Revolution for the Region but a Shallow ‘Band-Aid’ Peace for Darfur: The Doha Agreement in Perspective

By Elfadil Ibrahim

November 13, 2011 — Darfur, a place which was once was the centre of humanitarian attention, has now warped into a largely forgotten cause, in light of the revolutionary changes taking place in Sudan’s backyard over the course of the past year. The newspapers in Sudan have certainly not forgotten, as the front pages of all outlets have drawn attention towards the recent return of Dr. Tigani Sese, leader of the Liberation and Justice Movement, who has returned to Sudan following extensive negotiations with the Sudanese Government in Doha where the Doha Peace Agreement (DA) was concluded.

The first questions that come to mind for many is to ask who this man is, and why looks nothing like the gun-wielding rebel groups that tried to seize Khartoum in 2008, or the Janjaweed, or any of the armed movements that have been at the heart of the violence in the region which Colin Powell used the ‘G-word’ in describing in 2004. In light of the human rights ruckus over Darfur, where banditry, lawlessness, and the like have lent a direct hand in creating the dire humanitarian situation, one immediately questions whether Sese can be representative of Darfurians, and whether or not the Doha agreement is yet another attempt at ‘cosmetic’ peace.

Why Bother? The Tactical Game at Work

Like many of the initiatives for peace in Darfur that have proved futile in delivering real results on the ground, The Doha peace agreement is likely to be yet another addition. Dr. Sese, a former governor for the region during the previous administration, has never been a combatant, nor was he even present in Darfur for much of the hostilities for which the region became infamous over the last decade.

The Liberation and Justice movement, an artificial creation to mend the increasingly fragmented movements, shares many features with other ‘anonymous acronyms’ to emerge out of the earlier steps for peace in Abuja. Typical characteristics include leadership by intelligentsia, many of whom have little to no military power, and almost no visibility amongst the internally displaced peoples, tribal leaders, civil society or even rival factions in Darfur.

What then, is the point of the Doha Peace Agreement signed between the Liberation and Justice Movement and the Government of Sudan? I suggest two possibilities in this regard.

Firstly, perhaps this is an attempt at a resolving the problem via the backdoor. The agreement offers something in the way of addressing the marginalisation of the region that is in fact at the root of the discontent, prior to exacerbation by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and its enemies (domestic and foreign) as leverage to further their own interests with the threat of increasing instability in Sudan.

Second and more importantly, in light of what’s been happening in the region, the Sudanese government will certainly be keen to capitalise on its ‘accomplishment,’ seizing the timing of the Doha agreement as a show-and-tell for its own citizens and the global community that concrete steps are being taken. Timing here is of the essence, the stakes are high as populations are growing impatient with poor governance, and experiences within Sudan’s peripheries have proved capable in regards to completely uprooting political regimes, making them relics of the past overnight.

Is the DPA all that bad? In short, yes, but not completely so. On paper, one may applaud what the agreement offers, a vice president from Darfur, a bigger slice of the pie for the region in the long term and compensation for victims of the hostilities. However, the recently appointed Vice President, Haj Adam Youssef, is yet another ‘suit,’ a soft-spoken academic and long term resident of Khartoum. He may have the best of intentions, but his appointment will do little in the way of delivering lasting peace for the region. Perhaps, the only meaningful provisions in the Doha agreement are those indicating funds to be provided (by the Qatari’s) for the compensation of victims. In the midst of a crippling economic crisis facing Sudan, it is hard to see the Sudanese government raising the two billion dollars that Qatar will be injecting into the fund. This is the only pillar of the agreement not plagued by dim prospects as addressing the material hardships faced by the victims of the conflict is a key and critical element to any peace arrangement?

Prospects for the Future

Media interest in Darfur, which was superficial and simplistic in its coverage to begin with, has waned as the death toll has decreased. The issue has drifted from the attention of media, lobby groups and lawmakers in Washington only to become a less significant leveraging tool (behind the more recent crises in the Blue Nile State, and Nuba Mountains) for America’s carrot-and-stick policy towards Sudan. The Sudanese government has in response, attempted to conjure up the façade of genuinely striving towards peace.

Negotiations for peace in Darfur will fail until three obstacles are addressed. Firstly and most importantly, peace will be hard to envisage unless the peace process is made more attractive to the armed rebels. Heavy concessions are required here by the central government, and they must calculate the decision wisely, since without them there can be no cessation of hostility in the immediate future.

Secondly, support of the ICC indictment against Sudan’s head of state and high ranking officials has alienated a necessary participant in the process. Until the international community understands this contradiction, little progress can be achieved. Lastly, while negotiations have failed with the armed rebels, they’ve also failed at incorporating the most relevant parties, refugees, tribal leaders, and the civil society in Darfur. Scott Gration, the former US envoy to Darfur recommended this approach, and while it is remarkably far-sighted, his proximity to the Khartoum government had many in Washington accusing him of being ‘in cahoots’ with the NCP.

Foreign involvement, particularly by the United States and the EU has had great potential, but because this side has been quick to resort to labeling and polarising the players and problem rather than pursuing a deeper understanding of the crisis and a subsequent push for meaningful change, the involvement of this camp can be summed up as problematic and indecisive thus far. Until the Sudanese government, the United States and the global community develop a serious desire to bring lasting peace to the region, all that may come out of any such efforts is the Band-Aid diplomacy we’ve seen time and time again.

Elfadil Ibrahim lives in the Sudan and is a recent graduate from the University of Aberdeen with an LLM (Masters of Law) in Oil and Gas Law. He can be reached at [email protected]