After the 2nd August Roadmap Deadline: The Litmus Test to the International Community

After the 2nd August Roadmap Deadline: The Litmus Test to the International Community

By Luka Biong Deng

1st August 2012

The African Union Peace and Security Council adopted the Roadmap for South Sudan and Sudan to resume negotiations of the post-secession pending issues after such negotiations failed to show progress but instead deteriorated to status of war that threatened regional stability. The Roadmap specifically set a process for cessation of hostilities and resumption of unconditional negotiations on the pending issues to be concluded within three months. In lieu of amicable agreement reached by the two countries on all or any of the pending issues, the African Union Panel will present to the Council not later than one month specific proposal(s) on the unresolved issues that shall be endorsed by the Council as final and binding. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2046 endorsed the Roadmap and set 2nd August as deadline for the Parties to conclude negotiations and the Panel to present its proposals on unresolved issues by 2nd September after which the AU and UN will take the necessary actions.
With the two countries now failing to reach amicable solutions on all the pending issues by the 2nd August deadline except the oil deal and other payments, the real test is whether AU and UN will stick to their deadline or proceed to the second phase of the Roadmap to ask the Panel to come up with the final and binding proposals on all the pending issues. The Panel will present its report to the AU Peace and Security Council and the two countries will be expected to make statements as well to the Council. Although one may expect the Panel to present a balanced account of the negotiations during the last three months, it is likely that the Panel and based on slight progress in talks during the last days will suggest an extension of the 2nd August deadline so as to allow the two countries to reach agreement on the pending issues.
Although the moral equivalence approach seems to be the dominant diplomatic approach now-days, the Panel is expected to provide a sincere account of the compliance of the Parties to the implementation of the Roadmap. Generally, on the basis of the commitments made in the Roadmap, one would say that the Government of Sudan has failed to implement or comply with most of the provisions of the Roadmap. The South, on the other hand, has not only complied with all the commitments in the Roadmap but has clearly proven to the world that it is a responsible member of international community. The good performance of the South during the last three months negotiations has shown to the world that the South is dealing with a difficult regime in Khartoum that cares only for its survival rather than the desire of its people to build good relations with the South.
Generally, the two countries managed to ease tensions and virtually stopped the escalation of war along their borders. Despite the fact that Sudan tried to put conditions for the resumption of negotiations, the two countries have managed to resume negotiations with positive signs of
seriousness and willingness to find amicable solutions for the pending issues. However on the practical steps for cessation of hostilities and demilitarization of the border, Sudan has not only rejected the proposed map by the Panel for demilitarization zone but has even accused the Panel of creating more conflicts along the border.
On the withdrawal of all forces from Abyei Area as per June Agreement, the South withdrew all its forces while Sudan withdrew most of its forces but retained almost one battalion of oil police in Abyei area. Despite the consistent call by the AU and UN for Sudan to fully withdraw its forces in Abyei area, the regime in Khartoum defied such call and decided to keep its forces in Abyei area. Also Sudan failed to sign the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for the UN Forces deployed in Abyei area as one of the commitment in Abyei June Agreement, while the South is ready to sign SOFA with UN. As the two Parties differed on the appointment of the chair of Abyei Area Council, the South agreed with UN and AU to constitute Abyei administration while Sudan insisted on forming both the administration and the council at the same time. In fact Sudan has clearly shown during the current negotiations that it is reneging from its commitment to the conduct of Abyei Referendum as agreed upon in the CPA and would prefer Abyei to remain in Sudan or partition it between the two countries rather than holding a referendum.
On oil and other payments, the South provided a more reasonable proposals on the oil tariffs (transportation, processing and transit) while Sudan started with unprecedented oil tariffs of $36 per barrel. Although Sudan came down to $32, $22 and then $15 per barrel compared with $9 per barrel proposed by South on the basis of international practices, one would say that Sudan has made considerable concession and that showed beyond any doubt that it is desperate to reach a deal on oil and other payments. As the South would not want to set precedence in oil tariffs as it intends to diversify its access to ports, the current deal of oil tariffs of $11 per barrel that has been reached provides a basis for confidence building and resolving other issues. On other payments, the offer of South of financial transitional assistance of about $3 billion to Sudan is unprecedented as it did not happen before in the post-independent history of Sudan to receive such free budget support from any country or organizations. One would have wished that the acceptance of the South of the current oil deal to be conditional on finally resolving the issue of Abyei Referendum, particularly the issue of eligibility to be exclusively for members of Ngok Dinka and other residents except nomads.
On the disputed border areas, the Parties agreed even before the secession of the South to resolve the border disputes amicably through dialogue or international arbitration as the last resort without causing conflict. As the Parties had asked, before the secession of the South, the relevant authority in UK to provide historical evidence and facts about the disputed border areas, it would be appropriate for the Parties to have access to such information so that they can make an informed decision. The available information seems to suggest that out of five disputed areas, each country may have conclusive historical claims over two areas while the remaining area (the 14 miles between Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Southern Darfur) is rather a gray area from the perspective of experts and may only be resolved either through dialogue or to resort to international arbitration. Sudan seems to be particular about this area of 14 miles given the fact that the South has taken almost 80% of vegetation and water sources and its retention of this area
would ensure access to pastures and water to the Arab nomads. The South should now prepare a team for international arbitration on the disputed border areas as my experience with Abyei arbitration shows that such exercise requires dedicated and informed people. I am convinced that if the South is well prepared for arbitration it can win the case of the 14 miles area otherwise we may run a risk of losing it if we are ill-prepared.
As the Parties have shown a sign of progress, it would be logical if they could be encouraged to reach amicable solutions on the pending issues. One would go for the option of extending the 2nd August deadline for some few days while the Panel to start preparing the final and binding proposals for all the pending issues. Having a summit between President Salva and Bashir will be extremely critical for resolving the remaining issues and finding amicable solutions for normalization of relations. If Sudan continues to be unreasonable and defied the Roadmap and the final and binding proposals of the Panel, the AU should take the lead in taking bold sanctions against Sudan including expelling it from AU and a commitment to support ICC in arresting the indicted members of the regime in Khartoum. Also the international community, particularly US and China, to be ready now to assist the South with access to concessional loans for budget support and building of alternative pipeline if the regime in Khartoum rejects to implement the final and binding proposals of the Panel. Also if the regime in Khartoum is not ready to comply with the Roadmap, the international community should clearly adopt a strategy for a peaceful regime change in Khartoum by assisting and supporting the popular uprising and recognizing the Sudan Revolutionary Front as an alternative.

First published by the New Nation Newspaper, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia