The re-branding, re-imaging and re-building of a New SPLM

By Nyuol Justin Yaac

December 15, 2009 — For any movement to be successful, it has to frame itself as a people’s party, and this is more so for a revolutionary movement, which the SPLM/ A claimed to be prior to its official endorsement as a legitimate government and party which currently dominates the executive branch of the GoSS.

Given its historical background, there can be no doubt that the SPLM/A has done a great job within its five years tenure of the CPA epoch; however, judging it by its overzealous ambitions and goals that it set for itself, it would only be fair to conclude that its overall performance is contentious at every level, a realistic preponderance of gauging political meritocracy. Amongst the masses, there is a growing perception, if not cynicism, towards the movement’s ability to deliver desideratum. Others have attributed it to the dearth of a clear vision by the SPLM/A leadership, intransigence and demagoguery on the part of the NCP, or sheer ignorance of critical issues by GoSS, a situation usually exacerbated by incessant reticence due to a growing frustration at the leadership level. In response, and rightly so, the GoSS has oftenly vindicated itself by attributing the malaise to the mechanics of a very sophisticated partner who has mastered the art of political subversion. While this pretext isn’t far from the truth, at its core, it defies the full meaning and breadth of an opposition party. In other words, the actions of one’s political opponent could, almost, if not certainly, offer an explanation but never a justification for one’s weaknesses.

SPLM WEAKNESS

Domestically, the SPLM and by implication the GoSS’ success will be measured by how it leads and how it translates the much anticipated peace dividend into tangible socio-economic development. Internationally, its litmus test depends on how well it implements and safeguards the pyrrhic CPA, an agreement that brought a halt to Africa’s longest conflict and one that also averted the risk of another thirty-two million lives. While this is too big of a challenge, the SPLM—by its own accounts as well as the accounts of others—has consistently cast itself to be the only viable agent of change and sentinel of south Sudan and other marginalized areas, a point it demonstrated by waging a 21 year old war. While the ferocity, resilience, and persistent of the movement can never be questioned; in the recent past however and in the future to come, its ability to translate a set of policy options into practice has and will be closely scrutinized, a trait that will only become more acute as the south moves closer to a referendum that is roughly 14 months away.

At the onset of the formation of GoSS, the SPLM/A—a high contracting party to the peace agreement—in order to pacify a fractured south that was wrought with warlordism and militia groups with divergent goals, at times, competing interests, adopted a policy of political accommodation. Prima facie, the strategy is laudable as it not only facilitates unity amongst southerners, but also allows them to echo their grievances in a singular voice. An indispensable condition if the south is to prevail. Since then, this good-intentioned plan has however seemed to have raised more questions than answers. The disconnect between southern aspiration and the reality is increasingly widening, political divisions becoming more prevalent, fractured and fragile coalitions, and a paralyzed multi- headed government; a malaise that has manifested itself into tribal skirmishes, corruption, and political cleavages taking forms of genuine southern political parties, but in actuality, operating as proxy NCP wings.

Although the SPLM/A remains a powerful political force, its internal contradictions is increasingly hard to overlook. The government of South Sudan as rich and powerful as it is can sustain flawed policies for quite some time, but reality cannot be ignored forever.

What is needed, therefore, is a candid but civilized discussion of the influence of the SPLM/A and a more open debate about south Sudan’s interests, particularly, during this vital time. Above all, the SPLM/A needs to re-brand its image by pursuing a very intense public relations campaign, especially during these crucial times the country is about to experience. However, a melancholy of this magnitude cannot be transcended without exploiting NCP’s frailty.

NCP QUAGMIRE

After tyrannically ruling the country for the last twenty-four years, the NCP—formerly the NIF—is faced by major challenges, perhaps, in ways like never before. Internally, there is discordance between the two main houses: the political base and the religious base. Strategically, even though the two cleavages are unanimously hell bent on policies anathema to the south; tactically, their ambitions are divergent. Furthermore, the internal dissent currently facing them is compounded by the presence of an indicted president. After unsuccessfully trying to lobby the African Union to abandon their ICC obligations; and, by failing to get the UN Security Council to push for an indefinite deferral of the case, the NCP has resorted to a policy of indistinct rule so as to ensure the longevity of the President by monopolizing control of the state apparatus, therefore, making the apprehension of the president very difficult.

More indignantly though is the fact that the regime in Khartoum is using the CPA as a bargaining chip, and the implication is that, full implementation of the agreement has become a difficult bidding process, a negligence that may return the country back to war.

PENDING ISSUES IN THE CPA

So far most of the provisions of the CPA have been executed; however, the most pressing issues are yet to be realized. Amongst them are border demarcations, some nuances in regards to both the upcoming general elections, as well as, the much anticipated 2011 referendum.

To a majority of southerners the secession of south Sudan seems to be the paramount goal, a lot of people have taken the position that the movement should make concessions with the north as long as that will secure the ultimate separation of south Sudan as a country. Many more have even gone to the lengths of saying the movement should abandon the upcoming general election en masse, as long as doing so, gives the south a political advantage to clinch their ultimate goal. Conceptually, this argument makes political sense, but, looking closely at the CPA—which currently happens to be Sudan’s political bible—then it would only be cogent to participate and conduct fair and free elections because, not doing so, is a contradiction of SPLM’s ideology of a democratic Sudan, and moreover, it’s a course that also has dire ramifications for the future of Sudan especially after considering the clause in the CPA that says, “The Referendums of South Sudan and Abyei as well as the Popular Consultations of Nuba Mountain and Ingessina will be carried out by a democratically elected government.” The interpretation of this clause, should the movement abandon the upcoming elections, will not only offer a rationalization but also a raison d’être for the NCP to nullify the outcome of the 2011 referendum.

The paradox between SPLM’s commitment to the CPA and its unpreparedness to go for elections has resulted in a conundrum, if not addressed, will produce a cataclysmic political environment for the South and indeed the whole of Sudan—a fate the SPLM cannot presage, let alone, precipitate.
As such what does the SPLM and, by extension, the GoSS need to do?

OBAMA’S U.S POLICY TOWARDS SUDAN

On the 19th of October, 2009, the Obama administration unveiled America’s new policy towards the Sudan, allegorically dubbed the ‘Carrots’ and ‘Sticks’ approach owing to the incentives and disincentives it awards the regime in Khartoum. The general public may never know the incentives and pressures the Obama administration is offering Khartoum because they were enclosed in a separate classified appendix; however, what we know is the fact that the new policy is centred on three things: cajoling the regime in Khartoum to commit and pursue peace in the troubled Darfur region, implement in entirety the CPA and settle its disputes with the semi-autonomous government in Southern Sudan, and lastly, provide the U.S greater cooperation in thwarting international terrorism.

Given the regime’s wicked interest and its demagoguery, it is hardly anybody’s guess, what compromises or concessions they are willing to make in order to mend rapprochements with the U.S.,—which has been so lacking. And while the plan looks good on paper, translating it to actual practice will be a great challenge for the Obama Administration. The American’s are relying on the disincentives to get the full cooperation of the regime, but, as history testifies, the regime in Khartoum does not respond quite well to pressures that come in a diplomatic bag, except, for tough political rhetoric accompanied by the possibility of the roars of a gun.

On the other hand, America’s power, and by implication, its ability to respond militarily to threats to its interests have been restricted by its two wars, the worst economic crisis since the great depression, and a burgeoning threat of nukes by rogue regimes. While the U.S may never go to war because of the first two premises, the third one, if directly poses a threat to its strategic or economic interests will trigger it to wage war. However, in the case of the Sudan, the possibility of the U.S using force to achieve its goals will be curtailed by the flames of anti-American sentiments that have been so strong in the Islamic world, resulting in the reluctance by the U.S to pressure Sudan, since it considers Sudan a Muslim country. Nevertheless, what’s important is that the Americans are still determined to use force to mollify any terrorist threats to its interests.

Despite the political complication, the new Obama policy offers a silver lining to the SPLM and South Sudan in general. Because apart from the pressure the U.S is already exerting on the regime, what the SPLM needs to do is embark on a consistent, logical argument that successfully and directly links, if not portrays, the regime as a terrorist or a government offering the terrorists safe havens. While doing so creates the impression of political exploitation by the SPLM, it shouldn’t be perturbing, because this is precisely the objective of an opposition. While there is consensus, both within and without the SPLM, that the movement is suppose to go through a phase of political transformation, re-branding and rebuilding its image that seems to be fading and exploited by some opposition parties, the question: how do we re-brand our image? Still persists—probably more than ever before.

WHICH ROUTE AND STEPS THE SPLM SHOULD PARTAKE

While debate on what direction the movement is suppose to lead has been divergent at best and surly at worst; the rules, policies and positions to adopt in regards to a wide range of issues still remains polemical and unabated. But even so, there are, however, issues worth noting.

A) INVIGORATION OF SPLA

Since the signing of the peace agreement, SPLM/A’s peace partners, the NCP, has constantly frustrated the implementation of the CPA, in hopes the SPLM/A will concede to their demands. Furthermore, this retardation continues to persist and will only get acute as the country approaches referendum. The people and politicians hopes were, at times, dashed, only to be re-ignited by the omnipresence of our most gifted asset—our SPLA soldiers; all the reason why, the ability of these brave young men and women to defend us should never be underestimated. They did it for the past twenty one years and will do it once again should their duty demand them to do so; therefore, it is only right that their unwavering spirit to defend our rights, country and people be met with unconditional moral, political, economic and social support.

Since the dawn of peace, the soldiers have increasingly become frustrated whether from the leadership or for many other reasons; and while their frustrations stems from different issues, their results have proved perilous for the nation—propagating themselves in desertions, mercenary, pillaging of civilian property, and worst of all astronomical suicide rates amongst our soldiers and veterans.

Though addressing these predicaments require a concerted effort, time and patience, it’s important to recognize the need to boost their morale; besides, their satisfaction should be timed with that of elections because it’s evidently clear that the NCP’s quest of attaining its goal might come with an imposition of war on the south. Currently, if this abysmal situation is not adequately addressed or ignored, then, mobilization and conscription of the military will be difficult should the need arise.

B) GOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATION AND MORE REGIONAL REPRESENTATION

To culturally, politically, socially, and economically form an identity, the people of south Sudan had to wage two civil wars. And while they have always had a concerted, unified goal; on a different level, they have projected their goals from divided fronts , the reason being, self-interested leaders projecting their differences in tribal connotations, subsequently, followed by wars that take tribal dimensions—a move that has always had an inverse impact on the aspirations of the people of south Sudan.

It is said that “power does not concede to demand, unless, it is demand coming from a stronger constituency.” Therefore, the northerners will not concede to the demands of southerners unless the southerners can demonstrate their prowess by uniting to form a stronger constituency. In order to realize this dream it is imperative that the SPLM shows the people of south Sudan that it is a “government for all the people by all the people of south Sudan.” The only way to ensure this course of action is by forming a very diverse government, whose authority is anchored in a balanced, fair regional representation. While this is already a policy of the Government of South Sudan, the SPLM needs to adequately translate this policy into action as evidence.

C) FORMATION OF AN IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVE

The longevity of any political organisation is determined by how well it fuses its ideological feat to its masses. Unfortunately, the SPLM manages and sustains it political masses by offering a set of policy option as panacea for their grievances. While this systemic misnomer has served them well enough for most part of the struggle, a newly educated southern constituency will need a different approach which should be firmly anchored in offering an ideological narrative as an alternative to a mere prescription of a set of policy options.

D) ERADICATION OF CORRUPTION AND TRIBALISM

The GoSS has adopted a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy for eradication of corruption in all its forms including tribalism. In spite of this tough line of policy, tribalism, corruption, abuse of power, nepotism and all other forms of negative “isms” remain rampant and continue to plague the social and political fabric of the south at an alarming rate. Ignorance, docility, passivity and inaction can no longer continue to define the government. But since, the SPLM will be gauged by how well it practices what it preaches; then, it is of paramount concern that the movement immediately takes steps to reduce this negativity that perpetually transpires right before its eyes, yet, one it contra-distinctly opposes in theory.

E) NEW CALL FOR A NEW SUDAN

By faith, vision and ideology, the SPLM since its inception, has fought and struggled for a New Sudan built on equality, democratic values and devoid of marginalisation, all this changes within a united Sudan. However, during the latter parts of the liberation struggle, there has been a growing call for a separate southern Sudan, an option facilitated, by staging referendum in Abyei and South Sudan at the end of the transitional period. At the surprise of the political elite, this call for a southern nation has become stronger, at the helm of referendum. And as a result, the politicians are also buying into the call, a move that has only kept them farther at bay with the other marginalized regions. This has meant a reluctance by southern politicians to champion the cause for the people of Nuba Mountain as well as those of Blue Nile—that of popular consultation. This alternative vision pursued by the movement, at its essence, posses an irreconcilable discrepancy amongst SPLM’s ideology and goal.

The SPLM needs to be consistent in its language and ideology, revert back to its language of a secular, democratic Sudan; but moreover, they need to pursue popular consultation with the same vigour and rigor they are pursuing the referendums of Abyei and South Sudan; while, by the same token, recognizing that it is only a political position whose outcome will be proved wrong or right by the free choice of the people of South Sudan.

F) DOMINATE PUBLIC DISCOURSE

During its existence, the SPLM may have committed some mishaps, but overall, it has served the people of south Sudan with honour and dignity, and I believe the people of south Sudan, if asked to re-write history, they would not have it written in any other way. This should not be interpreted to mean the people of south Sudan cannot, at any time ask for change of government, rather, it should be read as majority support from the grassroots, and therefore, it should be a premonition for the movement to step- up its campaign instead of letting down their guards.

The faux pas suffered by the movement today is due to a greater degree of disconnect between the leadership echelon and the masses. And as bleak as it sounds or appears to be, this is an opportunity for the SPLM to champion a cause for high purpose by creating campaign strategies and a discourse that dominates the public conscience through all forms of mediums available to them. Modern political doctrine asserts that compliance and acquiescence, in a country run by brutal dictators, is achieved through force, but in a democratic society consent is manufactured by controlling how people think. Since the SPLM falls in the latter category, then it is vital that the start shaping public perception, especially during the run up for elections.

G) ENCOURAGE RIGOROUS DEBATE AMONGST SUDANESE POLITICIANS

For so long, Sudanese politics, more often than not, has been characterised by politics of fear, character assassination, and excommunication of political opponents by the ruling cliques. While this political strategy has always served short term goals, its long term effects have been detrimental to the south. Political division amongst southern parties and politicians creates a void usually fulfilled, and to the consternation of many, exploited by the enemies of south Sudan to merge their agenda by easily advancing a policy of “divide and rule.”

SPLM’s policies and strategies are comprehensive and superior to any other opposition in the country and that’s why it should never doubt itself. As such, it should never shy away from other southern parties; instead, it should encourage rigorous debate and foster more open discussions so as to allow the undecided, independents not to fall prey to self-interested, pseudo political parties. This is the only way the SPLM will boost its appeal as much as build public confidence towards it—which seems to be fading away.

H) EMBOLDENING DUAL LOYALTY LOBBY GROUPS

In just a little less than two years, the people of south Sudan will determine their fate in an internationally monitored plebiscite. Whatever, the outcome of the election, it is highly likely that the SPLM with be the de facto government of the South. A leadership that will only be matched with immense responsibilities, the GoSS has proved its detractors wrong by demonstrating that they can run the affairs of a state by fulfilling the traditional criteria of statehood: i) Defined Territory ii) Specific Population iii) Constitution iv) Ability to enter into relations with other states, the above criteria has become a legal concept in both treaty law—exuded by the Montevideo Convention of Statehood as well as customary international law. Each facet of these criteria has been fulfilled by south Sudan with the exception of self-determination which is recognizable under the UN Statute, and by extension the modern criterion of statehood, yet, one being pursued by the southerners at this juncture of the transition period.

As it stands, the best case scenario is that unity or separation will either come through the will of the southerners through a ballot box and the worst case scenario is the GoSS unilaterally declaring independence. Even though neither of these options is contingent upon international recognition; recognition per se, is very vital to the functioning of a state, more so, with a new state. The only viable, most effective panacea for this wish is for the GoSS, through its various liaison offices abroad, to strategically support lobby groups controlled by ‘hyphenated’ Sudanese with dual loyalty. This, as usual, will require a bifurcated approach, on the one hand funding and supported by the government while its operations are completely detached and completely disconnected from the government on the other.

CONCLUSION

Governments, like human beings, are transient; but their legacies—whether good or bad—remain to haunt or cherish us forever. As such, it’s a moral obligation for entities, during their verve, to advance actions, goals or policies that will leave their subjects or subordinates at an advantageous position, or one relatively better than they found them. This lustre, at times, requires making unpopular decisions. Naturally, human beings do not like change; therefore, it should not be perturbing that other leaders may resent and scorn some of the proposed, yet alien, decisions made by some elements within the leadership stratum.

At this very moment, the decisions and policies pursued by the movement will either break or make history, and it is only right that the SPLM makes ones that make up history. Those policies may be heretical, but eccentricity must never be used as an excuse to musk the people of south Sudan from the real cause and interests. This is the challenge the SPLM will have to live with in addition to the noble responsibility of riding the marginalized people of Sudan from all forms of oppression, subjugation, inequality and all other forms of social, political, and economical orthodoxies of the old Sudan.

Nyuol Justin Yaac is a South Sudanese currently residing in Canada and is author of the upcoming book. Dr. Justin Yaac Arop: “The Emancipation of Sudan,” he can be reached at [email protected]