National and international indices on Sudan government corruption

By Mahgoub El-Tigani

November 12th, 2008 — The financial and administrative corruption of the Government of Sudan is widely discussed in the Sudan, as well as the external world: “Sudan ranks 156th out of 163 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for 2006,” says the Index of Economic Freedom (2008).

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: Sudan laws, the Constitution, and the comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) stipulate clearly the government’s full responsibility for transparent and accountable public finances. The Sudan Transitional Constitution (2005) dictates by Article 111:

“(1) The President of the Republic shall cause to be presented to the National Assembly before the beginning of the financial year a bill on the general budget of the State… any reserve funds, transfers thereto or allocations there from, and explanations of any special budgets or financial estimates, policies or measures to be taken by the State in the financial and economic affairs of the country within the framework of the general budget.”

A major problem of state finances has been centered on the failure of the government to present the general budget in time to the National Assembly. The government always fails to explain, to the satisfaction of Assembly, why massive amounts of “reserve funds, transfers, and allocations” were frequently used by the Presidency secretive expenditures “for classified security operations.”

Also, the government fails to account for the “secretive” attitude of the ministry of energy and minerals regarding the oil and gold mining industries, and the ministry of finance non-existent records on the proper expenditure of presidential, defense, and security affairs.

Article 114 of the Constitution on final accounts states, “The President of the Republic shall cause to be presented to the National Assembly during the six months following the end of the financial year, final accounts for all revenues and expenditure as are set forth in that year, as well as expenditure withdrawn from the reserve funds; the Auditor General shall present his/her report on such accounts to the National Assembly.”

Aside from the irregularities of budget presentations, the key censorial organ of state finances, specifically the Auditor General, has been annually asking for the prosecution of government officials who embezzled billions of Sudanese (i.e., hundreds of millions of dollars) public monies, almost on a regular basis. None of the Auditor’s serious reports, however, were honored or even investigated by the ruling party.

On the other side, the size of loans paid by the NIF/NCP authorities in 20 consecutive years or more to recruit party supporters from the armed forces and the civil service since the NIF alliance with Nimeiri in 1981 is probably as big as the presidency’s free hand “security operations” in the South, Darfur, and the other regions.

How many millions of dollars Ben Laden gained or spent on the NIF “Jihadist” party government in years inside Sudan for terrorist operations versus the Sudanese and other nationalities? How much of these funds generated invested amounts in the world system? How many more State monies Turabi and Bashir used or abused for years to strengthen secretive operations of their “Islamic Movement Civilization’s Project” via the People’s Arab Islamic Conference of the early 1990s?

The corrupt nature of these funds will play a significant role in the 2009 elections to harvest majority seats in the effective absence of state control and the tragic situation of the opposition parties which have been meticulously deprived of effective financial and organizational competencies by ongoing restrictions of the ruling regime.

A PROMPT MEASURE: The National Council at Khartoum and Juba is invited to set-up a National Fact Finding Committee under jurisdiction of the Auditor General of the Republic to investigate charges of corruption against the Government of Sudan since June 30, 1989, up to the last day of the 2009 elections.

The proposed committee must obtain all necessary information from the authorities entrusted with constitutional duties over public monies (the presidency, the attorney general, federal and state ministers, governors, army and police leaders, banks and corporation managers and the other key executives).

Members of the National Council and the civil society non-governmental organizations, besides different groups of the Bar Association, might participate as full members of the proposed committee, and the Sudan Judiciary ought to monitor closely the legal proceeding of committee. The committee’s final findings must be largely disseminated as soon as possible for public use, as well published in the government’s gazette.

DEEPLY-ROOTED CORRUPTION: The Index of Economic Freedom (2008) on Sudan reads: “There has been some progress toward liberalizing the trade regime; but non-transparent regulations, discriminatory taxes, significant delays in customs clearance, inadequate infrastructure, and corruption add to the cost of trade.”

The Index emphasizes: “Corruption is perceived as rampant… Relatives of high government officials often own companies that do business with the government and usually receive kickbacks for government business. Bribery of police is also a concern. There are no laws providing for public access to government information, and the government does not provide such access.”

The NIF/NCP corruption continues to destroy the country’s integrity in financial and administrative terms, exactly as it did with respect to the political, legal, and cultural systems of the land.

Despite all “ethical and idealist claims” of the government and its Islamist allies in the international arena, the undeniable fact is that “Sudan is commonly considered among the world’s most corrupt countries; yet this is very difficult to prove,” stated Alferd Taban Logune (Global Integrity: 2006 Country Reports) “due to a secretive government and years of strict media controls, which have all but eliminated journalists’ watchdog ability.”

“People close to the government hurriedly set up companies, many in Malaysia and China, to take advantage of the newfound oil money, as did the ruling National Congress Party. One such company – based in China and owned by the National Congress – reportedly skims a commission of 35 percent for all trade in Sudan. Bilateral trade between Sudan and China has been valued at 249 billion dinars (US$1.2 billion) a year in recent years.”

CORRUPTED ALLIES: The Transparency International’ Corruption Perceptions Index, an independent non-governmental organization, conducts 13 surveys and expert assessments of which at least 3 surveys are required for a country to be included in the index (10 as highly clean; zero as highly corrupt).

In 2007, the Sudan index was (1.8), one of the lowest (i.e., highest in corruption) in the international index almost only second to a few other states and Somalia (1.4) which, unlike Sudan, has not yet established a regular ruling system.

The closest allies of the NIF/NCP are equally noted for corruption: The indices of the other financial allies of Sudan included Russia (2.3), Iran (2.5), and China (3.5); whereas the index of the United States was (7.3) and the index of Great Britain was (7.7).

Unfolding the financial corruption of the Islamist rule of Iran, Alireza Jafarzadeh widely cited statement (FoxNews.com) http://spcwashington.com/content/view/370/26/ indicates that “The cycle of name-and-shame, with opposing factions alternately spilling the beans on each other, is spiraling out of control.”

“The charges of massive financial fraud now out in the open first surfaced in a recent speech by Abbas Palizar, a member of the Investigative Committee of the Majlis (Parliament). He accused 44 of the most senior ruling clerics and officials of the regime not just of robbing it blind, but also of plotting the physical elimination of their rivals.”

“[Palizar] divulged information indicating that some of the plane crashes of recent years resulting in the deaths of several cabinet ministers and high-ranking Revolutionary Guards commanders were not accidents.”

FAILURE TO ACCOUNT BEFORE THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: The 52% government-controlled National Assembly is hardly exposed to open discussions about the government’s corruption or, for that purpose, the Auditor General’s annual reports on accounts of the State.

The central government’s unconstitutional rejection of transparency and accountability before the public, in general, and the National Assembly, in particular, has been worsening in the light of the Khartoum’s booming business in the South oil. Hundreds of millions of dollars might have been illegally spent in violation of the CPA firm provisions on the requirements of transparent reporting and sharing of oil revenues between the Central Government and the South Sudan Government.

In the 1990s, the opposition civil society forces and political parties pledged they would be strongly committed to clear the State’s financial administration from NIF corruption, as soon as the desirable democratic transition would be enforceable. SHRO-Cairo documentary publication, Democracy and Human Rights in The Sudan – The Obligations of Sudanese Political Parties, Trades Unions, and Military Forces (Cairo, 1997), included assertive statements by the NDA groups to end government abuses of power and financial corruption.

The Umma, DUP, the Communists, SPLM, the legitimate Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces, trades unions, and women’s groups expressed deep concerns over the privatization, financial waste, and economic corruption of the NIF government, and the need to comply with constitutional law with respect to the general budget and development of the country.

Since the time the opposition groups joined the CPA National Unity Government’s Assembly in 2005, however, the government’s secretive finances (most likely in billions of dollars) have never been revealed to the NDA or other inquirers at the National Assembly. Most recently in the years 2007 and 2008, the two CPA peace partners engaged in tense media campaigns in a wave of mutual questions and allegations about the oil revenues.

Very few Assembly sessions on the budget witnessed the NDA parliamentarian Suliman Hamid and other opposition members questioning the Minister of Finance and National Economy about the actual revenue of the country’s gold mining industry; but the Ministry did not satisfy the inquiry with any reliable answers.

GOVERNMENT LIBERALIZATION IS A MAJOR FACTOR: Economist Banaiah Yongo-Bure was one of the earliest Sudanese critics of the NIF corrupted privatization of the national economy.

In an article published by the Middle East Review (1991), Dr. Yongo-Bure mentioned that, since the early days of the Triple Economic Program (1989-1992) of the ‘Inqaz Government’ the National Salvation Revolution restructured the national economy to favor NIF partisan objectives.

These objectives included privatization of the public sector in the key export and import areas, among other plans, at expense of the public sector’s protection policies to the farming and working forces and the large poor consumer population.

Apart from the growth of the Islamists’ commercial and professional strata, as well as the NIF commercial businesses and relief agencies, the negative results of privatization policies embraced a high rate of pauperization among the farming and the working classes of the population. High brain drain and labor massive migrations ensued from the agricultural areas of the war-torn marginal regions unto unidentifiable numbers of shanty towns around the cities without amenities or modern services.

The Islamic socialist economist Mohamed Hashim ‘Awad has been consistently criticizing the liberalization policies of the government, which had been cautiously considered by the former elected government (1986-89), then fully implemented by the Inqaz military regime.

Earlier since the discovery of oil in Sudan by the mid 1980s, Hashim advised the ruling regime to insist on a fair share of oil returns on the assumption that the investing companies would pursue by all means larger shares of oil returns at expense of the national economy. By the 1990s and 2000s, Professor ‘Awad viewpoint came true by the disastrous dealings of the Salvation Revolution with ‘socialist’ China and the other ‘capitalist’ oil exploiting groups.

In the 1990s, Mohamed Hashim ‘Awad protested the government’s plan to dismiss thousands of the working force “to reduce expenditure of the general budget.” As he explained to the press at the time: “the massive dismissals would strip the machinery of State from its well-trained or experienced elements whose substitution would cost massive expenditure in the upcoming decades.”

“The public sector, however, might be successfully reformed by a number of workable measures (including active participation of the labor force in reform programs) to contribute lucratively to the welfare of the working personnel and the general society.”

Back in 1988, Mohamed Ibrahim Nugud, then leader of the Democratic Opposition of the elected Constituent Assembly, raised similar criticisms against the liberalization policy of Sadiq al-Mahdi coalition government that embodied the same Islamists of the succeeding military coup in 1989:

“The budget was not expressive of the needs of the vast majority of the population,” asserted Nugud who suggested before the Assembly many commendable compromising alternatives to strike a better balance between the State needs to capital formation and the producer/consumer economic and social rights.

RARE EXPOSURE TO THE PUBLIC MEDIA: There is a long way for the State to open up all media avenues to activate the popular movement, which alone is capable of making real actualization of all-Sudanese participation in the process of peace, at full length.

One of the rare public debates between government officials and opposition experts was arranged by the Sudan T.V. on budget discussion (December 15, 2004). Conducted between the late opposition economist Professor Farouq Kadoda and Dr. Babiker Mohamed al-Tom, Chair of the National Council’s Economic Committee, the debate indicated several commonalities in the direction of secular economics.

The two economists did not refer directly to the Islamic Shari’a principles that “nominally” govern the NIF/NCP state performance with respect to the national economy. It was Mohamed Hashim ‘Awad, a dedicated expert on Islamic economics, however, that correctly alerted the audience in another T.V. interview to the principles of Islam in economic investment: “Islam is not against the private sector provided that the investing sector will not be allowed to monopolize the fundamental resources of life such as water, energy, and pasture.”

Interestingly, the late communist critic Kadoda reiterated some of Hashim criticisms in his discussion of the proposed Peace Budget of the government (Sudan TV: December 2004): “The budget is simply traditional because it is placed within the frame of the ongoing liberalization policies. Expectedly after 15 years of budget failures, the new budget might clearly identify the problems of implementing such policies in the whole country.”

Criticizing the budget because “it proposed 60 percent of its total expenditure to security and defense,” the opposition economist affirmed: “It would have been appropriate to propose that much money to boost agriculture and the other key production sectors. Recently, the Sudanese Union of Industries complained from the stoppage of production in a number of industries due to the high cost of electricity and the other necessary inputs of production. Has the budget considered concerns of the farmers whose union in Gedarif predicted failure of the new season most recently?”

Professor Kadoda voiced serious doubts about the budget’s lacking of real sources of spending in the regions: “True, the proposed budget might increase by billions of pounds the share of regions in the total budget. These enlarged figures, however, are due to the increased expected expenditure of the police, the judiciary, and high education. What about the new agricultural season? How much difference would the proposed increases of the budget make in the life of the ordinary citizens in the regions?”

The opposition leader criticized the escalation of unprecedented increases by the financial corruption of State money, as the Auditor General report clearly revealed: “Year after year, there have been a great number of embezzlements side by side with a growing collapse in the financial accountability of the State.”

The National Council’s chief economist Dr. Babiker al-Tom admitted the occurrence of financial corruption in the government’s agencies. “But it took place only in the chaotic companies, not in the federal ministries where tight controls have been exercised over public money.”

Still, the question lingers on and on for most of the State budget was executed by tens of key government agencies, banks and business departments, in addition to the provincial administrations where hundreds of ministers, governors, and other government leaderships dictated the ruling party’s monopolies over national and regional finances.

This situation might also be linked to the erupting crises in Darfur and Eastern Sudan, as well as the new rebellion in the Northern provinces whose rebels claimed serious occurrences of financial and administrative corruption in multiple forms by government officials.

Babiker assured the audience that the high proposed expenditure of the security and police departments “is due to the State plan to strengthen the peace process and be prepared for all changes.” Ironically, the huge funds allocated to security operations never secured the people’s lives or property, as is clearly indicated by the unabated losses in the lives and property of the displaced people of Darfur and other areas of conflict.

The government’s top parliamentary economist mentioned that, “the new budget will be operated with real resources. The liberalization policy of the State has successfully depressed the inflation rate, increased the revenue, and is now generating investments and sufficient loans. Liberalization is a global fact, and we are determined to run its programs with good controls and efficient organization.”

WARRING “PEACE BUDGETS”: Whose judgment really counts in assessing whether the liberalization policy of the NIF/NCP reformed the country, or that it has simply added to the Nation’s financial crisis (more than 18 billions foreign debts, high levels of unemployment, inflation, unproductive spending, and corruption)?

Have the government’s warring “peace budgets” been addressed to the urgent needs of the regions, including the South and DarFur, to settle the displaced population, establish democratic regional and central structures, and boost productivity in the agricultural and industrial sectors?

Under the NIF/NCP rule, the Index of Economic Freedom (2008) finds that “Most of Sudan’s economic freedom cannot be graded because of the violence and genocide that have wracked the country in recent years.” Still, “Trade freedom, monetary freedom, and freedom from corruption are all weak in Sudan.”

Because they underdeveloped the human and material resources needed to man the agricultural and industrial programs, two decades of liberating Sudan’s heavily-indebted finances vanquished education and health.

The ruling Islamists allowed themselves to privatize most of the State’s infrastructural establishments and production units, including tanneries, textile factories, and railways. The ruling junta equally monopolized the import and the export sectors, dismissing thousands of the skilled workers and professionals and escalating the troubles of the economy with high security and defense spending for renewable wars and emergency state.

The NIF/NCP determination to stay in the seats of power, regardless of this shameless account of political failures and financial corruption, re-posits the major question:

When would the Sudanese undertake a popular uprising to end this mess?