SPLM Vision: Scenarios and Strategies for the New Sudan’s Evolution

By Elwathig Kameir

June 10, 2008 — The vision of the SPLM for the country was stipulated from the beginning, as the creation of a united Sudan, albeit on new bases: a New Sudan. Since then, the Movement has consistently articulated it. Thus, the SPLM’s vision is, and has always been the vision of the New Sudan, a concept anchored in a sober analysis of the historical roots of the Sudanese crisis. It is the New Sudan vision that has guided the struggle of the Movement since its inception in 1983 against all forms of governments in Khartoum and informed its alliance with the rest of the political forces in the country. The objectives, mission and political program of the SPLM are all premised on the tenets of this Vision. With correct tools of analysis, the Movement has successfully been able to diagnose the internal political situation, with both its regional and international ramifications. All covets the New Sudan vision, as the SPLM is seen as the only organized political force with a clear vision. Most importantly, the New Sudan vision remains the source of the growing popular support that the Movement has been able to garner all over the Sudan, particularly in the North. This espousal of the vision ironically appears to have intensified since the passing away of its principal proponent, the late SPLM Chairman, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, a powerful legacy of a man who has become recognized as a great historic national figure. It is the vision of the New Sudan, which sets the SPLM apart from the rest of the political forces. It is the brand of the SPLM!

Therefore, it is the direction and path that the SPLM has to follow in order to achieve the objectives of the New Sudan, which should be the focus of attention. On the other hand, however, this does not mean that there are no skeptics of the New Sudan vision within the ranks of the Movement. There are, and have always been, detractors. In fact, disagreement over the vision has occurred, at various historical junctures in the evolution of the SPLM, degenerating into violent confrontations since the early days of its formation in 1983 and subsequently in 1991. However, these differences have been a subject of deliberations at the 1st SPLM National Convention in 1994, which resolved in unequivocal terms the establishment of the New Sudan and the achievement of the right to and exercise of self-determination as two principal objectives of the Movement. Following the signing of the CPA, the SPLM Interim National Council, the highest decision-making body until the 2nd National Convention is convened, has also reconfirmed commitment to the vision of the New Sudan in its 1st meeting in February 2007.

NOVEL NATURE OF THE VISION

The New Sudan was genuinely intended by the Movement to act, without prejudice to the right of the various peoples of the Sudan to self-determination, as a safeguard both for the unity of the Sudanese people and the territorial integrity of the country. Failing to build a New Sudan is the shortest route to dismemberment of the country. Apart from its content, the Vision can also claim novelty coming from a southern-based political movement unlike all its predecessors, which upheld the banner of “southern nationalism” and called for the separation of south Sudan from the North. The vision underlines the fact that the Sudan belongs to all Sudanese and it is, therefore, the right as well as the responsibility of every southerner to pay his/her due in bringing about change in the whole country. As the late Chairman eloquently put it “we shall never allow ourselves to be reduced to a fossilized regional sub-specie”. The New Sudan Vision is further rooted in a wider perspective that transcended the national boundaries in the sense that continental unity could never be achieved if Africans engage in dismantling existing units.

GENESIS OF THE VISION

The perpetual governance crisis, of which the civil war in the South was a manifestation, and the SPLM leadership’s genuine search for achieving a lasting and just peace, were behind the concept of the New Sudan. The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement in delivering promised peace and prosperity to Southern Sudan, incited revisiting the approach and the way the Sudanese conflict has been perceived. Why would Sudanese people keep fighting and killing each other if the contested issues were not so grave? Marginalization in all its forms, discrimination, injustice and subordination, were thought to constitute the root causes of the conflict that cannot be addressed in a piecemeal fashion through dishing out handouts and concessions to the disgruntled and rebellious groups whenever a conflict erupted in a particular region. The Sudanese have problems everywhere in the west, in the east, in the center, and even in the far north. This analysis is evidently vindicated by the ongoing bloody conflict in Darfur. It is, in itself, an attempt at marginalization to define the problem as the “southern problem”. The problem was, thus, redefined as the “problem of the Sudan” and not the “problem of the South”, as conventionally advocated by the successive ruling regimes in Khartoum. The fish rots from the head and not from the tail! It is the Sudanese state, epitomized by the power structure in the Center, which needs to be radically restructured in order to accommodate the Sudan’s manifold diversity and attend to all forms of exclusion and marginalization of its people.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH OLD SUDAN?

Consistent with the conceptualization of the Sudanese debacle as the “problem of the Sudan” rather than the problem of the South, the solution is envisioned to be in the transformation of the whole Sudan after diligent and deep analysis of the Old Sudan.

– The need for the New Sudan is rooted in the ills associated with the Old Sudan.

– Two main distortions are associated with the Old Sudan:

I- Distortion of self-perceptions by which an African-Arab-hybrid racial, cultural, and religious minority groups identify as monolithically Arab-Islamic.

II- The imposition of these minority groups’ distorted self-perception as the identity framework for the whole country, in total disregard of its pluralistic composition.

– The discrimination and gross inequities associated with this distorted national identity framework.

NORMATIVE ELEMENTS AND PILLARS OF THE NEW SUDAN

– The crisis does not lie in the mere differences of identity, but rather in the implications of the distorted self-perception in terms of participation in the shaping and sharing of power, wealth, resources, services, employment and development opportunities.

– Corrective measures are therefore required to promote an inclusive sense of belonging as citizens who enjoy all the rights of citizenship on equal footing.

– While identities cannot be legislated and radically transformed overnight, a constitutional and legal framework of equality can be enshrined with immediate effect and could, over time, allow an inclusive national identity to evolve.

– The normative framework of the stipulated New Sudan emanates from the correction of the ills of the Old Sudan as outlined above. It presupposes a united, democratic and secular Sudan, a constitutionally, economically and culturally reconstructed Sudan. The founding notions of the New Sudan vision that call for further articulation are:

1. Evolving a Sudanese Identity:

– The Sudan is a truly multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. One major problem of the Old Sudan is that it has been looking and is still looking for its soul and spirit, for its true identity. Are we an Arab country? Are we an African country? Are we a hybrid? Are we Afro-Arab? What are we?
– The Sudanese identity cannot be defined by two parameters only (Islam and Arabism) to the exclusion of all other parameters intrinsic in the Sudanese historical and contemporary diversity.

II. Unity on a New Basis

– Unity, premised on these partial components and with all the attendant political, economic and social implications, will always be fragile and unsustainable. The constitutional and institutional arrangements, programs and policies of the New Sudan should be reflective of both these historical and contemporary realities. This is a necessary prerequisite for creating a potentially great nation that is voluntarily united in rather than divided by diversity.
– Insistence and persistence on identifying a single religion with the state, and thereby establishing a theocratic state will only lead to serious rifts in the fabric of Sudanese society and its eventual disintegration. For not only are all Sudanese not Muslims, but even among Muslims themselves there is little or no consensus on the Sharia laws.
– In the New Sudan, it is the constitution and not religion, which must constitute the sole source of legislation.

III. Restructuring of Power:

– Radical restructuring of the power of the central government in a manner that takes into account the interests of all marginalized regions and peoples, those who took to arms and those who patiently opposed in silence.
– Decentralization of power by redefining the relation between Khartoum and the regions and devolving more powers to the regions in the form of “autonomy”, where and when necessary, and federalism i.e. a form of regionalism that would enable the masses, not the regional elites, to exercise real power for purposes of economic and social development and the promotion and advance of their respective cultures.

IV. Democratic Governance and Human Rights

– A democratic New Sudan in which equality, freedom, economic and social justice and respect for human rights are concrete realities, rather than mere slogans.
– Entrenchment of human rights and peoples’ rights in the constitution, the upholding of the independence of the judiciary, including the creation of an inviolable constitutional court and commitment to the rule of law by the government and the governed, and the establishment of a truly independent and competent civil service at all levels of government..
– Recreation of the legislature in a manner that shall ensure rigorous checks and balances and guarantees powers to the regions, which can be neither withdrawn nor impaired by other centers of power.

V. Equal and Sustainable Development

– Evolving an economic paradigm that would make rational use of the country’s vast natural and human resources to arrest unequal development, put an end to all forms of mariginalization and deprivation and equitably distribute the fruits of growth.
– An integral part of equal development is the appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various peoples of the Sudan

SCENARIOS FOR EVOLUTION OF THE NEW SUDAN

A. Principal Scenario

The following cardinal principles have consistently guided the liberation struggle, and informed the position of the SPLM in all rounds of negotiations with the government-of-the-day since the signing of the Koka Dam Declaration in 1985, towards the realization of the New Sudan:

1- Unity of the country on “new bases” constitutes the cornerstone of the New Sudan vision, but need not be exclusively premised on a predetermined stipulation of unity. Thus, viable unity is only possible if the elements outlined above are agreed upon and credibly implemented to make unity attractive and mutually desirable.

2- In order to realize the ideals of the New Sudan, the concept should be viewed in evolutionary terms. Initially, the normative principles of mutual belonging, and full equality of citizenship can be articulated and agreed upon, but this full realization can only be pursued incrementally.

B. Alternative Scenarios

1- Otherwise, varying forms and degrees of self-determination, ranging from degrees of autonomy and self-administration, including federal and confederate arrangements, to partition on the opposite extreme can be contemplated. In other words, it is possible to establish a degree of “separation” by which each entity can be self-determining, while advocating peaceful co-existence and cooperative interaction.

2- Even with partition, the normative principles of the New Sudan will continue to guide the constitutional and governance systems of the entities concerned, South and North. In other words, a longer-term perspective can envisage the creation of new frameworks for evolving more constructive principles of varying forms and degrees of sustainable unity.

3 – It is also possible that regional cooperation can be effectively promoted to foster the realization of the principles of the New Sudan Framework.

STRATEGIES OF THE PRINCIPAL SCENARIO: TOWARDS THE NEW SUDAN

I. Armed, Political Struggles, and Negotiations (1983-2005)

Since the resumption of the civil war in 1983, the SPLM/A has gone a long way toward the achievement of the New Sudan.

– Following the Nasir split in 1991, the 1994 Convention aimed at developing a robust and rejuvenated SPLM/A that is capable of impacting the total situation so as to bring about a fundamental change in the entire country. The Convention has put the Movement on a correct path to achieve its mandate, which is a democratic Sudan, and to converge with democratic forces in northern Sudan.
– The SPLM has always interacted with northern opposition groups, while continuing to talk to the government-of-the-day in Khartoum. In the 1980s, interactions with these groups resulted in the Koka Dam Declaration. In the 1990s, following the NIF coup, cooperation with the northern political forces under the umbrella of the NDA culminated in the Asmara Agreement of June 1995. According to the agreement, confederal and federal arrangements would be put in place initially in all of Sudan, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination in southern Sudan, Abyei, the Nuba Mountains, and the Ingessena Hills after a four-year interim period. The Asmara Resolutions constituted the basic document (Blue-print for the New Sudan) that would be put in place after the NIF has been removed. The removal of the NIF from power was seen as an imperative for achieving peace and the creation of the necessary conditions toward the objective of the New Sudan.
– After, objective assessment of the political situation at the internal and external levels, however, the NDA decided to endorse the adoption of political negotiation as one of the means for bringing about the desired change. Instead of “uprooting” the Inqaz regime, the NDA, therefore, opted for the realistic objective of “deconstructing” from within through democratic transformation, embedded in this settlement. Thus, the failure in uprooting the Salvation regime through political and military means, laid the ground for reaching a negotiated settlement, though on separate tracks.

II. The Post-CPA Situation: Difficult Questions and Easy Answers

Does the CPA cast any doubt on the veracity of the New Sudan Vision?
Have the new political realities overshadowed the vision?
Has the SPLM substituted or replaced the Vision with the CPA and its implementation, thus withdrawing into a cocoon, waiting for secession of the South?
Has the Movement abandoned its principled position on the relation between the state and religion?

Has the SPLM critically assessed the effectiveness of its participation in the CPA-stipulated institutional structures, particularly the executive, legislature at all levels of governance, the various commissions, and the institution of the Presidency, towards the achievement of the Movement’s objectives?
Is the right to self-determination synonymous with separation?

Though these questions, lurking in the minds and hearts of the Movement’s supporters and adherents, seem to be tough, they are, nevertheless, easy to answer if the SPLM is intent on employing the CPA as a launch pad, which in reality is all that it is, for promoting its grand objective of the New Sudan.

– Premised on the Machakos Protocol (20 July 2000), the CPA remains a watershed in Sudan’s contemporary history. It marks the end of the First Sudan Republic and represents a milestone in the transition towards a democratic united Sudan (New Sudan). The essence of the transformation embedded in the CPA is a democratic transition from authoritarianism to democratic polity.
– To start with, the CPA incorporates several aspects of the New Sudan Vision, as dubbed by the late SPLM Chairman a “Mini-New Sudan”. Although it is essentially a political compromise between the SPLM and the NCP, the Agreement provides us with the required framework for the continued pursuit of the objective of the New Sudan through purely political means as opposed to the pre-CPA combination of political and military methods. Thus, the new political reality consequent on the CPA provides the SPLM with a golden opportunity to translate its vision of the New Sudan into a working political program, and to build alliances with like-minded forces (the marginalized in the west and east, and the New Sudan forces in the north, including the “converted” elements of the “traditional” forces) on the basis of this program.
– CPA is not merely predicated on trust of the NCP, or other northern political forces. It is premised on the SPLM/A being an equal partner in its implementation. We should not be worried that the NCP might renege on the Agreement, because the SPLM/A will not allow them to. In the past the question was: what will the north do? What will Khartoum give to the south? The question is rather: what can we all do? The creation of the New Sudan in the context of the post-CPA situation will depend on what we all do during the interim period.
– One of the First SPLM National Convention resolutions, in April 1994, was to give the name of the New Sudan to the five regions of Bahr el-Ghazal, Equatoria, Upper Nile, Southern Blue Nile, and Southern Kordofan. In the words of the late Chairman, however, “let us not be misunderstood in the rest of the regions of what we call the Old Sudan. We have interest there also. We can compare it to a nail. We are like a new nail. When a nail becomes old and rotten, another one comes from underneath. It is a matter of time and it takes over the whole finger. So, let us start with the New Sudan and we shall see in the future whether we can advance forward or not, it is enough or not enough. Let us complete the liberation of the New Sudan of five regions first, then we shall decide in future whether or not to advance forward”. Following the CPA power-sharing arrangements, however, three of the five regions are fully liberated, and the other two are partially liberated, while the Abyei Protocol is still not implemented, and the rest of the Old Sudan is yet to be liberated. If these achievements are the fruits of the armed struggle, the liberation of the whole of the country, culminating in the New Sudan, should be the objective of the SPLM throughout the interim period, albeit through political struggle.
– The SPLM has advanced the concept of the New Sudan as a socio-economic mutation, a qualitative leap out of the Old Sudan, or else an interim political arrangement leading to a referendum on self-determination at the end of the interim period, as overriding principles that guided negotiations. Short of making the leap towards the New Sudan, a transitional “confederal” model was proposed by the SPLM. In essence, it means the establishment of two states: one in the north and one in the south, linked by a central authority responsible for the matters (Commonalities) in which an agreement has been reached. The objective is to end the war by accepting the realities of the country, and the reality is that the country is indeed divided. From the perspective of the SPLM, in the words of the late Chairman “there is no way in which we can compromise on the question of Islamic Sharia as the basis of our social existence, no matter how it is coated. We believe that we must leave the issue of Sharia to each state to decide for itself”. The confederal model, however, can lead to the creation of the New Sudan through the expansion of the commonalities over time.
– The CPA’s “one country-two systems” was modeled on these confederal arrangements, with the objective of giving a chance for the two partners and the rest of the Sudanese political forces, for that matter, to rethink during the extended interim period how to maintain and sustain the unity of the country in the long run. In fact, what has been lost is only a battle and not the war for separating religion from the state. Law-making, including repealing, is a process and not an event and what has not been achieved in the CPA can be revisited through elections during the interim period.
– The SPLM remains to be the only political force with the largest base of support among non-Muslims in both the South and the North, and its principled position on the relation between religion and the state has lured to its ranks a noticeably large constituency in various parts of North Sudan. The SPLM is obligated by virtue of its vision and supporters, as well as by the CPA, to promote the cause of unity “on new bases”. Even when the Islamic laws were not practically applied in the south (since their inception in 1983), the SPLM, as a liberation movement has consistently been calling for a transformed, democratic and united Sudan.
– The only route for sustaining the unity of the Movement, thus the unity of the Sudan at large, is through genuine adherence to the New Sudan vision at the program and policy levels, and vigorous engagement in national politics. For the aspirants for either unity or separation of the south, their respective objectives would not be met through withdrawal or retreat from the center of power, where the fate of land and people has been, and is determined! Indeed, demand of the SPLM for an effective presence in legislative and executive institutions throughout Northern Sudan, and its participation in the governance of those states for the duration of the pre-elections period, was made with the objective of making it possible for the Movement to advocate, on an equal footing with the NCP, unity of Sudan on new basis.
– Paradoxically, even the “southern nationalists” would harvest the wind at the end of the day if the SPLM failed in making use of the powers, at the national level, accorded to it by the CPA. This is simply because the self-determination referendum has to pass through the gate of elections. The outcome of those elections would be disastrous for the SPLM, as well as for the cause of the “southern nationalists”, if it failed to secure a comfortable representation in the national parliament. Otherwise, the CPA will turn into Addis Ababa Agreement II.
– Elections, therefore, add yet another national responsibility to the SPLM to initiate a process of national dialogue and political discourse with all the political and social forces. The objective is to arrive at a social contract that encompasses issues of the CPA, national reconciliation and democratic transformation as a basis of national consensus. “Nationalism” is not a “northern” phenomenon! Indeed, in the words of the late Chairman “The CPA enables the SPLM to retain its national character and to expand all over the Sudan. The SPLM shall consolidate itself in Southern Sudan where we shall have 70% of power and in the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile where we shall have 45% of power. The SPLM shall also have 10% of power in all the remaining 15 States of the North. With the consolidation of the SPLM in Southern Sudan and its expansion and consolidation in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and the other States of the North, the SPLM clearly has the potential to become the majority party in the coming national elections at all levels – local, state and national”. The outcome of those elections shall be disastrous for the SPLM in case it decides to politically decamp from the North, while allowing the better-equipped and funded competitor play a pivotal role in the North and an active one in Southern politics.
– How does the SPLM expect to campaign for the political and administrative restructuring of Sudan in order to establish the requisite intermediate levels of Government upon which to devolve some of the Central Government’s powers as stipulated in the national constitution and the constitution of Southern Sudan (i.e. devolving powers away from Juba to the States and Counties in the SPLM-controlled GOSS)
– The twin objectives of the New Sudan and self-determination are not mutually exclusive, in the sense that it suffices to achieve either one or the other, but they are intertwined and reinforce each other. Self-determination is a tool for achieving unity on voluntary basis unlike the coercive unity of the Old Sudan. Thus, in a very deep sense, this means that the Sudanese people themselves must achieve the unity of the country i.e. building of the Sudanese nation-state through self-determination. Therefore, if self-determination were meant to be synonymous with separation, the SPLM would be seen as pursuing contradictory objectives at the same time: separation and a united Sudan.
– The self-determination referendum in the South will not come to pass unless the CPA is implemented fully. The CPA cannot be implemented fully except by the SPLM. The SPLM cannot do that unless it is in power (our present status is merely symbolic) and it cannot assume power nationally without the support of like-minded political forces. Such like-minded political forces will not act in concert with the SPLM in the absence of a common political vision and program. The only viable vision and program that can bring the SPLM together with other forces is the New Sudan Vision. Hence the New Sudan Vision is indispensable to the attainment of the twin SPLM objectives of the New Sudan and self-determination.
– Therefore, in the context of operationalizing the New Sudan Vision, something that is already long overdue, the SPLM should use Southern Sudan, where it enjoys near total control, to demonstrate how it would go about nationally pursuing the goals of (i) ‘Restructuring power’, (ii) ‘Democratic Governance and Human Rights’ and (iii) ‘Equal and Sustainable Development’.

ORGANIZATIONAL RENEWAL: STRENGTHENING SPLM STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONS CORRESPONDING TO THE NEW POST-CPA POLITICAL REALITIES.

– Reaffirming dedication to the vision of the New Sudan will be meaningless without articulating corresponding political strategies and economic programs and policies that would furnish the guidelines for assessing and monitoring the performance of the SPLM at all levels of governance, including the executive.
– Building a robust organizational structure for the SPLM on the national level is also imperative in order to address the profound challenges that the Movement is facing. The CPA has ushered the SPLM into a new phase/Republic with multiple transitions that need to be effectively managed, a necessary prerequisite for the Movement to entrench itself and assume the leading political and executive roles expected of it. Indeed, the ultimate success of the CPA will to a great extent depend on a multiplicity of factors notably accelerating economic growth, creation of job opportunities and building solid political structures that are capable of voicing the interests of those they represent in the context of formal political institutions. Thus, in the transition from war to peace, the Movement is facing a critical 3-fold transformation trajectory: from a politico/ military organization to one that is politically-based, from regionally/ethnically-bound to a movement that is national in both character and outreach; and from opposition to partnership in government.

– The transformation from a politico/ military organization to one that is politically based: How can the SPLM champion the cause of democratic transformation nationwide, without ensuring that its own internal structures and processes are fully representative, democratic and transparent? How do we demonstrate our national commitment to civilian democratic rule without first formally subordinating the SPLA to civilian authority?
– The transformation from a regionally/ethnically-bound to a movement that is national both in character and outreach: How does the SPLM transform itself into a ‘robust’ and qualitatively different political outfit capable of addressing these profound challenges, if it does not actively seek to expand its political constituency by enticing like-minded political forces into its ranks or seeking mergers with them?
– The transformation from opposition, not only to a partner in government, but to the leading or senior partner in such a government: How does the SPLM guarantee that the CPA in its entirety will be implemented peacefully through the political process and that the Vision of the New Sudan will be given the chance to succeed as the basis of voluntary unity, if the SPLM does not assume responsibility in conjunction with like-minded political forces, for running the Central Government in Khartoum?

– The transition from an ill-suited centrally planned ‘economic paradigm’ to one that is more responsive to the development needs of a vast and extremely diverse country: How do we eventually sell to the rest of Sudan, the socio-economic development ‘paradigm’ that requires the ‘taking of towns to the people’ instead of allowing mass rural-urban migration into impoverished city slums, if there are as yet no signs of an attempt by the SPLM-controlled GOSS to bolster the human and material resource capacities of the countryside?

The author is a former professor of Sociology and consultant for numerous regional and intl organizations, He can be reached at [email protected]