One country, two systems is better than outright secession

By Joe de Tuombuk

January 7, 2009 — Sudan’s fate as a united country is hanging in a balance and the chance of it breaking up into two countries is no longer a matter of if but when. Many people in the South are committed to voting for outright secession than for a united Sudan under different safeguards. Southerners are doing this out of anger and a searing sense of betrayal than anything else. After all, their experiences with North have been characterized by betrayal, extermination, and neglect. At first glance, the idea of outright secession from north seems like the only logical choice left. Five years after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the National Congress Party (NCP) is frustrating SPLM at every turn. This just goes to confirm what most southerners have come to expect: North can never be trusted to do anything that would satisfy and reassure South that the old ways are out and that preserving the country is more important. But are we reaching wrong conclusions and failing to understand why north is behaving the way it is behaving? The NCP has already concluded that doing more to win South’s trust is a losing effort. There is not much that can be done to persuade South from parting ways with North. So why bother? Why not just stifle that aspiration and make the SPLM work for everything even if it is enshrined in the CPA. This only breeds mistrust and reinforces what many southerners already expect from north. It is this kind of positive feedback loop that has created a runway chain of events that have set South on this seemingly irreversible road to secession. Is there an alternative to outright secession that ought to be explored and set up in such a way that guarantees preserving Sudan geographically as one country but under two systems? There is and it is the idea of managed conditional and voluntary unity.

Advocating for self-determination and, by extension, secession make good politics in the South. This position was adopted by remnants of Anyanya 1 rebellion but was dropped because it lacked the support of the Ethiopian Derge regime. The late Dr. John Garang was certainly conscious of what people in the South preferred and negotiated accordingly to have referendum as part of the CPA package. He had the means and an opportunity to negotiate for some form of alternative confederation rather than outright secession. Dr. Garang’s detractors and those who wish to condemn his achievements to oblivion would be quick to point out that he was somehow a unionist at heart. To Dr. Garang, the issue of self-determination was always an inescapable reality that had to be addressed to satisfy South’s aspiration. As an economist, it must have been tempting and politically expedient to be more pro-independent. However, overtly doing so would have alienated ordinary people in North who believed in a vision of a fair united Sudan and were certainly sympathetic to South’s cause. Northern political establishment was not doing much to give reassuring signals to southern populace that there is a chance for setting a nation that afford its citizens equal treatment in all aspects.

Southerners have a right to determine their own future and decide what is best for them. This was the first point of departure where things went terribly wrong when the Egypt and Britain decided to leave Sudan in the hands of North without consulting South. But we have moved on from this point now and into a totally different realm. We cannot continue to argue over spilled milk. The choices in front of Southerners, however, should not be absolutes. Other choices ought to be explored and given full consideration and equal weight so that Southerners can fully appreciate the magnitude of their democratic decision. If one were to ask Southerners what remaining part of a united Sudan entails, they would probably tell you that it means being stuck with North indefinitely without mechanisms for recourse should such union fail as has the current one. This is misleading and unfair to millions of Southerners whose fates depend on a rather poorly informed choice. What if there was a conditional union whereby the two parts of Sudan will remain geographically intact, maintain economic, political, and social union but with mechanisms for South to opt out should such system fail or correct itself? Under such a system, Sudan would be a confederation of two systems but one country.

The presidency would rotate between North and South. South would be governed under secular laws while North can choose whatever social control mechanism it wants to implement in the North. Sudan as a whole would pursue rigorous economic and social integration as the first step towards eventual union. If such a system is pursued in good faith for a period of fifty years, there is a good chance that people would have forgiven each other and repair trust that has been shattered by years of war. The armed forces would be set up in such a way that no part is at a disadvantage. There would be a joint defense board made up of equal number of officers from North and South that would oversee recruitment, training, and deployment of armed forces in various parts of the country. Law enforcement would be left for individual states to implement as long as special rights of the citizens from other parts of the states are protected. Southerners would scoff at this new system by correctly pointing out that this is exactly what we have now but the NCP has not done much to uphold its side of the bargain. Police in Khartoum continue to harass southerners and enforce dress code that is demeaning. So what would make the situation any different?

Well, unless the North is absolutely prepared to see South go, there is a good chance that it will seriously implement this conditional unity because there would be mechanisms for South to secede within six months of failure to respect all parts of the agreement. Egypt and some Arab countries that want to see Sudan remain united would be forced to lean on North to act appropriately and implement the agreement. Additionally, North would have the incentive to really make this conditional unity work. The reason why North is intransigent is that it believes that winning over Southerners is a lost cause. To North, it does not matter how much it tries because the South has never wanted to be part of North from the beginning. And Southerners have a right to want out of the current union. The memories are still fresh. It was just six years ago that the two regions were fighting a war of attrition with devastating consequences for millions of people.

Any attempt to set up a working conditional unity would have to address conflict over resources. Solid minerals, water, and oil resources played a pronounced role in North-South civil war. How to share oil wealth in particular was one of the most contentious issues during the peace talks in Kenya. With most of the oil being located in the South, North tried its best to redraw borders to carve oil-producing areas out of South. It is more palatable for South to see that oil is used to develop South and not North. While the issue of oil may appear to be a likely source of future conflicts, there is an opportunity that it could be a starting point for future economic cooperation between two the two parts of Sudan. North can benefit through revenues paid for oil transit and easy access to cheap to oil and gas in the South. North can also help South develop its agricultural capacity by sharing ideas, training, and fertilizers. The conditions are such that North and South would become so economically intertwined that resorting to force to resolve their disputes could be a thing of the past.

There are other intangible benefits to maintaining a united Sudan. South was not the only party to take up arms to fight marginalization. The Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and Southern Blue Nile joined their brethrens because they faced similar sets of grievances that led South to rebelled. With the exception of Abyei, the CPA has not been fair to Southern Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains. South can expect to go back to war with North over the fate of these two regions just like Eritrea and Ethiopia waged trench warfare over the barren strip of land in Badme. If these two erstwhile allies could fight over a useless piece of real estate, what would prevent war from breaking out over oil-rich and some of the best agricultural lands in Sudan? This potential conflict could be averted if the country remains united under a conditional unity as Sudan is given time to heal. Given fifty years of managed voluntary unity, people would have forgiven each other and prospered together. Both sides would come to appreciate the diversity and the unique role that Sudan plays as a bridge between Africa and the Arab world and its enviable position as the model country that truly reflects Africa’s diversity. After fifty years of instability, it is difficult to expect South and North to embrace unity after six years of uneasy peace. More time is needed. And time favors South in the end. The country’s outlook is likely to change and political moderates are the future winners.

In conclusion, it is an uphill battle to expect a different outcome from the referendum. Even the most optimistic would concede that maintaining a united Sudan is a wishful thinking that does not reflect the reality. What all can agree upon, however, is that Southerners are not fully aware of the magnitude of their democratic choices. There is a third alternative that ought to be explored and given full consideration. It is unclear why the negotiators of CPA did not consider an idea of conditional and managed unity with mechanisms for South to opt out should both sides reach a deadlock. This third alternative is the middle road and would attract a lot of attention from South. In fact, if history is any guide, this was what Southerners had all along been fighting for: an equitable united Sudan that respects its citizens and appreciates its diversity. The choices outlined in the CPA are absolutes that do not do justice to those who want a different Sudan. The NCP’s behavior is rooted in a strategic assessment that South is going to choose independence not matter how attractive unity is made to appear. That is why the NCP as a party is really giving SPLM a hard time and trying its best to renege on what it signed. This behavior, however, only breeds mistrust and reaffirms what many Southerners have come to expect from the North. This sort of positive feedback loop has set the South on an irreversible path to secession and setting the stage for one of the deadliest wars between two countries in the next decade. The only logical choice left is for the SPLM and NCP to sit down and explore the idea of adding a choice of conditional voluntary unity with mechanisms for the South to declare independence should it fail. If this happened, both sides would reach an amicable solution and work hard to maintain a united and plural Sudan. It is self-defeating to expect both sides to give conditional unity a chance over only six years.