Abyei’s Agreement falls short

By Steve Paterno

June 21, 2011 — The recently reached agreement on Abyei, between the regime in Khartoum and SPLM in the capital Addis Ababa will face difficulties in its implementations, since it is limited in scope and lacking significant implementation components. This agreement, which is a temporary arrangement, calls on withdrawal of both Khartoum and South Sudanese armed forces from designated Abyei area, where they will be replaced by a peacekeeping force, composed of Ethiopian troops. The agreement also calls for establishment of civil administration as well as rapid repatriation program for the residents of Abyei—the residents who were driven away from their homestead, due to forceful occupation of Abyei by Khartoum armed forces.

Even though the rule of engagements for these Ethiopian peacekeepers are not written yet, certain factors already make these troops a sitting duck, unable to protect themselves, like their counterparts, the UNAMID in Darfur. Since, these troops will act as a buffer, between the South and North, its mandate must not just be to protect civilians within its area of control in Abyei, but to also effectively monitor, intercept and prevent border incursions by armed groups. The major fear that will ignite the South-North conflict is this very border incursions by armed groups. Therefore, the mission of the peacekeeping forces is not to allow these elements across the borders. These armed groups may not necessarily be regular Khartoum armed forces moving with their tanks, but they may consist of proxy militias on horse backs, carrying only AK47 and swords. Unless we are not aware, the bulk of the ethnic cleansing in Darfur is the work of irregular Khartoum’s armed groups, which can be replicated along the South-North borders, if allowed.

This will then mean that the mandate for these peacekeeping troops is to authorize them to engage any armed group that crosses the designated boundaries. Such will require swift responses, mobility and capacity to engage in large scale firefights with any of these armed elements.

Second, the most important component, which is missing in this agreement is lack of air support to supplement the operations of the ground forces. These peacekeeping forces, the civilians, humanitarian personnel as well as the border regions of South Sudan will continue to remain vulnerable to Khartoum’s air assaults and bombardments. Khartoum already made it clear that its targets extend against UN aircrafts. The regime has just impounded a UN chopper and detained its passengers, who included diplomats from USA and UK. The regime vowed to shoot down UN planes that fly over the contested region. Most of these UN planes are low flying helicopters and twin engine planes, which are susceptible to any ground to air attacks. Not only that, without air patrol, Khartoum will use its planes to supply militias inside South Sudan. Only air patrols as part of the peacekeeping mission can prevent Khartoum’s air aggression, deny its supply capabilities and deter the intimidations.

Third, the number of the Ethiopian troops to be deployed in the area is only one brigade. These troops can easily be stretched thin, given the vastness of the land and number of different armed groups who roam the area. These number of troops can never be able to respond into any attacks within its mandated territory, unless their number is increased as well as their mobility is enhanced.

Fourth, the ability of these troops to effectively halt border incursions is limited by geographical location, because their mandate only allows them to operate within Abyei area as defined by Permanent Court of Arbitration. This geographical limitations provides Khartoum with free hands to still interfere with the affairs of South Sudan. For example, Khartoum armed forces will heavily deploy at Heglig, an oil reserves town, which is only a stone throw away from Unity State of South Sudan. They will then use this location as a springboard to carryout their activities inside South Sudan, including supplying the South Sudanese militias who are operating out of Unity State on behest of Khartoum. That is why this agreement must have been comprehensive in nature by trying to address South-North borders as part of resolving the Abyei issue. The problem of Abyei and South-North borders are one and the same. They ought to be treated as such, because at stake is South Sudan territorial integrity and stability.

Fifth, this agreement fails to comprehensively address other related conflicts in the Nuba Mountains as well as the looming one in Blue Nile State. Remember, the reason for the tensions in these areas is due to Khartoum’s attempt to forceful push SPLA who are from those areas to be deployed to the South of 1956, borderline. The current conflicts in these areas have direct repercussions to the South-North tensions, and ifleft unresolved, may eventually ignite a full scale war. It has been Khartoum’s tactics to move from one conflict into another. Now, the regime feels comfortable to wage the war in the Nuba Mountains. Next, it may go to Blue Nile, Darfur and make a full circle back to Abyei,just as it has done before. That is why in order to deal with Khartoum, the issues must be addressed comprehensively, where members of the regime are pressured in every front to deny them any opportunity or room for wiggling.

Sixth, the agreement mistakenly given the power of appointing and dismissing members ofAbyei civil authorities back to President Omar al-Bashir, just as it has done previously. This is a déjà vu, because President al-Bashir will delay confirming SPLM nominees and frustrate the whole process for establishing a workable administration in the area. He may even reject some of the SPLM nominees outright or dissolve the entire council, wily-nilly, just as he has done in the past. The administration of Abyei should be given under the UN mandate, which will provide services for the duration of specific period until the time it will administer Abyei long delayed referendum.

Seventh, this agreement once again makes a mistake of authorizing Khartoum and South Sudan to provide funding for the Abyei area administration. It is already obvious, Khartoum is not going to provide its portion of the budget for the area, which as a result, will cripple the delivery of services. Abyei budget should have been drawn exclusively from its own oil reserves, and only when the budget falls short then Khartoum and Juba will chip in. The Abyei budget should have been put under the management of the mandated UN run administration of Abyei.

In conclusions, the real burning issues, which are the major reasons for the tensions, are far from being resolved as of yet. These issues must be looked into as a whole and comprehensive solutions are found. More importantly, implementing mechanism must be the core of all the agreements and the rule of engagement for the peacekeepers must be strengthened, so that the peacekeepers don’t just remain as a sitting duck to the Khartoum’s onslaught.