Rough road towards democratic transition in Sudan

By Deng Yiech Bachech Deng

April 20, 2009 — In today’s African politics, democratic transitions from military regimes to democratically elected regimes have been a success in various Sub-Sahara African countries, but rough in some. In this democratic process, the Sudan, however, still has a long way to go. Since its independence in 1956 from British rule, Sudan has been subjected to a series of less powerful and short-lived eight (8) elected coalition governments and seven (7) powerful and long-lived military regimes (Kamal Osman Salih, “The Sudan, 1985-89: The Fading Democracy” in Sudan After Nimeri, 1991 by Peter Woodward).

Generally, military regimes stay longer in power than civilian regimes—consider Nimeri and Beshir governments. It’s believed that the whole political situations that often lead the military to intervene are the failures of the elected regimes to successfully resolve major crises facing the country. That the elected governments often failed because of patronage politics, intra-and inter-party rivalry and corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, which caused the longest civil war in Africa (1955-2005). Also the reasons military officers have ruled the country since independence have something to do with its history. Though military rules have been brutal, they sometimes provide order and some economic growth. I am not in any way saying military regimes are okay. I am merely weighing democratic civil disorder and justice versus authoritarian order and injustice. Each has its own deficiencies and merits for the existence of a nation. This is why I am here to examine them.

In this short summary of Sudan’s political history in attempt to forge a stable democracy, I will describe and analyze some political situations and summarize specific, but brief, events in light current political developments. What prompts me to embark on this task is because Sudanese are thirty for democratic transformation of the country but the road towards smooth and effective democratic transition has always been tough and tragic.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL HISTORY AND CULTURAL MIX

Sudan is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and racial country with over sixty (60) or more ethnic groups and 600 hundred tribes speaking over 100 languages and 600 hundred dialects. Within this diverse categories, the peoples of Sudan are yet divided into two (2) major ethno-geographical groupings—the Arabs in the North and Africans in the South, despite the fact that there still exists a good number of Africans living in the West (Darfur) and East (Beja and Funj) but they consider themselves Arabs due to Islamization and intermarriage process.

Because of the existence of racial, cultural, linguistic, traditional and religious differences between the groups, as well as political and economical marginalization of the other, these differences facilitated mistrust and suspicion. More so, the country’s geographic/cultural affinity with and proximity to the Middle East plays a great role, presumably, in this pessimistic stance. Nonetheless, it would be misleading for one to assume that Sudan is not ready for democratic transition due to its complex history.

I can now attempt to examine both challenges and prospects of the Sudan’s political strides towards democracy as far as national elections in 2010, SPLM’s hesitant to show interests in contesting in presidential election, 2011 referendum, ICC arrest warrants against President Beshir, Islamic fundamentalism, political factionalism, corruption, and tribalism, are concerned. So let’s look at Sudan’s future while reflecting on its present and past records as a nation-state.

In 1956 Sudan was declared a sovereign country without the consent of the Southerners. And subsequently, Northerners became economically and politically well off and influential, and thus dominated every aspect of social life in the country (O’Balance Edgar, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972). Religious and racial sentiments, discriminations, prejudices, and stereotypes against non-Muslims were commonplace. Thus such ill-practices provoked Torit Mutiny in August 1955 by Southerners who feared and disregarded discriminations. The mutineers resorted to killing Arab merchants and soldiers in South Sudan and that incident became the beginning of a long war between South and North. It’s an indisputable reality that racial differences may be the root causes of the problems which beset the Sudan for years, on one hand and it would also be implausible to assume that multiracialism could have caused the state of intolerance and disharmony. Robert E. Park, in Edgar’s The Secret War in the Sudan, points out that racial problem can exist unless there is “a consciousness of individuals to differences between their racial groups , and this consciousness is almost invariably provoked by the ruling race which the monopoly of power.” Indeed, most politicians in Sudan had used neo-patrimonial strategies to appeal to religious and ethnic sentiments to pursue their personal interests. Because religion and ethnicity becomes politicized, many Sudanese leaders, mainly Muslims, have continually used Islam as a source of influence and power.

NIMERI ERA (1969-1985)

However, things worsened when Islamic Law (or Sharia) was introduced in September 1983 by the former Sudanese president Jaffar M. Nimeri. Non-Muslims were furious and demanded the elimination of any legal code constituting any elements of Sharia law, but the majority of Muslim officials refused. Muslims felt that the Islamization of the country’s legal system was correct because Sudan deserved to be an Islamic state—whereby Hassan el-Turabi was the defender of this claim. However, some moderate Muslims and all non-Muslims claimed “they [radical Islamists] did not follow Sunnah traditions and its sources of positive rights, and violated complete equality of all citizens and guarantees of their rights without distinctions of color or religion” (Jean Francois Rynx, The Islamization of Law as a Political Stake in Sudan, In Peter Woodward, 1991, pp. 141). This imposition of Sharia law has been controversial and problematic in the country since the time it was introduced in 1983. Although the second civil war that erupted in May 1983 occurred before the imposition of Sharia at the time, sharing of national resources and power contributed largely to the conflict.

Nimeri, a pragmatic personality and military dictator, came to power in 1969 through a military coup. He ousted a democratically elected Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi (democratic however in Sudan’s context). Nimeri then made both radical economic and political reform policies (Peter Woodward, 1991). For him to get financial supports from Arab World as the conflict between Israeli-Arabs ended in 1967, he championed a strong diplomatic relations with the Arabs and the former Soviet Union (USSR) as well. Remember that this was a Cold War period. So he started nationalizing all sectors of economy through nationalization programs. He expelled Western corporations and replaced them with the USSR and its Eastern bloc corporations and technocrats.

In political front, he made all political parties illegal, except the Sudanese Communist Party which declared its political support to his regime. However, he later changed the course when members of the Community party in the Revolutionary Command Council, who brought him to power, attempted a coup against him in July 1971. He responded aggressively by killing those involved in the failed coup and revoked the Communist party, and then he orchestrated a flawed election—in a presidential referendum—in which there were no other opposition candidates. He became a constitutional president and not a military leader anymore. Then amidst political turmoil and economic crisis, he intelligently abandoned ties with the USSR and sought friendship with the West. (This was why the West didn’t support the Southern rebels). But the commercial bourgeoisie whose economic situations were severed by the nationalization policies and whose political influence were significant wanted to destroy Nimeri’s regime. As a pragmatic leader, he eventually made a political U-turn and re-liberalized the economy by privatizing big corporations and selling off of state assets to private business individuals.

These new laissez faire policies of J. Nimeri attracted Western governments, particularly the US and Britain. The Ronald Reagan’s and M. Thatcher’s governments wanted to rescue Nimeri regime’s exigent economic crisis, but the Islamic fundamentalists, spearheaded by Turabi, on the other hand, threatened to overthrow the government if it cooperated with the West by mobilizing tribal and religious leaders, merchants, trade unions and professional organizations. Knowing that those groups had strong influences politically, socially and economically, he had to make some calculated political concessions with them. Conversely, these events happened only in the north and other parts of the country such as in the south still entangled by the civil war that needed settlement. Ironically though, to put an end to those diverse and conflict issues, he had to make great efforts.

First, to consolidate his power he must solve southern problem for the southern populace to be the base of his power since he lost strategic political grounds in the north. Second, to persuade the Islamic extremists to join in, because were they influential forces politically and economically since they had support from the Arab countries. Nonetheless, Nimeri in the process made wrong calculations opposed by Islamic radicals but desired by the Southerners. In March 1972 he signed a peace agreement in Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, with Southern rebels known as Anya-Nya I. The Islamists were against that peace deal but Nimeri opted to implement both peace and Islamist agenda simultaneously. For him to rally support from the north he introduced Sharia (or commonly refer to as September Laws) and made it a mandatory, universal law that could be applied on/to all citizens in disregards of their diverse religious backgrounds. The Sharia Law was put into effect because the parliament was dominated by the Islamists.
In the middle of serious tensions over constitutional reforms, economic and political deterioration, many civil and business organizations engaged in endless riots, strikes and demonstrations countrywide (Sudan News Agency, May 1986). The Nimeri sensed the demise of his regime and left for Washington on March 27, 1985 in disguise to seek medical treatment. That was the end of his era. In the aftermaths, many people were arrested and 18 people reported killed by the riot police. Then Sudanese Army Chief-in-Command, General Abdul Rahman Swar el-Dahab took control as head of Transitional Military Council on April 6, 1985 along with professional civil servants who participated in the toppling of Nimeri government. The new provisional government arrested several of Nimeri Cabinet ministers and cronies; released political prisoners; lifted ban on political freedoms and press; and finally restored food price subsidies. The opportunity for democratic transition was at glance.

MULTIPARTY SYSTEM’S RETURN

The new military government of General Swar el-Dahab introduced liberal form of governance and promised the public that it would hand over power to an elected civilian government after a year of transitional period (Peter Woodward, 1991). The date of the national elections was scheduled for April 1, 1986. The multiparty system returned. By then many political parties were formed to contest for next elections. And about 29 political parties were officially registered ranging from those with revolutionary socialist inclination to Islamic ideology.
The dominant political parties that contested the 1986 elections were:

– The Ummah Party: backed by Anzar religious sectarian group was led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was overthrown from power in 1966
– The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP): was led by Mohammed al-Mirgani
– The National Islamic Front (NIF): an Islamic fundamentalist party composed of Muslim Brotherhoods led by Dr. Hassan el-Turabi
– The Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). Dominated by communist outfits led by Ibrahim Nagud. This party was considered the largest and well-organized community party in Africa and the Middle East until Nimeri purged it because of abortive coup in 1971
– The Sudan African National Union(SANU): the oldest southern political party led by Paul Hillary Logali
– The Sudanese Nationalist Party (SNP): Led by rev. Philip Ghaboush
– The Sudan African Congress (SAC): Led by then political science lecture at the University of Khartoum, Kunijork Ayoker
– The Sudanese People’s Socialist Front Revolutionary Committee (SPSFRC): led by Abdullah Zakaria, a prominent politician rumored to be the co-author of Libyan president Colonel Qadhafi’s Green Book.
Certainly, the Traditional Military Council regime of General Swar el-Dahab honored its promised and allowed general elections to take place as scheduled for April 1986. It was for the first time Sudanese participated in popularly contested elections in history, although vote turnouts were low due to the ongoing civil war. Elections were held however only in most northern state constituencies. Like in many African countries, people voted along ethnic and religious lines; and the election results showed how divided the country was.

The Ummah party drew its support from the West (Darfur) and the Centre, mostly in areas inhabited by Sunni Muslims and therefore won the elections overwhelmingly with more than one third (1/3) of 99 seats out of 301 seats in the parliament. The DUP came second with 63 seats; the NIF came third with 51 seats; SANU came fourth with 11 seats; the coalition of South Sudanese parties with 9 seats; independents with 7 seats, the Beja Congress which drew its support from the Eastern region with 3, Sudan Federal Party (SFP) with 1; SAC with 1, and undeclared southern constituencies with 4. Because the elections were held only in 37 constituencies throughout the country due to civil war situation, about 65 seats were reserved for Southerners, university and college graduates (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1986). Shortly afterward, Sadiq el-Mahdi was sworn in as new Prime Minister of the Sudan for the second time.

Judging from the election results, the parties that controlled the parliament hailed from the northern urban areas and Khartoum city, which were the strongholds of the Arab majority. Secondly, their victory demonstrated their financial influence. Another problem was the politics of Africa’s recycling of elites and ‘name recognition’ worked well in Sudanese case. Sadiq, al-Mirgani, and Turabi dominated politics of the country because of their family backgrounds. Both Sadiq and al-Mirgani come from 2 families with deep-rooted political and religious influence among Sunni Muslim community in the north and so does Turabi with his Islamic ideological influence among the youths in universities and colleges. So the failure of other parties to garner enough votes was largely due to financial constraints, social status, ethnic and religious inclinations, especially for those from peripheral regions.

On the contrary, the 1986 general elections never changed the historical and political dynamics for the better in the whole country. War still wreaked havoc in the south. Political party rivalries, factionalism and corruption persisted in an unprecedented scale. The economy was in bad shape. So it seemed multiparty system could not work in a country so divided and polarized by social, religious and ideological differences as ministers and parliamentarians could not agree on significant issues facing the country including, but not limited to, drafting a new penal code to replace Sharia Law, International Monetary Funds’ (IMF) hesitant to remit inherited debts, and ultimately the Southern Question remained unresolved. One Sudanese newspaper, AL Sudan, described the situation like this:

“It was utterly disappointing to see the parties quarrelling on how to divide the political cake…We thought that the parties would learn from their former mistakes but the current events have proved otherwise. We were under the impression that the parties would be guided by the public interest in their efforts to form a government. But that impression is wrong. What we sense is a partisan outlook that dominates the whole political game. No efforts have been made to launch concrete programmes and policies. Unfortunately, efforts have been dedicated to promoting personal and partisan interests. It seems our parties never learn from the past mistakes.”

At the end of the day, as the newly elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi could not solve problems facing the country, the military regime had to intervene. For example, economic crisis continued to escalate, the SPLA in the South persisted in fiercely attacking major towns, roads, and bridges made the South of the country a no-go area. The Prime Minister with Ummah Party had attempted to make peace with the rebels—a peace negotiation was convened in March 1986 in Koka Dam in Ethiopia. The references of agreement include “the freezing of the September Laws [Sharia], the lifting of the state of emergency, a cease fire, and a preparation for national constitutional government” of which most people in the country supported (John Obert, Sudan: State and Society in Crisis). But Turabi, who was then the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General refused the peace deal, along with al-Mirgani of the DUP. The NIF and DUP also “threatened to opt out of the government” if the Ummah party persisted. It was a political fiasco. On tactical move, the NIF and DUP declared their own peace deal with late Dr. Garang, the leader of the SPLA/M on November 16, 1988 in Koka Dam too. On February, 1989 the military in collaboration with the NIF and DUP gave the Prime Minister Sadiq an ultimatum to either adopt the peace deal sponsored by the DUP with the SPLM or equip the army to their teeth to wipe out the SPLA/M forcefully and completely. Sadiq opted for the former; however, in the process the NIF agents, while hampering any review of the constitution and making devious peace deals with the rebels, secretly cooperated with the military officers and the government was overthrown through a coup d’état on June 30, 1989. Then the incumbent General M. H. el-Beshir became the president of the Republic of Sudan. The multiparty system was now pronounced dead and the one-party system reintroduced. The NIF became the sole political party until it fragmented into National Congress Party (NCP) of Beshir and Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Turabi when political marriage between the two ended in 2000. Although it’s legal for other parties to operate and criticize the government as we can see now, such parties enjoy negligible freedoms of expression, press or association. Harassments and intimidations of other parties’ members were the norms.

THE CURRENT QUASI-MULTIPARTY SYSTEM

With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, 2005), the NCP and SPLM are the only parties with real power and influence, even though we have so many parties participating in the government of national unity. While the current political climate seems conducive at least for now in Sudan and democratic transition is on the horizon and appears promising, it’s difficult to predict what future holds. However, we can now discern the trends and issues surrounding Sudan’s political history. The president of the country is internationally a wanted man, or call him a fugitive, and he’s going to contest in February 2010 general elections; full implementation of the CPA remains murky; the simmering war in Darfur is another issue to reckon with; internal political bickering and potential fragmentation of the SPLM party coupled with incompetent, corruption, nepotism, insecurity, tribalism and many other isms are threatening SPLM viability and legitimacy in the eye of the marginalized mass to win the countrywide elections.

Conclusion

Any way, the United States now grants $25 million US dollars to Sudan to support the democratic transition through a fair, free and transparent election in 2011 (Sudan Tribune, April 20, 2009). I am personally pessimistic because a country complicated by religious and identity crisis that makes a smooth democratic transition even more uncertain. The only solutions that will determine positive transitions are citizens’ change of attitudes towards each other and to begin to treat and value themselves as one people; effective implementation and enforcement of the rule of law; competitive and fair elections where all political parties are guaranteed free access to media and expression of their opinions and platforms, respect for and protection of human rights, political and individual liberties.

The author holds a BA Honors in Political Science (University of Saskatchewan) and Masters of Science student in Sustainable Energy Development (University of Calgary), Canada. He can be reached at [email protected]

Cited References:
– Ayubi, Nazih, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: Routledge, 1991)
– Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan al-Turabi and the Islamic State, 1989-2000 (Brill Leiden: The Netherlands, 2003).
– Cowen, Michael and Liisa Laakso, eds., Multiparty Elections in Africa (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
– Edgar, O’Balance, The Secret in the Sudan: 1955-1972 (London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1977).
Garang, John M., The Call for Democracy in Sudan, edited and introduced by Mansour Khalid (New York: Kegan Paul International, 1992).
– Obert, John, Sudan: State and Society in Crisis.
– Rynx, Jean Francois, “The Islamization of Law as a Political Stake in Sudan” in Peter Woodward’s Sudan After Nimeri.
– Sudan News Agency (May, 1986).
– Sudan Tribune (April 20, 2009) www.sudantribune.com
– The Economist Intelligence Unit (London, 1986).
– Woodward, Peter, Sudan After Nimeri (London: Routledge, 1991).