Forcible disarmament in South Sudan will not improve security

By Eric G. Berman

June 1, 2008 — In response to decades of armed violence and cattle rustling, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) is planning a campaign to forcibly collect firearms from southern citizens. Government officials’ motivations are understandable. Endemic pastoralist violence is reaching dangerous levels and there are widespread suspicions of outside support for the perpetrators as part of efforts to scupper the fragile north-south peace process. But coercive disarmament will not resolve matters. It will likely exacerbate simmering tensions and could result in thousands of deaths. What is more, it will make the international community’s efforts to assist the fledgling government much more difficult.

Armed violence in Jonglei state is generating a political crisis of significant proportions. The state (about the size of Austria and Switzerland combined) is home to several ethnic groups—including the Dinka, Murle, Nuer, and Shilluk—with long-standing animosities toward one another. Of particular concern at the moment are Murle pastoralists who are raiding neighboring ethnic groups’ cattle that involve killings and abductions. Armed attacks—not just by the Murle— take place routinely throughout the state, resulting in many civilian deaths and the loss of livelihoods. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) has been deployed to the area but lacks mobility, training and the necessary communications infrastructure to deal with what amounts to pastoral warfare.

Cattle raiding is a time-honored tradition throughout the entire region. But whereas many years ago raiders used bows, arrows, and spears, they now use automatic rifles. Retributions involve similar weapons. This has resulted in a growing number of casualties and a breakdown of traditional conflict resolution procedures as elders’ authority has eroded.

The scale of the violence in Jonglei is spiraling out of control. During December 2007 in Bor, the capital of Jonglei, Murle raiders reportedly laid in wait for Dinka herders who set out to reclaim their stolen cattle. Some 30 Dinka were killed and another 30 injured in the ambush. Dinka from Bor retaliated by dragging five hospitalized ethnic Murle (not associated with the attackers) from their beds and killing them, as well as shooting to death a Murle government official and his daughter. The governor was subsequently re-assigned.

The new governor of Jonglei is keen to clamp down on the violence by taking away the guns. In so doing, he hopes to create a secure environment that allows development to proceed and communities to experience the dividends of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). While his intentions are good, however, his plan is flawed.

The current plan is reportedly for the removal of weapons from citizens in Jonglei, in a six-month campaign that is to begin in June. Although a ‘voluntary’ disarmament campaign has been ongoing among the Murle in Pibor county, Jonglei state, the governor has stated that forcible disarmament—though likely to be bloody—is a necessary short-term measure to provide long-term stability. With security, he argues, come development (e.g. health, education, basic services) and prosperity.

Past experience in southern Sudan may well prove him wrong.

A SPLA disarmament campaign in central Jonglei in the first half of 2006 was brutal in its execution. More than 1,000 people lost their lives in the course of the initiative that targeted the Lou Nuer and netted some 4,000 weapons. Besides the traumatic loss of life, the campaign against local militias (e.g. the ‘white army’) and civilians also resulted in considerable human rights violations, significant internal displacement, and wide-scale looting and food insecurity. The governor believes, however, that subsequent peaceful campaigns in other parts of Jonglei—which the United Nations supported—went smoothly because of the SPLA’s willingness to use deadly force in the initial exercise.

Importantly, the 2006 campaign was intended to be peaceful—just as the latest initiative is meant to be. But the lessons of the past must be taken seriously. Despite efforts to sensitize local communities about the benefits of disarmament and attempts to negotiate buy-in from local chiefs throughout Jonglei, violence nevertheless exploded. Moreover, the ‘successes’ recorded, including by the UN, were largely ephemeral. Recent reports suggest that the relatively modest number of weapons that were ultimately recovered was rapidly offset by subsequent rearmament.

One of the main problems associated with piecemeal or uneven disarmament is that neighboring communities remain armed. The GoSS has primary responsibility for providing security for those who are disarmed, but has routinely failed to do so. The United Nations peacekeeping mission has neither the mandate nor the resources to assume this role. Meanwhile, raids by warring communities show no sign of letting-up. In the absence of security, civilians are compelled to rearm in order to protect themselves. This is especially true of Jonglei where the Lou Nuer are reportedly more heavily armed now than before the 2006 campaign.

Another limitation of the governor’s plan is that many of the Murle cattle raiders have not returned home from far-away, dry-season grazing grounds. Armed Murle youth are reportedly well aware of the governor’s plans and have decided to remain outside of Jonglei for the time being. The SPLA is, therefore, not likely to find the real aggressors. Instead it will find members of an ethnic group determined to resist being disarmed. Even if security is provided by the SPLA, the Murle will likely feel they are being targeted for political reasons and resist. Arms and bullets are not in short supply in this part of the world. Any altercation is likely to be bloody.

What to do?

First, the governor should work to keep the SPLA deployed in Pibor county during the upcoming rainy season and beyond. Together with the GoSS, he should ensure that they are provided with sufficient supplies so that they can avoid looting and build better relations with the community. In demonstrating their capacity to provide security they are more likely to earn the respect of the local population through good behaviour and good works. The Small Arms Survey’s research reveals that many people in Pibor feel their physical security is the same or has actually diminished since the CPA was signed in January 2005. Here is a chance for the GoSS to provide genuine security to communities and an excellent opportunity to win hearts and minds.

Second, Sultan Ismael Konye, peace and reconciliation advisor to President Salva Kiir, has been leading the voluntary disarmament exercise among his people, the Murle. Having rejoined the SPLM/A in 2006 following years of support from Khartoum and attacks by his Pibor Defence Force against the southern rebels, he deserves more time to prove his commitment to the CPA and to peace.

And third, allow the UN and the international community to aid the government to reduce armed violence, enhance security, and hasten development. The UN’s two recent small-scale disarmament initiatives in Jonglei resulted in the recovery of more than 3,000 weapons. The cost? Less than USD 20,000. Whereas those efforts were ad hoc, the UN’s new Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme has pledged almost USD 3 million to improve law and order, support good governance, and assist in reforming the security sector as part of a broad effort to recover weapons and reduce demand for them. While more political and financial investment is needed, it represents a good start.

Forcible disarmament has been shown not to work in South Sudan. While it may highlight the government’s commitment to action, it tends to be short-sighted and can result in brutal violence. Making matters worse, the current plan laid out by Jonglei’s governor will not target those primarily responsible for armed violence in the state. Instead, it will result in armed resistance and threaten the lives of innocent civilians caught in the cross-fire. It will almost certainly lead to further attacks and rearmament and should be avoided until other options are exhausted. President Salva Kiir should actively promote alternatives to military action and build on the potentially positive initiatives underway.

Eric G. Berman, Managing Director, Small Arms Survey, an independent research institute based in Geneva. The Survey undertakes numerous projects on armed violence and small arms, including the Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) project. See www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan.