Darfur Minawi and the ICC

By Isaiah Abraham

Septemeber 14, 2008 — Put it this way: what is the relationship between Presidential Assistant decision or ‘defection’ and that of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor charges or threat for a warrant of arrest for the Sudanese President H.E. Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir? I mean the timing of his departure, does this tell any story or purely coincident decisions? In plain tone, was Al Minawi nudged to get out before the ICC decision and if yes who tipped it and why?

Remember this man called Minni Arco Minawi, the leader of Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction that signed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on May 5, 2006 left Capital Khartoum days before the ICC Prosecutor issued his freaky charges against the Sudanese President. How about SPLM Secretary General jabs and jibes against the National Congress Party (NCP) at that time? Were they connected with ICC’s or not? I don’t know but we shall talk about this question somewhere (another time).

As Sudanese, there is nothing in Sudan that is called risk taking or just out of the blue; our people are ever calculative (everything must be of an interest), and therefore easy to read a theory between the two decisions. Whether anything is gonna worked out for the two conspirators or not is immaterial, but the possibilities for risk are very high for both (the ICC and Al Minawi). Mr. Al Minawi demands or conditions are deep under the carpet (drawer) of Dr. Nafia Ali Nafia and in fact at the moment he doesn’t has time to look in to those files. Apparently Arco Minawi remains isolated and chances are getting slimmer day after day for his victorious return to Khartoum, the same way SPLM return.

May be he is currently under attack militarily and probably engaging the so called special forces for ‘clearance of bandits’ in Northern Darfur in a fierce battle that is endangering everything for him. He found himself between a hard rock and a sea as other rebels chiefs have firmly entrenched externally and even on the ground on his expense.

Dr. Khalil has already asserted his authority as does Paris self exiled Abdul Wahid Mohamed Al Noor. His forces on the ground moreover mainly from Zaghawa are conned out of his control as majority of them are on the process of being absorbed in to the Sudanese Armed Forces. His deputy in Khartoum has already denounced Al Minawi defection and warming up to replace in Khartoum Palace.

Here is then the argument: where does this situation lead as far Arco Minawi’s political future is concerned? Where will this gentleman going to get out of this quandary? His attempt to meet Dr. Khartoum (I think they did it long time ago in N’djamena) explains how things become difficult for Arco.

The SPLM moreover is deeply fractured (politically); the group looks wishy-washy (confused) and rudderless saved for Dr. Machar, Paul Mayom, James Wani and Madame Awut Deng. Leaders of that party speak with disjoin or passivity on officials issues with less regards to their impact. No help from there anyway. Arco calculation of the overthrow of Al Bashir through the ICC or at least pressure from there is fast flopping. That is where Khartoum is always smart. Unless you are prepared, goading Khartoum isn’t simple; it needs a bit of vapid and sanguine characters or approach.

There are however options for Arco to salvage his image and that of the people of Darfur. He must beat the retreat and return to Khartoum before Khartoum complicated things for him and the people there. Rejoining other rebels groups won’t help, as they are unlikely to treat him with respect. The likes of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, Suleiman Jamus, Abdul Ahmed Shafi, and Dr. Maburuk Mubarak Salim, Abdul Wahid etc. are not going to give him space to organize himself and claim back whatever that was of his status.

Returning to Khartoum is painful but objective for the good of his party. The other is to officially resign and leave others to play the game much better, if he feels strongly he couldn’t go it any further. He knew Abuja Agreement (DPA) was an agreement with some grey areas but agreed to sign it. To others it was ‘waraga bedha’ to borrow the words of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim but if one reads carefully, it is an agreement worthy to be inoculated from those who see nothing there and out to discredit it.

The wish by other rebel leaders to make it (DPA) like that of Southern Sudan’s (CPA) isn’t realistic. Why? Because to arrived there you got to fight for fifty years and lose 4 million lives. I guess that is the price tag Khartoum has put on CPA type of agreement. He must not think he could have everything at the same time; he can’t be in the government and in the rebel at the same time. He will lose and the cause of Darfur would be trampled on by Khartoum.

For the people of Darfur, this is your chance to convince us and others that you are serious. The world and ICC in particular has taken your case a notch higher but you have an obligation to help others and yourself. Unite and stop shooting at convoys and travelers. Southern Sudan rebels weren’t behaving like that. Secondly, you have to talk to the government. There is no way the security would be guaranteed unless this is negotiated. Don’t be fooled by outsiders, make use of your own. Your situation affects everyone else; Southern Sudan for example isn’t recovering quickly because of your crisis. Please stop dragging us in to your problems with Khartoum. We aren’t party and never claim to fight for us; we know how to fight for ourselves. Ramadan Karim!

The author is based in Southern Sudan; he can be reached at [email protected]