Sudan – Colliding interests
Too many volatile alliances bring little hope to Sudan’s problems
By Mohamed Elshabik
September 15, 2014 – Sudan seems to be unconcerned by the current political crisis in the region. Amid a prognosis of full-scale war in South Sudan, unrest in Egypt, chaos in Libya, Iraq and Syria, a shaky truce in Gaza, Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, and tumultuous conditions in Mali, Somalia and CAR, Sudan presents an apparently halcyon scene. The reality though is very different as political discontent is simmering beneath the surface.
A group photo of Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) leaders (a coalition of the armed rebel groups in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile) flanking the veteran Sudanese National Umma Party (NUP) leader and former prime minister al-Sadig al-Mahdi, provokes the new Sudanese political scene. This time the new coalition is between the staunchest advocate of change by peaceful means, and the armed rebellion forces. Odd as it may seem, this brought together opposing elements with shared tactical objectives in what is known as the Paris Declaration.
The Paris Declaration’s joint statement of 8 August calling for peace and democratic reform stressed the need for the unification of the forces for change in order to end the war and establish a democratic state based on equal citizenship. Al-Mahdi described the statement as a historic breakthrough. He further described as ‘clinically dead’ the national dialogue, adopted by the ruling National Congress Party (NCP).
At best, the Sudanese political scene has become more like a Sudanese Zar ceremony, a traditional trance dance associated with women believed to cure mental illness through contact with the possessing spirits and orchestrated by al-Shaikha, the female Zar leader.
Different motivations
To al-Mahdi the new alliance is more than revenge for his recent arrest. The paramount leader in Sudan published a recent article as a complaint to God and a historical testimony, in a desperate and a sad tone. Al-Mahdi listed all he has done with the NCP in his continuous efforts to avert a calamity in Sudan, but to no avail. He has finally realized that the NCP was never keen on genuine dialogue and that dialogue was merely an NCP tactic to strengthen its legitimacy and prolong its grasp on power. By endorsing the Paris Declaration Al-Mahdi is tacitly saying to his old National Front friends that he is not to be taken for granted.
On the other hand, the SRF which had recently been sidelined from influence by the NCP, is in no better condition. Militarily they are losing ground, thanks to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and politically they managed to upset the African Union High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan, after the last failed round of negotiation with the government. SRF also understands that the protracted civil war in South Sudan has changed the regional profile made Khartoum be seen internationally as a force of stability in this volatile area. As such, international stakeholders focusing on South Sudan are less keen to provide any support that might disrupt Khartoum.
In consequence SRF Head Malik Agar and General Secretary Yassir Arman visited South Africa in July to meet AUHIP head Thabo Mbeki to perk up the negotiations. The relatively peaceable language of the declaration should not be attributed solely to al-Mahdi’s influence; it also highlights a shift in the SRF approach from armed resistance towards more political accommodation.
July’s visit has paid dividends as Mbeki has vigorously reengaged himself in Sudan’s business. His efforts have yielded thus far in linking the new alliance of the Paris Declaration with the government’s national dialogue committee known as 7+7. His efforts were also crowned by a meeting with the president who apparently has given these efforts his blessing.
Reaction in Khartoum
Back in Khartoum, the Paris Declaration has triggered diverse reactions. The Popular Congress Party (PCP), an NCP defected faction led by Islamist leader al-Turabi, had aggressively rejected and criticized the agreement probably motivated by jealousy and competition, but more importantly by a desperate desire to return to power.
On the other hand Al-Tayeb Mustafa, Sudan’s Just Peace Forum chairman and also the President’s uncle and no friend of the SRF, has surprisingly welcomed the Paris Declaration which he hails as a major achievement . In a media conference, Mustafa astonished participants when he described the agreement as an accomplishment he could not fault. Mustafa’s new stance, cheered by Yassir Arman, depicts the zenith of ecstasy in the Zar ritual when everybody in the room starts dancing hysterically.
The NCP, representing the sorceress Al-Sheikha in our Zar analogy, immediately rejected the Paris Declaration on the basis that it was hatched on foreign ground. The NCP reiterated its rejection of the agreement when his political secretary, Mustafa Osman Ismail, repeated their concern that the Paris Declaration is based on external solutions, stressing that ‘foreign capitals will not bring solutions to the issues of the country’. Paradoxically foreign capitals have been incubating every peace deal that was signed during the NCP tenure; Abuja, Doha, Addis Ababa and Cairo (to name a few).
However the NCP decided to withdraw the initiative from al-Mahdi and to revive its own national dialogue when they gave the green light to the (7+7) committee representatives to sign the eight-point text with the opposition under the auspices of the AUHIP.
By doing so, the NCP has managed in a convoluted way to withdraw the initiative from the Paris axis, and bring the process back under its own jurisdiction. This is the same dialogue that al-Mahdi declared clinically dead and from which he has withdrawn and which the SRF rejected at the outset. This has been reinforced by President Bashir’s acceptance of an all-party meeting in Addis Ababa next month.
But regardless, the NCP still seems less apprehensive about the Paris alliance and more concerned about the looming economic crisis in the country. The NCP understands where the real threat comes from. Al-Mahdi’s ability to represent a threat was tested during his recent arrest, when the party that won the majority in the last democratic election in Sudan in 1986 was not able to mobilize more than few hundred protesters. The SRF military threat is contained by geo-political factors mentioned earlier.
The recent move to shut down the Iranian cultural center and expel its diplomatic mission is likely not because it represents ideological or sectarian concerns as declared, but rather economic motivation. Such a move will appease rich Saudi Arabia and UAE axis, which may help to ease the economic and banking embargo.
To the NCP, September brings with it bitter memories of last year’s large-scale uprisings that represent the most significant threat the NCP has had in its 25 years of rule.
Sudan is witnessing an unprecedented emigration in its history; the majority of Sudanese are living in despair because of deteriorating social and economic conditions and thus the Paris Declaration and Mbeki’s efforts to revitalize NCP’s national dialogue, was received with very little enthusiasm.
To the Sudanese, al-Mahdi lost credibility when he failed to live up to the people’s expectations and to support their resistance. The man who is unfortunately well-known for his indecision and changeability in midstream is unreliable. The alliance with the SRF is based more on tactical and situational interest from both sides than on strategic objectives.
Signatories to the Paris Declaration call for a roadmap for the post NCP transition, more equitable distribution of power and resources, ending the war, and starting a transition toward democracy; legitimate demands that represent the basic aspirations of all Sudanese people. Nonetheless, as long as the current balance of power between NCP and its opposition rivals is retained, and these disparate opposition elements are not able to enforce change on the ground by mobilizing their constituency, consequently represent a real threat to the NCP’s power, such agreements are merely a storm in a tea cup that will join the too many dishonoured agreements, to quote Abel Alier.
At the end of a traditional Sudanese Zar ritual, blood has to be spilled. Usually a sheep or a male goat is sacrificed, and this blood is believed to chase away the satanic soul. The spilled blood is gathered in a bowl that is passed around the room for the audience to dip their fingers in and smear on their faces with joy and relief. In this extended metaphor the sheep represent the Sudan, the blood belongs to the Sudanese citizens, the audience represents the politicians, and the sorceress Al-Sheikha is the NCP, ruthlessly manipulating the scene.
It became very clear that individual, piecemeal, flawed alliances, undeliverable promises and palliative economic measures won’t bring any change or hope. As September whirls in, Sudanese people will have to have the final say.
Mohamed Elshabik is a Sudanese blogger, and international development/humanitarian practitioner, he can be reached via Twitter at @ElshabikM