An open or closed political process? (Part 2)
What is the relationship between the political process, stopping the war and uniting the democratic forces?
Will the Islamists return to power through the war? And what is the future of the army?
Establishing the dialectical link between the Revolution and stopping the war.
Yasir Arman
We are facing a very complex situation that requires everyone to think deeply and learn from past experiences without levelling accusations at each other among the national and democratic forces, who are trying to answer questions posed by the unprecedented challenges created by a devastating war that has damaged the social fabric, caused mass displacement and destroyed the power centre of the state. Society and the state are the foundation, the physical base, and the broad frame through which civil and political forces operate. They are now at their weakest due to displacement and the impact of war. Yet, there is a rich experience to learn from.
The vast majority of ordinary people have priorities such as safety, food, shelter, the need for a ceasefire, and basic human needs: humanity comes before politics.
The key question is how can stopping the war be linked to the debate about the Revolution and unifying the democratic forces? How do we end the war and preserve the Revolution? How do we complete the Revolution while working to stop and end the war?
All this requires a deep and objective dialogue between the forces of revolution and change, without ignoring the actual interests of the forces that ignited the war, keeping in mind the interests of the people and the forces of revolution and change. It would serve no purpose and cloud our vision if we simply repeated the experiences of the numerous peace talk negotiations. None of these led to a comprehensive and sustainable peace, only to power-sharing agreements and the division of Sudan, without providing lasting solutions.
It is essential to separate the issue of stopping the war from the political process that leads to completing the Revolution, establishing a new state, building a professional army and achieving sustainable solutions. There is an organic relationship between how the process is managed and designed and its results. A political process that is not defined properly, with clear mechanisms and stages, cannot result in sustainable solutions that achieve the required results.
The Islamists’ control over the military and security sector is the main cause of the current crisis and the root of the problem. Stability, democracy, development and equal citizenship can only be achieved as an integrated package by ending the Islamists’ control over the military and security sector through an effective process.
There are currently two armies dominated by political agendas. Neither of them represents the army that Sudan requires because the Sudanese Armed Forces suffer from the control of the Islamists. The Rapid Support Forces’ problem begins with its name, as it no longer supports anyone but a military formation with political goals.
What is missing is the civilian bloc of the revolutionary forces composed of the masses engaged in peaceful civil democratic activity. This has been dispersed and scattered due to the war, as well as the deliberate planning and schemes of those who initiated the war. Despite the bitterness of the current situation, the masses do not deserve to stand at the gates of the military actors with their fingerprints on a power-sharing agenda. They do not deserve to receive the leftovers, as this will only reproduce the current crisis and an unsustainable outcome. Doing so would leave the Islamists controlling the Sudanese Armed Forces and enable them to achieve the objectives of their war, namely to eliminate the December Revolution – something that the brutal dispersal of the sit-in on 3 June 2019 and the 25 October 2021 coup failed to achieve. The fire of the Revolution continues to burn, thanks to the masses. Still, it will only flare up again after the war if there is an open political process in which the peaceful and civilian army of the masses actively and peacefully participates in.
Regional and international actors are making great efforts to stop the war, which is not necessarily synonymous with the agenda of the December Revolution. Nevertheless, the demand to stop the war is primary and unites the democratic forces with the regional and international communities. This is a good basis for joint action, although the democratic forces’ tasks go beyond this.
The political process must be designed in two interlinked and separate phases, the first phase being the creation of a conducive environment for the second phase. We have to get away from the mentality and template of the agreements that were built on partnership with the military after the December Revolution. We need to deal seriously with the issues of the Revolution and the dialectic nature of the relationship between the Revolution and the war so that the mass movement can gain strength in the face of its opponents. We should not be drawn into quick-fix solutions that do not address the real crisis or provide sustainable solutions.
The First Phase:
This consists of a humanitarian ceasefire, with a regional and international monitoring mechanism on the ground for a long period – initially for one year but open for renewal – performing the following tasks:
1) Opening safe humanitarian corridors and delivering relief and humanitarian aid.
2) Stopping human rights violations and protecting civilians.
3) Enabling the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their towns and villages.
4) Enabling the return and protection of democratic civil activity in rural and urban areas.
The warring parties should play their role in this agreement during the first phase, with the participation and oversight of the civilian forces that stand against the war.
One of the challenges of the first phase is how the agreement should include the forces of revolution and change, which are not united by a common vision about the second stage. Thus, the separation of the two stages provides an opportunity to unify the forces of the revolution as they all agree on the demands of the first stage.
The Second Phase:
The second phase of the political process can begin properly after the return of internally displaced persons and refugees wishing to return voluntarily, in accordance with international humanitarian law once there is an open space for political activity, the slogans of the December revolution have been restored, and there is wide popular participation, especially of women, youth, trade unions and resistance committees. Having the democratic civilian forces at the front of stopping the war should be outlined in the second phase, plus the overseeing of the two warring parties, leading to the establishment of the new state and building a professional, national military and security sector.
It is impossible for the Islamists and the National Congress Party, who initiated this war, to participate in the political process without sufficiently addressing their state capture and their hijacking of the military and security sector. Additionally, the need for accountability and putting an end to impunity is fundamental.
Manipulating this issue means sabotaging the political process, reaching solutions that are not sustainable and returning Sudan to a state of war in the future.