Sudan’s fragile unity navigating landscape of armies, militias, and political centres
By Yasir Arman
For the first time since Britain’s General Kitchener’s conquest of Sudan in 1898, Khartoum has disappeared as the centre of political power, as well as exercising the command and control of a single army. Due to the policies of the National Congress Party (NCP), its Islamists, and the prolonged state violence against marginalized groups and rural areas, the military and state are no longer the sole holders of arms. The proliferation of armies and militias has become rampant.
The absence of a unified army means the absence of a unified nation. If we want one country, we must strive for one army, as there can be no development, democracy, stability, or security in a country where armies and militias outnumber its universities and hospitals!
In May 2019, following the revolution, I wrote an article asserting that the multiplicity of armies is the primary issue facing the revolution. Without addressing it, both the revolution and the state would collapse. Today, the multiplicity of armies and militias has become a matter of life and death for every citizen and threatens the very existence of the state. Only the humanitarian catastrophe, the cessation of violations, and the protection of civilians surpass this issue in importance. However, these challenges are themselves consequences of the corruption in security arrangements and the wars of armies and militias.
Today, the state has collapsed, society has disintegrated, and people have retreated from their grand aspirations to mere survival – fighting hate speech and its implications, and prioritizing natural rights such as the right to life and the right to a stay in safe homes. The primary demand of citizens is to stop the war, with their priorities being security, food, shelter, and healthcare. Every political strategy must be built on addressing people’s needs, safeguarding their interests, and fulfilling their demands.
Humanitarian relief must precede politics, and the humanitarian process must take precedence over the political process – it is, in fact, the gateway to it. The search for the right to life must come before the pursuit of power. All this can only be achieved through an integrated and comprehensive approach that begins with addressing the citizen’s concerns and ensuring their protection and ends with completing the revolution and rebuilding the state. The political process must focus first on ending the war in order to address its causes, foremost among them being the multiplicity of armies and militias.
1. The Multiplicity of Political Centers:
New political and geographical centers have emerged, alongside old ones, some of which are large and have inherited elements of the state and its former central authority. Others express regional or ethnic aspirations in the absence of Khartoum. In reality, Sudan today consists of multiple centers – Port Sudan, Nyala or El Daein, Nierteti, and Kauda, to name a few. Who knows what the future holds?
2. The Unity of the Civilian Forces – The Absent Yet Present Center:
The absent yet present center is the one that represents the will of the people and their strong desire for change – December’s revolutionary center. Its geographical seat and capital is the betrayed Sit-in Square at the heart of Khartoum, but it also resides in the heart of every revolutionary, every person with a living conscience. This centre encompasses the largest and most diverse mass movement, representing Sudan’s social, geographic, political, and cultural diversity.
It is an extension of Sudan’s long-standing revolutionary legacy in both rural and urban areas, dating back to the 1924 revolution. This centre is a century old and aspires to build a new Sudan. Just as Syrians today speak of a “new Syria,” this center, born from the Republic of the Tunnel and Sit-in Square during the December revolution before it was crushed by the military, will emerge from the shadows of war. The future will prove that the revolution is more enduring than war.
The unity of this civil revolutionary center across rural and urban areas is the guarantee of Sudan’s social fabric, the unity of its people, and the unity of the country itself. All civilian revolutionary forces must organize into an anti-war front to restore the balance of power against the proliferation of armies and militias. They must not align themselves with the armed factions but instead reject war, guided by the illuminating book of the revolution. Fragmentation within these forces will only prolong the war and lead to fragile solutions.
We must have one professional army that ends the era of multiple armies and militias and ushers in an era of acceptance of political, social, and cultural diversity as the sole currency. We must rebuild a new Khartoum as a centre that respects the will of Sudan’s diverse components and regions, based on an unbreakable unity built on free will, equal citizenship, a democratic system, social justice, and a new constitutional framework.
3. Revolutionary Forces Are Not a Masking Paint for Power-Sharing Solutions:
Taking from their own catalogue and playbook, regional and global actors often resort to quick-fix solutions to war, prioritizing power-sharing agreements between warring parties. Given that Sudan’s war arises in the context of a revolution and the regional and international community’s commitment to restoring civilian democratic rule, these quick-fix solutions risk using the revolutionary forces as masks for power-sharing agreements. The fragmentation of revolutionary forces could – but should not – be used as a pretext for such superficial solutions. And when paint is insufficient, even a bit of alignment with pro-war groups might be employed.
The unity of revolutionary forces is the key to preventing fragile solutions and achieving sustainable ones. This unity ensures that civilians are not merely symbolic tokens in power-sharing agreements but instead form the basis for genuine transformation.