What the Kampala Attacks Mean for Uganda, the AU, and Somalia

By Shadi Bushra

July 17, 2010 — Somalia’s religious insurgents struck an undeniably forceful blow to Uganda’s sense of security this week. The blasts that tore through Kampala on Sunday were not targeted at strategic interests such as military compounds or energy stores. Rather, they were aiming to disrupt World Cup fans as they celebrated an occasion which hopes to bring countries together in friendly (if sometimes very heated) competition. In this respect, they were the quintessential terrorist attack: aimed at sowing fear and uncertainty in the population, rather than achieving tangible military gains. However there are indeed strategic spoils at stake for al Shabab, Uganda, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

Uganda, along with neighboring Burundi, provides the vast majority of the AMISOM forces that remain the only real impediment to al Shabab’s military takeover of Somalia. Somalia’s own armed forces are negligible and regional powerhouse Ethiopia pulled out of the country a year and a half ago. The terrorist attacks were intended to show the Ugandan people that they stood to pay for their government’s presence in Somalia. The message was simple: convince your government to pull out of Somalia or continue to suffer such attacks.

Whether or not Uganda responds as al Shabab hopes is another story. It is unlikely that Kampala will yield to terroristic demands after such a public attack. The international nature of the bombings further puts Ugandan leaders in the global spotlight. Africans, Europeans, and Americans were all victims of the attack, and there is undoubtedly pressure from those governments that the responsible parties should be punished, not rewarded. The swift US response underscores this international resolve; an FBI team was on the scene within a day, and President Barack Obama immediately called his Ugandan counterpart to offer continued support.

Aside from preserving its national pride and keeping relations warm with powerful allies, Uganda stands to encourage its own extremists by giving in. In fact, Kampala seems intent on taking advantage of this incident to increase pressure on such domestic agitators, rather than cave in to extremist demands. Even without any disclosed evidence, investigators have already claimed that the attackers needed Ugandan support to pull off the bombings. Whether there are indeed links that can’t be made public yet or if it is another political ploy is yet to be seen.

President Museveni’s reaction seems expected in this context. Lashing out at opposition leaders who want to reduce Uganda’s commitment in Somalia in the wake of the attack, he said,
“Those who argue that the best way of avoiding trouble is to surrender Africa to terrorists from the Middle East, then they are definitely wrong.” Drawing parallels to his guerilla struggle, he goes on to say that, “We fought for freedom, not for slavery from some confused groups in the Middle East.” The words are clearly intended to encourage Ugandans to support an African solution in Somalia, spearheaded by themselves.

Aside from his rhetorical response, Museveni reacted by increasing Uganda’s presence in Somalia by 2,000 troops. He also intends to use his position as host of the next African Union meeting to reassess the AU’s mandate in Somalia. Museveni, as well as other leaders, hope the African Union will vote to upgrade the 6,000 strong peacekeeping force to a 25,000 strong peace enforcing mission. A midway point between peacekeeping and peacemaking, peace enforcement will allow troops greater leeway in responding to attacks on themselves and civilians.

This is perhaps the exact opposite of what al Shabab wanted to happen. While some in Uganda are pushing for a pullout, it seems like Ugandan troops will be in Somalia for some time. Like terrorist attacks in the past, al Shabab has made Uganda’s presence in Somalia a personal matter. President Museveni has vowed to avenge the deaths, and it seems as though many Ugandans support this tact. Only time will tell how much treasure and blood the Ugandan people are willing to expend on revenge. Once the emotions ebb, some will begin asking more forcefully how much Somalia matters to Uganda’s long term interests.

For the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, the attacks have served a positive purpose. The world’s eyes are again trained on Somalia, and many are seeing it as the new battleground for the war on terror. The promise of more international troops will increase the chances of the TFG coming to power as an actual government. To them, anything is better than their current position as a government-in-exile that controls no more than a few blocks of the country. However, as has so often been the question in the past, are the interests of the Transitional Federal Government truly the interests of the Somali people? Given how fractured Somalia’s politics and society is, the question remains unanswered.

The African Union can either emerge a big winner or a huge loser from this situation. If, as Uganda is suggesting, they put another 20,000 pairs of boots on the ground in Somalia, they may be able to turn the tide of the stalemated war in their favor. However, they also run the risk of overcommitting and still failing – the worst possible outcome for the regional body. If the gamble pays off, and Somalia is stabilized, it would be the largest success in the history of the African Union. Widely criticized as an organ of dictators and despots, such a victory would allow the AU to claim the title of a democracy promoting, nation-building body of African countries. But if the American experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries are to teach them anything, it is that nation-building is much more difficult than fighting a war. And given Africa’s record of falling short when it comes to contributing the troops, money, and logistical support necessary, it is likely that the words and promises will outpace the progress on the ground.

For al Shabab, it seems as though they miscalculated how weak Uganda’s resolve was. While common sense would suggest that more African Union troops in Somalia could hurt their chances of a military takeover, there is another argument to be made. A greater foreign presence could unify the country’s many disparate clans and armed factions to oppose the African Union as one. However, given the lack of unity in Somali history and the particularly fractured nature of the country at the moment, this seems unlikely. The biggest benefit of such an attack is the international attention, and the surge in membership and support that comes with it. Somali-Americans have been lining up to join their struggle for years, and one can expect to see al Qaeda provide more material and logistical support to the group now that it has proven its international bona fides.

If African and Western opposition to the group is as strong as it has been made to seem in the previous week, global attention and more popularity among extremists won’t matter. Giving the AU the benefit of the doubt and assuming that it follows through with a troop buildup, AMISOM will be able to secure Mogadishu for the Somali government-in-exile. With time, commitment, and international support, AMISOM may be able to push such armed groups to the fringes of Somali society – but they will remain players in the nation’s politics for some time to come.

Shadi Bushra is the Editor-in-Chief of the Stanford Progressive and a contributor for The Citizen. He can be reached for comment at [email protected]