What, or Who, Solves the conflict in Darfur? – Part 1
By Tadjadine Bechir Niam
October 16, 2010 — It has been long since I wrote topics in English, but I feel compelled to present several new ideas, and challenge some of the extreme opinions and theories that have risen to the surface of the political scene in Darfur, Sudan. I have chosen to try and answer the question “What, or Who, Solves the Conflict in Darfur?” Part I of this three part series will set out the history of the Darfur conflict, and the efforts to resolve it. Part II will then detail the rise of the Liberation and Justice Movement/Army (LJM) and its participation in the Doha Peace Process. Finally, Part III will present the argument that the time has come to solve the conflict, and that Doha is place to do it.
I begin with the history of the Darfur conflict and the efforts to bring a lasting and sustainable peace to the region. The conflict in Darfur started publically in February 2003, when two Darfuri groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), claimed political and economic marginalization of the region. The two movements vowed to put an end to this marginalization, and gain more rights and representation for the Darfuri people from the central government in Khartoum.
Shortly after the outbreak of fighting between the movements and the government, the Government of Sudan (GOS) responded viciously by unleashing its army, aided by an organized militia known as the Janajawed. The army and Janjaweed were unrelenting, attacking both the rebels and the civilians in Darfur. The result was unprecedented humanitarian suffering (the greatest share of it put on women children), which received worldwide condemnation and calls to action.
Under the auspices of President Idriss Deby Itno of Chad, assisted by African Union (AU) and Humanitarian Centre for Dialogue, the parties (JEM, SLM & GOS) signed the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on [month] 8th 2004 in N’djamena. The parties promised free access to relief, humanitarian assistance, and the movements of people and goods. The parties also agreed to the disarmament of the Janajawed. Next, in Abuja Nigeria on Nonmember 9,2004 the parties signed two security and humanitarian protocols aimed to enhance the situation in Darfur. Then, on July 7, 2005, also in Abuja, the parties signed the Declaration of Principles (DOC). Regional and international stakeholders and observers heralded the DOC as an important, and serious step towards a political settlement of the conflict.
What followed was not as promising. In April of 2006, a significant Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed. Only one faction, the SLM – Mini Minawi faction, signed the DPA. JEM, SLA-Wahid, SLA-G19 (headed by Khamies Abdalla), as well as many IDPs, refugees, civil society, diaspora, Darfuri intellectuals and even some Sudanese opposition political parties, rejected the DPA and promised to fight its implementation. This was despite the considerable endorsement of the DPA by many in the international community.
Displeased with the DPA, in Asmara, Eretria, the movements united and formed the National Redemption Front (NRA) in July 2006. NRA defeated the GOS in many battles (Hamara –Al Shek, Om Sider, Kulkul, Sauah,Kari Yari, etc.). These military operations, supported by civil acts, forced the regional and international community to accept the reality that the DPA was far from an agreement that would achieve peace in Darfur and Sudan.
Despite the NRA’s military success, it failed to form a political structure, and in early 2007 it fell apart. This brought considerable fragmentation of the Darfuri side. On October 4, 2007, JEM divided into 2 factions: JEM-Collective Leadership (JEM-CL), chaired by Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, and (JEM-Khalil), chaired by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. The SLA also divided. New factions included SLA-Wahid, SLA-Khamis Abdalla, SLA-Ahmed Abdelshafi, SLA-Unity, and SLA-Field Command.
The regional and the international community expressed concern over the division of the movements, seeing this division as an obstacle to any peace talks, and focused its efforts on uniting the movements. On October 2007, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) from South Sudan, aided by the UN/AU, invited all the armed movements to Juba, South Sudan, for a unity conference. Only JEM-Khalil refused (although later its delegation visited Juba for two days). The participants formed two new bodies: the United Resistance Front (URF) which was comprised of JEM-CL, SLA-Main Stream, SLA-Field Command, Movement for National Reformation and Development (MNRD) and the United Revolutionary Front Forces (URFF); the SLA-Juba faction also formed from many original SLA factions, and was chaired by Ahmed Abdelshafi.
While in Juba, the UN/AU invited the Darfur movements to take part in Sirte, Libya peace talks, starting on November 27th, 2007. More than 86 countries’ representatives assembled in Sirte for the first peace forum after Abuja and the signing of the DPA. JEM-Khalil and SLA-Unity refused to attend the conference.
The movements, despite their differences, temporarily came together and produced one strong message to the conference. After one week of discussions, the Mediation and the participants called off the talks for more time to conclude the unity in Juba, and urged the other movements to join them for a comprehensive settlement.
On February 2008, the Government of Sudan supported Chadian rebels nearly took over the capital N’djamena, but President Deby of Chad showed un-expected resistance and firmly stood tall, forcing the rebels to wither back to Sudanese Chadian border. That operation opened the doors for further proxy wars between the two states, including the battle in May 2008, when JEM-Khalil, reportedly supported by Chad, unsuccessfully tried to invade Omdurman, near the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Although unsuccessful, this proved to the Government of Sudan that the capital was no longer as safe and secure as they thought.
In July 2009, the movements (except JEM-Khalil) gathered in Siena, Italy, and attended a workshop on “Darfur at the Crossroads,” organized by George Mason University, collaborating with the University of Siena.
On August 22, 2009, at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and under invitation and supervision of Jonathan S. Gration, Maj Gen, USAF (Ret), who is the US President’s Special Envoy to Sudan, four movements (SLA-Wahid, SLA-Shafi, SLA-Unity, and the URF) agreed to form unity among themselves and seek for general unity of all Darfur an movements within 2 months at the field in Darfur. This created the “Road Map group.” Later in Cairo, Egypt two additional movements, the URFF and the D–JEM, joined the Road Map. At N Ndjamena, Chad, two more movements, SLA-Democratic and SLA-Main Stream, joined the Road Map. They formed a temporary structure and carried out a lot of activities to go to the field and unite, but ultimately they failed to do so.
While all this was happening, the Libyan had shown concern for the Darfur movements, and worked hard to unite them. The Libyan’s held their own unification conference in Kofra, Libya, a town bordering Darfur from the North. In late 2009, this effort succeeded, and they managed to unite six movements who became known as the SLA-Revolutionary Forces.
During the unification processes, the UN/AU, in cooperation with Arab League, chose Doha, Qatar to host the peace talks. The Qataris, in close coordination with the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST), worked to engage the major stakeholder groups in the talks. They invited Road Map, SLA-RF, JEM-Khalil and the Civil Society in February 2010.
At Doha, the three movements exchanged ideas on how best they could unite, but JEM-Khalil, as usual, insisted that the other movements must join it. SLA-RF and the Road Map group refused, and continued contacts, meetings, and consultations. Ultimately they successfully united under the name of Liberation Justice Movement/Army (LJM/A), and unanimously chose Dr. El-Tigani Sesi to lead them. This occurred on February 23, 2010, the same day that JEM-Khalil signed a Framework Agreement with the Government of Sudan. JEM-Khalil protested the formation of LJM/A, claiming that it was the only movement on the ground, and that it would not allow any other group to join the process in Doha. The JMST rejected this claim, and called on JEM-Khalil and LJM/A to cooperate for resolving the conflict. Later JEM-Khalil left Doha for Cairo, accusing the mediation and the host country, Qatar of bringing irrelevant groups as parties to the talks.
On March 18, 2010, LJM/A signed a comprehensive Framework Agreement with the Government of Sudan, covering all the areas of the conflict, and addressing the root causes of the conflict. LJM/A and GOS delegations rapidly formed 5 commissions for purposes of negotiations on Power Sharing, Wealth Sharing, Security, IDPs and Refugees, and Justice and Reconciliation. The two parties also adopted a methodology for the negotiations, and worked hard under the supervision of the joint mediation. They achieved a lot progress, and as of October 2010, are about to conclude their negotiations for a comprehensive solution to the Darfur conflict.
The author, Tadjedine Bashir Niam is the Researcher in international Affairs& Diplomacy and Chief Negotiator of the LJM/A and he can be reached at [email protected]