Will IGAD Plus deadline have the same fate of IGAD deadlines?

By Luka Biong Deng

The IGAD Plus agreed in its first meeting on a document titled “Proposed Compromise Peace Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan” and resolved to share it with the warring parties and other stakeholders as the basis for the next round of peace talks. Besides this document, IGAD Plus came up with a clear timetable to conclude these talks with peace agreement to be signed on 17th August 2015. The question is whether this new deadline of IGAD Plus will have the same fate of the previous deadlines set by IGAD?

The possibility for concluding peace deal by 17th August will largely depend on the reaction of various stakeholders and particularly the warring parties to the proposed agreement. As the warring parties are still studying the proposed agreement, no party rejected the entire document but only raised concerns in some provisions of the proposed agreement. The findings of the recent perception survey conducted by the Centre for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS) at the University of Juba and public reaction survey conducted by Community Empowerment and Progress Organization (CEPO) show the overwhelming support to the proposed peace agreement but with some concerns about certain aspects of the proposed agreement.

Although one is not aware of how IGAD Plus has come up with the proposed agreement, there is no doubt that this proposed document is largely informed by the previous peace talks mediated by IGAD and importantly by series of serious consultations conducted by IGAD Plus with various stakeholders, particularly the warring parties. One suspects that the warring parties may have committed themselves either in writing or verbally during the consultations of IGAD Plus to compromise on some of the contentious issues that derailed the previous peace talks.

Generally the proposed agreement has some important aspects that are easily overshadowed by its weaknesses. There is no doubt that the document has improved a lot in terms of quality, substance and presentation of the issues in a more coherent way than the previous proposals. The various institutional and policy reforms provided in the document, particularly in economic sector, security sector, transitional justice, humanitarian sector and governance sector provide sound basis for addressing the root causes of the current conflict. Other positive aspects of the document include the recognition of the modern civil societies forces such as youth, women and academia in the implementation of the proposed peace agreement.

The warring parties have raised concerns on some issues related to power-sharing and security arrangements and less on the proposed policy and institutional reforms. While SPLM-IO welcomes the demilitarization of Juba, the Government refuses such arrangement as well as the power-sharing arrangements in the three states of the Greater Upper Nile largely on the basis of sovereignty.

Given the high level of mistrust between the warring parties, the possible compromise on these contentious issues can objectively be informed and guided by the views and opinions of the other stakeholders and views of people of South Sudan. The public event that was organized by the Centre in collaboration with CEPO at University of Juba was aimed to allow the other stakeholders to share their views and opinions on the proposed agreement. One of the findings of the perception survey conducted by the Centre to gauge the reaction of its students to the proposed agreement shows that about 54% agree that the warring parties should reach peace at any cost with almost 50% agreeing to conclude peace talks by 17th August as suggested by IGAD Plus. This finding underscores the importance of compromise and the urgent need to conclude peace agreement now rather than later. This concurs with the call by South Sudan Churches for the signing of the proposed peace agreement by 17th August.

Concerning power-sharing arrangements, the survey shows more respondents (52%) favour national arrangements while about 60% disagree with the power-sharing arrangements in the three states of Greater Upper Nile region. Interesting the respondents are divided over the exclusion of other seven (7) states from power sharing arrangements. Slightly more than 60% of respondents agree with the position of incumbent president, incumbent vice president and the newly created position of the first vice president and with about 68% agree with first vice president to deputize and act on behalf of the President in his absence in chairing councils of ministers, national defence, and national security.

Slightly more than 60% of respondents agree with additional 68 new members of parliament and their allocation as well as overwhelming majority of two-third of respondents agreeing with the provision that the speaker of the parliament to come from the states of the Greater Equatoria Region. Surprisingly, slightly more than 63% of the respondents agree with demilitarization of Juba and nearly about 60% agreeing with keeping the two forces of the warring parties separate during the 18-month period. Of great interest, overwhelming majority of respondents (72%) agree with establishment of an independent hybrid court and slightly more than two-third of the respondents agreeing with federal system of government.

The respondents of this survey came from the ten states of South Sudan with majority from the three states of the Greater Equatoria Region (42%). Given the majority of respondents are from the Greater Equatoria Region, the survey may provide balanced views. Also as the respondents are graduates, middle age (66%), women (13%), middle income (53%), civil servants (53%), from organized forces (17%) and from private sector (23%), the findings of survey may mirror the general feelings of the larger community of South Sudan.

One concern in the proposed agreement is that it has failed to recognize the Arusha Agreement as that could help in resolving some of the contentious issues related to power-sharing and security arrangements. Despite the progress in the implementation of Arusha Agreement, IGAD Plus has failed to recognize the synergy and complementarity between Arusha and Addis peace processes. By recognizing the Arusha Agreement, IGAD Plus could have treated SPLM as one entity in the proposed power-sharing arrangements at national level and three states of Greater Upper Nile Region as well as resolving the issue o powers of the proposed position of first vice president.

Also, there is a genuine concern that the proposed demilitarization of Juba as capital and seat of the government may contravene with the sovereignty of state as the provision of public safety and security is one of the core functions of any sovereign state. The issue of security and public safety has been resolved and agreed upon in Arusha Agreement as such task has been designated to the Transitional Government of National Unity supported by IGAD, AU and international community. Also the proposed agreement recognizes the presence of two forces but not “armies” of the warring and it sets a detailed process of how to integrate the two forces within 18 months. The discussion should be about the period rather than the two forces as these forces will continue to be present in the Greater Upper Nile Region even when the peace agreement is concluded. Given the huge size of SPLA that existed before the eruption of the conflict in 2013, the parties should agree in principle to recognize all soldiers and officers SPLA who were present before the conflict as the starting point for the proposed integration and security sector reform.

With increased human suffering that is exacerbated by rapidly deteriorating economic conditions and coupled with the mounting demand by people of South Sudan for peace at any cost as well as the increasing regional and international pressure, the warring parties have the option of concluding peace by 17th August or to continue with war. For the people of South Sudan continuing with war is not an option and the warring parties will be left with no any other option but to achieve any peace by 17th August. Despite some concerns, the proposed peace agreement provides a good basis for achieving positive peace since it adequately addresses the root causes of the current conflict with detailed policy and institutional reforms. As rightly stated by Archbishop Loro that the IGAD-Plus peace proposal may not be perfect but it is better than dragging on with the war.

With the proposed peace agreement one is optimistic that peace may be concluded by 17th August. The deadline set by IGAD Plus may not face the same fate of previous deadlines set by IGAD as the consequences for not signing peace agreement will be extremely serious. If peace is not signed, the IGAD Plus that represents the AU and international community may act collectively against those seen to be obstructing the conclusion of peace agreement on 17th August. This is well reflected in strong-worded comment made by President Obama that “If they (leaders of the warring parties) miss that target (17th August) then I think it is going to be necessary for us to move forward with a different plan, and recognize that those leaders are incapable of creating the peace that is required”. What remains to be seen is what that different plan will mean?

Also if peace is not signed, the people of South Sudan should prepare themselves for hard times ahead with more suffering and with the sovereignty of their state becoming increasingly challenged. South Sudan will be more isolated regionally and internationally with some of its leaders facing targeted sanctions and some may even be indicted upon the release of the report of the AU Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan. The people of South Sudan may need to go to the drawing board if peace is not concluded and look for their own homegrown solutions through the church leaders who command high moral ground and respect of the people of South Sudan.

The author is the Director of Centre for Peace and Development Studies, University of Juba, Global Fellow at Peace Research Institute Oslo and Associate Fellow at Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School. He is reachable at [email protected] or [email protected]