A reading of the Arusha intra-SPLM agreement
By: Dr Lam Akol
On the 21st of January 2015, the three factions of the SPLM (now calling themselves ‘Groups’) inked in Arusha, Tanzania, an agreement dubbed “Agreement on the Reunification of the SPLM”. This development comes after negotiations mediated by the ruling party in Tanzania, CCM, that started in October last year. The first attempts at the reunification of the SPLM were made by the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the EPRDF of Ethiopia as soon the split took place on 15 December 2013. However, these earlier attempts were frustrated by the intransigence of the two warring parties. The question that imposes itself is: what were the circumstances that gravitated towards the success of the CCM mediation?
This paper is an attempt to provide an answer to this question as well as to examine the prospects that this agreement holds for the future of peace talks and the unity of the SPLM as a party.
Let us first consider the genesis of the agreement so as to help us understand the dynamics behind the concessions made to make the agreement possible. We shall do this by comparing the final draft agreement that was prepared by the joint Tripartite Drafting Committee and submitted to the principals and the document that was signed by these principals.
Resolution of the Outstanding Issues:
Towards the last lap of the dialogue, a joint Tripartite Drafting Committee produced a draft on the 18th of January based on the original draft proposed by the CCM. The main issues that remained outstanding and were referred to the principals were the following:
1. Implement and comply with the provisions of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement and use the Intra-SPLM party Dialogue in Arusha, the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on the conflict in South Sudan and the IGAD mediation process to expedite the conclusion of the Peace Agreement in order to end the war;
Agreement: The reference to the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry was dropped.
2. There shall be established new transitional structures of SPLM;
Agreement: the entire provision was dropped.
3. Revocation of decisions for dismissal of party cadres from party membership and leadership positions resulting from the internal conflict within the party.
This was deleted by the drafting committee as redundant if new transitional structures were adopted (see No. 2 above);
Agreement: It was adopted since the provision on transitional structures was dropped.
4. The two main contentious provisions in the draft SPLM Constitution: mode of voting and appointment of 5% of the membership of the National Convention by the Chairman;
Agreement: Secret ballot was adopted and the 5% appointment was dropped.
5. On equitable representation of the three SPLM Groups in the Political Bureau;
Agreement: the word ‘equitable’ was dropped.
6. Equitable participation of the SPLM Groups and other political parties in the transitional government;
Agreement: The word ‘equitable’ was replaced by ‘proportional’.
The Significance of the Resolution of the Points of Contention
To begin with it must be acknowledged that the Chairman of SPLM-IG made significant concessions. He agreed to reinstate the leaders he had dismissed and dropped the very contentious provisions in the draft SPLM Constitution that caused the rift in the first place; i.e, the points he insisted on that fateful day in mid-December 2013; namely, voting by the show of hands and appointments to the membership of the National Convention. This bold step has on the other hand raised some questions: why now? Did it need to take the lives of tens of thousands of innocent South Sudanese citizens and a destructive civil war to come to this? We will attempt to provide an answer to these queries later.
Second, dropping the reference to the AU Commission of Inquiry on the Conflict in South Sudan, the outcome of which the parties have previously agreed to abide by, talks volumes about their lack of commitment to fighting impunity and holding those who committed atrocious crimes to account. True, points 11 and 15 refer to handling some aspects of dealing with crimes and transitional justice. However, the first is passive rather than proactive; it deals with what to do should a member of the SPLM be convicted on atrocious crimes. But who initiates the legal process? Point 15 does not define the nature of the system of the transitional justice envisaged. It must be remembered that the SPLM is still a ruling party and has to the power in government to prosecute.
Third, it remains true that the SPLM-IG is bent on maintaining the status quo. This becomes obvious in preferring to reinstate the dismissed leaders rather than adopt new Party transitional structures (see points 2 and 3 above). Again, sensitivity with the word ‘equitable’ must be read in the context of SPLM-IG being averse to genuine power sharing with the other two groups both in the party and in the government.
What was agreed?
The agreement is self-explanatory and does not need to be explained to anybody. However, a number of commentators have read too much into this agreement; matters it neither contains nor is it meant to achieve. In general terms, the agreement was meant to bring about a reunited SPLM on a new basis. As a democratic party founded on democratic principles and institutions, repackage itself to the people of South Sudan after the devastating civil war its division has wreaked and continue to visit on the young nation, and use its unity to facilitate the peace talks in Ethiopia.
With this understanding, the agreement has made considerable strides towards reconciliation, peace and unity (in that order, I am afraid!) For what has happened in Arusha was that the SPLM groups have agreed to reunite but this unity is conditional on the conclusion of a peace agreement. There is no way you can have a united party that is fighting itself. Hence, the Arusha agreement should facilitate the peace agreement because some of the issues on power sharing that were difficult to resolve for the seniority in the SPLM hierarchy should now be out of the way (see point 9 of the signed agreement). In other words, Arusha should help bring about a peace agreement and the latter shall help effect the unity of the SPLM. That is, of course, if none of the three groups runs away with its share of power in the transitional government and prefers to be on its own.
This agreement has also proved that the issue of leadership continues to be the greatest challenge facing all efforts at the reunification of the SPLM. For instance, point 9 would suggest that the issue of the top leadership has been resolved, but then point 40 tells us that “the structure of the leadership of the reunified SPLM” will have to be worked out by the CCM and the three principals.
The commitment of the parties that signed the agreement to accountability on war crimes is half-hearted at best. It commits the SPLM Leadership that it shall make a public apology for “what happened since December 15th 2013” and not to spearhead the prosecution of those involved in war crimes and atrocities.
Why Now?
That the Arusha agreement was concluded at this time when previous talks have floundered was not by accident. There were circumstances that pushed the parties to rethink their calculations. At the moment the region and international community are frustrated by the lack of progress made in the IGAD mediated Peace Talks and the continuous violation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, at the time when a sizeable population in South Sudan is threatened by war-induced hunger. This was the backdrop of the resolution of the 28th Summit of IGAD Heads of State and Government held in Addis Ababa last November warning the parties either to stop the war or risk punitive sanctions and direct intervention by the region in South Sudan to protect civilians and impose peace and stability. This was a landmark decision as the countries of the region have been hesitant previously to impose sanctions when some countries in the West have taken lead on that, albeit targeting the small fry. The IGAD summit decision was followed by creating a new AU body comprising heads of countries representing the five regions of the continent to assist the IGAD mediation. That was followed by the submission of the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on the Conflict in South Sudan to the AU Commission.
Further afield, there were consultative discussions on the level of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on the Government of South Sudan and the rebels who obstruct peace and cause suffering to the population. What was being debated was not the idea but the nature of the sanctions to be imposed. Indeed, the European Union went ahead and imposed arms embargo on South Sudan. Other countries are under pressure from their public to follow suit. And more are to follow. There has never been a time when a government has been so isolated in the international arena like the current situation of South Sudan. Even the Sudan prior to the CPA would be pleased of itself.
Domestically, indicators point that the economy is on the verge of collapse. The production of oil, which is in essence the only source of government revenue, had dropped to about half its level in December 2013 as a result of the current war, with the better quality and higher priced oil being shut down. This, coupled with the falling oil prices and adverse contracts on using Sudan’s export facilities have seen the coffers of the government drying up. Such a situation will certainly aggravate political risks to a government that will have to slash budgets while battling a rebellion.
However, the biggest worry for the current government is the consequences of the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on the Conflict in South Sudan which shall be considered by the powerful 15-member Peace and Security Council of the AU prior to the AU summit on the 30th instant. That is its sword of Damocles. Many critics have attributed the concessions made by the SPLM-IG Chairman who is the President of the Republic to this factor in order to shake off the forthcoming AU Summit from their backs only to resume business-as-usual tactics thereafter. I hope these critics will be proved wrong and Arusha will stand the test of time.
Conclusion
The Arusha agreement between the three factions of the SPLM has taken many observers by surprise. Therefore, it was received with mixed reactions. The people of South Sudan are skeptical that a party the division of which has caused so much damage to the country can come together again so easily. On the other end of the spectrum there are others, mainly SPLM member, who think that this framework agreement has done it: the party is together again. My own humble reading is that there is no denying the fact that the declaration was a giant step toward the reunification of the SPLM factions, or at least two of them. However, a lot needs to be done for the unity to be realized. The signatories of the document see it as to “expedite the conclusion of the peace Agreement in order to end the war”, not as an end in itself, at least for the moment. Since it is the same three groups that are the current political stakeholders negotiating the Addis Ababa Peace Talks, nothing should prevent that wish of theirs from being realized if the commitment they made in Arusha was in good faith. As such the Arusha declaration should accelerate the conclusion of a Peace Agreement and signing peace should consummate the unity of the SPLM.
The Arusha agreement will be faced with challenges that should not be underrated. Within the SPLM-IG there are elements whose personal interests or ambitions will be affected negatively by the unity of SPLM factions and they may not take this lying down. As for SPLM-IO, its ranks were joined by a considerable number of persons who were not SPLM members and who currently occupy senior positions in the hierarchy of the Movement. They will certainly weigh their stand in terms of what they stand to gain from this agreement. Add to this the field commanders who have all along been orientated to change the regime rather than make peace with it as the last Pagak Conference has clearly demonstrated. The greatest challenge is the one facing the Former Detainees if no peace agreement is concluded in Addis Ababa. Will they proceed with a bilateral deal with the government faction under the current situation? If this be the case, what guarantees will they get in Juba in terms of political freedom and freedom of movement inside and outside the country? Only time will tell.
In the last few days, some statements have been made by senior members of the two warring factions of the SPLM that cast doubt on thei commitments of the other to the Arusha agreement. We hope such statements were either a slip of the tongue or rhetoric meant to appease the extremists in each camp.
It seems the litmus test of the Arusha agreement may come sooner than the parties expected. It is reported that the principals of the two warring parties are scheduled to meet before the IGAD Summit slotted to be held on the 29th instant just before the AU Summit that will be convened the day after. Before the AU Summit it will be clear whether or not the Arusha agreement will serve its intended purpose. The IGAD will then report its conclusion on the matter to the leaders of the continent either to bless a successful conclusion to the IGAD mediation or take drastic measures against the parties. This last possibility will open up a host of scenarios, none of which will be comforting.
The author is the leader of SPLM for Democratic-Change.