Managing daunting agenda of unity and peace in Sudan

By John G Nyuot Yoh

September 29, 2008 — As Sudan prepares itself to organise general elections nation wide, it seems that the mood in the country continuous to be divisive. There are over forty political parties in the country ready to join the race. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), as a peace agenda, stipulates that general elections must aim at establishing a democratic transformed Sudan, where peace agenda should reign in the whole country. What scenarios are there and what options do the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its allies as driving forces behind the peace agenda in Sudan have? What options are available for the marginalise forces, in order to realise the unity agenda in the country. The driving forces for the unity agenda in Sudan include the SPLM, which was formed in July 1983, Darfurian political and militant organisations, the Eastern Front organisations, the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions. A united Sudan can only be realised if and when the peace and unity agenda prevail in the country. All biases and political-religious extremisms that the country had witnessed during the past fifty years can be attributed to competition between those political forces who espoused the war agenda to keep power abreast and those who espoused peace and unity agenda, through reform and transformation of the country into a nation that accommodates all its citizens and their aspirations.

From historical perspective, Sudan has not been at peace with itself for too long because the elites who were in charge of the evolution of the country political life were uncertain of some of the important ingredients of nation building:

Firstly, even before the independence in January 1956, there was no agreement on the identity of the country, a situation that created a rift among citizens, each perceiving the other as an alien and a potential enemy.

Secondly, religion was regarded by some as a criterion for belonging to the country. To be a Muslim was equal to being a super citizen in Sudan, at least in perception. Those who were not Muslims were looked down as third class citizens.

Thirdly, cultural chauvinism, based on perceived superiority of ‘Arab’ Sudanese, was used as a tool for legitimisation of power in the country. To accept belonging to the ‘Arab’ culture and perceive oneself as Arab Sudanese was a tool for ascendancy to power and prestige.

These contradictions and perceptions resulted in long fierce political conflicts in the country. The first region to say no to these divisive ideas was the South in August 1955, a ‘no’ which resulted in a seventeen year long civil war, brought to an end in February 1972 following the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement. Political ideas, which were advanced to look out for alternative options to deal with the deliberate socio-economic and political marginalisation of some communities and regions due to cultural and identity biases, were ignored and as a result, what was seen as ‘Southern problem’, became, by 1980s, a contentious problem for the whole country.

In fact, the culture of war and the war agenda became enshrined in Sudanese political life, to the point where by 1960s; it has been institutionalised by the central governments. The politics of marginalisation by the centre, the deliberate use of religion as a vehicle for political manipulation since 1956, manipulation of public opinion in the name of democracy, through elections as a means to ascend to power (1954-1958, 1966-1969, 1986-1989), the use of military coups (1958-1964, 1969-1985, since 1989) by military elites in collusion with their civilian counterparts as a deterrent force against the reformists and the deliberate impoverishment of the peripheries to force them to submit to the centre, all these policies had deepened the rift between the centre and the regions.

Attempts were made by various political and militant groups to identify which agenda worth adopting: peaceful co-existence of cultures or their clash. In the 1960s there were those, in the north who recognised that the identity question was the base of crises in the Sudan. They tried to advance new ideas in an attempt to convince the Sudanese to accept that Sudan is a multi-cultural and multi-religious and a hybrid of Afro-Arab heritage. They tried to marry the desert and the savannah. Those genuine attempts were condemned by Arab- chauvinists’ riverines and regarded them as divisive. Even the reformists such as the Republicans, who in early 1980s, tried to provide an alternative view of what Sudan should stand for, were suppressed and persecuted. In 1980s, the SPLM began the mobilisation of the Sudanese to espouse its vision of the New Sudan. Even though the Movement managed to attract considerable supporters from the peripheries, the Sudanese traditional oligarchy, remain un-amused by the new ideology, and began to play the religious card, declaring the SPLM as anti-Arab and anti-Islam and condemned any northern Sudanese who is a member of the SPLM. Eventually, major aspects of New Sudan vision were enshrined in the CPA, as a result of which, a peace agreement, between the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP) was signed in January 2005. One of the cornerstones of the CPA road map was conduction of internationally supervised national elections at all levels in the country in July 2009.

POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO ELECTIONS

As the country enters into new phase in its political struggle to transform itself, the SPLM as a guardian for managing the daunting peace and unity agenda in the country, has to explicitly make its electoral agenda clear. Indeed, the next elections, as an integral part of the CPA road map, must be informed by three important aspects of the CPA:

Firstly, the 2009 elections are about transforming the country from a hostage of political manipulation and exploitation by unpatriotic chauvinist religious zealot elites in the centre, into a multi-cultural, multi-religious and a democratic united nation. The SPLM and its allies in the east, west, centre and the north, will have to take seriously their historical role in seeing to it that they work collectively and discuss all aspects of the transformation, including forging alliances to enter the election race. The peace and unity agenda should become the base of their campaigns.

Secondly, the ongoing conflict in Darfur can be a recipe for change and transformation in the country, but also it can transform the country into pieces if not handled with care. In fact, the Darfur conflict can be transformed into a unity agenda by those who would like to see the country united, irrespective whether the South chooses to secede or not. In terms of political heritage, population and historical role in the country, Darfur has characteristics of glue in service of unity of the country. The SPLM should therefore engage the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leaders (Abdel Wahid Al-Nur, Mini Minawi, Ahmed Abdel Shafie, and others) and the JEM leadership on their stand on upcoming elections. The Movement should also interact with its Eastern Front allies, especially now that they are facing internal divisions, their unity will strengthen the SPLM election alliance.

Thirdly, the referendum which the South is waiting to exercise in 2011 is a challenge to the Sudan unity and peace agenda. Unless the SPLM and its allies, especially the Darfurians, began to deal with issues of unity and peace in the country before the elections, the country may find itself in serious challenges. There are two paradoxes regarding the link between the unity of the country and the referendum in the South: The SPLM as a ruling party in the South, while advocating the unity of the country, cannot ignore or skip the exercise of referendum by Southern Sudanese in 2011, because its power base is there. On the other hand, the SPLM has the responsibility to make sure that its peace and unity agenda for Sudan, if managed correctly through the upcoming elections, may save the country from disintegrating.

LESSONS TO BE CONSIDERED

The question then is what are the SPLM and its allies’ strategies for the upcoming elections? What are the scenarios and options available for the SPLM, its allies and the other political forces in the country who may opt to forge an alliance with the SPLM? What are challenges of the post-2009 elections in Sudan?

Firstly, before entering into general elections, the SPLM leadership must learn from the dynamics of its Second National Convention in May 2008. During the Convention the organisation found itself confronted by three bitter realities: the leadership of the organisation was not prepared enough to manage the congresses’ elections at various levels, resulting in senior cadres loosing their seats to individuals who may be considered as new recruits or defactees from the National Congress Party or its allies. The SPLM Convention was convened concurrently with the general census in the country, another milestone in the implementation of the CPA, hence dividing the focus of the organisation’s leadership. Therefore, the lack of preparedness for the convening of the Convention was a serious political omission that should not repeat itself. The second reality was that the delegates to the Convention were mot given the opportunity to take time, during the Convention to discuss the SPLM’s policies, whether political or socio-economic sector agenda. It was expected that the delegates should have spent enough time to evaluate the SPLM organisational structures, the performances of its cadres since October 2005, revise its policies on national issues such as developmental policies, Darfur conflict, educational, health and infrastructure policies, management of resources, accountability, and deployment policies of its cadres. Finally, the organisation’s leadership devoted a considerable time debating the structure of the organisation, especially the positions of Deputies Chairperson. These matters are always dealt with before the convention convenes to avoid sensitivities and polarisation of the delegates during the convention. In fact, the organization’s convention was paralysed for almost a week, where leadership spent time trying to settle the question of who will be number two in the party, almost resulting in factionalisation of the organisation into power centres, where some tried to ethnicise and regionalise their positions.

Secondly, it is very important to appreciate that the chances for the next elections to take place depend very much on three vital factors: the dynamics of the International Criminal Court (ICC) charges against President El-Bashir may impact on the manner in which the internal politics within the NCP expressed itself. The NCP controls the resources of the country; manages brutal security organs; controls sixty per cent of the army and police force in the country, and controls the public and private media. Unless the internal dynamics of the ICC implications within the NCP become clear, the likelihood of some influential cadres within the party disrupting the process and preparations for elections is a possibility. If President El-Bashir is indeed indicted as seems to be the case, who will be the candidate for Presidency from the NCP and will the party agree on one candidate. Secondly, the Darfur conflict may derail the election process all together. The continuous war in Darfur may escalate into large scale war, if the Darfurian factions’ leaders feel that they are being ignored, through partial elections process, or if the NCP leadership feels that it will not win the elections, it may opt to escalate the war in Darfur, hence making it impossible to conduct peaceful free, inclusive and fair elections in the country. Will the SPLM be ready to accept conduction of elections before the peaceful settlement of the Darfur conflict?

Thirdly, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is regarded as the custodian of the CPA and like the NCP, is responsible for its implementation. The three pillars of the CPA are: trying to make unity attractive during the interim period, through establishment of new political, economic, social and legal structures, establishment of a democratic transformed new Sudan through general elections, where all shades of political forces in the country would participate and the right to self determination for the people of Southern Sudan, to decide whether they want to remain part of the Sudan or secede. These principles require the SPLM and its allies who converted to the CPA ideological principles to respect them and implement them. The general elections therefore pose challenges to the SPLM and its allies as a co-ruling party in the country.

SCENARIOS

Analysing scenarios for the upcoming elections is a very daunting task for any analyst. There seems to be five different scenarios opened to the SPLM leadership and its allies to consider, if they want to influence the process and the outcome of the 2009 elections:

Firstly, the SPLM may decide to persuade its leader, General Salva Kiir to contest elections on behalf of the marginalised block, on unity, peace and new Sudan agenda. This would mean that all the marginalised groups and other progressive forces in the country will rally behind Chairman Kiir’s candidacy and work towards mobilising the voters to elect him as a candidate who would ensure unity, stability and realisation of the new Sudan. The challenge of this scenario lies in that the SPLM will have to convince its allies in Darfur, East, centre and indeed its members in northern Sudan that Chairman Kiir is the right candidate for the alliance. Moreover, the SPLM must convince Chairman Kiir to accept the candidacy, given that should he decide to accept to contest the elections, and should he fail to win the national Presidency, he would automatically loose his two positions: First Vice President of the Republic and President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Of course he would retain his two other positions, the Chairman of the SPLM and the Commander in Chief of the SPLA. Meanwhile, in the South someone else will have to be elected to fill in the Presidency of the Government of Southern Sudan, as well as First Vice President of the Republic according to Part II, Article 2.3.7 of the Power Sharing Protocol of the CPA and Part Three, Chapter Two, Article 62 (1) of the Sudan National Interim Constitution. However, if Chairman Kiir won the Presidency of the Republic, then the post of First Vice President will automatically be occupied by someone from northern Sudan, who needs not to be from the NCP, because he or she can come from any political party in the north. Another challenge would be that if the President of Government of Southern Sudan is elected from another Southern political party, in case the SPLM candidate did not succeed to win the post, the dynamics of Southern Sudan interim period politics may change, hence creating uncertainty about the implementation of the CPA. Indeed, in this case, will the SPLA command pay its allegiance to non-SPLM President of the South? And what will happen if the President of Government of Southern Sudan is from another Southern party while the Chairman of the SPLM and the C-In-C of the SPLA is not in power neither in the South nor in the north?

Secondly, in the event that Chairman Kiir decides not to contest, and asked the movement to choose one of its cadres to contest the national Presidential elections, the question then would be: who would be the suitable candidates for the Presidency of the Republic within the SPLM hierarchy? What would be the criteria for nominating one of the SPLM top brass to join the national Presidential race in 2009? Would any of the top ten of the SPLM’s twenty seven members of its Political Bureau be suitable for candidacy? The challenge with this scenario lies in that if Kiir decides not to contest and asked one of his colleagues to contest the national election for Presidency of the Republic on behalf of the SPLM, and if that candidate wins the race, it will be difficult, constitutionally speaking, for the President of Government of Southern Sudan, who definitely would be another person rather than the one who won the national Presidential election, to become at the same time First Vice President of the Republic. It would mean that the two positions will have to be separated. It would also mean that there will be two centres of powers within the SPLM and in the South. On the other hand, if the SPLM forwarded another candidate other than Chairman Kiir to contest the national Presidential elections, will the other allies accept that candidate? And if the allies express their reservations on that candidate, will the SPLM be willing to present a list of other candidates from whom the allies can choose from?

Thirdly, the SPLM may decide not to forward at all a candidate for the national Presidency, thus implying that Chairman Kiir will be their candidate for the Presidency in Southern Sudan, and who if he wins that position, would automatically becomes the First Vice President of the Republic as stipulated in the National Interim Constitution and the CPA. Such a scenario would suggest that the SPLM would ask its allies to come up with a candidate who would challenge the NCP and other political parties’ candidates in the Presidential election. Here, issues such as when and how the Darfur conflict comes to an end will become imperative. The SPLM will have to work hard to see to it that the conflict is resolved peacefully and that peace is restored in Darfur before the elections. Such a situation would imply postponement of the elections until the war in Darfur is brought to an end. Equally, it would mean that the road map of the CPA will be affected and hence may open up undesired possibilities which may not be acceptable to the SPLM and its supporters.

In the event that this scenario is adopted by the SPLM, the question that begs for an answer would be: who are the SPLM closest allies who would secure the success of the alliance in winning the position of the President of the Republic. There are several options that the SPLM leadership may opt to pursue: One, the SPLM as an organisation has six political centres: the South, Northern Sector, the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile, Abyei and the Diaspora. These centres represent the SPLM power house. Two, the SPLM also has historical links with the SLM factions in the West, the Eastern Front and Beja Front, and has political presence in Kordufan. These allies have the potential to form a block with the SPLM to sponsor a candidate for the Presidency of the Republic, and hence secure sizeable votes for their candidates in the parliamentary polls. Other important potential allies to the SPLM from the north include the Sudan Communist Party (SCP), the Umma Reform Party of Mubarak El Fadil Al-Mahdi and other small, but influential progressive forces in the country. The SCP, from historical perspective has been consistently sympathetic with the cause of the marginalise people of Sudan. In fact, a good number of the SPLM leaders from the north, were influential members of the SCP. Making use of this historical and strategic connection, the SPLM may gain the support of the SCP and other progressive forces in the north. Such a broad base coalition would afford the SPLM and its allies, not only to win the Presidency of the Republic, but a possible comfortable majority in both the Senate and the National Assembly.

Fourthly, the SPLM and its allies may opt to widen their alliance to include opposition parties that are against NCP monopoly of politics and governance in the north. These political parties are the Umma National Party of Imam Al Sadig Al-Mahdi, the National Popular Congress of Dr Hassan Abdalla al-Turabi and the Democratic Unionist Party of Moulana Muahmmed Uthman Al-Mirghani. Such a scenario can only be plausible if these traditional Islamic parties have decided to push out of power, once and for all, the NCP and willing to forge an alliance with whoever is willing and able to secure the ousting of the NCP from power. What would be the implications of such a scenario from power politics perspective in the country? Definitely the SPLM would continue to rely on its progressive allies to win votes in the parliamentary national elections, in order to secure enough seats to influence national politics after the elections. Thus, while the SPLM may opt to create an alliance with the traditional Islamic political parties to sponsor one candidate for Presidency against the NCP candidate, it is not likely that these Islamic political parties would cooperate with the SPLM and its allies in supporting each other parliamentary candidates. This is because, the traditional Islamic parties, would according to this scenario, be interested only in gaining parliamentary votes, rather than win the Presidency. The traditional power base of these Islamic political parties has always been Darfur, Kordufan, Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains, northern and eastern Sudan. These regions are now part of the marginalised progressive political alliance, led by the SPLM. Is such a scenario possible? Probably yes, only if the discussions and debates between the SPLM and these Islamic parties start earlier; because such an alliance would be huge one and the management of various interests would be very hard to handle. Moreover, it would require sophisticated negotiation team from the SPLM and its allies. Leaders such as Al-Turabi, Al-Mahdi, Al-Mirghani and Nugud are shroud politicians and know very well how to negotiate their interests. They have been around in the Sudanese political scene for a while. Moreover, the ‘trio’ of Al-Turabi, Al-Mahdi, and Al-Mirghani tend to believe that history of Sudan as a nation has something to do with their families’ legacy, and would find it sometimes condescending to negotiate with people they consider to come from the marginalise regions. Perhaps it was only late Dr Garang and the SPLM who skilfully forced these traditional leaders to accept the fact that the fate and the future of Sudan is no longer tied to individuals, whether they come from influential families, middle-upper classes or not.

Fifthly, the SPLM may opt to create an election alliance with the NCP, by supporting an NCP candidate for Presidency, arguing that the two should continue to monopolise the politics of the country until the end of the interim period. The challenges that would face the implementation of such a scenario would include the fact that the two partners have been exhausted by continued political bickering over the implementation of the peace agreement. Two, the SPLM, should it chooses to cooperate with the NCP during the elections, will be indirectly expanding and extending the NCP life time in power, hence alienating its allies and other political forces in the country who feel that they were victims of the NCP policies of exclusivity. Three, the SPLM has the moral obligation to support political forces that are willing to promote its policy of establishment of the New Democratic United Sudan. A united democratic Sudan can only be achieved in part or in whole if the SPLM and its allies sponsor a presidential candidate who would secure the unity of the Sudan, or the north, if the South chooses to secede in 2011. Extending NCP life in power would be considered by the other political parties as a political expediency from the part of the SPLM. In fact, the SPLM is expected to consolidate its power in the north, so that it inherits the power, through cooperation with its allies in the north, should the south secede. Secession of the South in 2011, if that happens, does not mean, in the opinion of the SPLM Northern Sector’s leaders, the end of the SPLM transformation agenda. The SPLM they argue is a national political organisation with a transformation agenda, that does not ends with the secession of any of the regions where the SPLM has supporters. The unity of the Sudan in the opinion of these SPLM leaders is a strategic goal that lives on beyond 2011. If this is the general ideological strategic framework of the SPLM national agenda, it does not matter whether the South secedes or not, and thus it becomes irrelevant, as far as the SPLM transformation agenda is concerned. Thus, allying itself with the NCP during the upcoming elections would not be a desired goal, because the marginalised alliance is perceived to be capable of taking over power and save the country from disintegration during the period leading to 2011.

Finally, what do we make of the scenarios and the analyses presented in this essay? What we have tried to do is to trigger a debate, indeed a serious one, among political forces in the Sudan and beyond, to put on the table the challenges and the complexities before the leadership of the country as they embark on their electoral campaigns. We also emphasized that the next elections seem to be about the unity and peace in the country. By unity we mean, putting in place strategic plans that would make it possible at least for the northern parts of the country to remain united even if the South secedes. The elections are also about the Sudanese political forces of all shades working to achieve and maintain a lasting peace that would bring an end to the misery of the ordinary Sudanese people, wherever they are. Maintaining the balance between managing the unity and the peace agenda in the country is not only the responsibility of the SPLM and its allies, and therefore should be the focus of the leadership of the Sudan during the elections, irrespective of their political ideology, objectives and goals. For what will the Sudanese political parties gain if they win elections but the country is disintegrated into small unviable entities?

*Dr. John Yoh is lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences, University of South Africa in Pretoria.