14 Miles: potential implications and scenarios
14 Miles: potential implications and scenarios
By Garang Kuot Kuot
October 30th, 2012 – The African Union High Implementation Penal (AUHIP) brokered Cooperation Agreements, signed between the Republic of Sudan and Republic of South Sudan on September 27th, 2012 in Ethiopian Capital, Addis Ababa, has come as a shock to South Sudanese masses, particularly, people in Border States. People have written and will continue to write about this treaty and this is their constitutional right to do so. The pact poises precarious position now that South Sudan has just experienced another betrayal from international community – whose pressure was seemingly one sided during the negotiations.
Since the Cooperation Agreement has been given full blessing by South Sudan two Houses and National Council of Ministers which paves way for continuation of negotiations on other outstanding issues and resumption of oil production, I find it necessary adding my perspective on this crucial national matter.
On the onset, I wish to make a couple of clarifications: that the reaction by the people of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State against the inclusion of “14 Miles” on the accord has quickly been taken up by some opportunists, branding it as opposition to the leadership of Salva Kiir Mayardit. These people went as far as spreading rumors in Juba that pictures of the President have been burnt in Aweil Town and the name of a secondary school named after him changed. The same opportunists went further to claim that the reaction was a complete rejection of the whole Cooperation Agreement. These charges are simply misplaced because the petitions and public protests have purely been objection to the inclusion of “14 Miles” area on security agreement. My advice to these opportunists, who are competing for Presidential attention, is that the President has eyes and ears everywhere in South Sudan through his security establishments which are tasked to furnish him with any information they deem necessary.
People of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State, in all their petitions, have made it clear in speeches and on placards that they continue supporting the country’s leadership and have always been very candid about their grievance: the inclusion of “14 Miles” on the agreement. What these rumormongers tend to forget is that the citizens of South Sudan have constitutional right to question matters they feel unhappy about and the President is aware about this constitutional provision – particularly “freedom of expression”.
The “14 Miles” Area:
The issue of “14 Miles” presents the most difficult and complex political dilemma to all players involve with Cooperation Agreement. While the people of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State and majority of South Sudanese have already expressed their utmost outrage and rejection to the inclusion of “14 Miles” area on Cooperation Agreement and continue to do so, it is high time this “14 Miles” saga is given a further critique and its immediate implications and scenarios analyzed.
In order to go into brief analysis of “14 Miles” account and its potential implications, I would like to begin by giving three major fallacies inherent in the security agreement with regard to “14 Miles”. The history of “14 Miles” is fresh and vividly known by all and sundry in Northern Bahr El Ghazal State. It has never been a disputed area as claimed by the Sudan.
An attempt by British authorities in 1924 to forge an agreement that would allow Reziegat pastoralists to graze their animals in Dinka Malual territories ended in failure. The children of the two Paramount Chiefs: Diing Wol and Aturjong Anyuon, who refused to be lured into this dirty trap, are here with us today, as well as children of Chimiir Adongbeek, who stabbed to death a Reziegat tribe mate in protest to this attempt. So, where did National Congress Party get this idea of a signed agreement by Dinka Malual, Reziegat and British Governors in Darfur and Bahr El Ghazal? I would caution our people against making statements over “Mile 14” that can only serve as unnecessary incentive for Khartoum to further entrench its unjustified claim over this area.
What really transpired, in brief, was that, after the resistant of Dinka Malual to this idea and ensuing conflict between the two communities, British Governor in Darfur issued a unilateral decision allowing Reziegat to graze their animals in Dinka Malual territories all the way up to 14 Miles South of River Kiir. This was because British colonialists were obligated to reward Reziegat community after the later helped them fight and defeat Sultan Ali Dinar who resisted British rule in Darfur. The rest is history. This is the first deliberate distortion of “14 Miles” history, in which it is being claimed that there was a signed agreement that gave this area to Reziegat when there was no agreement at all.
The Second misrepresentation of this historical fact is that, there is and continue to be a serious attempt by Khartoum regime to twist this unilateral decision by British Governor to allow Reziegat to graze their animals in Dinka Malual territories during dry season to include areas along River Kiir starting from Abyei all the way to Raja in Western Bahr El Ghazal State. This generality includes Messiriya into “14 Miles” saga when in fact this community has never been a part of this history. “14 Miles” area is only confined to present day Aweil North County, yet in this Cooperation Agreement, it is everywhere south of River Kiir. I urge our negotiators to raise this concern in the next round of negotiations.
Third misrepresentation of “14 Miles” area is that, it was never part of any negotiations ever conducted between Sudan and South Sudan including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Why and how it ended up being part of negotiations and its eventual designation as disputed area will remain a matter of debate and great mystery to the people of South Sudan in general and Northen Bahr El Ghazal State in particular.
Potential implications of “14 Miles”
Inclusion of “14 Miles” on Cooperation Agreement was a dangerous precedent in terms of maintaining peace and stability along ever peaceful borderline between Northern Bahr El Ghazal State on one hand and South Kordufan and South Darfur States on the other. In fact, it has re-invoke bitter memories of last 21 years of North-South conflict specially atrocities committed against Dinka Malual community by NCP backed Reziegat and Messiriya militia, then known as “Murallen” and Public Defense Force (PDF). For a long time, Dinka Malual and neighbors: Reziegat and Messiriya have maintained cordial relationship. Dinka Malual community has seasonally allowed these nomadic communities to come to their territories during dry season in search of water and pastures. In fact, these nomadic communities, as a result of this cordial relationship, travel deep inside Northern Bahr el Ghazal state sometimes up to 100 kilometers south of River Kiir.
This grassroots arrangement reached a different level in 2008 when USAID supported annual peace conferences between Dinka Malual and her two neighbors were initiated. In these series of conferences, Chiefs from three communities would discuss grazing corridors and other necessary arrangements in an effort to maintain peaceful co-existence among their communities. Grassroots Peace Committees were set up in Warawar, Gokmachar, Dhien and Meriem to monitor implementation and violations of resolutions reached. These traditional arrangements actually provided the best example of ‘soft borders’ between the two countries. Thanks to USAID, partners and the Government of South Sudan for supporting these grassroots peace initiatives.
However, this traditional arrangement will fundamentally change after the designation of “14 Miles” as a disputed area. Following the penning of Cooperation Agreement, and surfacing of “14 Miles” as part of agreement, there was sweep change of attitude among Dinka Malual community toward historical neighbors whom they have always welcome with open arms and hearts as evidenced in recent protests in Aweil and Juba. People of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State see Sudanese claim over “14 Miles” as betrayal of generosity. Dinka Malual, out of good will, have historically welcomed their neighbors into their land only to be told that their neighbors have acquired territorial right over their ancestral land – this is an insult of the first order according to Chiefs and youths. Secondly, this is seen as worse slap in the face of a community which proved to be role model for the rest of nation’s communities in terms of peace and harmony amongst themselves and with their neighbors.
Possible Scenarios:
We are very much aware that the Cooperation Agreement doesn’t define permanent boundaries between Sudan and South Sudan. However, what is causing anxiety with regard to “14 Miles” is a decision to add it to claimed and disputed areas in the first place. Its sudden inclusion into the list of disputed areas bring to fore five major scenarios as follows:
Scenario One: today, the overall sentiment across a broad segment of Northern Bahr El Ghazal State community is that, never again will Reziegat and Messiriya communities ever be allowed to come to Dinka Malual territories since generosity proved to be a curse than blessing as previously believed to be the case. This is a dangerous development which can adversely affect the stability along South-North border.
Scenario Two: how will the other two communities react, especially after being armed by Cooperation Agreement as having territorial claim along River Kiir? And how will ICC indicted fugitives in Khartoum, who have unsuccessfully tried in the past to collide these border communities, react as well? Answers to these questions are obvious; the response could be immediate armed communal confrontation which could easily drag the two armies into conflict. This may escalate to border conflict.
Scenario Three: suppose Dinka Malual Communities decide to go for wait-and-see strategy, how will Reziegat and Messiriya communities react to the agreement? The possible answer is that, they will, through National Congress Party influence, begin flocking and occupying these areas by putting up permanent residential and business structures which never existed and start carrying out other activities in an attempt to entrench themselves in the area – just as Messiriya is currently doing in Abyei. Again, this may provoke reaction from Dinka Malual Community leading to instability.
Scenario Four: how will the government of Sudan interpret article three of security agreement and react to it? What guarantees are there that Khartoum will not send its forces to “14 Miles” area even after South Sudan government pull out its forces? Khartoum regime has never respected any agreement nor has it ever given full respect to international law and I don’t think it will respect it this time. For example, Khartoum violated Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling on Abyei and illegally invaded the area in May, 2011. It’s a known fact that Khartoum regime doesn’t respect any international law nor does it succumb to any level of pressure. My reading therefore is that, if South Sudan pulls out its forces in order to implement the agreement, Khartoum will definitely send its army to the area. In such eventuality, the usual international condemnation, with Russia and China assuming lukewarm position, will follow and the story ends there as business goes ahead as usual.
Scenario Five: if South Sudan pulls out forces from the area and Khartoum keeps its word by retaining SAF in their current positions in Meriem and Abumadharik, then it is likely that agitators from NCP will carry out covet activities such as mysterious killings of civilians, kidnappings and rapes in order to scare and chase away Dinka Malual civilians in the area. This may not go on for long without retaliation that may easily escalate to military showdown.
Either way, the inclusion of “14 Miles” on Cooperation Agreement was such a mistake and doesn’t serve the purpose for which the Cooperation Agreement was signed. I hope Reziegat and Messiriya communities should not be fooled to begin thinking that they have any territorial claim in Northern Bahr El Ghazal territories because they have no long term interest in such claims. They should reject any NCP’s attempt to use them because the government in Khartoum doesn’t care about them and this can be explained by the fact that there are no health facilities, schools, clean water and roads in Reziegat and Messiriya areas.
Conclusion and Recommendations:
Having highlighted the above realities, I would like to provide the following recommendations to the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the AUHIP:
1. In order to avert likely security implications of “14 Miles “saga, I would recommend to the Government of South Sudan and AUHIP to suspend the implementation of article three of security agreement so as to give room for traditional mechanisms that have always ensured peaceful co-existence among these border communities.
2. AUHIP to make best possible efforts to reach out and consult with affected border communities so that their opinions are incorporated into discussions in Addis Ababa
3. Representation of border communities in the next round of negotiation in order to avoid the repeat of mistake made in the first round that resulted in “14 Miles” saga
4. Encouraging the three communities to continue their previous arrangements in which grazing corridors are discussed and agreed before nomads from Reziegat and Messiriya communities come to Northern Bahr El Ghazal State. This will lessen tension and strengthen confidence that has been strained by “14 Miles” saga
5. Explore the possibility of ‘soft border’ mechanism between Northern Bahr El Ghazal, South Darfur and South Kordufan States.
Garang Kuot Kuot is based in Aweil and is the Secretary General for the government of Northern Bahr-El-Ghazal state.