Let’s not forget Darfur: Prospects for peace
By Nasredeen Abdulbari
September 10, 2009 — The situation in Darfur as it stands now illustrates that the international community, including the African Union (AU), civil society organizations and religious groups—whether they are Sudanese or African– could not make the breakthrough that many circles in Africa and across the world expected of such organizations and groups. The continuously deteriorating humanitarian, security, and political situations unequivocally show that. Despite the inauspicious situation, making peace in Darfur is possible if the Sudanese parties as well as the international community follow the right track. Peace has always been a difficult thing to make. Through constant support and continuous efforts, difficult things can become easy and achievable.
THE POLITICAL SITUATION
In 2003, the year when two Darfurian rebel organizations, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) declared war against the government of Sudan, there was not as much political division and complication in Darfur as it is today. In fact, there were only three parties to the conflict, the SLM, JEM, and the government of Sudan. Today, there are at least three SLM factions that still fight the government, four that have signed the failed Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), two JEM factions that still fight the government, and at least one that joined the DPA. Indeed, there were and are other opposition political organizations in the region that, with different rates, contribute to the conflict in the region positively as well as negatively. The most important of these organizations are the Umma Party, led by Sadiq Almahdi, and the Popular Congress, led by Hassan Alturabi, and indeed the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) that is now ruling the Southern part of the country.
The various Darfur rebel movements agree on the cause of the struggle in general, i.e., that the region has been marginalized by the different Khartoum-based governments and that Darfur should be represented in the central government and given more regional powers. Even the DPA signatories agree with the still-fighting political and military organizations in Darfur on the demands.
The political scene has gotten more complicated in the aftermath of the Darfur Peace Agreement conclusion. It divided the region which was already fragmented and made some movements that are now parts of the National Unity Government oppose any new agreement that might deprive them of the positions they are occupying. The DPA has created the Darfur Transitional Regional Authority. It also states that the people of Darfur shall decide before 2010 whether they want Darfur to remain with three states under a federal system or opt out for a regional authority with a regional government. Today, the rebel movements and most of the components of the Darfur community ask for more participation in the national government and certain powers at the regional government. Those demands can be summarized as follows:
I. One region with a regional government under which the three states of Darfur will work. The government rejected this demand in Abuja in 2006 and it still argues that creating one region with a regional authority would lead to the secession of the region in the future, and that if such region and authority are necessary they should be established by the referendum of 2010 as the DPA states. The rebels and some Darfurian intelligentsia argue that Darfur was a united region until the beginning of the 1990s, when the region was divided into three states, North Darfur, West Darfur, and South Darfur. Such division was not done in a referendum, why referendum is now necessary to restore the unity of the region, they wonder.
One of the strongest arguments in favor of the one region demand is that it will well-position the region in the political struggle against the central government. Given that states in Sudan are pretty weak in the face of the national government, creating a regional government in a united Darfur will give true meaning to the federal system that is applied now in Sudan.
II. In addition to the demand of one region, there are voices in Darfur that ask for two more states, east Darfur state and central Darfur or Jabbal Marra state as a substitute for or together with the one region demand. In fact, creating two new states as a substitute for the one region demand is the position of the government. From an economic perspective, creation of new states will only increase the expenses of the state governments without contributing to solving the political problems of the region. It is also believed that new states will be created on ethnic or tribal lines, which is not a good thing. The National Interim Constitution provides only for 25 states, which means that it has to be amended if new states are to be added.
III. There should be a vice president from Darfur in the Republican Palace with wide constitutional powers. The government rejected this demand during the 2006 peace negotiations in Abuja. Looking at the DPA, a compromise was made and the position of Senior Assistant to the President appeared in the Darfur Peace Agreement. Minni Minawi, the only Darfur rebel commander who signed the agreement, has been appointed in that position. Although the fourth highest person in the national government, it is widely known that Minnawi is the weakest political official in the Republican Palace. The president of Sudan directly deals with the governors of the three states of Darfur and the governors themselves show too little cooperation with him. One of the reasons in my personal perspective is that rejection of the DPA by the people of Darfur has encouraged the government not to pay a lot of attention to its implementation. Unless one has strong popular support in his region, it is very difficult for them to be politically influential in the Presidential Institution. The weakness of Minnawi has now created an unyielding conviction within the rebel movements and Darfurian political activists that a vice president position should be created and given to Darfur. It is still unclear to what extent the government is ready to make any concessions with regard to this demand. Here again, the National Interim Constitution conspicuously provides that the Presidential Institution consists of the President, the First Vice President, and the Second Vice President. The first and the third positions are, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), for the National Congress Party (NCP), while the second one is for the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). There is a need for lifting this constitutional restriction for this position to be created. The international community might also need to engage in negotiations with the SPLM to figure out the contribution the latter can make to make a peace deal possible.
VI. Given that the public service offices in Sudan are clearly dominated by men and women from certain regions of the country, many argue that 20% of the positions of the public service should be given to Darfur. The question is: will the National Congress accept this demand? An argument could be made that the occupation of civil service positions and offices should be according to objective criteria and standards, not according to political compromises. This is especially true in light of the fact that one of the demands of the vast majority of the Darfurians is that 10% of the so-called “sovereign miniseries” should go to Darfur in any future political solution. A counterargument is that in post-conflict situations, adhering to objective criteria might be detrimental to restructuring the government in favor of the disadvantaged groups. Here another argument in favor of the one region demand arises. A more independent Darfur State, which would apply its own internal civil service laws to local applicants, could help end the problem of occupying civil service offices and positions at the regional level and indirectly at the national level.
THE SECURITY SITUATION
The fragmentation of the rebel movements in the aftermath of the DPA conclusion has led to an unprecedented deterioration in the security situation. This is in addition to the chaos that has already been caused by the different parties of the conflict the most prominent of which is the barbarous Janjaweed militia. Many of the SLA and JEM factions have become robbery groups throughout the region. Speaking to people from different tribes and social groups in Nyala in mid-November in 2008, I was told that it is almost impossible to go out of the city without getting robbed. Inside Nyala, most of the international organizations have changed their cars from 4-wheel drive cars to the Korean-made Visto and Atos/z cars because the former are always the target of the hijacking groups. It is believed that the Janjaweed militia is mainly responsible for the security chaos. Its members hijack the vehicles of the international and national NGOs to prevent them from working and delivering their services to the needy.
In the recent months, the IDP camps have also witnessed a huge deterioration in the security situation. The government is determined to enforce the IDPs to leave their camps to go back to their original villages, although they are not safe. In point of fact, the IDPs have today become a political power that vehemently and constantly support the rebel leaders, especially the leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, who lives in exile in Paris, Abdulwahid Mohammed Elnur. The IDPs have politically organized themselves and are no longer by-standers. They demonstrate against any move that they see inconsistent with their demands and in many camps, they do not allow government officials or representatives to enter the camps. One of the main problems as far as the security situation is concerned is that many IDPs camps have become a sanctuary for criminals who are not IDPs but use the camps as a safe haven.
The resolution of the Security Council to deploy international-African force to Darfur was expected to solve the security problems or at least diminish the danger the civilian population of the region is facing. The force has however proved to be unable to deal with the situation. Due to various factors, the deployment process is going too slowly. Many countries are, in my personal viewpoint, pretty skeptical of the ability of the force to keep peace in light of the fact that there is not a peace agreement that reflects the demands of the various components of Darfur. That being said, reaching a concrete peace agreement is a sine qua non of stability and a first step towards peace-building.
On the other hand, it is widely said in Darfur that the African Union-United Nations force is corrupted and only looks for financial benefits without having a strong commitment to protecting the civilian population although their mandate allows them to do so. Furthermore, the troops hail from regions that suffer from the same problems as Darfur, and it is unlikely that they would be able to properly deal with the insecurity problem in the region. Theoretically speaking, since they come from regions and countries that suffered from the same problems, they should be better positioned to deal with the problem in Darfur–that is not the reality though. Over and above, there are internal problems within the hybrid force. Soldiers from Nigeria, for instance, are not ready in some of the cases to work or cooperate with their fellows from, say, Rwanda or work under their command.
Talking to human rights, religious, and political activists in Darfur about the UN-AU troops, I was a bit astonished when I was told that some members of the force strongly believe that there is a conspiracy planned and implemented against Sudan!
The problems of the UN-AU hybrid force have made many in Darfur believe that the solution to the insecurity situation is to bring non-African troops. A group of Darfurian young politicians and activists told me that the government accepted the hybrid force because it knew it would not make a difference on the ground.
THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
The most prominent aspect of the Darfur problem is the humanitarian crisis that resulted from the fight between the government of Sudan and the rebel movements, but also from the barbarous attacks by the infamous or ill-famed Janjaweed militia against the civilians. Today, there are approximately 2.7 million people populate the IDP camps and about 300000 refugees in Chad and Central Africa. Hundreds of villages have been completely wiped out. Properties of those who have become IDPs have been looted or destroyed.
The biggest problem that faces the IDPs today is that the United Nations food agency, the World Food Program (WFP) and many other relief organizations have reduced the rations basically for financial reasons. Deterioration in the security situation is also partially responsible for the reduction. The eviction of the major international relief organizations in the aftermath of the International Criminal Court indictment against President Omar Albashir has increased the problem and no one can predict the repercussions.
Besides the international organizations, it was expected that domestic and regional religious and non-religious organizations would play a significant role not only in addressing the problem in its humanitarian dimension but also in helping end the problem once and for all. Christian organizations have largely contributed to supporting the IDPs probably for their international character. Sudanese domestic organizations played too little a role for their financial and technical incapability.
As far as Islamic organizations are concerned, there is a lot to be said. Religion has not been a factor in the Darfur war. Almost all Darfurians are Sunni Muslims, but religion failed in preventing the government and the rebels from fighting. It also failed in preventing the Sudanese security forces and their allies, the Janjaweed militia, from killing and destructing the villages of the tribes that are accused by the government of supporting the rebel movements in the region. Two reasons are basically responsible for the tension between the Islamic relief organizations and the IDPs. The first is that those organizations started working under a close supervision of the Sudanese government which encouraged them to work in the region. The second is that some religious figures in Khartoum issues fatwas asking the Darfurians not to cooperate with the international relief organizations.
Early in 2003, religious men in many cities and towns in Darfur condemned the attacks against the civilians and their villages. But they were asked by the authorities not to speak about the situation. In Nyala for instance, Adam Jamaa, the mayor of Nyala at the time, invited all religious men, namely Imams, and told them that mosques are for teaching people about their religion not about politics. An Imam replied to him that Sharia prevents people from killing one another and that Muslims are required to mediate if two groups of Muslims are fighting, but Jamaa replied to him “apply your Sharia in your mosque.” Another Imam reiterated that there is an obligation on all Muslims to mediate if two Muslim groups are fighting. He was insulted by a Popular Defense Forces commander called Herika who said that the Imam was an outsider, and a bad influence. He additionally said that was the last time for that Imam in that mosque. In fact, the Imam was expelled to Khartoum where he currently lives.
Throughout the history of Sudan, Sufist sects and groups have played an instrumental role in promoting peaceful co-existence in the northern part of the country between all tribal and ethnic groups. Highly affected by African traditions and customs and distancing itself from politics, Sufism succeeded in making great contribution to making, keeping, and sustaining peace in Sudan. The problems that some religious men confronted in early 2003, however, demonstrate a need for freedom. Freedom of speech should be secured for religious men if they have to carry out their preaching message effectively. No restrictions should be imposed on them and detention should be strictly prohibited by the state and central authorities. The law might theoretically allow religious men and groups whether they are Muslim or Christian to speak out and deliver their services, but what is really needed is to prevent local and national security authorities from intervening in the work of religious sects and groups when they tell the truth and criticize the government and the Janjaweed militia.
THE WAY TO A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
Since 2003, peace has never become as important as today. When you walk on the streets in Darfur and ask people what they currently urgently need, they unsurprisingly say: peace. Is peace possible in Darfur? If yes, what does it take to make and keep it?
Many people think that in light of the current complications of the Darfur crisis, it is too difficult to believe that peace is possible in the foreseeable future. They say that the main parties of the conflict are not interested in peace and that they are not ready to make any significant concessions to reach a sustainable peace deal. My personal perspective, however, is that peace is possible if certain requirements are met. Huge efforts need to be exerted from the parties of the conflict and indeed from the international community now represented by the UN-AU joint chief mediator, Djibril Bassole.
As far as the above-mentioned requirements are concerned, I think it is appropriate to start with the preconditions of the SLA founder and Chairman, Abdulwahid ELnur, who lives in exile in Paris. His demands and preconditions are widely echoed by the IDPs and most of the Darfurian political activists in Khartoum, Darfur, and abroad. His positions are important because no peace agreement is going to work without having him on board. The DPA failed not only because it was not a solid agreement but also because it was not blessed by him.
The SLA Chairman speaks publicly about a three-step approach to achieve peace in Darfur. According to this approach, peace could be achieved in Darfur through: conflict suspension, which means that violence should be stopped in Darfur; conflict resolution, which leads to peace negotiations; and conflict transformation, which is peace agreement implementation and sustainable development in Darfur. In the words of the SLA leader:
“…To make the long story short, any negotiations will aim to end conflict. This “end” may take many forms, and we in our movement (SLM), perceive it in three levels. First, we believe that the negotiations should start with the CONFLICET SUSPENSION which is to stop the killing of our people and protect them from Khartoum genociders. Second, CONFLICT RESOLUTION (negotiations) with the hope to discus the root causes of the problem and obtain a total settlement. Last, move into CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION to build positive relations among our people in Darfur and elsewhere in the Sudan as well as to build durable projects for sustainable development. Over all, peace will occurs precisely with the immense attentions to protection and security of our people first, and then the resolution of the root causes of the current genocide, punishment of the perpetrators, redress the injustice of the past, reconstruct positive relations among the people, and create new political order that admire the attraction of our differences, respect our human dignity as equal citizens. To make it short, without genuine commitment of protection of our civilian population and removal of the new settlers from the lands (Hawakeir), of our Darfuri indigenous people, it will be difficult if not impossible for us to participate in any political negotiations, and no conclusion of any peace settlement with the Khartoum regime will consider valid, but it will reserves the material for future conflict and human distraction. ”
In general, Abdulwahid’s approach is not, in my personal perspective, disputable. He properly differentiates between the consequences and the ramifications of the conflict and how and when to address them. Although they are related, the root causes and the ramifications of the Darfur crisis should be kept distinct so as not to mix apples with pears. What is disputable is his reluctance to join any peace negotiations before the realization of the first phase of his approach i.e., conflict suspension. In most of the cases throughout history, peace negotiations are started without any preconditions. Even amid security chaos, parties have to sit together to negotiate a peace agreement. Political wisdom requires that a party to a conflict go to the table, make his or her case, and finally decide whether to conclude a peace agreement or not depending on to what extent that peace agreement reflects his or her demands. It goes without saying that peace requires that concessions be made. No one gets all what they want in any political or non-political negotiations. Creation of good atmosphere for peace is important and therefore ceasefire is one of the few conditions that the parties could demand to start peace talks.
A particularly significant point with regard to Elnur’s approach is the removal of the new Arab settlers from the lands of the IDPs who now live in the IDP camps across the region. There are reports that thousands of Arabs from Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Mali have settled in the villages of the IDPs, and that they have been naturalized by the government authorities to change the demography of the region. Of all the problems that hinder any peaceful agreement today, occupation of the IDP villages and farms is the most complicated aspect of the crisis in Darfur and may make reaching a peaceful solution in the foreseeable future impossible. The new settlers may refuse to leave the villages which are in the best locations in terms of water, weather, and land fertility. The SLA Chairman’s precondition in this regard is, in my personal standpoint, plausible and defendable.
In some areas where people were forced to leave their lands and houses, it has been possible to uproot new settlers in order to restore lands and houses to populations unjustly removed. This removal is only possible in cases where there is good evidence. In Darfur’s particular context, there are two maps that determine who owns which land in Darfur—one was drawn in 1928 and the other in 1948. On the other hand, the traditional land system in which tribes own particular lands (Hawakirs) will be greatly helpful in this regard. In China, when the government strictly applied and implemented the land reforms, and later the commune system of public ownership, many peasant families carefully kept the written records of their ownership buried, hidden in the rafters, etc. Of course, land restoration projects work best if governments arrange for reparation or other solutions for the intervening occupants. The United Nations and other international organizations could make sure to have detailed satellite photographs taken that could supply supplemental evidence for the land restoration project.
In short, pressure should equally be put on the parties of the conflict to stop violence and unconditionally start peace negotiations after ceasefire and removal of the newcomers. In this context, pressure must be concentrated on the rebel to come up with a united political platform and on the Sudanese government to make great and painful concessions and disband the barbarous Janjaweed militia that creates chaos and instability in the region. All other issues then, save the newcomers one, can be discussed at the table of the peace negotiations.
In Abuja in 2006, only the representatives of the government and those of the armed groups formally took part in the peace negotiations. The Darfurian civil society organizations were excluded from the formal rounds of the peace talks. The upcoming peace talks should be different, and representatives from civil society organizations must be invited to participate in the negotiations to guarantee popular support for the peace accord that will be reached, and achieve democracy. The leaders of the Native Administration are the most significant part of the Darfur civil society organizations. In this regard, the United Nations and the African Union should be the only authority that will select those who will represent their tribes as leaders of the Native Administration upon consultations with the leaders of the tribes. Apart from securing support and achieving democracy, participation of the civil society organizations and particularly of the Native Administration will allow the original Arab tribes of Darfur that do not in general participate in the war against Khartoum to be part of the solution. Those who sided with the Sudanese government are part of it and are therefore represented by the Sudanese government.
The DPA has become one of the obstacles to reaching a peace deal. It is depended on by the signatories to justify their positions. For the movements that signed the DPA, any future solution is a threat to the political positions they are occupying in the government. The non-signatories refuse to recognize the DPA. Some even ask the international community to start the peace talks from the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur signed in Abuja on November 9, 2004. The Sudanese government, the signatory movements, and some circles in the international community insist that the DPA be the basis of the future peace negotiations. One wonders why the DPA should be the basis of any future peace talks in light of the fact that it is a very weak, vague, and unpopular agreement.
Finally, I think it is necessary to discuss the issue of oil revenues distribution as far as Darfur is concerned. My conviction is that China should be brought to pay a portion of its royalties to Darfur. This money will undoubtedly be extremely helpful in repatriating and supporting the IDPs.
CONCLUSIONS
The current security, humanitarian, and political situation in Darfur does not reflect any positive developments. It instead shows that enormous efforts have to be exerted to make a breakthrough, especially with regard to forging a sustainable peace agreement which is now dependable upon the ability of the international community to enforce the Sudanese government to remove the newcomers from the villages of the IDPs. Such removal should be done by an outside, neutral force. Even if the Sudanese authorities were to do this, it seems unlikely that they could do the task honestly; in light of the political harm this would do them with their own constituents. The different parties of the conflict should unconditionally abide by the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Darfur Conflict singed in N’djamena on April 18, 2004. All other problems, including the disarmament of the barbarous Jaanjaweed militia could be discussed at the table of negotiations. To improve the security situation, the international community should strengthen the AU-UN hybrid force not only to deal with the current deteriorating security situation, but also to help keep the future peace agreement in which all Darfurians, regardless of their ethnic or tribal backgrounds, should see themselves. Without following the above-mentioned steps, the African Union and the international community are only heading for repeating the 2006 unfortunate Abuja experience.
LL.B., LL.M. (University of Khartoum, Sudan), LL.M. (Harvard University, USA). Nasredeen Abdulbari was a lecturer at the International and Comparative Law Department, University of Khartoum, Sudan. He is a senior researcher at the Rift Valley Institute currently based in Nairobi. He can be reached at: [email protected]. The author would like to very much thank Professor Susan Weld, from the Georgetown University Law Center, for her invaluable comments and suggestions.