Julie Flint and Darfur crises

By Adam Dawelbait

March 6, 2010 — Most observers perceive Julie Flint as a credible source of information on the Darfur crisis. Her writings on this crisis penetrate far and wide. She has become a pioneer author and news reporter on the current Darfur issues. From her career background, Ms. Flint seems to be an intelligent and canny person. Yet most of her writings about Darfur and especially the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)-Abdul Wahid are controversial. In other words, most of her writings about the movement are often fictitious, slippery, unethical and dishonest. How so? My hunch is that, Ms. Flint wants not to embrace the ethical conducts of her professional journalism, but rather, it seems that she is using her imagination and creativity to manufacture a new reality that serves concealed motives. This can be seen clearly in her book with Alex de Waal, (Darfur a New History of Long War, Revised and Updated Edition, 2008). Also, in her papers and articles on Darfur, and especially in her recent article “Making Sense of Sudan, Rebels: The Strife Inside the SLA”, (http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2010/02/01/the-strife-in-the-sla/), February 1, 2010. Tackling all Ms. Flint’s writings about the Darfur crisis and SLM-Abdul Wahid is clearly an huge subject, and I believe that it will be difficult to undertake all her controversial works in this short article. However, the aim of this article is to identify some key counterfeit aspects in her article “Making Sense of Sudan, Rebels”, and evoke her unfortunate and misleading information about the SLM-Abdul Wahid, and in the coming articles, I will outline in depth her writings about the same matter with special focus on her above mentioned book with Alex de Waal.

To begin with, professional journalism deals with facts. It requires various standards that are concerned with higher consciousness, ethical values, credibility; quality research and so on. Yet, in her article “Making Sense of Sudan, Rebels: The Strife Inside the SLA”, Julie Flint presents the opposite. Most of her information in this article is misleading. Anyone who examines Ms. Flint’s argument, will observe that she cares little about serious journalistic investigation or even respects its ethical standards. For example, she indicates that “Since 5 January, rival factions of SLA-Abdul Wahid have been fighting each other in Jebel Marra”. Here, this information is less accurate. In fact, the fighting was between SLA-Abdul Wahid and the Khartoum armed forces and its allied Janjaweed and other militias. To be more precise, since December 20 to the present, the government forces have been repeatedly attacking various SLM/A areas and especially Jebel Marra. They use helicopters, gunships, MiGs, Antonov aircrafts, and ground troops assisted by Janjaweed militias in their attacks on SLM garrisons and civilians alike. As a few examples, they attacked Kutorr, Alaradib Al Ashara, Leiba, Baldong and West of Jebel Marra. They also attacked Nirtattay, Faina, Boldong and Komodigay. On February 7, 2010, they attacked Galoul, Boldong, Kutroum, and Keinga. Furthermore, on February 10–13, 2010, they used air and ground forces and bombarded Kutour Leiba, Kidineer,
(http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VVOS-835R7L/$File/full_report.pdf). Finally, from February 20, 2010, to present, they have been launching massive air and ground attacks all over the SLM/A, the civilian areas and especially Dirbat and its surroundings (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article34255). Moreover, I believe that Ms. Flint would agree that these attacks were not from among the “rivals of SLA-Abdul Wahid”. Many independent sources including the UN reported that there were massive human casualties and miserable humanitarian situations in the area (http://radiodabanga.org/?p=10506), (http://af.reuters.com/article/sudanNews/idAFHEA52099520100225), and
(http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSHEA13619220100301). I assume that Ms. Flint will have confidence in all or at least some of these sources. Thus, she will accept the notion that these assaults are done by the government and its allied Janjaweed and other militias and not “intra-SLA fighting”.

Furthermore, Ms. Flint said that “In the middle of 2009 when senior SLA commanders—including several of those considered most loyal to Abdul Wahid—‘challenged him for 10 days’,… The chief of staff of the SLA, Yousif Ahmad Yousif ‘Karjakola’, went as far as to call the SLA chairman incompetent”. Astonishingly, this information is inaccurate. First of all, Yousif Ahmad Yousif “Karjakola” did not participate in the SLM/A workshop in Switzerland. For the record, there were two SLM/A workshops in Switzerland. The first one was in January 2009, specifically from January 14–24 (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article29782). Most of the participants in this workshop were mainly political and civilian personnel that came from Sudan and the diaspora in addition to a few representatives from the SLM/A military faction (SLA), but Yousif Karjakola was not among them. Furthermore, the second workshop was from April 25–May 5, 2009. At this time, the participants came equally from both political and military bodies. Yes, Karjakola was supposed to be one of the key participants in this workshop. For this reason, he arrived with other field commanders in N’djamena, Chad and was supposed to travel from there to Switzerland. Karjakola and other field commanders were supposed to arrive in Switzerland sometime ahead of the other participants in late April or May 1, 2009. Unfortunately, for some technical reasons, his flight was delayed with the other field commanders. And due to the holiday in Switzerland, and lack of direct air flights from Chad to Switzerland at that time, the Swiss authority was unable to process his and the other commanders’ air tickets.

When the holiday was over, there were only two or three days left of the workshop. After considerable consultations between the Swiss authority and SLM leadership and with the direct involvement of Karjakola and the other commanders, they agreed that there was no point for them to come to Switzerland for one or two days and then go back to Darfur without participating in the workshop. As a result, they agreed to go back to Darfur and prepare themselves for the next workshop. In fact, this happened not only to Karjakola and his fellow commanders in Chad; actually, it happened to General Suleiman Marajan as well. Furthermore, General Marajan was also supposed to attend the second SLM/A workshop in Switzerland. Accordingly, he traveled from the SLM/A North Darfur front, and arrived in Kampala, Uganda and continued on to Nairobi, Kenya; from there he was supposed to travel to Switzerland. But, his travel was delayed for the same technical reason experienced by Karjakola and his group. There was an idea that Marajan also should go back to his base in Darfur and wait for the next workshop, but he decided to come after the end of the workshop and meet with Chairman Abdul Wahid and other SLM leaders. For this reason, he waited in Nairobi until the end of the holiday, when the Swiss authority finalized his travel process. He arrived in Switzerland in June 2009, a few days after the end of the workshop when everyone had returned to his or her base. Marajan stayed two days in Switzerland and then went to France to meet with Abdul Wahid and other leaders. He met with them in Paris, stayed there for about two weeks and then went back to his base in North Darfur. In short, Karjakola did not participate in the first or the second SLM workshop in Switzerland, or even visit Switzerland or France after the workshop as Marajan did. Moreover, Karjakola was in regular contact and consultation with most of the participants in the workshop. In particular, he was in special contact with some of the field commanders and Chairman Abdul Wahid, but he never challenged him or called him “incompetent”. In reality, and during the workshop, Karjakola always gave reasonable advice to the all participants including Chairman Abdul Wahid.

Ms. Flint argued that “Others complained about a lack of support, including salaries and military supplies, and the refusal to participate in the internationally-mediated peace process led by Djibril Bassole”. Regrettably, Flint did not report the source of her information. As it happened, during the workshop meetings, the participants discussed many contemporary SLM critical issues, including organization, logistics, negotiations and other matters which were the main reasons for the workshop. Yes, there was a collective request to enhance the movement’s strategic policies; but no one complained or criticized or even questioned Abdul Wahid’s refusal to participate in the “internationally-mediated peace process led by Djibril Bassole”. Indeed, the majority if not all of the participants agreed collectively not to participate in any upcoming Darfur peace negotiations unless there was security on the ground that protected the civilian populations first. Moreover, the participants reemphasized this (security) position to the special representative of joint mediator Djibril Bassole who came especially from New York to attend the SLM workshop and give lectures on negotiations, wealth and power sharing. Also, the participants expressed the same view to the Swiss authority, special representative of the U.S. State Department and U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Scott Gration, experts, academics, civil society and activists. In short, the SLM/A members told observers who attended the workshop that they would not participate in any negotiations prior to the enhancement of security on the ground, the disarmament of the Janjaweed and other government militias and the removal of new settlers from the Darfuri indigenous people’s lands.

Julie Flint does not allow herself to be fazed by serious ethical investigation. Indeed, she claims that “A number of commanders from Ain Siro were ‘arrested’ and taken to Jebel Marra, Abdul Wahid’s headquarters, late in 2007 as they gave voice to growing popular demand from the field for reform of the movement that Abdul Wahid leads from the diaspora”. Surely this argument is far from the truth. The Ain Siro’s problem was not the way Flint has described. The fact is there was an internal disagreement among the commanders in Ain Siro’s front (the Ali Haroun group vs. others). The real issue was that Ali Haroun and his group were mobilizing SLM/A forces from the inside and encouraging them to put pressure on Chairman Abdul Wahid to agree to negotiate with the National Congress Party (NCP) of Omar Al Bashir. Accordingly, the relationship between the field commanders and Ali Haroun’s group became very tense and even reached a deadlock with some commanders. Owing to this fact, the field commanders reported the situation to the SLM/A headquarters in Jebel Marra and asked them to intervene and solve the problem.

Here, the SLM/A headquarters sent a special delegation to Ain Siro to resolve the disputes between Ali Haroun’s group and the other commanders. The delegation arrived in Ain Siro and met with the two disputed parties, and for some reason they were not able to solve the problem. Similarly, the delegation reported back to headquarters and in return, SLM headquarters requested them to come back; and at the same time headquarters asked Ali Haroun to come with them. Voluntarily, Ali Haroun agreed to do so. Luckily, the problem was solved shortly after they arrived at SLM/A headquarters in Jebel Marra. After the problem was resolved, immediately headquarters appointed Ali Haroun as the head of the SLA Judiciary Committee and asked him to lead his judiciary team and resolve some civil disputes around the area before returning to his base in Ain Siro and he agreed to do so.

At the same time, headquarters sent a new delegation to Ain Siro to inform the commanders there about the results and bring back their comments to headquarters to be discussed and kept on file in the SLM/A records. When the delegation arrived in Ain Siro and before they engaged in any discussion or even explained their mission, someone from Ali Haroun’s group who was left behind in Ain Siro called one of his relatives in the Netherlands and told him that Ali Haroun and his team were detained and transferred to the SLM/A headquarters in Jebel Marra. Unexpectedly, on Saturday, December 29, 2007, and without any investigation, the person in the Netherlands released a statement on behalf of Ain Siro’s front that they were not ready to cooperate with the mediation team sent by the SLA Chief of Staff General Abdul Gaudier Abdulrahman (Gadura), (http://darfurdaily.blogspot.com/search?updated-min=2007-01-01T00%3A00%3A00%2B01%3A00&updated-max=2008-01-01T00%3A00%3A00%2B01%3A00&max-results=50). Following this statement, and on Wednesday, January 16, 2008, the same person in the Netherlands issued a new statement appealing to human rights organizations to intervene and rescue the life of Ali Haroun and his group,
(http://darfurdaily.blogspot.com/2008/01/darfur-fear-for-safety.html) and
(http://www.reliefweb.int/rwarchive/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KARI-7AWR4M?OpenDocument). At this point, many human rights organizations called and wrote to the SLM Chairman Abdul Wahid, his military Chief of Staff and his spokesperson requesting them to intervene and release the detainee Ali Haroun and his group.

Without delay, Abdul Wahid called SLM/A headquarters with a detailed inquiry about Ali Haroun’s case. Shortly, Abdul Wahid found that Ali Haroun was not detained. Moreover, Abdul Wahid spoke with Ali Haroun personally and he explained to Abdul Wahid the whole story including his new judicial post. Immediately, Abdul Wahid requested that he call some of the human rights organizations and explain to them his current situation, and I believe, Ali Haroun did so. Additionally, Abdul Wahid called most of the human right organizations and precisely the UN Human Rights Office in the Sudan, Amnesty International, Red Cross, Human Rights Watch and others and informed them that no one detained Ali Haroun and his group and now they are free conducting their daily duties in the movement. Besides, Abdul Wahid gave the human rights organizations the phone number of Chief of Staff General Gadura, SLA Spokesperson General Nimir Abdul Rahman and even Ali Haroun’s personal satellite phone number and asked them to call and investigate the matter themselves. Abdul Wahid went further and stated that if they were not satisfied with their answers, he would facilitate them going and visiting Ali Haroun and his group at SLM/A headquarters and investigating their situation. I believe that some of these organizations, especially the UN, Red Cross and Amnesty called headquarters and spoke with Ali Haroun in person and found that he was free and performing his duties in the movement normally. To make a long story short, Ali Haroun’s problem was solved way before Ms. Flint met with Abdul Wahid in the late afternoon at Café Sarah Barnard in downtown Paris. Yes, and among her many questions, Ms. Flint asked Abdul Wahid about Ali Haroun’s problem, and Abdul Wahid explained to her the whole story in detail. In reality, her particular questions and objection for Abdul Wahid was about his relationship with Israel. In her advice to Abdul Wahid was to terminate his relationship with Israel, and also she asked him to give orders to his soldiers to respect human rights. Abdul Wahid rejected her advice in regard to his relation with Israel, and accepted her advice about the human rights and told her that “we in SLM/A are fighting for freedom and human rights; therefore, we will never defeat our own statement”. Yet, deceitfully, Ms. Flint wants to convince her readers that she succeeded by her personal intervention in persuading Abdul Wahid to release Ali Haroun and his group.

Ali Haroun stayed at SLM/A headquarters for a few months performing his duty as head of the judicial committee; then he returned to Ain Siro and integrated peacefully with the other military commanders. However, in July 2009, he again began mobilizing the military commanders and asked them to accept the negotiations with the NCP. At this time, the SLM leadership and Abdul Wahid in particular gave orders to the field commanders not to ask or investigate Ali Haroun’s act or decision. Furthermore, Abdul Wahid requested from SLM/A headquarters in Jebel Marra and from Ain Siro’s front to help him and his group go free wherever they wanted to. Once he had secured that no one would restrict his movement, he (Ali Haroun) immediately contacted the office of the United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and told them that they (Ali Haroun and his group) were ready to negotiate with the NCP. As a result, and on Monday February 15, 2010, the (UNAMID) sent a helicopter to the Ain Siro front and took Ali Haroun and his group to Ndjamena-Chad and then to Doha Qatar. Then Ali Haroun and his group were joined by Abdallah Khalil’s group in Doha to negotiate with the NCP.

Abdallah Khalil (“rival factions of SLA-Abdul Wahid”) is a leader of SLM-Addis Ababa and is also known as “SLM-Scott Gration”. Abdallah Khalil’s group is mainly supported by the U.S. Envoy to Sudan Major General Scott Gration (this is in public domain). Although what I want to bring to light here is, Gen. Gration was supposed to meet with the SLM/A Chairman Abdul Wahid first and then with his forces in the field and supporters in the camps and elsewhere. Sadly, Gen. Gration did the opposite. First he visited Darfur and met with the people in the Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) and according to eyewitnesses from the Kalma Camps, Gen. Gration told the people in the camp that Abdul Wahid was staying in Paris, France in “luxurious five-star hotels”, looking after his personal interests and did not care about the suffering of the people of Darfur and especially the suffering of those in the camps. Furthermore, Gen. Gration advised the people in the camps to forget Abdul Wahid and look for a new leader to represent them and their interests. In return, the IDP representative protested against Gen. Gration’s idea and told him that Abdul Wahid is their only leader. In short, the IDP representative requested from Gen. Gration that he help and provide them with security and humanitarian assistance; and if he (Gen. Gration) was interested in talking about negotiation, then he should have to go and talk to their leader Abdul Wahid.

Further, in early April, after meeting with IDPs, Gen. Gration visited Abdul Wahid’s field commanders (SLA forces) in Darfur without knowledge of or permission from their leader Abdul Wahid (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article30775). When Mr. Gration met with the field commanders, he informed them of what he said to the representatives of the IDPs. In addition, Mr. Gration promised some field commanders that if they chose a new leader for the movement, he and his government (U.S.) would support them. The majority of the field commanders refused the idea and told Gen. Gration that Abdul Wahid is their only chairman, and if he (Gen. Gration) wanted to talk about negotiations, then he had to meet with their chairman. Yet, Abdallah Khalil accepted Gen. Gration’s idea and from that day on, the field commanders have called him “SLM-Scott Gration”, which has now become public domain. Moreover, Abdul Wahid and his leadership council were aware of all Gen. Gration’s messages to the IDPs and field commanders. Finally, after he failed to convince the IDPs and field commanders to replace Abdul Wahid with a new leader, Gen. Gration went to Paris and met with Abdul Wahid on May 29, 2009 (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article31326), and discussed with him the Darfur crisis and how to reach a peace settlement.

After a few weeks of consultations Abdallah Khalil’s group met with Gen. Gration’s team in N’djamena, Chad, (particularly with the woman who is working at the Sudan desk at the U.S. State Department and in the office of U.S. Special Envoy Gen. Gration). The coordinating between Abdallah Khalil’s group and Gen. Gration became even stronger after Gen. Gration representative met with Abdallah Khalil during the SLM workshop in Switzerland. Furthermore, after Abdallah Khalil returned from Switzerland, he and his team stayed in N’djamena to meet with Gen. Gration and his team before going to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for the “SLM-Gration unification conference”. The idea of this conference was that Gen. Gration would help some rebel groups to unify under one leader and then go to Doha and negotiate with the NCP. The rebel groups failed to unify at the Addis conference, but they proposed that they would hold their unification conference in the SLM/A controlled areas in Darfur. This is one of the main reasons of the disagreement between Abdul Wahid and Gen. Gration,
(http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32136; http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32195).

At the end of Addis Ababa’s conference, Abdallah Khalil and his group returned to N’djamena. They waited there for few days and met with Gen. Gration and his team and discussed the issues of a rebel (SLM-Scott Gration) unification conference inside the Darfur region. They selected Dirbat’s headquarters in Jebel Marra (one of SLM/A-Abdul Wahid’s main political and military bases) as the place for the proposed conference. During their stay in Chad, Abdallah Khalil’s group called some field commanders (including the late Abdalla Abaker) in Darfur and told them highly confidentially that the U.S. Envoy Gen. Scott Gration would support them completely in holding a SLM/A conference in Dirbat, Darfur and replacing Abdul Wahid with a new leader. According to some witnesses, Abdallah Khalil assured those whom they contacted that “Gen. Gration gave them a green light to overthrow Abdul Wahid and replace him by a new leader”. When the SLA Chief of Staff, Gen. Gadura heard about Abdallah Khalil and Gen. Gration’s plan, he called Abdallah Khalil in Chad and Abdalla Abaker on a different front in Jebel Marra and gave them three options. First, to leave the SLA controlled areas and create their own movement. Second, to go and join any other movement of their choice. Third, to go to Doha, Qatar and negotiate with the NCP or even to go and join the NCP in Khartoum or elsewhere. At the beginning, Abdallah Khalil and Abdalla Abaker refused Gen. Gadura’s suggestions (At the end Abdallah Khalil accepted the Doha option), and they told Gen. Gadura that as long as they had Gen. Gration’s support, they would continue their SLM/A unification conference and it would have to be in Dirbat. Because of these reasons, Gadura gave orders to his forces not to allow Abdallah Khail and Gen. Gration to enter Dirbat or any other SLM controlled areas. Also, Abdul Wahid requested from Gen. Gration that he stay away from the movement territories (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33005). Thus, when the UN plane landed in Jebel Marra on November 9, 2009, without permission from the movement, the field commanders in the area thought that this was the plane of Gen. Gration and Abdallah Khalil and immediately held the plane; they released it shortly after they discovered that it was a UN plane (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33071). This is why the UNAMID spokesperson condemned the incident and accused SLM/A-Abdul Wahid of impeding the UN work in Darfur (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33071).

Abdalla Abdakar’s tragic death as Ms. Flint indicates: “On 5 January this year,…, Abdalla Abaker, was shot dead by Abdul Wahid loyalists at a checkpoint in Jebel Marra”. Indeed, this is related to the above (SLM-Gen. Gration) complexity. But, what Ms. Flint did not tell us is how, where and why Adalla Abaker was killed. Also she did not tell us if Abdalla Abaker has an Antonov, MiG, helicopters and Janjaweed militias or not. Since the case of Abdalla Abaker is still under investigation, I will keep the pre-trial information till the end of the investigation. Yet, I will outline a general overview of this case so that the reader can have some idea about this tragic incident.

Abdalla Abaker was a senior field commander. Misleadingly, Abdallah Khalil’s group (SLM-Scott Gration) called him from N’djamena, Chad and told him that Gen. Gration and the U.S. government would help them to organize a SLM/A conference in the field and then would support them logistically to reach their military and political objectives. According to the records of the primary investigations with the late Abdalla Abaker, while Abdallah Khalil and his group were in Chad, they called Abdalla Abaker in Jebel Marra and requested he prepare for a “SLA unification conference”. When the SLA commander Chief of Staff Gen. Gadura heard about the information, he called Abdalla Abaker and asked him to stop his “suspicious conference activities”. But, Abaker refused to listen to Chief of Staff Gen. Gadura. Accordingly Gadura called him to investigate and then restricted his movements for a brief time; after a few days he released him and gave him three choices. First, to stay in his SLA position and respect SLM/A laws, rules and regulations. Second, to leave the movement peacefully and go and create his own movement or join another movement of his choice. Finally, to go to the NCP/ government, Doha or wherever he likes. Furthermore, Abdalla Abaker accepted the first choice, and accordingly he resumed his normal SLA duties (Abdalla Abaker released a statement in Arabic explaining his story with Gen. Gadura and other commanders). After a few days (weeks) and without any notice, people received with great sorrow his tragic death which is now under investigation.

In response to some comments in her article, Ms. Flint argued that “To blame all opposition to Abdul Wahid’s leadership on government divide and rule is simply incorrect. Is this why Jar el Nebi split in 2006? Or Suleiman Marajan?” To some extent, Flint is right, not all opposition to Abdul Wahid’s leadership is coming from the NCP. To be sure, like any other organization, SLM/A has its own internal difficulties that have nothing to do with the intervention of the NCP. Certainly, there are different points of view among the SLM/A leadership themselves and with their chairman Abdul Wahid. To illustrate the argument further, most of the opposition to Abdul Wahid’s leadership is motivated by egoistic personal interests (power struggles). For this and other reasons, the majority of those who disagree with Abdul Wahid, consciously or unconsciously will become targets or even victims of the NCP divide and rule strategy. This strategy is not new. They exercise it with other oppositions. For example, they use it with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in the South Sudan and even with the Northern political and opposition parties. Furthermore, they used it and are still using it with the SLM-Abdul Wahid. This has happened many times and especially after the Abuja Agreement. For instance, they divided Dr. Abdulrhaman Musa, Abo Al Gasim Imam Alhaj (Agrass), Ibrahim Madibo, Ali Majok and many others. Consequently, most of the opposition to Abdul Wahid’s leadership is coming from personal interests and the NCP divide and rule tactics.

Furthermore, the problem with Ms. Flint is that she misled her readers about the “split of Suleiman Marajan”. One should first be aware that Marajan and others split from SLM-Abdul Wahid, but he rejoined the movement in 2007. More specifically, in March 2006, in Abuja, Nigeria, Suleiman Marjan, Khamis Abaker, Jar el Nebi, Abulgasim Ahmed Abulgasim, Suliman Jamal (he was died in a car accident in March 2006, while he way traveling from Abuja, Nigeria to N’djamena Chad) and others split from SLM-Abdul Wahid and formulated their own movement, naming it “SLM Group of Nineteen (SLM-G19)”. The reason for their split was that they thought that Abdul Wahid had a secret deal with Majzob Al Khalifa (the head of the government delegation in the Abuja peace talks). Accordingly, they believed that Abdul Wahid was going to sign an agreement with the Khartoum government and they would be left out. But, after Abdul Wahid did not sign the agreement, both Maragan and Jar el Nabi returned to the movement. Shortly after their return, Jar el Nabi put a precondition that either he was to become the “General Secretary” for the movement or he would leave. Unfortunately, after a few months and when Jar el Nabi did not get the post he left the movement, and Marajan remains to this day. Thus, in some respects, Ms. Flint informed her audience that Suleiman Marajan split in 2006 from SLMA/AW, and for some reason, she decided not to tell them that Marajan rejoined the movement in early 2007.

Ms. Flint went further in her response and said that, “The infighting is not simply a GoS tactic. Not all those who took up arms have a price.” In one crucial aspect, Ms. Flint’s position does not ring true. What is going on inside the SLM/A-Abdul Wahid is well designed by the NCP. According to a reliable source, The Sudanese National Security Intelligence (NISS) set up two plans (A and B) to deal with the movement. The objectives of these plans were to persuade or force SLM/A-Abdul Wahid to negotiate with the NCP. First, the plan (A) was supervised by the former NISS director Solah Gosh (nicknamed Al Sanjack), and Mohamed Atta (the current NISS director), and assisted by Mohamed Hassan Babiker (NISS officer positioned in Addis Ababa); with the direct involvement of the Qatari government and Robert McFarlane (a former Reagan administration official). More specifically, according to the official documents in Arabic signed by the above NISS officer in Addis Ababa, they call it in the Arabic language (????? ????? ????????), and according to Sudan Tribune, it is called “Plan Tragacanth” (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/29/AR2009092903840.html?nav=emailpage). It is emphasized in more detail by the Sudan Tribune News Agency (http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article32626). Moreover, besides Mr. McFarlane’s job to lobby in favor of normalizing U.S. relations with Sudan, the NISS and Qatari government appointed him to convince SLM-Abdul Wahid to make a secret deal with the NCP, or at least to participate publicly in Doha peace talks (copies of internal e-mails both in English and Arabic and other documents are with the SLM leadership council). Accordingly, and with the assistance of Darfuri émigré residing in Virginia, U.S., and other Sudanese persons, Mr. McFarlane succeeded in meeting with Abdul Wahid in Paris in early May 2009. Here, McFarlane gave Abdul Wahid his personal and career background as well as his hardcover book Special Trust. Moreover, Mr. McFarlane told Abdul Wahid that he (McFarlane) genuinely supported Abdul Wahid’s just cause and leadership. For that reason, he came to meet with him and see how he could help him to attain his goal. When Abdul Wahid asked Mr. McFarlane about what kind of help, he refused to disclose it to Abdul Wahid, but he promised him that he would explain it to him in their next meeting. Fortunately, and since early October 2008, the SLM leadership was already aware of the NISS, Qatar and Mr. McFarlane’s plan. As already planned, Abdul Wahid accepted Mr. McFarlane’s offer, and told him that he needed some time to discuss it with the SLM leadership council. Finally, they agreed to meet again after two weeks.

Again, in mid-May, 2009, Mr. McFarlane met with Abdul Wahid in Paris. The meeting was in an elegant French restaurant in Paris. Shortly after they finished their dinner, McFarlane took Abdul Wahid aside and told him that he had had extensive consultations with officials in the Obama administration and with many retired politicians and diplomats and they all agreed to help SLM/A-Abdul Wahid. But, Mr. McFarlane told Abdul Wahid that there was one request (precondition) from the U.S. Special Envoy General Scott Gration, which is the unification between SLM-Abdul Wahid and the other rebel movements and especially SLM-Ahmed Abdulshafi, SLM-Abdalla Yahya and Sharif Harir. In view of that, Abdul Wahid told him, I am ready to unite with them at any time, but I need some time to consult with my leadership cabinet. Thus, they agreed to meet again as soon as Abdul Wahid finished his consultations. After a few days, McFarlane called Abdul Wahid from the U.S. and requested an urgent meeting with him. Abdul Wahid told him that the SLM leadership council appointed someone for this project and the person resides in New York, so McFarlane could meet with him there and he would explain the SLM leadership’s final decision about the matter.

On May 28, 2009, Mr. McFarlane met with the appointed representative of SLM in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York, U.S.A. Shortly after they met in the hotel, McFarlane briefed the SLM representative about the previous meetings and their results. Furthermore, McFarlane told him that Gen. Scott Gration requested that he go to Tripoli, Libya to meet with SLM Unity, Sharif Harir and Ahmed Abdulshafi and convince them to unite under the leadership of Abdul Wahid. Also, he asked the SLM representative, is Abdul Wahid ready to lead these people in any peace processes? And many other questions related to the subject. In response to his questions, the SLM representative explained to Mr. McFarlane the NISS and Qatar’s plan and his involvement with them. So, the SLM representative told him that SLM-Abdul Wahid would be ready to negotiate if the NCP agreed to implement the SLM road map for peace in Darfur which would start with security on the ground (Conflict Suspension, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation). Finally, they (McFarlane and the SLM representative) ended the meeting and agreed to call each other and determine the day and time for their next meeting; but, it did not happen.

Apparently, after the meeting between the SLM representative and Mr. McFarlane in New York, the Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) found out that SLM-Abdul Wahid had discovered their plan (A). Instinctively, the NISS moved into plan (B). The final decision of plan (B) came out after two separate meetings. The first meeting was on September 18, 2009. The meeting was held in the NISS office near the National Military Garrison in Khartoum. The first objective of plan (B) was to weaken SLM/A-Abdul Wahid militarily, politically and diplomatically, and then force them to negotiate with the NCP (transcripts and tape recordings of the meetings and other documents are in the office of the SLM leadership council). The second objective was to replace Abdul Wahid with a new leader from the Fur tribe. To achieve these objectives, they divided the movement into two main parts (military and political bodies).

In regards to the political body, the NISS committee identified some key active members in the movement inside the Sudan and in diaspora as the most important targets. The main idea was to make a deal with the French authorities to put pressure on Abdul Wahid to accept Doha negotiations. And, if Abdul Wahid refused to go to Doha, they NISS will make a deal with the French authority and request them to expel Abdul Wahid from France. Furthermore, the NISS should reach the targeted SLM members and convince them to put pressure on Abdul Wahid and his closest advisors to accept the Doha negotiations. According to the SLM sources (documents), if this plan did not work well, then the NISS would make individual agreements with them and then take them to Khartoum with huge media propaganda and show that some of the key SLM leaders have signed a deal with the government. In addition, if all these plans failed, the NISS would use all means (incentive and disincentive), to convince the targeted leaders to stay away in diaspora or inside the Sudan and remain silent and not to engage in any Darfur issues. Finally, if they failed to achieve these objectives, then the NISS would employ foreign espionage agents (mercenaries) to assassinate some key or all of the identified SLM personnel.

Moreover, the military plan was critically similar to the political one. They decided to takeover all SLA-Abdul Wahid’s controlled areas before March 15, 2010. To be precise, the NISS committee identified and divided the SLM/A controlled areas into six fronts (Jebel Marra, Korma, Ain Siro Jebel Midob, Hashaba and Jebel Moon). The central idea of this plan was to make contact with the identified SLM/A-Abdul Wahid field commanders and convince them to make deals with the government. According to the documents, the NISS would reach out to the field commanders through individuals as well as government officials (National Congress Party) who were originally from Darfur and particularly from the Fur tribe (the names of these people are in the SLM leadership office).

The second meeting was on October 8, 2009, at the same place as the first meeting. This meeting was designated for the action plan. Here, the NISS committee divided the work among teams. One team would go to Darfur and make contact with the SLA field commanders, and the second team would stay in Khartoum to provide them with the necessary logistics. The Darfur team met on November 4, 2009, in the security office in Al Kafori, Bahri, and received some money and they traveled to Darfur the next day. That same day, they arrived in Al Fashir, Nyal and Al Genaina. They contacted some of the SLA field commanders and met with a few of them few days later. Furthermore, some of the commanders refused the money (bribes) and the deals and some accepted them. Some of those who accepted the deals are now in Doha, Qatar for the negotiations, and some others went to Khartoum and the rest went with the NISS in Nyala, Al Genina, Alfashier and Kass.

The NISS field operation personnel kept contacting the field commanders and tried hard to persuade them to accept the deals. But most of the remaining field commanders refused to do so. According to some field commanders, the NISS personnel threatened that if they did not accept the deal, the government would crash them in a few days. Accordingly, in late December 2009, the government troops and its Janjaweed and other militias started attacking SLM/A controlled areas. In short, from January 1, 2010 to the present, the government and its militias have been intensively attacking the SLM/A controlled areas and especially Jebel Marra (http://www.daylife.com/topic/Darfur),
(http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/27/world/africa/27briefsDarfur.html?partner=rss&emc=rss), (http://www.sudaneseonline.com/en216/publish/Latest_News_1/Sudan_Clashes_in_Darfur.shtml), and
(http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=899&ctl=Details&mid=1072&ItemID=7930). Thus, this is indeed self evident that the fighting is simply “a GoS” (NCP) tactic and no one else’s.

In conclusion, writers should serve as the medium to provide credible information to their readers. It is his or her function to amuse, entertain, and inform. Research and any investigative writing or reports, however, should be confined within ethical values, honesty, and codes of behavior. In other words, the raw material of information must pass through successive investigative filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to print for readers. Yet, and as we have seen, it seems that Ms. Flint’s information on the Darfur crisis and her criticism of the SLM-Abdul Wahid are less restrictive about these facts. Her arguments give the impression that she is highly motivated by concealed motives. She treats some information well and hides other. Her perception of the SLM and its Chairman Abdul Wahid is very dismissive. Furthermore, she used greatly misleading investigatory zeal to demonize Abdul Wahid and portray his movement as a dysfunctional and abusive organization that victimizes its own members. In other words, she is portraying the movement as an enemy of democracy and irresponsibly guilty of high human rights abuses; but her determination diminishes when it comes to examining and proving such matters ethically and honestly. It seems that Ms. Flint’s purpose is to construct a fictitious story about the movement that generates the reader’s interest and sympathetic emotion to accept her allegations. It is true, and for a long time, she managed to mislead many of her audience and convince them to see her writings about the Darfur crisis as unbiased, professional and objective. Accordingly, she attracted a broad audience including a number of decision makers, state officials, humanitarian and human rights organizations and members of the intellectual community. To put it in different words, Ms. Flint succeeded in manipulating some information that dictated her audiences to see, hear and think according to her egoistic motivations. Obviously, anyone who writes or reads about the crisis in Darfur should be aware of the importance of accuracy and honesty. Equally, whoever looks at the contemporary situation in Darfur will find certain informational disarray. In this case Ms. Flint decided to exploit this disarray and manufacture a fictitious picture about the SLM-Abdul Wahid that serves her personally motivated agenda. This is incredibly facile and unsophisticated.

Certainly, there is no doubt that SLM and its Chairman Abdul Wahid are not above criticism, but it should be ethical, honest and overall based on truth and reasonably fair. Moreover, what is happening now in Jebel Merra is a human tragedy. Most of the countries and organizations have shamelessly kept silent about these atrocities; and even those who mention it are shamelessly demonizing the humanity of the victims of these incidences by reducing them to a debatable mathematical number (100, 300, 400, 600, 100000, 300000 deaths, losses, displaced etc). Regrettably, Ms. Flint is among them. And, when she mentioned the government attacks on Jebel Marra in her recent article (http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/2010/02/25/doha-a-new-beginning/), she forgot even to tell her readers that the ongoing attacks in Jebel Marra are in the SLM/A-Abdul Wahid controlled area, and mostly against the civilian population. In reality, she was utterly absorbed with Doha peace talks between JEM and NCP. In short, she only mentioned the attacks on Jebel Marra to show that they might have a negative impact on Doha negotiations. But she was not even able to mention that there are victims of attacks in the area or even just to demonize them like the international community did and reduce them to numbers. Is this ethical or intellectual honesty?

The author is a Sudanese based in Kampala; he can be reached at
[email protected]