Sudan Capsules: D07. Darfur: Why is Doha “Process” failing and who is responsible?

By Tag Elkhazin*

July 31, 2010

1- The mess in the “Process Structures”
2- “Isn’t it time for this knight to dismount” : Djibril Bassole (Mr. Bassole): Mediator turned political analyst and “roaming ambassador”
3- Scenarios for the Comprehensive Political Settlement Process (CPSP)

“Capsules” is an ad-hoc series of short notes focusing on three issues relating to Sudan:
1. Darfur,
2. South Sudan,
3. Nile Waters.

The notes shall focus on facts and on realistic analysis and possible scenarios. The notes are meant to be unbiased and representing only the views of Subsahara Centre-Ottawa. They are self-funded by Subsahara Centre. No comments or dialogue over the Capsules is expected.

This Capsule Note D07 is inspired by two events: The apparent loss and disorientation of the Joint AU/UN Chief Mediator for Darfur (JAU-UN-CMD) Mr. Djibril Bassole and the continued unbecoming statements from Mr. Bassole and from the Qatari State actors dealing with the file. It is also inspired, in part, by the emerging news that Libya may be a revived actor in Darfur Political Settlement file.

Summary

If one has a bad driver who wrecks cars every-now-and-then, one does not continue purchasing new cars, but thinks about asking the driver to look for another job. That is what we will try to prove is a better remedy for Darfur Process. After Mediation travelled in all directions, talked to all people, begged all leaders, gathered all the Movements’ and Political Formations’ leaders, their relatives and friends, flew out IDPs, Refugees, Darfur Society, envoys and representatives of External Stakeholders, built and structured “Movement (s)” and split others they now decided to recess talks. One reason given is the Muslim Fasting Months that does not start until August 12th (and one cannot see why talks do not continue during the Fasting Month). Another reason given is that the very IDPs/Refugees that were flown in to legitimize the lame talks between GOS and LJM have shocked Mediation with their maturity and solid ceiling of demands. A third reason that is not much publicized, is that all of a sudden, Mediation realized that the “Trade Mark” of “Rebel Movements” were still with Mr. Abdulwahid and Dr. Khalil. The talks will recess on July 17th and are not expected to resume until end of August! Or may be after the Hajj (November 14th, 2010)

Mr. Djibril Bassole has requested the President of South Sudan Gen Salva Kiir to intervene to convince Abdulwahid and Khalil to join/rejoin the talks. This is the third time he makes that request directly or indirectly. Mr. Bassole does not know that late Gen Yousif Ahmed Yousif met with late Dr. John Garang on a similar mission. Garang had considerable respect for the late General Yousif. The mission did not work and Garang advised Gen Yousif that the war was not about “Personal Grievances” that can be resolved through personal mediation. That a proper Political Settlement was needed. Why does Mr. Bassole assume that Dr. Khalil and Mr. Abdulwahid are not carrying legitimate causes in their struggle? Why, after he has failed, they would listen to anyone else for the third time? What can President Kiir do that he (Bassole), while wearing three hats of the UN/AU/LAS, has failed to do?

President Kiir can take an initiative of his/SPLM’s own fabric rather than saving the face of Mr. Bassole. Both Dr. Khalil and Mr. Abdulwahid need to be careful about ceremonial meetings and initiatives delved into without solid groundwork that improves the opportunity for yielding results. Abdulwahid sent a delegation that stayed in Juba for weeks on end and were finally –literally-asked to leave as Abdulwahid failed to show up.

Such an initiative needs to be between “Institutions” and on “Strategic” principles so that the parties can build on it and not between “leaders” and then the initiative evaporates into thin air (as it did before). It will be unwise if President Kiir expects Dr. Khalil and Mr. Abdulwahid to come to Juba right away. The timing of such an initiative is important so that the SPLM/A and GOSS are not occupied or pre-occupied with pressing issues. The “Objectives” and the raison de être must also be clear and doable to avoid “Public Relations” Activities that are a waste of time. Can that happen without serious ramifications in the relations between GOSS and GOS?

Under Clement Ganda, under Edward Lino, under Aziz Al Hilo and with the involvement of Dr. Ann Ito and others, the SPLM has tried to build up a file and portfolio for Darfur and they failed. They must do things differently.

Sadig Al Mahdi was Prime Minister of Sudan during the Third Democracy. Between 1986 and 1989 he changed, dissolved, reshuffled his cabinet time and again thinking that it was “Them” and not “he” were to blame for failure of governance. He was wrong and he had to fall. Do we have a synonymous situation here?

Do we still remember the bad driver who is wrecking cars?

It is pressing to call a spade-a-spade. Doha has failed; no mincing of words. The talks will freeze by July 17th and are expected to resume in one to three months time (Does anyone really know?); if they ever resume. There are signs of fragmentation within LJM and as we said before: Watch Mahgoub Hussien . The participation of the Movement that forms the spine of the rebellion in Darfur is on-hold and the gap between them and Mr. Bassole is widening by the day as he is trying to blame his failures on them. The other Movement with the wider popular support among the Fur Tribe never participated in the venue/process

If GOS/NCP were not still using the usual security lens to deal with Darfur/Movements, GOS should have been the first party to request the suspension of negotiations until, at least, JEM is back in the Process. We need to wait and see what will transpire from Dr. Ghazi’s statement that revision/re-evaluation needs to be done for Doha Process. We also need to see what he went out with to, and came back with, from Doha. Will that make both Mr. Bassole and Qatar stop and think/rethink? Not tactically, but strategically. Are they recessing the talks because he is miffed with Mediation?

The content of this paper exposes and details why Doha has failed and shall continue to fail unless structural reforms are done to the Process and competent mediation personnel are engaged . We cannot beat about the bush and look “elsewhere” while the main fault-line is in Mediation.

A- The mess in the process structures

A robust Mediation Process must (at least) have:

1- Framing of Issues (DOP) that meets the agreement of the belligerent parties.

2- A well designed gathering Process: Not a Bazaar.

3- Impartial venue and mediator who know his/her/their role.

4- The mediator must have the continued and sustained confidence of the parties.

5- The Mediator is a “Facilitator” and not an “Umpire” dictating on parties.

6- He/she must “level the field” and make sure both/all belligerents are treated equal.

7- He/she must have the capacity, knowledge and resourcefulness to generate seeds of options and must be able to open windows when doors are shut.

8- The venue provider does not have to be part of the mediation team. He/she/they have no right to “elbow” others otherwise we will have “Power Mediation” that does not work.

9- The Process must be “at arms’ length” from State Actors

10- Trust fund(s) must be at arms’ length from donors.

11- Define Primary and Secondary Stakeholders and Beneficiaries on clear criteria

12- Track I is for Primary Stakeholders only and an independent from Track(s) II or III for other stakeholders

13- “Process Friends” must organize themselves as think tank and at arms’ length from Mediation.

14- Stay the course: “process not content”

15- Liberal timeframe

16- Experts for the parties upon their request.

17- Curtail media and bullies

18- “Pressure” is the wrong tool and the wrong term. Encouragement is a better approach.

19- He/she must be fully conversant with the “TOOLS” needed for mediation and he/she must be aware of the limitations of those tools especially “Shuttle Diplomacy”

Do we have that in Doha? Or, what do we have in Doha?

We have an “Incrementally Driven Approach”-Not a “Process” in Doha

1- Mediation dives in with green “assumptions”.

2- Even worse, dives in with “People”. The lessons taught to mediation and LJM by the very IDPs and Refugees who were flown in to bestow legitimacy on the process were a blow to both Mediation and LJM. It was that single unexpected outcome that sobered up Mediation to their mess.

3- Over-dependence on “Shuttle Diplomacy”. We have “Mobile Mediation”.

4- The AU-UN CM is more into the “Content” than the “Process”, passing judgements and sometime assuming his own moral grounds.

5- While LJM and GOS are negotiating, the top two men in the team flew to meet with Abdulwahid. They “caught the wind” and distracted attention from the failing talks in Doha.

6- Throw in whatever may make a difference.

7- State actors are up to their ears in the Process and throwing in their political and diplomatic prejudices. Qatar and Egypt as example. The fragile Eritrea swaying from camp to camp.

8- Regrettably, Qatar’s PM was close behind his State Minister. This is not an inter-state conflict; it is intra-state conflict that needs independent mediation. He caused and can continue to cause considerable “Unintended negative results”

9- No designed/pre-designed course

10- Events steering the course (People and Process) from day-to-day.

11- Every Tom Dick and Harry in/chipping in

12- “Bullies” coming and going. Gen Scott Gration as example.

13- Infringement on the basic rights of leaders of Movements and Political Formations to ensure their presence close to the venue. Several times this went to mean measures touching the dignity of the leaders. Rule # 1 in Mediation is that Negotiations are out of free will and that the freedom to exit is unconditional.

14- Inability to safely and honourably return field commanders to their bases and/or where they were flown out from. This one snag has eroded considerable confidence in the current Mediation.

15- Even worse is the dishonourable blackmail of Dr. Khalil in N’Djamena airport by Mr. Bassole to fly back to Doha in return for travel documents. He still expected Dr. Khalil to come back to a process he is mediating/co-mediating.

16- Pressure groups/actors having a foot

17- This led to bringing top leaders to the hall. That is taboo in professional mediation. Mediation does not seem to have a clue about “Re-entry” procedures. The leaders were wrong in cornering themselves in Doha and the Mediation was grossly wrong in bringing them and humiliating them by holding them to ransom as they were not, and still are not, sure if they will come back again. What kind of Mediation is that which does not respect the free will of the adversaries?

18- More than one boss and more than one frame of reference: UN/AU/LAS /Qatar

19- “Multi-track” process that needs a team of geniuses who are not there.

20- Serious activities brewed outside the Process and venue. GOS/JEM agreement in N’Djamena as example. Addis and Tripoli mini-processes as examples.

21- Emotional blackmail by concentrating leverage on Movements on violence and suffering of the communities rather than addressing root causes.

22- Disastrous mix between Track I and Track II.

23- Childish rivalry between incompetent heads of departments and organizations dealing with the Process.

24- Seeking “Quick Results” and not Quality Product” dictates

25- And the list can go on.

B- Where are the “Gaps” in Doha?

1. Only bipolar parties (LJM and GOS)

2. There is no Universal DOP

3. There is no Exclusive “Unbiased” retreat venue

4. The Chief Mediator has not got the Professional Capacity to manage the Process and keep it on track.

5. Let alone run a multi-track, multi party Process.

6. There is only ONE Movement that meets the entire 8 points criteria

7. There are four distinct entities: JEM, SLM-A/W, LJM and the Road Map which are still not fully harmonized. That is not all. Some Movements/Formations never came to Doha and some came and left. That left Mediation wondering “Who really represents Darfurians?”When President Mbeki brought in “Civil Society” meaning “Darfur Society” in his AUPD report. Mr. Bassole had to jump on that first.

8. A big gap was the threatening tone of Mediation that talks shall proceed with “Whoever shows up”. That is now bad egg on their face. Do we remember who the “primary Stakeholders?” are?

9. Another glitch was forcing Movements/Formations into LJM structures or else they remain in hotel rooms.

10. The Capacity of all the Movements in 28 identified areas needed for Negotiations was not properly built.

11. The Venue and Mediation are serving for both Track I and Track II. In the last week, Track II (Darfur Society) has torpedoed the fragile Track I between LJM and GOS/NCP. No agreement will be signed on July 15th and LJM may very well crack from within with time. In the absence of a confined geographic location containing them, they are likely to re-fragment.

12. The “Template” of talks is not agreed and is swinging between Protocols and Holistic.

13. There are no proper Forum(s) structured for the International and Regional Communities and for the Secondary Stakeholders.

C- On Mr. Djibril Bassole

1- Darfur conflict is not Togo and the “Inter-Togolese Dialogue” process. It is not Niger and Tuareg. It is not Cote d` Ivoire either. Mr. Bassole was successfully involved in all those with his President Blaise Campaore`. In Darfur, he does not have the direct support of his President and does not have the knowledge of the West African region and its language (French).

2- Mr. Bassole was Foreign Affairs and Regional Cooperation (FA) Minister under President Campaore from June 2007 to September 2008.15 months of “International Diplomacy” seemed to have been enough to qualify him for the job. His country’s non-permanent membership in the UNSC in 2008 may have helped his appointment without the required proficiency in either English or Arabic languages. But do we need communication and cross-cultural skills in Mediation?!

3- Before his FA portfolio, he was in charge of security in Burkina Faso for 7 years. It is unfortunate for Darfur that all the lenses of all the regional stakeholders seem to be the security lens. He never came to a position of leadership through the ballot boxes to learn how to win over human beings and win their hearts and minds.

4- His boss (President) has been in power for 23 years. Two years more than President Beshir. Mr. Bassole may not be able to conceive “Power Sharing” or “Compromise”. Those terms are taboo in dictatorial language.

5- While Ethiopia chaired the OAU/AU 4 times, Egypt 3 times, Nigeria 3 times, Burkina Faso and Sudan chaired it once; at least a shared commonality with Mr. Bassole’s country.

6- We raised our hats before for Ambassador Allan Goulty before he engaged in the IGAD file as UK Representative; he took a sabbatical and did a degree in Conflict Management at Harvard and took Sudan as his study case. In Doha, we do not see the Max Plancks, The Goulty(s), the ICGs, the JAM , Concordis, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, John Young , Prendergast and the Clingendaels. Who then is generating and developing options? Who is doing the research needed for the Process? Where are the skills to facilitate? Do proper “Gathering Process” to replace the current Bazaar? UNAMID’s selection of IDPs to go to Doha representing Darfur Society (as wrong as their presence in Track I may be), is being subjected to vetting of GOS/NCP. The return of Refugees from Doha was delayed for 2 days due to “Clearance Procedures”.

7- IDPs and Refugees were flown to Doha last week and it is rumoured that they were offered “incentives” to bless Doha and LJM as the only legitimate apparatus. That was dashed. They were up to the level of responsibility expected of them. They insisted that JEM and SLM-A/W must be in the process. They reiterated the ceilings of demands of both JEM and SPL-A/W as basic demands. Now Mr. Bassole has adopted those “pre-requisites” of Abdulwahid. GOS were knocked off their feet as they thought that LJM was an easy target to be driven to sign an agreement by July 15th. LJM position was certainly buttressed by the strong avocation of the IDPs and Refugees for their basic rights. It is ironic that on July 15th the talks were destined to be recessed and no agreement signed.

8- The news also goes that the Refugees have left in discontent after making their point that without JEM and SLM mainstreams there will be no solutions. That is not a surprise for anyone who read the survey report of “24 hours for Darfur of New York ”.

9- The IDPs were thought to be a different story and no one knew what their composition and affiliation were, now that many of the “Real” IDPs have declined to participate. They were a massive disappointment to Mediation as they stood their grounds and made demands that are not far from those of the two mainstream Movements JEM and SLM. The communiqué of the “collective” Darfur Society (IDPs representatives, Refugees Representatives and Darfur Society Representatives) is expected to be issued today July 15th, 2010 and may set the initial tone for any future rounds of talk in Doha or elsewhere.

10- Conflict Management under the difficult and sensitive conditions we have for Darfur has two main enemies: State Actors and biased and ignorant media . We have both in Doha. Between Presidents Beshir, Deby, Mubarak, Gaddafi, Afworki and with Emir Hamad and Ministers Bin Jassim and Al Mahmoud, we have an uncoordinated team of political players with varying and changing political prejudices. Abuja I (on North-South Civil War) was wrecked primarily by the over-intervention of President Babangida. IGAD was a disaster until president Daniel Arap Moi gracefully realised that he was doing more damage than good by poking his nose into the affairs of mediation. Contrary to many analyses, Abuja II on Darfur was seriously compromised by the power brokerage of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Robert Zoellick and Hilary Ben. The Arab Media lacks constructive criticism and honest coverage. State controlled media can only be biased to the “party line” of the State. The international credible media is no longer interested in Darfur and less interested in its Political File.

11- In the IGAD Process and with the more formidable IGAD Partners Forum (IPF), several countries had positively impacting presence through very powerful political actors. They did not only act as funders for the Process, but also as “Pro Bono” Think Tank for the parties. They managed to isolate and bar any “spoilers” from encroaching on the Process. (Egypt and the NDA as example). They made sure with Mediation that ONLY Primary Stakeholders who can impact on the conflict were in the room.

12- Communities and Societies have their own Track II forums. That is more graceful than having them on the margin as “observers” in Track I. At one time, Canada was interested in helping with such Track II; but Mediation were not enthusiastic.

13- The “International Observers” that show up in Doha now (when they show up), are junior diplomats or consultants-turned-diplomats. Does anyone REALLY care?

14- Between President Mbeki, President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi (AU Chair) and Dr. Jean Ping of Gabon (AU Commission) and the entourage of SG Ban Ki Moon, Mr. Bassole and Minister Al mahmoud, we have another level of power struggle and diversity. “Too many chefs scrambling in the same kitchen”.

15- When there is no solid and durable Declaration of Principles (DOP), any product is susceptible to infringements or even de facto abrogation. This happened to the Document of “Goodwill” between JEM and GOS of February 17th 2009 and one year later the same fate faced the “Framework Agreement” of February 23rd, 2010 between the same parties. In both agreements both Al mahmoud and Bassole are witnesses (But there are no guarantors).

16- Now Mr. Bassole is challenged: The Libyans are coming! By barring JEM’s Dr. Khalil from entering N’Djamena, Chad gave a God-sent gift to Libya. Weapons supplies to JEM were coming from Libya anyway (JEM are denying that), but through Chad. Now they can come directly. Khartoum is doomed if they quarrel with Tripoli and are doomed if they do not; and accept the status quo. Dr. Khalil has been very quiet for the last two weeks. We call this “ducking” and it is a wise policy at this time and conditions. The International Community being used to noises and tactics of “we are still here” may be misinterpreting this ducking for lack of interest or resourcefulness.

17- Mr. Bassole was very crude when he flew to N’Djamena and offered Dr. Khalil travel documents if he would go back to Doha. A rather pathetic approach. No one in his right mind would negotiate “Under duress”, but I presume Mr. Bassole does not know what that means.

18- The big question is: Why Dr. Khalil in person? He signed an agreement by first initials in N’Djamena, signed an agreement in the presence of President Beshir in Doha on February 23rd, and before that signed the Doha “Good Will” document on February 17th, 2009. He is not far from the “Process” and he has solid and knowledgeable lieutenants dealing with Negotiations.

19- A possible scenario is that JEM/Libya will wait for Doha/Bassole to deal with and complete an agreement through the current talks between GOS and LJM and/or recess the talks and either of those will burn the LJM team and their document agreement of March 18th 2010 will go into the same dust bin of Fashoda September 20th 1997, Khartoum April 21st 1997, , Cairo with NDA/DUP June 18th 2005, Protocol on the Enhancement of the Security Arrangements Abuja November 9th 2004, Ceasefire agreement with Abdulwahid Abache September 3rd 2003 and Djibouti with Umma among Others . Would Mr. Bassole wish to end his engagement like that? Join the Ian Pronks, Sam Iboks and the Salems?

20- An opportunity prevailed itself in the LAS mini-summit of Tripoli on June 28th whence Amir Hamad could have possibly met with JEM/Dr. Khalil. That meeting did not take place and instead a tense meeting between Khalil and Al Mahmoud took place. Al Mahmoud was defensive of Doha’s mess and Khalil did not want to know until LJM is done and out. That fits well with Libya’s plans. Did the Libyans have anything to do with lowering the level of the meeting with JEM? It is a blessing in disguise that the meeting did not take place. Neither Doha nor any other retreat/venue shall work if high-profile State Actors are meddling in the mediation.

21- Then the game will start between GOS/NCP and JEM. The borders between Sudan and Libya are officially closed as of July 1st 2010. The borders between Sudan and Libya are 383 KM of the Libyan Dessert and hell-on-earth. This is compared to 1360 KM between Chad and Sudan that gave more porosity to JEM. Libya has 1055 KM of borders with Chad that are practically no-man’s land.

22- Will GOS have an option not to go to a Tripoli brokered process if JEM does not want to go to Doha? Will Doha/Mr. Bassole have any business to do if LJM’s business is done and JEM is not returning? Of course! Khartoum may refuse to negotiate under a Libyan flag. The fighting goes on and Libya pours more resources into JEM’s capacity and Darfur is set more ablaze again. Libya brings other current Darfur Political Formations under their wing to integrate within the umbrella of JEM and pre-empty Doha and its JAU-UN CMD. When the flames die, both parties will come to the table under international pressure emanating from an aggravated “Humanitarian Crisis” rather than taking the short cut and dealing with a “Political File”. By that time we hope Mr. Bassole will be in Ouagadougou helping President Campaore’ and his party with the elections.

23- One would love to see what the League of Arab States (LAS) and Mr. Amru Musa will do! Will they support? Oppose? Mediate? Will they lean North Africa? Gulf? Does anybody really care what they do? Will the SG of the LAS be satisfied with such comments as he has recently passed on the tension between Sudan and Libya that he “hopes” it does not turn into a dispute?

24- Qatar, Doha and Minister Al Mahmoud shall be there and all they would have lost is a few million Cubic Feet of Natural Gas traded for part of the cost of the expenses of the long feast and party of 8 months so far! I say part of the cost as the main spending is from a “Trust Fund” in which many nations are contributing. The Qataris are not footing all the bills.

25- Darfur and Sudan lose.

26- In Khartoum on July 20th 2008 Mr. Bassole said “It is not mission impossible”. Exactly two years later, it is still “Mission Impossible” for him. Even worse, his lack of leadership and over-reliance on shuttle diplomacy, have made the situation worse. “Elbowing” by Minister Al Mahmoud and party did not help either. There are more splinter groups, more “bullies” and Track I and Track II mixed together for results that may prove catastrophic.

27- After Gen Gration’s “stampede” and globe-trotting, where is he now-a-days? It seems that Darfur has fallen through his cracks. Movements and formations of Darfur do not even want to see him.

28- Now more on Mr. Bassole :

a- In Paris, Mr. Bassole asks the GOS/NCP for the following steps (In public and not in the Process in Doha or a secret meeting in Khartoum): 1- Improve the security situation: Isn’t that what Abdulwahid kept saying for ages? 2- Cessation of hostilities: Isn’t that what JEM and Abdulwahid have been asking for? 3- Facilitate the return of IDPs/Refugees to their homelands: Isn’t that the universal demand of all the movements and the aggrieved parties in Darfur? 4- Reconstruction of Darfur so that it would have “Normal economic activities”. Isn’t that Post Conflict Reconstruction? Does he really expect that to happen during the conflict? If all that is done why on earth would anyone need his services?

b- Now if he has a forum that he runs in Doha, why is he coming out public and in Paris?

c- Mr. Bassole has wondered who is representing Darfurians. Isn’t it LJM? Solely and exclusively? If not, what and why is he mediating them and GOS? Why has he been knocked off his feet when JEM froze their participation? In which mediation process did he see communities and secondary “stakeholders” in the negotiating hall?

d- We are told be an eye witness that all that Mr. Bassolé does when he meets with Rebel Leaders is to “Plea to them” to engage! With Abdulwahid it was actually pathetic. He has no options to offer. No incentives to offer. No new windows to offer.

e- Mr. Bassole in his despair in Paris wants to do DDR before an agreement is signed. He has asked for the integration of those carrying weapons into regular forces of GOS.

f- Now he is turning into an African Politician confirming the robustness of the Chad-Sudan agreement and the correctness of Deby’s actions against Dr. Khalil. He may not know that Deby is on a hot tin roof now from his Zaghawa aides. Reversal is not at all ruled out.

g- The controversial Mr. Bassole dared to criticise BOTH Mr. Abdulwahid and Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. That is taboo in Mediation. He does not know or has forgotten that when the legendary Nelson Mandela criticized the rebels of Burundi after a mediation session he was managing, he burnt himself as “Mediator”. Now so did Bassole. And we ALL cannot walk in the empty shoes of Mandela.

h- Then he contradicts himself in the event of the Arab Press Club in Paris by saying: “If Khalil and Abdulwahid wish to join in, they are welcome if not, we are proceeding”. But then he says (and he knows) that there is need for a comprehensive settlement!!

i- Then he makes a rather condemning statement that should never come out of a Mediator: A Judgement: That the situation of the Movements is to the pleasure of GOS/NCP as they do not have to give any concessions! I am not sure if the UN and AU listen to what he says. This is taboo in Mediation. This man is acting as a State Actor and not as Mediator. Chose one Mr. Bassole.

j- The big question is: Why does he have to talk so much? He is advised to go back to the record of General Lazarus Sumbeiywo in IGAD and the Record of Yamani Gabriab in Asmara.

Do we still remember Sadig Al Mahdi as the ONLY “Constant” between 1986-1989?

29- Mr. Bassole tells the UN that he is working to resolve Darfur issues before the January 9th 2011 Referendum! I wonder who “resolves”, in proper mediation, it is the two parties and the Mediator is not more than a “catalyst”.

30- On the 25th of June 2010 Mr. Bassole described Abdulwahid’s prerequisites as “obstructive”. In the same date, he reiterated those prerequisites are important steps for GOS to do if peace is to be achieved!

31- On June 7th 2010 Minister Al Mahmoud stated in the last session of that round of the process that “Darfur people have chosen their representatives”. That was less than wise. Why then is he hosting a Process if the people have said their word?

32- Just after it became known that JEM could not go back to/through Chad, PM Hamad bin Jassim told JEM when they asked for a plane to take them to Asmara that he will provide the plane but he cannot guarantee where it will land. That was said when Khalil requested a plane weeks before JEM”s departure to Cairo. He was wrong and he was not diplomatic. It is such non-thoughtful comments that may hurt JEM for long and work to bar them from returning to Doha.

33- Seeing Minnie jittery and nervous, GOS has decided to compensate the ex-combatants phase II of the too young and old ex-combatants and who are not willing to join the armed/security forces. 2724 of them. Funds have already been paid to them. 47 officers and privates for police and 57 officers and 1385 privates for the Army. Solders pay loyalty and salute those who pay their salaries.

34- On July 6th 2010, Mr. Bassole called on Khartoum to “stop violence and restore confidence”. He went on to tell Dr. Ghazi to “reduce tensions”, “seeking an end to all armed hostilities”. He went on to request facilitation of all the selected Darfur Society (he calls them civil society) to attend the July 12th event in Doha with only LJM talking to GOS. Regrettably Darfur Society got entangled between President Mbeki and Mr. Bassole and their tensions. Mr. Bassole brings down the file of Darfur Society when the chips of Doha are down.

35- We have been informed by credible sources that Mr Bassole has been lobbying against JEM in Western capitals. In one incident he explicitly advised against high level consultations with JEM. This “back-biting” is dishonourable and will harden JEMs position not to deal with Mr. Bassole. The lobby did not work and the meetings went on. This is the beauty of the Western World: They offer space and want to make their own opinion.

36- Mr. Bassole has told the German Government false and distorted analysis about JEM’s position. That he advised a member of the House of Lords in London not to facilitate any meetings between JEM and the British Government for fear that it will harden their position. This “back-biting” is dishonourable and will harden JEMs position not to deal with Mr. Bassole.

37- As if one Mr. Bassole is not more than enough for Darfur: On July 6th 2010 in Rotana Salam Hotel, Mr. Gambari was quoted saying “ UNAMID faces challenges from the fighting between GOS and JEM and SLM Abdulwahid” The question will be: Why on earth are the LJM talking in Doha?. He also saw the “biggest challenge” as the freezing of JEM for its participation in the talks. What are you doing about it? What is Doha doing about it without insulting and belittling JEM?

38- Totally contrary to Mr. Bassole’s statement in New York, Gambari says they cannot confirm the UN/AU can conclude peace by the end of the year, but they will try their best. To put us in some despair, he confirmed that UNAMID forces are on the ground at 92% and CIVPOL at 84% from the designed numbers . And the war goes on and the violence goes on. Is UNAMID REALLY capable of defending the Civilian Population even where they are deployed? Even if the mandate is strengthened? He needs “One transport plane” unless Al Sahafa Daily is mistaken and he needs “Early Warning Systems”. That is all.

39- The “Level of Effort” of UNAMID in Darfur now is about one peacekeeper for every 25 Square Kilometres (20,000 for 493000 Sq Km) of territory. In Iraq’s current invasion at its peak it is one soldier for every 2.7 Sq. Km. (160,000 for 438,000 Sq. Km.). In Desert Storm 1991 it was 2.5 soldiers for every Sq. Km. (956,000 for 438,000 Sq Km). In Afghanistan at its peak, the Combined Allied Forces were 391,600 forces for an area of 647,000 Sq. Km. giving one soldier for every 1.6 Sq. K. How can UNAMID do the Job?

40- Dr. Ghazi has called for “re-inventing” of Doha Process. That means the “invention” is not working. Would one who is engaged in Mediation and who respects himself (as Joint Mediator) have resigned after such a strong statement? This came after he stated that”… the process did not achieve the desired outcome” Flat on Mr. Bassole’s face!

41- Dr. Ghazi listed four very interesting spheres of activities . 1- Delivering dividends to the people. 2- Building institutions of governance in Darfur. 3- Peace and humanitarian issues. 4- Relations with neighbouring countries. This is a mix of “in conflict activities” and post conflict activities. They are all valid provided there is “vehicle” to deliver peace in Darfur. That vehicle, or “Doha”, is in limbo.

42- It will be interesting to find out the contents of the message from President Bashir to Emir Hamad bin Khalifa delivered at low-profile by Ambassador Ibrahim Fagiri to Minister Al Mahmoud on July 1st, 2010.

43- Was not Sirte 27-10-2007 under the auspices of the same UN/AU? It failed. Now Doha under the auspices of the AU/UN (Including the LAS), may be the same umbrella can shelter another venue somewhere sometime and Darfur people must wait for mediators to try their hands on the file.

44- In Executive Interviews with several leaders of the Road Map groups (main bodies that did not join LJM) still in Doha and those who gracefully left Doha, they stated that what is keeping them/ their colleagues from leaving Doha are two things: 1- That they cannot afford to buy their own tickets. 2- That the Qataris told them it will be an “embarrassment” for Qatar if they leave before LJM signed an agreement. That is the main difference between a Movement meeting the 8 international criteria and a “Political Formation” that can be easily trapped. Some were considering self-funding their exit from Doha to preserve their dignity.

45- The Road Map groups were advised to make one of two decisions: 1- Either to Join LJM as Qatar/Mr. Bassole want them to do or 2- Leave Doha as soon as possible if they do not wish to engage in the talks as part of LJM. It is very humiliating for them to linger around for lack of $400 per person to take them to safety and dignity. It is also a very poor show to stick around so as not to “embarrass” Qatar. Is that acceptable by the people of Darfur? This will be a lesson for any future talks in Doha that “house arrest” is on the list.

46- If Libya decides to enter the game afresh, Mr. Bassole will be out of business by July end of whence he sees to the recession of the talk between GOS and LJM.

47- If not, I see JEM raising the ceiling of their demands for reformation of the process in their 9 points document to include a 10th point requesting the removal of Mr. Bassole.

48- Darfur Movements have not been able to rethink the “Judiyya Modality” and are giving Mediation in Doha and elsewhere a status and power that Mediation must not have and should not have. In a levelled field, the Rebel Movements and GOS negotiating are on equal footing. If any party loses confidence in Mediation, a Mediation/Mediator who respects himself makes his exit.

49- The Movements, as well, are finding it difficult to differentiate between “negotiation” and “process”, between content and process. JEM came out of that when they wrote their 9 points request for reform of Mediation to Ban Ki-moon.

50- One never gets a second chance to make a first impression. Mr. Bassole and company have moved from failure to failure. The puzzling question is: Why is Mr. Bassole still there? Why doesn’t the “Knight Dismount” gracefully admitting failure or more palatably, “lack of cooperation”! This way another possible person, process, country or mechanism may be available to pick up the pieces. But do Africans resign?

51- Do you remember Sadig Al Mahdi and the car wrecking driver? Mr. Bassole cannot be the only “constant” in the Political Process and should not be allowed to wreck more cars.

52- Some of the blood currently being spilled in Darfur since May 2010 (Government or Armed Movements makes no difference) lies squarely in the hands of Djibril Bassole and company and their failure to manage the Process .

What Next

Best Case Scenario

1- For the UN/AU to appoint another and more qualified and experienced Joint Mediator and make sure that there is a competent team of experts around him.

2- Appoint the AU-UN JM in consultation with BOTH GOS and the “noteworthy” Rebel Movements.

3- Limit the intervention of the LAS to balance the roles of the Arabs and Africans in the file. The file is currently too much in the domain of Arab Countries.

4- Select an independent venue and independent funding both at miles distance from State Actors. The venue needs to be accessible for entry and exit by the Movements without harassment.

5- The new team to start by drafting a credible DOP.

6- Set a pre-venue and pre-process for coordination between the noteworthy Movements culminating in a “combined and harmonized” negotiating team. The noteworthy Movements will never merge as they aspire to become political parties competing for the political power in Darfur after a settlement is reached.

7- The new mediation to set out designing the Gathering Process and the Mediation Process.

8- At the centre of that design needs to be the separation of Track I and Track II. The later dealing with Darfur Society and brainstorming for Track I Process.

9- Parallel to those preparatory activities, to build the capacity of the noteworthy Movements to better equip them for the talks.

10- With the support of the UN and the AU see to the pre-requisites to create a conducive atmosphere on the ground for the talks. Both GOS and the Movements will have their pre-requisites.

11- The AU/UN to strengthen the Humanitarian Framework for Darfur to deal with the Humanitarian Situation and leave the Political Process free to deal with the Comprehensive Settlement.

12- Mediation and the AU/UN to create a Forum of Darfur Friends from countries that can have value added to the Process, do not act as spoilers and that will act as donors and think tank for the Political process.

13- Curtail Media

14- Generous timelines. The files cannot be resolved in months and no one can say when they will be resolved.

15- While Darfur is not South Sudan, lessons learned from the IGAD Process can be useful.

16- Put a cap on shuttle diplomacy, bullies and amateur personnel

17- Limit the role and presence of any “observers”

18- Stay the course

Middle Case Scenario

1- Libya takes over the Process Venue and GOS agrees to talk to JEM in Libya.

2- Libya offers a safe retreat for the talks and for the capacity building of the Movements.

3- The UN/AU continue to be the legal umbrella for the talks.

4- Libyan State Actors stay out of the Process

5- Abdulwahid and his group agree to coordinate with JEM

6- Libya offers a second, separate venue at a distance from Track I venue for Darfur Society and their Track II encounter.

7- Follow the same Process template and frame of Best Case Scenario above

Worst Case Scenario

1- Doha/Bassole/Al mahmoud set remains.

2- The recess proposed for July 17th is effected

3- Bassole continues his shuttle diplomacy and damaging PR campaign.

4- Qatar State actors continue meddling in the talks

5- The Process is not reformed and noteworthy Movements are reluctant to travel to Doha even if they decide to re-engage; for fear of being stranded.

6- Business as usual and only LJM re-engages.

7- GOS/NCP sees the futility of Doha and Mr. Bassole and settles for the “Status Quo” of no war and no peace.

8- With the countdown for the referendum, the International Community, GOS and GOSS/SPLM are embroiled in their own primary concerns of South Sudan/Unity and Separation issues and Darfur is even fainter in their radar screens

9- Chad seeing that their strategy of pushing JEM to sign an agreement with GOS did not work and reverses gear.

* The author is a consultant at the Subsahara Centre, Ottawa, Canada