Managing, not solving the crisis
By Abdullah Iskandar, Al-Hayat
August 10, 2004 — Darfur’s crisis is an internal Sudanese issue, not an Arab cause. Minister Mustafa Othman Ismail said this in Cairo, where he attended the emergency meeting of the Arab League Council; called by Khartoum to discuss the crisis’s complications. Before Khartoum asked to Arabicize the crisis, it “internationalized” it through its agreement with the United Nations on a “road map,” an agreement that was imposed by the desire to absorb the effects of the UN Security Council resolution. Prior to that, Khartoum resorted to the African Union to sponsor negotiations with the rebels in Khartoum first, then to send observers for the ceasefire, which was agreed upon during these negotiations. In the meantime, Khartoum hosted officials from the European Union and European countries, and sent delegates to many countries. The central issue is trying to resolve the crisis in Darfur.
In tandem, Khartoum accused the rebels in Darfur of being part of a conspiracy by Hassan Al Turabi’s Party. Hence, it arrested six of its members, their leader included. Then it accused the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by John Garang, of stirring up the conflict. It associated the rebellion with an Eritrean desire in hitting the stability in the country and supporting the rebels in Darfur and the east. After a silent crisis with Libya – also related to Darfur – the rebels were accused of repeated visits to Israel and of coordinating with it.
This means that the theory of Arabicizing, internationalizing, or Africanizing the Darfur conflict, politically and on the field, has been followed by the Sudanese government since the beginning of the crisis. It thought that this is the way to strike the rebels’ credibility, and cover up the ongoing massacres.
When it became clear that this theory involves duties on its behalf, Khartoum returned the crisis to the internal arena. Thus, the crisis would be about sovereignty, and would be treated within an internal Sudanese framework. When the idea of a national conference about it was raised, the effective Sudanese parties were excluded, and other Sudanese forces were accused of conspiring against it. Hence, it gave up this failed idea to begin the phase of seeking a solution from the outside.
Neither the Eritrean nor the Israeli intervention is excluded. Not all the American goals in Sudan are sincere. Sudan’s neighboring countries are trying to benefit from the crisis to serve their interests. All this is true.
On the internal Sudanese level, there are opposing forces that would not lose sleep over the authority finding itself in crisis. They might even deepen crises until they exhaust the authority. These are not secret positions. They are public.
It is unlikely for contradictions and paradoxes in the official Sudanese stance to be a misunderstanding of the crisis or inability of treating its reasons. What happened in the past weeks indicates that the government’s goal is managing the crisis with whatever tools are available. It is important to keep taking action, regardless of the nature of the actions themselves. However, what is dangerous in this policy is that the lives of millions hang in the balance, which Khartoum did not realize that it is difficult to ignore. Therefore, taking advantage of feelings of solidarity, support, and warning from foreign occupation, to maintain the principles of managing the crisis, cannot continue to serve Khartoum’s interests.