America Partnership in Sudan

By Steve Paterno

April 10, 2009 — For United States, allies and partners are central in advancing American foreign policies. These allies and partners are spread throughout the world in many different sheds and forms. They don’t matter so long they serve American interest, whether in mutually beneficial way for all the involved parties or restrictedly serving only American interest. In its history, America never wavered for its thirst to search for allies and partners around the globe. In the process, America even switches these types of relationships; scales down or up, dumps some, and picks others along the way, depending on favorable conditions that serve the country’s interest at a given period in time.

In the case of Sudan, America plays its role and intimately projects it quest for partnership by and large. In the recent years, as being opposed to a dictatorial Islamic government in Khartoum with ties to Islamic terrorism, American took stand and opted for the Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), the then rebel armed group opposed to Khartoum as its partner. By 2002, the US Congress passed into law the “Sudan Peace Act,” a legislation to punish the regime in Khartoum and reward the SPLM/A, which is fighting for the rights of the marginalized people of Sudan. The act seeks to impose arm embargo against Khartoum, denies Khartoum access to global finances, and limits Khartoum diplomatic influence and reach to the US, the UN and others. It authorizes the use of millions of US dollars in areas under SPLM/A control and promises direct future support to the SPLM/A war efforts against Khartoum in case Khartoum rejected to negotiate in good faith and unable to reach a peaceful settlement with the SPLM/A. This act was a leverage used by the US in pressuring the National Congress Party (NCP) of Khartoum to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with SPLM/A in 2005. If anything, the act solidified the US-SPLM/A relationship.

As the peace effort was on its successful conclusion, America under President George W. Bush was very enthusiastic with the prospect of its partnership with SPLM/A. It even proposed to host the signing ceremony of the CPA in Washington, D.C. The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which the agreement was sponsored under its auspicious was offended by such proposal and rejected it. Otherwise, the US would have stolen the limelight associated with the CPA as an international partner who helped in the peace process.

At any rate, despite losing to steal the limelight, the Americans were still highly expectant that the SPLM/A will be able to change many things once in Khartoum when sharing power with the Islamic regime there. They could not be more wrong. After the signing of the CPA, it took seven long months before the partners to the agreement formed a unity government. Then, as things began to move, only two weeks after being sworn in as the Vice President of Sudan in Khartoum for the new coalition government, the leader of SPLM/A, John Garang was killed in a tragic helicopter crash. As such, violence ensued, chaos erupted, and there was a sense of lost of directions both within the country and outside. Despite all these, the SPLM/A was able to survive, though emerging out badly divided, but under one leader, Cdr. Salva Kiir who became the chairman of the SPLM/A by virtue of being deputy to the departed leader of the movement.

Notwithstanding the hitch, the US was still convinced that SPLM/A was its best partner out there. The US followed through by extending several of invitations to Cdr. Kiir, (who automatically became the Vice President of Sudan in Khartoum and President of South Sudan in Juba), to visit Washington so as to symbolize the commitments of US-SPLM/A relationship. Then, in the turn of events, the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region took center stage in the globe. The conflict became front page news and the focus of advocacy groups as well as the major humanitarian concern of the world. The American government has no choice, but to shift its priority in Sudan and made Darfur the focus of its policies. It was here that the US-SPLM/A relationship is put into serious test.

The US long term goal is to achieve a sustainable and durable peace in Darfur. It expected the SPLM/A to help in this peace process. The first US-SPLM/A joint effort to make peace in Darfur was in the infamous failed Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006, which took place in Abuja, Nigeria. The SPLM/A went to the peace, portraying itself as experienced and well positioned to help the Darfuri movements negotiate a better settlement with Khartoum. However, in reality, some members of SPLM/A peace delegations were in collusion with the NCP. Instead of negotiating, they attempted bribing the members of Darfuri movements to sign the agreement with Khartoum, regardless of its content. The American delegations were not any better either, but bullies who wanted the peace to be signed, not on the terms of the parties involved, but on the Americans’ own terms. As a result, the entire peace process collapsed. One of the Darfuri movements, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction of Mini Minawi was the only one convinced to sign the final peace deal. The agreement died the very moment it was signed. Those who involved in it withdrew in haste.

Well, the Americans realized their abortive effort. Though doing less on its part, the America exerted pressure on the SPLM/A to do more. Habitually, it seemed like the SPLM/A was not any more on the side of US on the Darfur issues. The worst of it was when the Sudanese foreign Minister, Lam Akol, and the Sudanese Charge d’Affaires in the US, John Ukech (both represented SPLM/A in the government of Khartoum), were making damaging statements against the US effort in Darfur at the world stage. For the last time in 2007, the US summoned in SPLM/A chairman, Salva Kiir to report to Washington. He was offered a head of state reception treat. He had the privilege of the US Secret Service protections and driven in full-blown-out sirens around Washington for him to gain the sense of being an important leader. In return, the US requested Kiir to work hard for peace in Darfur, and specifically bring together the Darfuri movements around a unified negotiating position.

Kiir took the initiative, but faltered badly. Instead of dealing with the major Darfuri movements in pragmatic way, the SPLM/A started haphazardly pick-on some key leaders and selected several individuals from within Darfuri movements and took them to Juba, and then declared that they united the Darfur movements. Since then, the SPLM/A has completely lost credibility among the Darfuri movements. First, the SPLM/A is resented by the Darfuri movements for having involved in fragmenting the movements further. More damaging, the SPLM/A is implicated in the Darfuri movements internal conflicts, which resulted into deaths of some of the Darfuri military leaders. Secondly, the Darfuri movements see no any incentive for negotiations with Khartoum because the peace agreement Khartoum negotiated with SPLM/A is not being fully implemented.

At the moment, the US sees the SPLM/A as a dispensable ally with little credibility left. The SPLM/A on its part, is not doing anything positive to gain acceptance for continuity of this long developed mutual partnership that is at the verge of collapse. Recent events clearly signal that the relationship is at snapping point. Earlier this year, Salva Kiir, the chairman of SPLM/A, in a bizarre move led a delegation of more than thirty entourage included ministers and other dignitaries to visit Washington and bid farewell to the outgoing US President George W. Bush. Perhaps, it did not occur to him that one does not mend relationship with the outgoing president, but build relationship with the incoming president. Anyway, at the time, the US incoming President, Barack Obama, showed no enthusiasm in meeting Kiir. Matter of fact, President Obama rejected to meet with Kiir—remember the phrase there is only “one president at a time.” After spending thousands of US dollars and great amount of time for the long trip, Kiir and the entourage went back home empty handed. The event, which would have cost a couple of cents for mailing farewell letter to President Bush did not only ended-up a fiasco with many ministers running around on the same trip and literally bumping into each other, but it eventually cost the poor people of South Sudan their fortunes in terms of dollars.

With no learning curve, the SPLM/A, nevertheless sent another delegation to Washington. This time, the delegation was led by the SPLM Secretary General, Pagan Amum. Reminiscent of the preceding delegation, this one too failed to remotely achieve any of its objectives. First, the delegation was sent to catch-up with US envoy to Sudan, Scott Gration as he was already traveling to Sudan on a high profile fact finding mission. The best and ideal place to catch up with the envoy would have been Sudan where he traveled to. However, this seems to have not made any common sense to the SPLM/A leadership. Secondly, the delegation wanted to talk on the indictment by International Criminal Court (ICC) of President of Khartoum Omar al-Bashir, but the Americans are not ready to talk on that issue. The US left it for the SPLM/A to talk about it within their party since the leaders of SPLM/A are on record contradicting themselves on the issue. The delegation also failed to convince the US to assist them with finance to run the autonomous government of South Sudan. The SPLM/A led government of South Sudan have blown its budget of more than seven billions for the last four years through pandemic corruptions, deliberate mismanagement, dysfunctional institutions and poor governance. The efforts to curb corruption are not put in place. There are no ways for which the government of South Sudan can generate its own sustained revenues since capacities of the relevant government instructions are not strengthened, but instead are completely ignored. Therefore, the US saw all these beyond its control, hence decided not to help financially.

American number one priority in Sudan, as of now, is to get the humanitarian situation in Darfur under control by bringing back the NGOs, which were thrown out of the country by Khartoum or having the gap left by these NGOs filled. The US clearly showed no attention in dealing with SPLM/A at present due to the fact that the SPLM/A has proved to be ineffective partner regarding the current US policies and the party is even incapable to run its own affairs in South Sudan. The US currently is searching for a partner in Sudan. The mission of US envoy to Sudan is to exactly do that, which he describes as a learning experience from all the stakeholders and a search for opportunities to build relationship. Though in desperation, the NCP is also in the run to winning a partnership deal with the US. The NCP seems to understand what is at stake as Nafie Ali Nafie; a top official of NCP approach to the US envoy to Sudan demonstrated their stand by portraying the NCP as the only viable party that the US can deal with. So, if the US priority is to get the NGOs back to Darfur, it has no choice but to deal directly with the NCP though as evil as it is. As to how long or intimate the two will be involved, it remains to be seen. Any move of direct negotiation between the NCP and the US is clearly a slap in SPLM/A face and a real setback to US-SPLM/A long relationship. However, everything will entirely depend on the recommendations of the US envoy to its government upon his return to Washington on which party will be a better partner for US to work with among the competing interest groups in Sudan. One would hope the envoy got some good impressions from his trip.

*Steve Paterno is the author of The Rev. Fr. Saturnino Lohure, A Roman Catholic Priest Turned Rebel. He can be reached at [email protected]