Book Review: Waging Peace in Sudan, The Inside Story of the Negotiations

By Ahmed Elzobier

July 19, 2011 — On the last day of August 2003 Hilde Johnson received a phone call from the First Vice President of Sudan, Ali Osman Taha, and since then her engagement in the Sudan peace process has become legendary. The relatively young devolvement minister from Norway, born in Tanzania, committed herself to resolve one of Africa’s most complex conflicts. In her book “Waging Peace in Sudan: The Inside Story of the Negotiations that Ended Africa’s Longest Civil War”, she describes vividly what goes on behind the scenes inside the negotiation rooms. Johnson humbly does not consider the book to be an authoritative history of the CPA negotiations, but rather it reflects her own story and needs to be understood in that context. She acknowledges the critical efforts of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and its chief mediator General Lazaro Sumbeiywo of Kenya, and his technical team, as well as the role of regional leaders, the European Union, the UN, and the then new American administration of George Bush.

Meanwhile, she developed a unique and personal relationship with the SPLM/A Chairman, Dr. John Garang, and Ali Osman Taha, First Vice President of Sudan. The two leaders called her, consulted with her, sometimes asking her to convince the other party or to solicit a third party to intervene. She describes their personalities as being as different as night and day. Garang was charismatic and outgoing, Taha was cautious and shy. Although there are differences between them they have many things in common, they are intellectuals, thinkers and strategists and the sharpness of their minds and tactical talents impressed her. They allowed her access to the negotiation process that was not available to anyone else. Her influence on the two leaders was sometimes magical and the trust she obtained from them was unparalleled. After several rounds of talks she ended up being among the best-informed participants in the negotiations and to her surprise she was better informed than those in the formal talks. During the celebration ceremony in the Republic Palace in Khartoum in July 2005 President Bashir called her “the mother of the pride”.

Johnson describes the process as having been “painstakingly slow”, however, she believes that the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was primarily due to the engagement of her two friends. It took them sixteen months to finalize the deal. Quoting Vice President Ali Osman Taha that “peace was not achieved through manoeuvres and posturing, but was a result of digging with bare hands.” Yet, she also recognizes that other key factors in achieving peace in Sudan were the contentious International pressure, and the events of September 11, 2001 that provided Khartoum with a “strong motivation to be seen as cooperative.” They also provided an opportunity for the National Congress Party (NCP) to stay in power for a longer period, and the fact that the SPLM was in a stronger position militarily and politically enabled it to compromise. Both leaders were also faced with hard to satisfy constituencies of hardliners and they needed to navigate carefully during the talks.

According to Johnson, Sudan was spared from US reprisals after 9/11 because of the unlimited cooperation from Khartoum in terms of intelligence on terrorists. A CIA source described to her the information provided by Khartoum as (A to A+), and that Khartoum agreed to engage in a meaningful peace process to resolve the conflict in southern Sudan. Khartoum’s need to satisfy US demands became a decisive factor in entering into negotiations with SPLM/A.

She was also instrumental in forming the Troika, composed of the US for its carrot and stick strategy, the UK for its colonial past, and Norway for its strong connection in southern Sudan. The IGAD conference in Khartoum in January 2002 approved the role of these countries in the peace process and since then, with her colleague from the UK, Clare Short, and the Netherlands development minister, they developed a new strategy in dealing with development issues in Africa including Sudan.

Prior to the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20 July 2002 the negotiation teams spent 29 days mostly shouting at each other. According to Johnson, on 19 July 2002 General Sumbeiywo played a critical role at this juncture and he asked that two representatives from each side should remain in the conference room. They were allowed one hour only and were asked for straight answers, yes-or-no, as to whether they accepted the text. Said Al Khatib and Yahia Hussien represented the government and Nhial Deng and Deng Alor represented the SPLM. However, both team members spent time on the phone calling their superiors in Southern Sudan or Khartoum and only when the green lights were given were they able to sign. The signing of the Machakos Protocol surprised both the parties and the international community as it set the framework for the negotiations, and the parties agreed on the principles of self-determination for the South and sharia law for the North. According to Johnson, Fink Haysom, the former legal adviser to former South African President Nelson Mandela and his IGAD team were instrumental in preparing the single negotiating text of Machakos that broke the deadlock in 2002.

In September 2002 the SPLM attacked Torit and the government pulled out of the negotiations, however, a breakthrough with the agreement on a cessation of hostilities was signed in October 2002. After a long pause, in July 2003, the IGAD presented the Nakuru document. It outlined compromises on various issues and while it was embraced reluctantly by the SPLA/M it was harshly rejected by the government of Sudan. At that juncture Johnson sensed that an engagement at high level seemed more appropriate. Following a phone conversation with Taha she pressed John Garang to engage in direct talks with Taha. As a result of the two leaders’ engagement a second breakthrough took place with the signing of the protocol on security arrangements on 25 September 2003.

By the start of 2004, both leaders started to know each other very well, they joked that they probably spent more time with each other than with their wives and families. After several rounds of Naivasha talks Johnson had become a trusted go-between. She believed that the government trusted her, particularly Taha, because she could put some pressure on the SPLM leader. But she was not just a tool to be used, as she knows where she’s coming from and both sides were aware that she was an honest broker. On 7 January 2004 they managed to sign the third protocol on wealth-sharing.

The critical period of negotiations was from 16 February 2004 to 25 May 2004, according to Johnson, where intensive talks took place regarding the Three Areas protocols and the power-sharing agreement they finally managed to sign on 26 May. This was followed by the Nairobi declarations (a summary of the four protocols) on 5 June, 2004

During this period Johnson’s engagement in the peace talks became intense in relation to the Two Areas (Southern Blue Nile and Nuba Mountain). Johnson had proposed the idea of popular consultation to resolve the deadlock on the issue, as the government refused to concede to a referendum for the two areas. Dr John asked her to talk personally to Abdel Aziz Adam and Malik Agaar. She managed to convince them that with the support of the international community guaranteeing credible and fair elections that state parliament could decide on the popular consultation. But she later regretted that the people of Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile were betrayed by the international community with little peace dividend during the interim period as well as now facing uncertain political future. Meanwhile, the American proposal on Abyei area was presented to the negotiation teams. However, the timing of the referendum in the original American proposal was to be six months after the South referendum. She convinced the Americans that the SPLM would not accept that, as the timing should be simultaneous with the southern referendum, and so they changed the dates and both parties accepted the American proposal on Abyei.

Meanwhile, Johnson was also aware that the Niavasha talks delayed the solution to the Darfur situation and she urged the two leaders, Johan and Taha, to find a fast-track solution to the crisis. But in Khartoum the government preferred the engagement of the African Union whose weak capacity and mandate politically suited the government but, as it turned out, prolonged the conflict and the resolution of the crisis.

Following the Nairobi declarations on 5 June the government, under pressure in Darfur, seemed to shelve the Niavasha talks; however, following intensive contacts of which Johnson was a part, the negotiations on the Implementation Protocol started on October 2004. The Security Council meeting in November 2004 in Nairobi set a deadline for the negotiations at 31 December 2004. Meanwhile, the SPLM was distracted by rumors of an internal conflict involving Salva Kiir although the party managed to resolve the dispute amicably by the end of November in Rumbek city. The negotiations resumed in December on the Implementation Protocol; security arrangements, the status of the Other Armed Groups and SPLA funding were the sticking points. However, the party managed to overcome these difficulties and the Implementation Protocol was signed on 31 December 2004 and the overall peace agreement ceremony took place on 9 January 2005.

Following the momentous events in January 2005 a transitional team was sent to Khartoum and negotiations with the other northern opposition parties started in Cairo to accommodate them within the CPA. This culminated in the arrival of Dr. John Garang in Khartoum, on 9 July 2005, to a hero’s welcome. The number of people who came out to see him had never been seen before in Khartoum, he was ecstatic and reported to his colleagues that “Sudan will never be the same.” The scene also spread fear among certain circles in the ruling party in Khartoum. On 31 July 2005, while she was on vacation in Sweden, Johnson received a phone call saying that Garang’s plane was overdue, followed by the dreadful news that John Garang had died in a plane crash.

Johnson ends her book emphasizing that the lesson learned from the negotiations process is that continuous, coherent, forceful engagement was critical in ending the civil war. Now, to build peace in South Sudan, more effort is needed. Last week Ms Johnson was appointed as Special Representative of Secretary General for the new United Nation Mission Southern Sudan. Her book has also been translated into Arabic and will be available soon in bookshops across the country.

(ST)