Can military intervention be avoided in South Sudan?
By Luka Biong Deng
It seems the IGAD-led mediation may exhaust its diplomatic endeavour if it fails again to convince the warring parties to sign peace agreement in the next round of peace talks. The leaked documents from IGAD suggest that IGAD plus will be working on a final and binding agreement that is expected to be signed by the warring parties by 18th April. In lieu of such agreement, IGAD and international community may use force to intervene militarily in pursuit of humanitarian goals in South Sudan. Assuming that one of the warring parties, particularly the government, rejects the IGAD proposed peace agreement, will military intervention be justifiable?
Military intervention is the last resort after exhausting other humanitarian interventions such as material assistance (humanitarian assistance) and sanctions (non-military actions). Military intervention is justifiable when the nation-state fails to protect the human life, or it is seen committing gross human rights abuses or unable to avert humanitarian crisis such as famine or maintain law and order. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar in their article titled “Can Military Intervention be a “humanitarian intervention”?” assess the effectiveness of military intervention. They argued that the use of military intervention is fraught with enormous problems, never “clean” or “quick” and to making it effective it should be subjected to rigorous preconditions, which have rarely been met in practice.
Do the current conditions in South Sudan warrant military intervention? Since the eruption of crisis in South Sudan in December 2013, more than 2 million people are internally displaced and about half a million people took refugee in the neigbouring countries; making it the most serious displacement crisis since the 1983-2005 civil war. With generous intervention by international community, particularly USA, an imminent famine was averted but a looming famine persists in 2015.
More than 6 million people are food insecure with tens of thousands of children remaining at risk of malnutrition with rates of acute malnutrition reaching over 30 percent that is more than double the officially recognized emergency levels. It is estimated that thousands of innocent lives were brutally lost. UN Human Rights reports on South Sudan painted gross human rights abuses that may tantamount to crimes against humanity. The expected report of AU Commission of Inquiry for South Sudan may expose more atrocities committed since 15th December 2015. The recently released report titled “South Sudan: The Cost of War” estimates the price of failing to bring about lasting peace in South Sudan could be USD158 billion over the next two decades.
With this account of enormous human suffering, one may easily jump to a conclusion that military intervention will be justifiable. Some elites and intellectuals naively support and call for military intervention as a desirable neo-colonialism to put South Sudan on path of peace and stability. Despite the fact that the deteriorating security, economic and humanitarian situation in South Sudan may pose a real security threat to stability in the region, yet military intervention may not be the best option.
The military strength and national sentiment in South Sudan may need to be carefully assessed before any military intervention. With its history of liberation struggle and coupled with newly acquired military hardware, SPLA may be considered as a formidable force in the region despite its recent disintegration. Given the bad relations that developed between the government and UN, any possible military intervention can easily be used to mobilize citizens against international community as it can easily be equated with Sudan.
In comparison with other crises in the continent such as Libya, Sudan, Nigeria and Somalia, the crisis in South Sudan may not be different or worse. Also, what lessons can we learn from recent military interventions in Iraq, Libya, Somalia and Haiti for the possible use of military force in South Sudan. As rightly argued by de Waal and Omaar that the experience from every case in which military intervention has been tried or contemplated affirms missed opportunities and serious blunders.
Another question is how such military intervention will be organized? Military intervention stands better chance of success if it is accepted by all and preferably under the umbrella of UN. If the warring parties failed to conclude peace agreement by 18th April, IGAD cannot initiate military intervention by itself but through AU Peace and Security Council that will forward such decision to UN Security Council to act on it under Chapter VII. Certainly, some members of IGAD plus such as Sudan, South Africa, Rwanda, Chad, Uganda and probably Algeria may not support such military intervention. It seems IGAD and some members of Troika will be ready to avail the necessary forces and funding of the contemplated military intervention in South Sudan.
Even if IGAD plus agree to use military force in South Sudan, the AU Peace and Security Council may be divided and may reject the option of military intervention. Even if the AU Peace and Security Council agree to use force in South Sudan, it will be difficult for the members of the UN Security Council, particularly China and Russia to endorse such intervention. As the contemplated military intervention may not get blessing from all with exception of some members of IGAD and Troika, such intervention may face enormous challenges to succeed.
Another question is whether IGAD and international community have exhausted other peaceful options? UN Security Council has unanimously agreed to use targeted sanctions to encourage the warring parties to conclude peace agreement. Although these sanctions are not effective in two-third of the time, the enforcement of these sanctions is less harmful than military intervention. Rather than resorting to military intervention, there is one-third chance that the implementation of UN targeted sanctions may be effective in encouraging the targets to expedite the conclusion of peace agreement.
IGAD and international community may need to explore the use of the SPLM Reunification Agreement as the basis for encouraging a homegrown peace resolution in South Sudan. The conclusion of Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement came as a result of grassroots Church-led peace initiative in 1999 that resulted in local peace agreement known as “Wunlit Dinka-Nuer Covenant”. This grassroots peace initiative contributed not only to the unification of the SPLM after its split in 1991 but it strengthened the SPLM to negotiate with the Government of Sudan as one united movement and that resulted in the conclusion of CPA. Also the Greater Pibor Peace Agreement is another successful homegrown solution. Although people may differ about the political implications of this agreement, Pibor area is now experiencing relative peace and the church leaders have again provided another example of a homegrown solution. If church leaders and some prominent chiefs are given opportunity, they will be able to convince the warring parties in the spirit of Arusha Agreement, Wunlit Agreement and Greater Pibor Agreement to resolve the outstanding issues in the peace talks.
Definitely the easiest way to avoid the military intervention is for the warring parties to resolve the outstanding issues or to accept the IGAD’s proposed final and binding peace agreement. One expects IGAD to be mindful of the concerns of the warring parties and the overwhelming demand for peace by the people of South Sudan and to come up with an acceptable proposed peace agreement. If the leaked IGAD’s proposed peace agreement were true, then there would be no chance to be accepted by the warring parties, particularly the government.
One hopes that IGAD will propose an agreement that will be accepted by the warring parties without making it a bad peace to the people of South Sudan. The IGAD’s proposed peace agreement will certainly provide a golden opportunity to avoid military intervention in South Sudan. The option of military intervention in South Sudan must be avoided by all means as it will exacerbate the current crisis and it will cause more human suffering as it may obstruct the much-needed humanitarian assistance and possibly may result in more serious blunders and missed opportunities.
The author is the Director of Centre for Peace and Development Studies at University of Juba. He is also a global fellow at the Peace Research Institute Oslo and an associate fellow at the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School. He can be reached on [email protected]