Sudan’s SSR is not the only “time bomb” in the mismanaged transition
By Trayo A. Ali
[email protected]
Even though the issue of Security Sector Reform (SSR) constitutes the “mother of all time bombs” that can threaten the process of democratic transition in Sudan (as evidenced by the dramatic way it caused the postponement of the “framework dialogue” and prevented from beating its designated deadlines), the fact is that the SSR is not the “only” issue charged with or full of such time bombs.
Many other time bombs also stand in the way of democratic transformation. Therefore, in order to successfully defuse such time bombs, it’s necessary to first carefully examine, and resolve the central problem of the methodology and procedure adopted. All the political mistakes committed and miscalculations adopted once led to the abrupt suspension of the “framework” process. The wrongs are procedural but “political in nature.” Therefore, the problem squarely lies in this fault in approach. This is where the real problem lies, and this is where it should be addressed first before all other things can be added to it.
The actors (mediators, stakeholders, facilitators, and all other players) do need to realistically reflect and structurally redesign the approach to make it realistic, accommodative, and transparent.
The first political mistake is the unilateral approach being adopted by the political parties and/or politicians.
In response to the very “tricky” statement made by the leaders of the military component (MC), which implied their willingness to hand over power to civilians (provided the politicians are united), the Forces for Freedom and Change-Central Council (FFC-CC), instead of engaging first with its civilian counterparts to consolidate the front, they, however, preferred unilateralism and decided to negotiate with the MC in a very non-transparent manner. That was the “beginning of the Word.” By doing so, the FFC-CC abandoned all other political forces, including the Forces for Freedom and Change-Democratic Bloc (FFC-DB), the Forces for Radical Change (FFRC), and the Resistant Committees (RCs).
Thus, irrespective of whatever reasons the FFC-CC has or the argument it advances, the fact is that the mistake of unilateralism has been done, and the rule of “unity is strength” has been violated. Subsequently, the “Pandora Box” was opposed and gave the MC the needed opportunity and chance to manoeuvre.
Ironically, the FFC’s insistence on a unilateral approach not only demonstrated the realism of observers’ concerns about the inherent inability and lack of stamina of the political forces to unite but also intensified the already existing mistrust between the political forces and widened the margin of the military component’s ability to manoeuvre and play delaying tactics against political forces.
The second political fault that complicated the process is the “condonation” of this unilateral approach from the international community’s side, including UNTAMIS, the AU, and the IGAD, which are officially designated mediators/facilitators. Perhaps the international community’s tactic was intended to create a “de facto” situation for the long-delayed “negotiations” to take off. However, given the way things turned out, their decision is not far from a miscalculated step. Such condonation could also be easily interpreted in a negative way by the “excluded parties” and be viewed as a partial position that could touch the delicate issue of neutrality in such a heavily polarized situation.
Thus, this political “faux pas,” (no matter whether the intention was positive or unintended), will help generate unnecessary political suspicions and further widen the ever-growing political polarization. It also contradicts the international community’s call for a “broad-based” civilian-led government, which needs to be headed by a person who enjoys a larger “consensus” that enables them to pull the situation out of the mess.
The third political mistake is the policy of “exploitation and counter-exploitation” of the internal contradictions pursued by both camps (military and political) to cause internal frictions and confrontations within each camp. Any attempt by politicians to incite either the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or the SAF against the RSF will have deadly consequences for civilians and the country. Therefore, caution is needed.
The fourth risky miscalculation is the explicit suggestion of “early elections” under the threatful environment of gunpoint where a multitude of armed forces (or groups) have no single “Chain of Command”. To say the least, this is like “hiring a fox to guard the chicken.”
Furthermore, this suggestion of early elections (which means the referral of security sector reforms to an elected government) is unrealistic and full of risk as it undermines the implied implications.
The critical question is: what will be the situation if the remnants of the “deep state” forces win such elections? Definitely, this miscalculation is not only a case of “putting the cart before the horse,” but also constitutes a recipe for a destabilized future Sudan.
The fifth political miscalculation is the issue of prior determination of “time frame” without taking into account the size or volume of issues involved. Limiting the duration of the transitional period to two years (as suggested) is an impractical proposition, especially in view of the issues involved. The principle should be that fixing the time frame should be determined according to the issues dealt with. Therefore, it is unreasonable and politically immature to box crucial issues such as the return of the IDPs and refugees, security sector reforms, effecting justice, conducting a constitutional conference, and preparation for elections…etc all within a period of two years. This “quick fix” arrangement is neither realistic nor practical. It is only doomed to backfire as experience proved.
Finally, before concluding one important reminder. If the mere mentioning of the idea of “forces integration” alone can blow up the entire process of “framework dialogue” into an oblivion of suspension, shatter the entire efforts, cause panic and push the parties themselves to the point of fumbling guns and sharpening knives while causing pandemonium to the public, what can then be expected when they land into the details of the issues where the real devil hides?
The conclusion is that, in view of the prevailing political situation overwhelmed by grave mistakes, disastrous miscalculations and grievous misjudgements emanating from the shortsightedness and narrow perspectives based on erroneous assumptions held by the leading actors, it is not difficult to judge how unhealthy the direction of events.
In order to avoid falling into unforeseen traps, barricades and mines, actors need to change their view of things, realign the course of events and see the bigger picture.
Unilateralism, exclusion and non-transparency can only lead to the unknown. Concession, transparency and realism should be the choice and the order to guide the tumultuous transitional process.
Only in that case, actors can collectively devise the right tactics capable enough to forecast, detect and defuse any unforeseen time-bomb ahead (including those expected to be caused by the issue of security sector reforms).