Abyei, the results of Arbitration

By Julie Kuol

April 5, 2009 — In the next few days the Permanent Court of Arbitration will hear the arguments between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement over the status of the disputed area of Abyei. Abyei, on the border between north and south Sudan is the historic homeland of the Ngok Dinka people. It was a major conflict area in over 20 years of civil war. Both sides recognised that resolution of the Abyei question is a key part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed by the SPLM/A and GoS in December 2004.

Anyone who has been watching the Abyei dispute can see what will happen next. It is just like watching cows going to the water hole. The future direction is obvious from the direct and definite path that events have followed until now. The results of the arbitration are predictable. Each result follows on from the one before it.

Firstly the Court of Arbitration will dismiss the argument of the Government of Sudan (which contradicts the principles it agreed to in the Abyei Protocol). The Court will support the Abyei Boundary Commission report of 2005 by the independent experts. This set the boundaries of Abyei area some distance to the north of Abyei town, not south of the river Kiir/Bahr el Arab! The Court will order that the Abyei Protocol that was agreed by vice-president Osman Taha and Dr. John Garang in 2004 will be implemented mostly as its architects intended. There will be support for Misseriya grazing rights as stated in the Abyei protocol. The land of the Ngok Dinka will be allocated to the region in which are its cultural and ethnic and economic roots. The inhabitants of Abyei will rejoice. For a short while.

The second result is also obvious. It is the direct consequence of the first. The Government of Sudan will refuse to accept the court’s decision. Omar Al-Bashir will actually use the words “they can immerse their judgement in water and drink it”. History will be repeated until Sudan falls apart. The GoS has not yet kept any promise or principle over Abyei that it has signed. In the Abyei Protocol of 2004 it agreed that the Presidency would set up the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the Abyei area. It made the commitment that on “presentation of the final report, the Presidency shall take necessary action to put the special administrative status of Abyei Area into immediate effect.” In reality as soon as the ABC report was published el-Bashir reneged on the commitment to implement it. There followed a 3 year failure to provide any administration for Abyei. Finally the Presidency agreed to refer the Abyei dispute to international arbitration after the utter destruction of Abyei town in 2008 by Sudan Armed Forces Brigade 31 and militia. The Presidency promised to cover the costs of arbitration according to an agreement with SPLM/A. However, it was recently reported that the Presidency will no longer pay for arbitration which they will lose. Consequently the conflict over Abyei will continue for years to come, with periodic violent disturbance by Khartoum’s proxy militias. Eventually Abyei will be depopulated and there will be frequent clashes between north and south military. It is unlikely that the African Union, the Arab League, or any other international agency will persuade Al-Bashir to hold back from this profoundly risky step that endangers regional stability.

How will the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement, the Government of South Sudan, respond to this? They will try to negotiate a further solution. They will continue to do all in their power to support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement rather than return to war. Their choices are limited. The SPLA is not the force it was 5 years ago. Neither is the SPLM. Rumours of corruption have disillusioned many who used to have hope. There is an impression that South Sudan has lost too much energy and too many ideals in the past four years. Maybe it seems easier to put up with injustice than to rise up against it. That is the price of peace. In this respect the policy of the Government of National Unity is clear. It is to progressively weaken and then collapse each plank of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Al-Bashir will keep renegotiating (reneging) agreements until he gets the result he wants.

The fourth result is that many in South Sudan will now agree with the recent words of the secretary general of the SPLM. Pagan Amum said that he will vote for unity with the north in the referendum, if certain key conditions are met. These key conditions are the fundamental points of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. They include the revision of the security laws, freedom of the press and political expression, equitable sharing of oil revenues, the resolution of the 3 conflict areas. It is virtually certain that these key conditions will never be met by the Government of Sudan. All the issues listed by Pagan Amum are those that Khartoum has had four years to resolve. In four years it has done very little. Now time is running out for Khartoum. It will be unable to resolve the conditions listed by Pagan Amum in the remaining months before the referendum. In the referendum the majority in the south will vote for secession because the north cannot be trusted. The Naivasha agreement will fall into the same hole as the Addis Ababa agreement. The act of secession will be later than currently imagined because the Government of Sudan will resort to all kinds of delaying tactics. But secession will take place and, however delayed, it is inevitable. The independent South Sudan will be created at the end of the direct chain of results that started with Al-Bashir’s failure to keep the promises of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

The fifth result is that Al-Bashir will go down in history as the last ever President of a unitary Sudan.

The author is a Sudanese based in UK