US strategy on the LRA – breakdown of key sections

US strategy on the LRA – breakdown of key sections

Resolve’s highlights and a brief breakdown of the strategy, including actions listed as priorities for implementation:

Vision: “Though the challenge is complex, the vision remains simple: people in central Africa are free from the threat of LRA violence and have the freedom to pursue their livelihoods.”

Purpose: The strategy does not contain much detail about specific action steps, instead providing an “overarching, comprehensive strategy direction over several years to… increase the likelihood of success in mitigating and eliminating the threat posed by the LRA.” (Upcoming Congressional decisions on levels of funding will help determine how robustly the strategy is implemented and hence specific action steps.)

Four main objectives (and summary of sub-objectives):

1. Increase protection of civilians

– Improve sharing of information for understanding threats and vulnerabilities of civilian population as a result of LRA presence, and for supporting and developing effective protection strategies and interventions.

– Promote the increase in physical security of vulnerable civilian populations through the presence and action of protection actors.

– Strengthen the understanding of the LRA threat and the will and capabilities of key actors to support efforts to protect civilians and prevent and mitigate LRA attacks.

2. Apprehend or remove from the battlefield Joseph Kony and senior LRA commanders

– Provide enhanced integrated logistical, operational, and intelligence assistance in support of regional and multilateral partners.

– Enhance and sustain diplomatic efforts to coordinate and encourage support for multilateral and regional military forces in their efforts to counter the LRA and to deny any potential support to the LRA from outside actors.

3. Promote the defection, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of remaining LRA fighters

– Ensure continued multilateral support to efforts to promote defections of LRA fighters and non-combatants through radio programs, leaflets, and other communication.

– Work with regional governments, MONUSCO, and other international actors to ensure necessary facilities and procedures are in place to receive defectors and transport them to desired home locations.

– Support the provision of enhanced medical, social, and economic reintegration assistance to demobilized LRA members and receiving communities.

4. Increase humanitarian access and provide continued relief to affected communities

– Humanitarian agencies provide minimum standards of life-saving support to LRA-affected populations.

– Promote increased access and infrastructure for the delivery of humanitarian services.

– Humanitarian agencies support early recovery activities, including transition support and livelihood support for LRA-affected populations.

Priority actions for immediate implementation

Increase physical access and telecommunications

– including road and airstrip rehabilitation and telecommunications expansion, with focus on LRA-affected areas of CAR and DRC

Increase mobility and access of civilian protection actors in LRA-affected areas

– mentions need to increase mobility of “humanitarian and civilian protection partners, including peacekeeping missions”

Enhance coordination of civilian actors and sharing of information across borders

Enhance the coordination and collaboration of forces in LRA-affected areas

– mentions need for coordination between national militaries and peacekeeping missions

Increase opportunities for LRA fighters and associated persons to safely defect and escape

Multilateral engagement

– The strategy mentions the October AU conference on the LRA in Bangui and “applauds AU engagement and regional leadership and coordination to address the LRA threat”

– The strategy highlights three priorities for US engagement at the UN Security Council as, 1. ensuring relevant peacekeeping missions are “resourced appropriately to fulfill their mandates,” 2. encourage the UN political office for Central Africa to strengthen regional and international cooperation on the LRA, and 3. support the deployment of UN humanitarian staff to LRA-affected areas.

– The strategy also states an intention to continue engagement with the Office of the EU Special Representative, the World Bank’s TDRP-led LRA working group, and the Great Lakes Contact Group.

– The strategy says “Any effective strategy cannot exclusively rely on one military force…” It also acknowledges that there is no guarantee Ugandan military operations against the LRA will continue and highlights the necessity of developing broader support and capacity among regional and international actors to address the crisis (though few specific details are provided).

Other notes of importance

– The strategy acknowledges that “there is no purely military solution to the LRA threat and impact.”

– The strategy highlights that additional support to the UPDF for LRA operations will happen in parallel with efforts to encourage professionalization of the UPDF and diplomatic efforts to encourage the Ugandan government and UPDF to respect human rights, democracy and good governance in Uganda.

– The strategy mentions that “local outreach” is an important component of pursuing the strategy’s objectives, but does not provide detail on how this will be done.

– The strategy also outlines continued US efforts to promote comprehensive reconstruction, transitional justice, and reconciliation in northern Uganda (see annex 3).