Inclusive ceasefire vital for Sudan’s political dialogue
“Non-inclusive” ceasefire defeats inclusive political dialogue. Avoid it
by Trayo A. Ali
■ The latest development on the Sudanese conflict is that the United States has proposed ceasefire talks to be held in Geneva (Switzerland) on August 14, 2024. The US has so far invited the two major brillegrants, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and excluded other active armed actors on the ground.
■ To start with, it is important to state in an unequivocal manner that any expedited action that brings ceasefire, pacifies the situation, brings normalcy, and mitigates the ongoing unprecedented dire humanitarian crisis is more than good and more than welcome. However, as, the announcement has generated very much heated reactions from the Sudanese public as well as from different political spectrums, we should note that it is neither fixing a new date for the resumption nor changing the venue of the talks that ignites this debate. What ignites this debate is the “repetition” of the same old method of “noninclusiveness” in conducting a ceasefire.
The method of a “non-inclusive” ceasefire arrangement (since it was established as a recorded failure strategy throughout Sudan’s long journey of the peace process) is *not wise, not rational, not practical, and not advisable to pursue.
This is because, first, in addition to the fact that the recent history of the Sudan peace process has proved its erroneous. Also, by logic, it constitutes a stumbling block, it contradicts, corrupts, obstructs, and defeats both purposes of a successful ceasefire and/or achieving successful political dialogue.
In addition to the above, there also exist other major problematic factual factors on the ground that can not be resolved except by way of inclusive strategies including the fact that any successful humanitarian solutions (which by nature) requires an inclusive participation of all the armed actors on the ground, plus the fact that the existing pervasive state of “distrust” amongst the actors, which only their participation can minimise and/or lessen their fears. This becomes more necessary in the face of the participation of a “non-neutral” THIRD party in the ceasefire mediation, e.g., the United Arab Emirates- (UAE)
■ What is to be done?
To avoid any setback or to repeat any major fault, it’s both rational, possible, and practical to be guided by a number of principles and realities:
■ First
we need to be consistent (in that the ceasefire should be designed in a fashion that it conforms to the already suggested “all-inclusive” political dialogue). We should avoid any arrangement that becomes asymmetric to contradict the overall target.
The hard, undisputable, and consistent fact these previous agreements can offer is that the more partial and/or non-inclusive the agreement becomes, the more the chances of failure increase and the more failure of any agreement becomes, the more prolonger the conflict becomes, and the more the armed groups proliferate.
It goes without saying the fact that, designing an inclusive ceasefire arrangement is the only rational and prerequisite condition to make the two “complementary” tracks (the ceasefire and the political dialogue) can be merged in a symmetric, compatible, non-antagonistic, non-adversarial manner and lead to a much needed holistic, viable, sustainable, congruent, and comprehensive resolution.
■ Second.
We should be mindful of the principle that “many wrongs do not make right.” The catalogue of the Sudan war is nothing but a record of four major bilateral ceasefire arrangments that all failed.
The fact that the US has always been an instrumental actor in the Sudan peace process and will remain an indispensable actor. All that in terms of employing resources, dispatching high-level envoys, US media exposure of the Sudan conflict, helping the United Nations Security Council in passing resolutions, funding the peacekeeping missions (especially UNAMID and UNMIS).
The US engagement on the Sudan peace process started right from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, (popularly known as the “Naivasha Agreement), the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of Abuja (2006), the DDPD of Doha (2011) and the Juba Peace Agreement (2020), of which the US played a central role.
However, all these agreements remained non-inclusive (including the CPA), which was, to a greater extent, comprehensive on issues but remained partial in parties involved. It was obvious that this “partialism” was the underlying and primary problematic factor behind all these consecutive failures.
The non-inclusive arrangement will most likely end up with a failure and eventually reverse the entire situation to square one and reignite the conflict once more.
That is why we need to rectify the approach, make it inclusive, and get a better result.
Isn’t it high time for us to avoid treading on the same rake?
■ Third
Humanitarian reasons
Since the top strategic goal behind the ceasefire is the humanitarian issue (delivery of unhindered relief aid to the affected population and the protection of civilians) any ceasefire agreement shall (by definition) include the formation of a mechanism of implementation, (monitoring, verification and reporting), then the above tasks imply a joint mechanisms that represent signatory parties to the agreement.
■ Four
We all acknowledge the fact that one major and deep-seated problem that kept compartmentalised Sudanese political forces in this predicament is the pervasive “distrust.”.
This virus is so strong enough to erode Sudan’s entire body politics and prevent any meaning of political rapprochement among the political forces.
Therefore, any ceasefire arrangement that excludes key stakeholders will only exacerbate the situation and inflame tensions, particularly among the armed groups. In light of this, it is imperative that the US advocates for ceasefire arrangements that are inclusive of all relevant parties.
This is what makes the issue of inclusivity of paramount importance in the thinking of the armed movements whose grassroots supporters experienced the hell of genocide and feel that their participation in an inclusive ceasefire is the only condition that guarantees the viability of any given ceasefire.
Furthermore, what adds fire to fuel and makes them more uncomfortable is the participation of a country considered a non-neutral player, such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For the US attention ((Suffice it )) to mention the evidence presented by most top senior US former officials, John Prendergast and ambassador Anthony Lake in their article under the title” The UAE’s Secret War in Sudan. How International Pressure Can Stop the Genocidal Violence” released on July 31, 2024.
Obviously, we should be obliged to handle this challenge with care as the more any party is excluded, the more the gap of distrust becomes wider and wider.
■ Five. Conclusion
The protracted experience Sudanese went through only tells one thing, inclusivity is the magical word. Noninclusive arrangements were the cause behind four consecutive failed agreements.
Any exclusion of any armed party (or parties) to the conflict will only create a structural defect in any ceasefire arrangements.
It is high time to set boundaries to avoid repeating harmful tactics.”
This problem won’t go away by just ignoring it; we all have to face the music!”. A simple proverb says an experienced person should not be stung twice from the same hole!”
As the current US special envoy Mr Tom Perrelo himself has stated several times that the US policy would be informed and shaped through listening to the greater Sudanese public, I am more inclined to think that the United States, with all the astuteness it enjoys, the experience it has on Sudanese affair, is shrewd enough to re-examine these factual facts raised in this argument and help Sudanese avoid the fragmented approach of the non-inclusive ceasefire that will take us to walk into the same wall.
We definitely need to abide by the “Biblical” proverb: let us go back to the cornerstone refused by the builders. In this case, that is “inclusivity.”
Mr. Trayo A. Ali can be reached at the email address: [email protected]