Escalating authority stall two weeks off the Council’s decision
By Mahgoub El-Tigani
August 15, 2004 — Two weeks already passed of the Security Council’s allowable time for the Sudan Government to disarm the Janjaweed militias as a top priority to be able to return the DarFur war-affected people safely to their homes with well-deserved human rights provisions and legal compensation besides the necessary task of taking to fair trials all of the accused Jangaweed, state managers or army leaders who committed heinous crimes against humanity in DarFur.
Deliberately ignoring the vital role of the Sudanese democratic opposition and civil society groups to end the crisis, the government hurried in these past weeks to: 1) escalate security operations inside DarFur (see Amnesty International’s latest release on this issue), as well as continuous arrests and detention of opposition activities, including the humanitarian DarFur Call Group in Khartoum (see the SHRO-Cairo press release on August 8, 2004); 2) exaggerate media programs on the government’s judicial, security, and administrative measures to control the Jangaweed; 3) escalate ideological attacks on the West as interest groups aggressively planning to attack the Islamic Republic of Sudan “to possess the country’s wealth”; 4) strongly appeal for political support of the Arab League; and 5) show technical allegiance to the Security Council via foreign affairs’ ascertainment of the government’s cooperation with the United Nations and the African Union.
The government’s strategies, however, proved redundant for the most part. The security situation worsened with more attacks by the Jangaweed on many peaceful villages. The insistence of the government on expanding police operations by Jangaweed police converts and the other ill-reputed government troops without consideration to the serious lacking of confidence between the government and the victimized people of DarFur virtually blocked the government’s plan to control the situation by any swift security plan. Moreover, the failure of the peace negotiations with the Sudan Liberation Army and Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, and the continuous government’s show of power in the streets of Khartoum and DarFur have already poisoned the climates of peace with the war-mongering attitudes of the ruling regime.
What is worst is the government’s iron-clad determination to suppress the civil society endeavors to facilitate humanitarian relief to DarFur in the absence of clear relief programs by the government or even the minimum standards of peaceful dialogue between supporters of the DarFur and the transgressing regime. Related to this, the president’s pledge to convene a national conference for all concerned parties in the DarFur’s Crisis simply turned to a full-fledged security offensive versus the civilian population at large in the region of DarFur.
The government’s authority stall is worsening off by a media campaign that is consistently thrown into disarray by the different speakers of the state managers. Of these, Dr. Rabi’, the director of the Sudan News Agency, was the first to persistently repeat that “90 percent of the crisis is under control.” Less appreciative of this falseness was Mr. Zahawi’s reiterated statements in the Jazeera T.V. that “the government is prepared to control the security situation.” Contradictory to these confirmations was Mustafa Isma’il’s and his foreign ministry’s crew who filled the western media with appeals to prolong the Security Council’s one month’s time for the government “cannot disarm the Jangaweed and return home the displaced population in only one month.” At this point, the foreign affairs under secretary claimed “it might take 3months or 30 years to disarm the militias.”
More steeply in contradiction with this media chaos is the government’s glorification of the prompt judicial, security, and administrative measures thus far enforced to help control the Jangaweed. Regrettably, the South DarFur Judiciary apparently collaborated in political terms with the Khartoum administration as the DarFur Chief Judge rushed to approve dreadful physical penalties on “100 or more members of the jangaweed militias” with death penalties and cross-amputations. The trials of these citizens were not publicly made.
On August 7, 2004, the state minister of the interior, Mr. Ahmed Haroun, mentioned to the Egypt T.V. that “the Jangaweed should be called Matareed (outlaws).” The minister then announced “the International [powers] will not allow us to develop internally.” The ideological attacks on the West by state managers further mirrored the government’s full protection of the Jangaweed leader Hilal, according to a public announcement by the Vice President ‘Ali Uthman Taha in the BBC (August 9, 2004). The Vice President rejected the idea of arresting the Janjaweeed leader “in observance of the international human rights.” With this presidential decision, Mr. Taha sent a clear message to the whole world his government’s is irrevocably determined to collaborate with the Jangaweed, whatever the cost might be.
The Sudan Government’s ideological attacks on the West as powers “aggressively planning to attack the Islamic Republic of Sudan,” according to flat announcements by the President several times these past weeks signaled the government’s strategy to restrict the Sudanese press from free dissemination of the DarFur’s Crisis about the Western powers, especially the United States and Great Britain, that led the world grave concerns with the state-escalated catastrophe of DarFur. Ironically, the government failed to pursue the presidency pledges “to stop the suffering of people with a national peaceful conference in DarFur among other workable measures.” Only terrorizing shows by the security and army troops were, nonetheless, implemented in the Khartoum streets as well as DarFur.
The government’s strategies included a strong appeal for political support from the Arab League. The latter did not hesitate to convene a high level meeting of the Arab ministers for foreign affairs with the active presence of the African Union and the United Nations representatives. As expected, however, the AL show of solidarity with the government was strongly rejected by the DarFur rebel groups “being a partisan move” that would not help the peace process in the war-torn region.
In general, the AL decisions were supportive of peace. Ironically, the AL Secretary General and his assistants affirmed full responsibility of the government in the DarFur’s Crisis. This policy stand overlapped with the firm position of the United Nations and the African Union to further frustrate the government’s strategy. The AL, furthermore, failed to provide any substantive support to DarFur at the time the Western powers pumped millions of dollars to alleviate the suffering of the displaced population.
The Sudan Government’s technical allegiance to the Security Council has been repeatedly emphasized via the foreign affairs’ intention to cooperate with the United Nations and the African Union. This announced cooperation culminated in a plan of action by the minister of foreign affairs to help process humanitarian relief as well as easy access for relief agencies to the affected regions. This technical cooperation, however, remains to be seen within the two upcoming weeks of the Council’s decision. Unfortunately, the government already wasted precious time beautifying its face, pursuing political support from the AL, offending the International Will by rallying government demonstrations against the Council’s decision, and wrongfully alienating the bulk of the Sudanese political constituencies and civil society groups.
The failure of the Sudan Government to rally national support to a Program of Action to comply with the Council’s decision is further worsened by the insistence of the government/party speakers to water down the humanitarian extent of the situation or to deflect attention from the NIF full responsibility of the Crisis. In his interview with the Egypt T.V., the state minister of interior Mr. Ahmed Haroun asserted that “the [DarFur] crisis is due to the failure of governments, the ambition of local politicians, and the meager development.”
The next day (Jazeera T.V., Sunday August 8), the NIF scholar Dr. al-Tayeb Zain al-‘Abdin admitted the government mistakes in DarFur. Still: “the government is opening up participation for all opposition groups in the country to share the political power based on the six peace agreements of Naivasha.” Dr. Zain al-‘Abdin, however, ignored the fact that of all peace players in the Sudanese arena, the NIF ruling regime consistently refused to convene an all-Sudanese democratic conference to do away with the Sudan’s Crisis.
The government’s hostile stance against the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which includes with many political parties and trades unions the SPLA, the SLA, JEM, and the Eastern Sudan opposition armed forces of the al-Fatah, the Beja Congress, and the Free Lions is one major factor inhibiting the Naivasha Peace Protocols and threatening renewed civil war all over the country, especially that government militias have been repeatedly reported transgressing the peaceful villages of the Nuer, the Shulluk, and Equatoria.
The remaining weeks would most likely witness same strategies/activities by a government unwilling to make peace with its own people. Minutes before this analysis is posted, the Nile Wali [governor] reiterated his government’s accusations to the democratic opposition of “conspiring against the Homeland” in correspondence with “foreign powers.” In the meantime, the Eastern Sudan opposition forces (August 13, 2004) issued a clear statement lending unwavering support to the NDA/Government Jeddah Framework (which calls for joint democratic national conference to solve the Sudan’s Crisis), and openly negating the government’s “partisan solution.” The Eastern Sudan opposition forces communiqué is firmly grounded on the NDA Leadership Council (Asmara, July 2004), which approved the Naivasha Protocols and opted for peaceful negotiation with the government to end the Crisis.
The Sudan Government’s chaotic performance earned her open criticisms by the Sudanese people as well as the international community, including the government’s opposition ally, the Umma Party whose leader publicly criticized the Khartoum’s handling of the DarFur’s Crisis.
Thrown into disarray, would the Sudan Government spend the remaining 2 weeks of the Council’s designated time to fail the international agenda as it continues to polarize more armed conflicts with the opposition, harassing the populace with security repression and army shows, begging in vain for Arab support, and recklessly challenging the western powers and the International Community, or would a decent national political structure urgently assumes the political power to save Sudan the Council’s 2-weeks-away and the other aftermath sanctions?
*Member of Sudanese Writers’ Union (in exile) and the president of Sudan Human Rights Organization Cairo-Branch.