AUPSC Toothless! The solution’s in the hands of the Sudanese!
By Elwathig Kameir
1. The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), at its 539th meeting, on 25 August 2015, issued a communique adopting a number of resolutions on the activities of the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) on Sudan and South Sudan. Following the report and briefing of the Panel’s Chairman, former President Thabo Mbeki, on the current efforts to engage with the Government of the Republic of Sudan, political parties and the armed movements, in support of the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the establishment of democracy in Sudan. It is worth mentioning that communique 539, does not only address the Sudanese conflict, and subsequent negotiations with the armed movements and inclusive national dialogue, but also embodies other tasks in the mandate of President Mbeki, namely; a) addressing the crisis in Darfur, and b) resolving the outstanding issues between Sudan and South Sudan.
2. The decisions of the AUPSC meeting have precipitated conflicting interpretations and views in public opinion, and a split in the positions of the opposition forces, both civil and military, regarding the expected outcomes, and the consequent repercussions, of these decisions. Those who rejoiced in the Communique, are hopeful that it would push the government towards adopting a “comprehensive solution”, an objective that the opposition forces have always sought, while, others do not see anything new, or added value, in the decisions of the AUPSC, and rather of the opinion that the Council, in the end, is just a paper tiger. On the other hand, the ruling party, together with its allies from the “satellite” parties, think that the dialogue has been hijacked by the AUPSC. Thus, an opposition spokesperson in the 7 +7 Dialogue Mechanism claimed that Communique 539 is an unacceptable interference of the African Council, and the African Union, in the internal Sudanese dialogue.
3. I do not intend, in this modest contribution, to argue with either of the perpetrators of these divergent views, which are mostly partisan and reflective of predetermined positions of the various political forces. My objective is, rather, to provide an objective reading of the AUPSC’s decisions, supported by documentary evidence, and to explore and analyse these decisions and their impact on the fate of the negotiations with the armed movements, and Sudan National Dialogue, including the role of the AUHIP, and its chairman President Thabo Mbeki. In my opinion, it remains imperative that the impact of the AUPSC’s Communique 539, or the one preceding it (456), should not be overestimated, as long as the Council does not have the powers or the resources to impose its decisions on states and governments, by virtue of its mandate. The African mediator, therefore, will not be able to succeed in his mission, without the support and backup of all the Sudanese stakeholders.
4. The present article, will be followed by a series of, important, papers. The first one, will explore deeply the impediments and obstacles that stand in the way of both negotiations and national dialogue. The second paper will review the efforts of the AUHIP in assisting the conflicting parties to reach peaceful solutions, which would steer the country on the path to stability and democratization. Specifically, the Chairman of the Panel has put forward a proposal in this regard to the parties to the conflict, especially the government and the SPLM-North. Eventually surmounting the Sudan’s complex multi-crises, however, lies in the hands of the Sudanese themselves, not in Mbeki’s.
5. These pieces have already been successively published at a time when the Sudanese political forces, who have accepted the President’s invitation to participate in the Sudan national dialogue, which kicked-off on 10 October are meeting. I trust that the arguments I have presented in these articles will contribute to enriching the dialogue, on the one hand, and persuade the opponents to participation, especially the armed movements, to positively respond to the comprehensive plan, put forward by the Chairman of the AUHIP, to the two parties to the conflict.
Communique 539: Misrepresented
1. The content of the said Communique is not very different from that of the previous AUPSC Communique 456, 12 September, 2014, which had adopted a number of steps in view of ensuring harmonized and focused action by the AUHIP, in support of the efforts of the Sudanese stakeholders, to address the issues confronting their country. These steps are namely:
i. Negotiations on cessation of hostilities, immediately leading to a comprehensive security arrangements agreement, should resume at the earliest opportunity, under the auspices of the AUHIP and in collaboration and coordination with the JSR/JCM;
ii. Negotiations on the cessation of hostilities for the Two Areas and for Darfur should be conducted (though separately) in a synchronized manner;
iii. A meeting of the Sudanese parties to discuss relevant process issues, in order to pave the way for the National Dialogue should be held at the AU Headquarters under the facilitation of the AUHIP;
iv. Encouraging the Government to expedite its efforts towards implementing the agreed confidence-building measures.
2. Thus, Communique 539, has not added anything new, a part from reinforcing the previous decisions of the AUPSC, in particular Communique 456, while taking into account developments pertaining to the process of national dialogue, and diplomatically chiding (a slap on the wrist) the government on the slowness of the process.
i. The Communique’s rebuke of the government, though strongly worded as it appears, is considered by some opposition forces as testament to the government’s weak diplomatic efforts, and its ineffective political and diplomatic presence. However, the language of the AUPSC’s reproach of the government is mired in sweeping statements, along the lines of:
• Notes (The Council) with deep disappointment and concern that despite the decisions and encouragement of Council, the more than six years of unparalleled efforts of the AUHIP, as well as the support offered by the international community, the fundamental challenges of the Sudanese nation remain unresolved and insufficient progress has been made in the implementation of the Roadmap for the National Dialogue and in the efforts to end Sudan’s long-running conflicts;
• Reiterates the importance for the region and the Continent of the resolution of the crisis of Sudan, and the particular responsibility the Government of Sudan bears for taking the lead in ensuring a credible and genuinely all-inclusive National Dialogue and democratic transformation of the country;
• Strongly urges the Sudanese parties, especially the Government of Sudan, to demonstrate the necessary leadership and recommitment to processes necessary for achieving the goal of realizing the democratic transformation of Sudan;
• Calls upon the Government of Sudan to desist from any actions that would undermine confidence in the process or jeopardize the possibility of holding a credible and all-inclusive National Dialogue within Sudan;
ii. However, in return, the Council “reiterates its support for the National Dialogue announced by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir in January 2014”. The Council notes that the objectives of the National Dialogue are consistent with the principles espoused in the AUPD Report;
iii. The Communique has unnecessarily made repeated references to the national dialogue,
• The Council “affirms the principle adopted by the Sudanese parties that the National Dialogue should be an all-inclusive Sudanese process intended to address and resolve the longstanding challenges faced by the Sudanese nation and based on the agenda of peace and national unity, economy, basic rights and freedoms, national identity, constitutional review and governance and international relations”;
• Observes (The Council) that the National Dialogue was conceived as an all-inclusive exercise, which would command the confidence of all the Sudanese people. Council reiterates the necessity for an adequate and all-inclusive preparation of the dialogue process, as envisaged in the 5 September 2014 Agreement on the National Dialogue and Constitutional Process signed by the Sudanese stakeholders and endorsed by Council;
• Notes (The Council) the statement made by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir that the Government of Sudan is ready to observe a two-month ceasefire in order to create the necessary confidence for all stakeholders, including representatives of the armed movements, to join the National Dialogue process, and further notes the commitment made by President al-Bashir to grant amnesty to members of the armed movements to enable them to attend the National Dialogue in safety;
• Requests (The Council) the AUHIP to continue its engagement with the Government of Sudan and the other Sudanese stakeholders in support of their efforts to realize an all-inclusive, transparent and credible National Dialogue;
• Reaffirms (The Council) its determination to assist all the Sudanese parties with regard to the National Dialogue and the search for peace in Sudan, with a view to taking such additional decisions and actions as may be necessary to help ensure that the goal of the democratic transformation of Sudan is not derailed, and in particular that an all-inclusive and credible Sudanese National Dialogue is organized;
• Requests the AUHIP to report to Council, within 90 days of this decision, on the re-engagement of the Sudanese stakeholders with the processes towards an all-inclusive and credible National Dialogue as envisaged in the Roadmap and the necessary efforts for bringing to an end the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas.
iv. Confirmation of the steps (in I above), adopted by the Council in its Communique No. 456, to address the crisis in Sudan which, appears in more than one paragraph in the Communique 12, 13.16, and 20, I, IV, V.
v. Commitment to comply with the same approach in dealing with the armed conflict in South Kordofan and Darfur, Blue Nile, and thus, the Council:
a) Acknowledges the commitment and readiness of the armed movements to continue their engagement with the Government of Sudan to negotiate an end to the armed conflicts in Sudan;
b) Commends the tireless efforts of the AUHIP in seeking to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Two Areas between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), which is a manifestation of the Sudanese crisis and, in this regard, notes that, as reflected in the draft Framework Agreement of December 2014, the negotiations have already yielded substantial consensus capable of forming the basis for the resolution of that conflict;
c) Further commends the efforts of the AUHIP and the JSR to facilitate negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the Darfur armed movements, within the context of the agreed one-process-two-track approach to end all violent conflicts in Sudan; (This means commitment to negotiate on basis of the negotiations’ frames of reference and mechanisms, between the government and the SPLM-North (The AUHIP), on the one hand, and the government and the Darfur movements (Doha document), on the other hand. The Darfurian movements, and many observers, have misconstrued reference to these “synchronized” to mean the integration of the two processes in one forum. This is an incorrect interpretation.
The AU Peace and Security Council: Toothless
1. As with the Council’s Communique 456, I see Communique 539 to be, equally, problematic in and of itself. The APSC has no jurisdiction or power over the Government of Sudan, or any other government for that matter, to ensure compliance with the Council’s communique. Apparently, its power lies only in persuasion! Indeed, the Sudan government itself is a full-fledged member of the APSC, which in essence is a states’ club that is inclined to side with governments rather than with political oppositions and rebels.
2. I tend to believe that the APSC wouldn’t have come out with its roadmap, inclined towards a comprehensive approach, had the President not initiated the national dialogue. Indeed, the blessing of the regional and international community for the “Leap” initiative tipped off both President Mbeki, and his employer: the Council, to articulate a plan (the Communique 456) that could be palatable to the regime, while appealing to the opposition forces, both military and civil.
3. Indeed, while the Communique 456 encourages the Government to initiate the implementation of the confidence-building steps, it does not consider these measures as preconditions for the national dialogue, as is misconstrued by many quarters. However, the matter was succinctly clarified by the Chair of the AUHIP himself, in a written letter addressed to all signatories of the Addis Ababa Roadmap, on 4 December 2014, underlining that “the 12 September, 2014 Communique of the AU-PSC did not say or require that the “confidence-building” measures it mentioned in paragraph 15 are or should be prerequisites for the holding of the National Dialogue”.
4. Thus, the Council has to first guarantee the Government’s green light before moving these steps forward on the ground. Undoubtedly, it is the government alone that has the power and authority to take the appropriate decisions and implement the necessary procedures and prerequisites for holding an all-inclusive and transparent national dialogue.
5. Therefore, the expectation of some political forces that the 90 days’ time-limit, defined by Communique 539, is a warning to the government, with which it would be forced to comply , thus implementing the council’s decisions, is not supported by any evidence. Indeed, this is not the first decision issued by the AUPSC, with a specified timeframe, which has not been adhered to by the government, while the Council remained arms-crossed. Thus, even the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement (Nafie-Malik), dating from June 28, 2011, and approved by the UN Security Council resolution 2046, set the same deadline (3 months) to reach a final agreement, but to no avail. Equally, I am convinced that it is politically unrealistic to think that the forthcoming report of the AUHIP’s Chairman will push the AUPSC to escalate the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Moreover, the African Council disappointed the expectations of some opposition forces, by neither granting the AUHIP, and its Chairman, new powers or terms of reference, nor extending the current mandate of the panel, both of which were actions to which these forces aspired.
6. I am inclined to believe that the apparent tension in the relationship between the government and the AUPSC, in the wake of the recent Communique (539), will not last long, especially as the ruling regime is aware that the African Union remains its regional basis of support, and the hostility with the organization is a loophole through which external forces will intervene. Ironically, the Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, landed in Khartoum on a cordial visit, marked by mutual expressions of friendliness, following decades of antagonism and enmity. In addition, he asked President al-Bashir to mediate between him and Riek Machar, after an invitation from the Presidency for the latter to attend, a development, undoubtedly sending non-reassuring signals, and unpromising news, to the leaders of the armed and political opposition in Kampala. Furthermore, Museveni will be the Chairman of the AUPSC, for the next month-term.
7. However, even if the matter reached the UNSC, the latter would be most unlikely to take a decision for imposing the resolutions of the AUPSC on the government. The ruling regime has allies in the UNSC who have a veto power, while the opposition, both civil and military, lack such support, other than pleading with the United States and Europe to back up their demands. Again, the government took pre-emptive moves, to forestall the probability of any hostile resolution, thus came the prolonged visit of the President to China, followed by the Foreign Minister’s visit to Russia. In my opinion, the report of the Chairman of the AUHIP to the AUPSC, will be a mere periodic follow-up report. Equally, the UNSC will adopt the report of the African Council, without any substantial additions, although it is expected that the US may propose some changes, which I doubt will be accepted and/or endorsed. The tension occurring in the relationship between the government and the AUHIP will gradually be bypassed, as President Mbeki strongly needs to succeed in his mandate and mission, and is personally omitted to achieving peace in the country.
How should Mbeki Proceed?
1. If the employer of Mbeki is toothless, in facing the government, what would the former President of South Africa be able to do in order to succeed in carrying out his mandate of assisting the Sudanese in peacefully resolving the conflict, and laying the foundations of a democratic system? Without contemplating an answer to this question, the AUPSC commended, in Communique 539, the efforts of Mbeki in this regard, it thus “reiterates its endorsement of the work of the AUHIP to ensure harmonized and focused action in support of the efforts of the Sudanese stakeholders to address the challenges confronting their country, including through support for negotiations to end the conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas, and the efforts to organize a credible National Dialogue”.
2. President Mbeki has been widely criticized, especially in the opposition circles, to the extent of resentment of some individuals, for being responsible for the stalled negotiations, and that the judgment of the former President of South Africa has always been biased in favor of the government. However, the fact remains that, if we objectively undertook a substantive review of Mbeki’s unrelenting efforts, since the formation of the AUHIP in July 2008, we would undoubtedly agree that the African mediator has done everything in his power to bridge the rift between the negotiating parties, offering many specific proposals for resolving the conflict. He made it clear to the parties that the reasons for the stalled negotiations, on the one hand, and the stumbling of the national dialogue, on the other hand, in essence, lie in the political will of the government and the ruling party, and all Sudanese political forces, albeit to varying degrees. Thus, the solution to the Sudanese conflict, in all its attributes and forms of manifestation, remains in the hands of the Sudanese parties themselves. Thabo Mbeki is a mediator and facilitator for reaching this solution. This, was precisely his reaction, saying: “The problem is not me .. I’m just an intermediary, the problem lies in you Sudanese“, in response to a question by a journalist in which he implied that the failure in achieving any breakthrough in the peace negotiations on the Two Regions, despite the prolonged mandate, is Mbeki’s, in a press conference for an AUPSC’s delegation in Khartoum (Al-Youmaltali, 29 August 2015). This is what has been re-replicated in all previous communiques of the Council regarding the Sudanese conflict, using the same mundane expressions such as: urges, supports, reminds, commends, reiterates, notes, recalls, and expresses. On the other hand, how many resolutions of the UNSC, strongly worded and replete with harsh condemnation phrases, to which the government turned a deaf ear. What has the world security body done?
Conclusion
I have attempted in this contribution to show that the AUPSC is toothless, with regard to the challenge of implementing its decisions. The Council remains a club of states and governments. In fact, there are real obstacles to both the processes of negotiations, with the armed movements, and the inclusive national dialogue, which are the creation of our own political forces, elites, and governments, and of which President Mbeki is innocent. What are these obstacles? The next article provides the answer to this question!
Dr. Elwathig Kameir is a former university professor of Sociology and consultant with numerous regional and international organizations. He is reachable at [email protected].