can be implemented?