The 2nd SPLM National Convention: Dealing with real issues of transition
By John G Nyuot Yoh
May 30, 2008 — Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan is in full gear to kick off the second most important activity that the SPLM has undertaken so far, since the signing of the CPA in Naivasha, January 2005. The city is crowded by delegates from the ten states of the south plus delegates from Abyei, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and from the 15 Northern states. All came to deliberate on key issues. The moods of delegates as things unfold, is mixed: some are caught by election mood, others are seeking to maintain their current status, while other are working to secure post convention positions, while others are skeptic of emotional fever of the ingoing politicking, which seems to suggest that the SPLM is ready to change leadership. It looks as if everybody is living in post Naivasha Southern Sudan, where politics of real freedom are supposed to be practiced. The questions that deserve attention are: what are the objectives of the SPLM Second National Convention? Is the gathering aiming at consolidating national unity, balancing transitional governance and paying close attention to security of the South or indeed has war that brought the transition period been declared by the delegates over?
The SPLM National Convention is convened to deal with vital issues which center on three important conceptual frameworks, which informed the Vision of the Movement as it stands today:
1. The realization of New Sudan vision as a process of transformation of all aspects of the country, without limitation to time frames, given that the process itself is a transitory in nature. In other words, all formations of the SPLM, unionists and secessionists have the opportunities to achieve their visions, without necessarily tampering with the rights of others to enjoy the ownership the New Sudan Nation.
2. The realization of new democratic secular Sudan requires complete adherence to voluntary formula of unity in diversity, as stipulated in the SPLM Manifestos of July 1983, April 1994 and CPA (January 2005) through the right to self-determination or any other formula that would give each and every Sudanese the right of citizenship.
3. The historical evolution of the SPLM/A since its inception in 1983, had witnessed serious political and military challenges, some of which have shaped the political settlement embodied in the CPA. What these challenges had posed on the character of the Movement can be explained through clear short and long term perspectives. I am sure some of the papers to be presented in the 2nd Convention will tackle them. These challenges are still here, and they should be the focus of the delibration of the SPLM Second National Convention, and should preoccupy the minds of the delegations for the duration of the next remaining three years.
CONCEPTUAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
The 2nd National Convention will have to deal with and try to provide answers to some of the conceptual/ideological questions/challenges especially those issues which are not widely and openly discussed by the members due to lack of public forums. For example, what does it means to create a new ‘nation state’ for newly converted Sudanese members to the SPLM membership, let alone to the sectarian or Islamic political party members within the context of historical and ideological tenets of the SPLM struggle: what does self-determination or a united democratic secular Sudan means to the sectarian parties’ membership against the background of referendum for Southern Sudanese in 2011, and has work been done to explain it to them?
Does the new Sudan ‘nation state’ mean, building ‘New Sudans” as suggested by CPA: one in the north and the other in the South if attractive unity is not realized within the interim period framework or does it mean ‘reformed old Sudan’ and ‘transformed new Sudan’? Can the emergence of the ‘ New Sudans’ formula be postponed, or rather, as the attendants of the 2nd National Convention members prepare themselves, has unity been made attractive enough at least in the eyes of the SPLM leadership, or could it have been made more attractive, and who should have done that? Would the results of the elections in 2009 abort any possible tendency to secede among Southerners or indeed, should the SPLM 2nd National Convention concentrate on working towards winning elections, and suspend temporarily strategizing for the practical challenges of post-2011 status of South? The SPLM is a national mass movement, whose membership comes from all over the country, and the secession of the South, some argue, would discourage the Movement from working towards achieving its long term objectives. The question then is, given time limitation, will the SPLM delegates be ready to discuss post-2011 scenarios for the rest of the country, without necessarily giving up other options. For example, if it becomes clear that the result of the elections in 2009 is not in favor of the SPLM and its allies will such results pave the way for the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile Populations to decide to join the South, should the referendum take place and the South secedes? Will the new “Greater South Sudan”, which include the marginalized areas, accommodate others who might chose to join, and what will be the criteria, i.e being like-minded? Here the question of con-federal arrangements between the “Greater South Sudan” and the rest of Sudan becomes an option that needs discussion by the SPLM affiliates and those progressive Sudanese formulations who feel that short of taking over power in the next general elections, the SPLM should opt to seek a confederation arrangement between the Greater South Sudan (possibly composing of Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Darfur, Eastern Sudan, may be later joined by Kordufan and the far north), until such time it becomes possible for the SPLM to realize the New Sudan nation. One wonders if the convention will put this matter on agenda. It is a challenging concept, because it falls within the central politics of Self-determination.
Alternatively, one may still ask: does the “new nation state” to be established depends only on the SPLM winning elections, and indeed, is there enough political will and commitment, based, I presumed on continuous discussions between the Movement and its allies, which will consolidate strategic alliances between the SPLM and the progressive forces and other marginalised areas, a process which will guarantee their success in winning an over all majority in 2009 elections? What if the SPLM does not win the majority, hence could not agree with the winning parties on the modalities of the transformation and peace building in the country: for example on reaching just and lasting peace in Darfur, Eastern Sudan Front might not have made its mind as to which side to ally with, and the majority members of the SPLM from Southern Sector might be preoccupied with local electoral politics rather than with the greater issues of transformation in the country. If it becomes clear that the SPLM will not win the majority votes in the next election, can it opt for the postponement or cancellation of the elections and what would be the implications of such decision on the rest of the road map (CPA) implementation?
LESSONS
The 2nd National Convention will definitely stock check on issues which were discussed during the 1st National Convention in 1994. The First National Convention came about as a result of political discontents within the Movement, where, among other things, lack of internal discussions on major issues was noted, lack of clarity of vision of the Movement among ranks and file at that stage: in fact there were two floating ideas- creation of new democratic secular Sudan versus independent Southern Sudan; there was concerned that the Military-Politico High Command organ (the highest military and political decision making body in the Movement at the time) was not functioning and hardly met, thus there was a need for rationalization of leadership command; there was also the demand for separation of the military from the civilian administration; it was also noted that the traditional leadership, whose vital role in supporting the struggle was paramount, were beginning to feel that their role in administering their areas was declining; the women members of the movement were starting to raise their voices and asking for more role in political as well as administrative spheres in the liberated areas; some friends of the movement were sending signals that the SPLM should instututionalised its foreign policies and relations through regional and international representations in key and friendly countries as Cold war politics reached its peak; some members of the movement were concerned that the status of members of the Movement from other marginalised areas and their role in the revolution needed rationalization and formalization. The result of the 1st National Convention, among other important undertakings, was that new structures were established (NEC, NLC, and the military organs were rationalized). The vision of the movement was clarified to be the creation of a new united democratic secular Sudan, while at the same time leaving all the other options such as federation, confederation and self-determination opened during the negotiations with Khartoum regime. This affirmation was also consolidated by the Asmara Declaration in June 1995, which for the first time; put the SPLM on the center stage as the transformation agent of the Sudan from decadent weak state to a democratic new nation. In fact, like the Chukudum Convention of 1994, where the self-determination was accepted as a natural right for the Sudanese regions who wish to exercise it, the Asmara Declaration affirmed the concept of ‘voluntary unity’.
NATIONAL AGENDA FOR 2ND NATIONAL CONVENTION AND BEYOND
The ideas discussed during the 1st National Convention, in my opinion should inform the period leading to the establishment of Naivasha protocols, all of which reaffirmed the unity of the Sudan on new basis, self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan and popular consultations for the people of Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, and democratic transformation of the country through democratic electoral system. These principles: attractive unity, self-determination and democratic transformation informed and shaped the constitutional framework that established the Government of National Unity, Government of Southern Sudan, judiciary, legal and legislative system including the electoral law, which supposed to govern the general elections in the country.
It is through the lessons learnt from the 1st National Convention resolutions 1994, the Rumbek crisis conference 2004, and the Naivasha institutional framework 2005, that the SPLM is now preparing itself for the 2nd National Convention. There are certainly realities that should inform the formulation of the 2nd National Convention’s slogan and programmes:
– Thorough discussions on reexamining the validity of the Movement’s vision as provided for in its Manifestos 1983 and 1998.
– Reevaluation of the Movement’s performances since 1994 to January 2005.
– Reevaluation of the Movement’s performances in organization and governance sphere since January 2005 to third year of the interim period.
– Consolidation of unity of ranks and file of the Movement, by focusing on the unity of the leadership during the interim period and recognizing the realities of shaky security in the South.
– Reorganization of the Movement (structuring of the Movement organs; revitalization of effective roles of youth and women leagues, and consolidation of historical relations with sisterly progressive organizations throughout the world in order to learn from their experiences
– Deal with polemics of creation of south-north sectors versus the unity of the party membership: Should SPLM remain a centralized party, and do away with two sectors, a formula which seems to suggest the existence of two parties in one. What are the short and long term repercussions of the current system and those of centralized party system on the future of the SPLM in the north?
– Discuss economic policies: the neo-liberal economy which some SPLM leaders seem to favor, versus mixed economy that encourages state interference in redistribution of national resources.
– Renewal of party commitment to its ideals namely-unity, freedom and integrity: it is argued by some that ever since the SPLM start the process of transforming itself into ruling party in the South and senior partner in GONU, the Movement’s ideals and objectives were not pushed hard enough to become the basis of governance in the country: there has been a lot of talk of freedom of press and fight against corruption in the South, but little has been said about the rampant corruption and oppression of press in the GONU, where the SPLM is a partner.
– The role of the SPLA as a transforming military factor within the framework of the CPA security arrangements needs to be clarified. Is SPLA an SPLM army, or a Southern Sudanese army or a national army? At GOSS level where the SPLM is the ruling party, funds has not been availed for the SPLA to transform itself, a situation which raises the question about how the SPLA can be starved financially by an SPLM Ministry of finance.
– Activities of political parties are often shaped and strengthened by regular meetings of their executive arms: the Secretariat. There is a need to rationalize the SPLM leadership structures in such a way that the SPLM Secretariat, as the working committee of the Movement regularly meets and issue statements on issues that are deemed important, rather than wait for the IPB and INC (or what to be known as National Liberation Council) meetings that take place upon request.
– The decision making bodies of the SPLM, even prior to the passing on of the founder late Dr Garang, has shown that the Movement, political wing, the SPLM lacked strong structural organs and as a result avoided internal political discussions on vital issues such as: validation of the revolutionary objectives; political orientation, devising of advanced tactics of obilization of the masses and recruitment of membership from areas outside the traditional SPLM areas; convening of regular political rallies and political debates; these issues are pressing at the moment and would require mechanisms through which they could be addressed.
– The SPLM should reconsider redeployment of its intellectual reservoir, individuals who have the capacity to think and provide well-informed advises to the movement’s leaders, by either recalling them back to party Headquarters, and assign them less time consuming assignments to enable them doing party work or relieve them from their executive/legislative positions.
– Strengthening the link between the SPLM ideology and the daily operations of different apparatus of the organization. As a ruling party/senior partner, the SPLM ideology should inform all the policies of GOSS/GONU through its sectorial committees. In the case of the GOSS, one notes that the GOSS runs the government affairs and not the SPLM.
– The management and equitable distribution of the resources and delivery of the services is the responsibility of the SPLM. Cadres deployed to carry out tasks on behalf of the Movement are accused of behaving as if they own the portfolios they are deployed to run.
– Deployment of cadres needs to be accompanied by clear instructions of what their responsibilities are, job descriptions, monitoring mechanisms and accountability modalities.
– Sectorial strategic division of labour within the Movement structures and of course the strengthening and channeling of and strengthening of information sector across the board.
I chose this slogan because in order to achieve the objectives of the movement, we must be mindful that the SPLM went through bitter periods of internal crises in the 1980s and 90s, and the movement had to convene critical forums to resolve some of these challenges. One of the important results of these debates was the achievement of reunification of the Movement, without which the CPA would have not been concluded. Now that the SPLM is in the middle of the interim period, the 2nd National Convention should take time to reflect on the challenges of past 25 years of struggle, examine the present challenges brought about by the CPA and look beyond the Naivasha consensus, so that it charters the way towards achieving its objectives and goals. There are more challenges after 2011 than they are today, discussing them in the 2nd National convention would pave the way for better understanding of challenges to come.
* John Yoh is a Lecturer, Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa, Pretoria