Why negotiate again the Sudan’s Abyei region?

By Steve Paterno

October 14, 2010 — The recent negotiation on oil rich region of Abyei, between National Congress Party (CPA) and Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Addis Ababa ended in a deadlock, since both parties could not reach an agreement. Traditionally, the people of Abyei are linked to their kins in South Sudan. But due to administrative reasons, the area was transferred to Kordofan province in the North. After the people of Abyei endured endless wars and oppressions under the successive regimes in Khartoum, it was resolved under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that the people of Abyei shall vote in a referendum scheduled for January 9, 2011, as to whether they want to remain with a special status in the Northern Sudan or join the South, which is destined for independence, early next year. However, the NCP and SPLM cannot agree on the composition of Abyei Referendum Commission, the border demarcation, and the eligibility of the voters so as to allow a successful referendum to take place.

This latest episode marks the fourth in a series of renegotiations on Abyei, after both NCP and SPLM extensively negotiated and agreed previously—on at least three different occasions—notably, the Abyei Protocol, the Abyei Road Map, and the Abyei Arbitration. This then begs the question: why renegotiate on the issues that have been negotiated over and over, and have been agreed upon?

ABYEI PROTOCOL

The Abyei Protocol is a component of the CPA, a landmark agreement signed by the NCP and SPLM, in 2005. The agreement suppose to resolve, once and for all, the conflict in Abyei, along with the South-North war.

This protocol defined Abyei as the area that belongs to the “nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” Accordingly, Abyei territorial boundaries were to be demarcated by Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC). Nonetheless, the NCP rejected the ABC demarcated boundaries of Abyei. This was despite the fact that both the NCP and SPLM agreed that the ABC finding and report should be ‘final and binding.’

On the issue of citizenship of Abyei region, the protocol stated that the residents of Abyei shall be the “members of Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area.” The agreement never specifically identify who are those “other Sudanese.” The criteria for the identifications of those “other Sudanese” residents was left for the Abyei Referendum Commission to determined.

This issue of Abyei residency becomes very contentious in current negotiation between NCP and SPLM, since both sides cannot agree on the criteria to identifying those “other Sudanese” residing in Abyei. The NCP insists that the Misseriya, a nomadic Arab tribe, which graze their animal seasonally in the region, constitutes those “other Sudanese” residents of Abyei. The NCP argument is unfounded in many ways. First, the Abyei Protocol acknowledged Misseriya as a special category of people who “retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei,” meaning, they don’t belong to the territory, but can pass through it, in order to maintain their traditional livelihood. Secondly, under no circumstances that nomads can qualify as eligible residents of an area they are merely crossing through on seasonal basis. Thirdly, the agreement specifically defined the Abyei area as belonging to the Ngok Dinka.

Therefore, the SPLM rejection of inclusion of Misseriya as residents of Abyei has validity to it, both legal and geographical. In order to break this impasse, a real criteria must be adopted in identifying the “other Sudanese” who can be eligible residents of Abyei, and that must take into considerations things such as ancestry, period of residency, marriage, etc.

With respect to Abyei Referendum Commission, the Abyei Protocol stipulated that the commission should have been established in the middle of interim period. However, that was never the case. Since, the NCP rejection of ABC finding and report, Abyei Protocol was invalidated. This led into the other important provisions of the agreement such as the establishment of administrative structure, wealth distribution, and security arrangement to be put into a hold. The condition in Abyei became dire, and with the deterioration of security situation, a war provoked by Khartoum broke out. As a result, the entire town of Abyei was reduced into ashes by Khartoum armed forces. Abyei residents fled for their safety. It was then that the Abyei Protocol was dealt a final blow. The NCP and SPLM went for another round of negotiation. The result of that negotiation was the Abyei Road Map.

ABYEI ROAD MAP

The Abyei Road Map was in part to immediately stop the deteriorating security situation and ensure the safe return of the displaced residents of Abyei to their original homestead. More importantly, the agreement was to salvage the Abyei Protocol, which was all, but decimated. Abyei Road Map contained all the important provisions of Abyei Protocol and it attempted to resolved some of the most contentious issues still being negotiated today.

The Abyei Road Map seek outside professional tribunal to arbitrate the dispute between NCP and SPLM. Both parties then agreed on the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague to settle the Abyei dispute, for the final time. Once again, the issues concerning Abyei was dragged on, that time, leading to The Hague for Abyei Arbitration.

ABYEI ARBITRATION

The main aim of the Abyei Abitration at the PCA was to determine whether or not the ABC had exceeded its mandate when it defined and demarcated the “area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” The NCP position in the dispute was that if the court determined that the ABC did not exceed its mandate, the court should “make a declaration to that effect and issue an award for the full and immediate implementation of the ABC report.” However, if the court ruled that the ABC exceeded its mandate, then the court should “proceed to define the boundaries of the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905, based on the submissions of the parties.” The SPLM was persistent that the ABC report “entitled to final and binding effect,” but in an event that the court determined that it was not, “then it should go on to define the Abyei Area to encompass all of the territory occupied and used by the Ngok Dinka in 1905, including of the northernmost part of that territory which the ABC Experts excluded from their definition of the Abyei Area.”

The PCA ruled in a manner that many believed was a compromise to both parties. At the time, both parties reluctantly accepted the ruling and agreed that it will be subjected into full implementations. More than one year after the ruling, no action is taken in trying to honor the outcome of the court.

The tribunal ruling is significant in two major ways, because it attempts to resolved the two contentious issues currently under dispute: the border demarcation and the eligibility of Abyei residency. First, the ruling clearly defined Abyei boundaries. Therefore, the boundaries should not even be disputed at the moment. Secondly, even though the court was not mandated to set criteria for Abyei residents, by so delimiting the Abyei boundaries, the tribunal automatically excluded other potential Abyei residents from Abyei territory, particularly the Messeriya who are out of range from the territory awarded by the court.

In conclusions, it is pretty obvious that the current issues under dispute, between the NCP and SPLM are issues that both parties already agreed on—at least in separate three agreements and on three different occasions. What is remain is final implementations of these agreements. With time running out for Abyei referendum, the priority must be, an urgent establishment of Abyei Referendum Commission, the composition of which, must reflect the South Sudan Referendum Commission. The eligibility of Abyei voters must consist of Ngok Dinka and other Sudanese residing in Abyei, whom their qualifications can be determined through ancestral linkage, period of residency, marriage, and other relevant criteria. This should not include the other nomadic groups, who are already provided special status to graze their animals in Abyei region. And, of course, the Abyei boundaries are already known. It is only a matter of accepting the drawings of the map. Now, the challenge is on NCP to honor the agreements it signed. However, any attempts in dragging the dispute further, must be seen as a clear sign by NCP in trying to postpone the Abyei Referendum—a plan that can potential lead into full scale South-North war. The international community must rein in to put much needed pressure on NCP to honor the agreements it signed and the pledges it made.